In re Interest of Luis D. , 29 Neb. Ct. App. 495 ( 2021 )


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    IN RE INTEREST OF LUIS D.
    Cite as 
    29 Neb. App. 495
    In re Interest of Luis D., a child
    under 18 years of age.
    State of Nebraska, appellant,
    v. Luis D., appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed February 9, 2021.   No. A-20-727.
    1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of
    law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
    2. Criminal Law: Courts: Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. A juvenile fit-
    ting into the categories described in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.01
    (1) and
    (2) (Reissue 2016) must always be commenced in the juvenile court;
    however, proceedings initiated under § 43-246.01(2) are subject to
    transfer to the county or district court for further proceedings under the
    criminal code.
    3. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. Proceedings fitting under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.01
    (1) (Reissue 2016) must always be filed via a juvenile
    petition and must always proceed to completion in the juvenile court.
    4. Courts: Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. Actions involving juveniles fit-
    ting into categories under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.01
    (3) (Reissue 2016)
    may be initiated either in the juvenile court or in the county or district
    court and may be transferred as provided in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-274
    (Supp. 2019).
    5. Statutes. A court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute,
    and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected
    as superfluous or meaningless; it is not within the province of a court to
    read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out of a statute.
    6. Criminal Law: Prosecuting Attorneys: Courts: Juvenile Courts:
    Jurisdiction: Legislature. A city or county attorney has authority to
    seek a transfer to the criminal court when both the juvenile court and
    the criminal court have statutory jurisdiction; the county court and dis-
    trict court have statutory jurisdiction over criminal matters, except in
    those instances where the Legislature has preserved such matters to the
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    IN RE INTEREST OF LUIS D.
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    exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court, such as in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.01
    (1) (Reissue 2016).
    7. Statutes: Judicial Construction: Legislature: Intent: Presumptions.
    Where a statute has been judicially construed and that construction has
    not evoked an amendment, it will be presumed that the Legislature has
    acquiesced in the court’s determination of the Legislature’s intent.
    Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Sarpy County:
    Lawrence D. Gendler, Judge. Reversed and remanded for
    further proceedings.
    Andrew T. Erickson, Deputy Sarpy County Attorney, for
    appellant.
    Colleen Dostal, Deputy Sarpy County Public Defender, for
    appellee.
    Moore, Bishop, and Welch, Judges.
    Bishop, Judge.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    A petition was filed in the separate juvenile court of Sarpy
    County against the appellee, Luis D., alleging three Class I
    misdemeanor offenses. At the time of the incidents which
    led to the charges, Luis was 17 years old and approximately
    a month away from turning 18. The State filed a motion to
    transfer the proceedings from the juvenile court to the county
    or district court. The juvenile court denied the transfer based
    on its interpretation of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.01
    (2) (Reissue
    2016), concluding that only the juvenile court had jurisdic-
    tion over a juvenile who was age 16 or 17 at the time of an
    alleged misdemeanor offense. The State appeals. We reverse,
    and remand for further proceedings.
    II. BACKGROUND
    A “Juvenile Petition” was filed in the juvenile court on
    August 27, 2020, alleging that on August 11, Luis commit-
    ted three Class I misdemeanor offenses: third degree domestic
    assault, obstructing a peace officer, and resisting arrest. On
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    September 2, the State filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction
    to the county court or district court, alleging that the factors
    outlined in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-276
    (1) (Supp. 2019) weighed
    in favor of transferring the case from the juvenile court.
    On September 10, 2020, a hearing took place on the motion
    to transfer. At the outset of the hearing, the juvenile court indi-
    cated that it had talked with counsel “as to the issue of whether
    or not this [c]ourt has exclusive original jurisdiction, meaning
    this case cannot be transferred to adult court[,]” and that it
    would not decide the matter that day so that the attorneys could
    “submit something in writing.” The court then proceeded with
    the receipt of evidence. Exhibit 1 (police reports) and exhibit 2
    (“JUSTICE printout” reflecting criminal history) were received
    without objection. A witness from the Sarpy County juvenile
    probation office testified.
    A further hearing took place on October 5, 2020, at which
    time the juvenile court received exhibit 3 (State’s written argu-
    ment) and exhibit 4 (Luis’ counsel’s written argument) related
    to the juvenile court’s concern about authority to transfer under
    § 43-246.01. The juvenile court entered an order that same day
    concluding that § 43-246.01 gave it “exclusive original juris-
    diction as to any juvenile who was 16 or 17 years of age at the
    time of the alleged offense pursuant to Sec. 43-246.01(2) and,
    by virtue of such, the Motion to Transfer is denied.” The State
    timely filed an appeal the next day.
    III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    The State failed to include a separate assignments of error
    section in its brief, but a heading in the argument section of its
    brief contends, restated, that the juvenile court erred in denying
    its motion to transfer based upon the court’s interpretation of
    § 43-246.01(2).
    In order to be considered by an appellate court, an alleged
    error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued
    in the brief of the party asserting the error. U.S. Pipeline v.
    Northern Natural Gas Co., 
    303 Neb. 444
    , 
    930 N.W.2d 460
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    (2019). See, also, Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(D)(1)(e) (rev.
    2014) (requirements for assignments of error section in brief
    of appellant; consideration of case is limited to errors assigned
    and discussed). Headings in the argument section of a brief do
    not satisfy the requirements of § 2-109(D)(1). D.W. v. A.G.,
    
    303 Neb. 42
    , 
    926 N.W.2d 651
     (2019). When a party’s brief
    fails to comply with § 2-109(D)(1), we may proceed as though
    the party failed to file a brief or, alternatively, examine the
    proceedings for plain error. D.W. v. A.G., 
    supra.
     Plain error is
    error plainly evident from the record and of such a nature that
    to leave it uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity,
    reputation, or fairness of the judicial process. 
    Id.
    However, because this case involves a matter of statu-
    tory interpretation, we will independently review the juvenile
    court’s interpretation of § 43-246.01.
    IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which an
    appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. In re
    Interest of Seth C., 
    307 Neb. 862
    , 
    951 N.W.2d 135
     (2020).
    V. ANALYSIS
    At issue in this case is whether § 43-246.01(2) and its use of
    the language “[e]xclusive original jurisdiction” can be recon-
    ciled with 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-274
    (5) (Supp. 2019) and its use
    of the language “concurrent jurisdiction.” Section 43-246.01(2)
    grants the juvenile court “[e]xclusive original jurisdiction”
    over any juvenile who was 16 or 17 years of age at the time he
    or she committed an offense, other than a traffic offense, which
    would constitute a misdemeanor or an infraction. However, it
    also provides that proceedings initiated under “this subdivision
    (2) may be transferred as provided in section 43-274.” Section
    43-274(5) indicates that “[w]hen a transfer from juvenile court
    to county court or district court is authorized because there is
    concurrent jurisdiction, the county attorney or city attorney
    may move to transfer the proceedings.” (Emphasis supplied.)
    It appears the juvenile court must have concluded that since
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    a transfer under its exclusive original jurisdiction pursuant to
    § 43-246.01(2) was subject to the provisions of § 43-274, and
    § 43-274(5) authorized transfers only when there is concurrent
    jurisdiction with a county or district court, then a transfer was
    not permitted in this instance.
    While we understand the potential for confusion created by
    the statutory language noted above, we conclude that the plain
    language of the statutes and Nebraska Supreme Court precedent
    compel a different interpretation than the one reached by the
    juvenile court. As we explain in more detail later, the use of the
    language “[e]xclusive original jurisdiction” in § 43-246.01(1)
    and (2) means that certain matters must be commenced in the
    juvenile court if they fall into any of the categories covered
    in those subsections. In other words, there is no discretion
    by a county attorney or city attorney to file such matters ini-
    tially in the county or district court; they must be filed in the
    juvenile court. On the other hand, § 43-246.01(3) provides for
    “[c]oncurrent original jurisdiction” over the categories covered
    in that subsection, meaning there is discretion on whether to
    initially file such cases in the juvenile court, county court, or
    district court.
    The concurrent jurisdiction language used in § 43-274(5)
    means only that the transfer must involve matters over which
    the county court or district court would otherwise have subject
    matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is the power
    of a tribunal to hear and determine a case in the general class
    or category to which the proceedings in question belong and
    to deal with the general subject matter involved. In re Estate
    of Adelung, 
    306 Neb. 646
    , 
    947 N.W.2d 269
     (2020). While
    county courts have been given jurisdiction of criminal mat-
    ters classified as misdemeanors or infractions via 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-517
     (Cum. Supp. 2018), that statute does not pro-
    vide for county court jurisdiction over felonies; other statutes,
    however, do authorize county court judges to play a role in
    felony matters. See State v. A.D., 
    305 Neb. 154
    , 
    939 N.W.2d 484
     (2020). As for district courts, the Nebraska Constitution
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    provides such courts with both chancery and common-law
    jurisdiction, and such other jurisdiction as the Legislature may
    provide; 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-302
     (Reissue 2016) provides
    that district courts shall have and exercise general, original,
    and appellate jurisdiction in all matters, both civil and crimi-
    nal, except where otherwise provided. See Webb v. Nebraska
    Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 
    301 Neb. 810
    , 
    920 N.W.2d 268
     (2018).
    Therefore, although the case before us had to originate under
    the juvenile court’s exclusive original jurisdiction as required
    by § 43-246.01(2), the Legislature also specifically granted
    to the juvenile court the ability to transfer such cases to the
    county or district court so long as those courts otherwise have
    subject matter jurisdiction. As we explain next, certain juvenile
    criminal matters are statutorily reserved for the juvenile court’s
    exclusive jurisdiction from beginning to end; however, depend-
    ing on the juvenile’s age and the nature of the offense, such
    matters may be transferred to the county or district court.
    1. Statutory Language
    The full text of § 43-246.01 is set forth below, and begin-
    ning with subsection (2), we have provided bracketed abbrevi-
    ated explanations of references made to certain other statutory
    provisions. Section 43-246.01 states:
    The juvenile court shall have:
    (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction as to:
    (a) Any juvenile described in subdivision (3) or (11) of
    section 43-247;
    (b) Any juvenile who was under sixteen years of age
    at the time the alleged offense was committed and the
    offense falls under subdivision (1) of section 43-247;
    (c) A party or proceeding described in subdivision (5)
    or (7) of section 43-247; and
    (d) Any juvenile who was under fourteen years of age
    at the time the alleged offense was committed and the
    offense falls under subdivision (2) of section 43-247;
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    (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction as to:
    (a) Beginning January 1, 2015, any juvenile who is
    alleged to have committed an offense under subdivi-
    sion (1) of section 43-247 [act other than traffic offense
    which would constitute a misdemeanor or an infraction]
    and who was sixteen years of age at the time the alleged
    offense was committed, and beginning January 1, 2017,
    any juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offense
    under subdivision (1) of section 43-247 and who was six-
    teen years of age or seventeen years of age at the time the
    alleged offense was committed; and
    (b) Any juvenile who was fourteen years of age or
    older at the time the alleged offense was committed and
    the offense falls under subdivision (2) of section 43-247
    [act which would constitute a felony] except offenses
    enumerated in subdivision (1)(a)(ii) of section 29-1816
    [offense punishable as Class I, IA, IB, IC, ID, II, or
    IIA felony].
    Proceedings initiated under this subdivision (2) may be
    transferred as provided in section 43-274; and
    (3) Concurrent original jurisdiction with the county
    court or district court as to:
    (a) Any juvenile described in subdivision (4) of section
    43-247 [traffic offense];
    (b) Any proceeding under subdivision (6) [termination
    of parental rights], (8) [ward whose guardianship is dis-
    rupted or terminated], (9) [adoption or guardianship], or
    (10) [paternity or custody] of section 43-247;
    (c) Any juvenile described in subdivision (1)(a)(ii) of
    section 29-1816 [offense punishable as Class I, IA, IB,
    IC, ID, II, or IIA felony]; and
    (d) Until January 1, 2017, any juvenile who is alleged
    to have committed an offense under subdivision (1) of
    section 43-247 and who was seventeen years of age at the
    time the alleged offense was committed.
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    Proceedings initiated under this subdivision (3) may be
    transferred as provided in section 43-274.
    (Emphasis supplied.)
    [2,3] Notably, subsections (1) and (2) of § 43-246.01
    both commence with the juvenile court having “[e]xclusive
    original jurisdiction,” meaning any case involving a juvenile
    fitting into the categories described in those two subdivisions
    must always be commenced in the juvenile court. See In re
    Interest of Tyrone K., 
    295 Neb. 193
    , 
    887 N.W.2d 489
     (2016).
    However, unlike § 43-246.01(1), § 43-246.01(2) provides that
    “[p]roceedings initiated under this subdivision (2) may be
    transferred as provided in section 43-274[.]” Therefore, when
    juveniles commit an offense fitting under § 43-246.01(2), an
    action “against these juvenile offenders must always be initi-
    ated in juvenile court by filing a juvenile petition, but [they]
    are subject to transfer to county or district court for further
    proceedings under the criminal code.” In re Interest of Tyrone
    K., 
    295 Neb. at 198-99
    , 887 N.W.2d at 494. In contrast, pro-
    ceedings fitting under § 43-246.01(1) “must always be filed
    via a juvenile petition and must always proceed to completion
    in juvenile court.” In re Interest of Tyrone K., 
    295 Neb. at 198
    ,
    887 N.W.2d at 494.
    [4] Finally, § 43-246.01(3) provides for “[c]oncurrent origi-
    nal jurisdiction with the county court or district court” for the
    categories described in subparts (a) through (d). This means
    that actions involving juveniles fitting into any of these catego-
    ries may be initiated either in juvenile court or in the county or
    district court. See In re Interest of Tyrone K., 
    supra.
     A proceed-
    ing initiated under § 43-246.01(3) may also be transferred as
    provided in § 43-274.
    In the present case, Luis was charged with three Class I
    misdemeanor offenses. He was 17 years old at the time of the
    incidents leading to the charges. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247
    (1)
    (Reissue 2016) provides that the juvenile court in each county
    shall have jurisdiction of
    [a]ny juvenile who has committed an act other than a
    traffic offense which would constitute a misdemeanor or
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    an infraction under the laws of this state, or violation of
    a city or village ordinance, and who, beginning in July 1,
    2017, was eleven years of age or older at the time the act
    was committed.
    Luis was clearly more than 11 years of age at the time of his
    misdemeanor offenses, so the juvenile court has jurisdiction
    over Luis’ case pursuant to § 43-247(1). In next looking at
    § 43-246.01(1)(b), which applies to misdemeanor offenses
    for juveniles under the age of 16, it is evident that Luis does
    not fit into this category because of his age. Accordingly,
    § 43-246.01(1) does not apply here, and this is the only
    subsection under § 43-246.01 which requires always being
    filed in juvenile court and always proceeding to comple-
    tion in juvenile court. See In re Interest of Tyrone K., 
    supra.
    Instead, the circumstances involved here fall under the juve-
    nile court’s “[e]xclusive original jurisdiction” pursuant to
    § 43-246.01(2)(a), which applies to 16-year-old or ­17-year-old
    juveniles who have committed a nontraffic, misdemeanor
    offense. Further, the statute plainly states that “[p]roceedings
    initiated under this subdivision (2) may be transferred as pro-
    vided in section 43-274[.]” § 43-246.01(2).
    [5] However, as noted earlier, it appears that the “concur-
    rent jurisdiction” language of § 43-274(5) may have contrib-
    uted to the confusion in this case when trying to reconcile
    it with the “[e]xclusive original jurisdiction” language used
    in § 43-246.01(2). Section 43-274(5) states, in relevant part,
    “When a transfer from juvenile court to county court or dis-
    trict court is authorized because there is concurrent jurisdic-
    tion, the county attorney or city attorney may move to trans-
    fer the proceedings.” It appears the juvenile court construed
    § 43-274(5) to allow for transfers only when there is “[c]oncur-
    rent original jurisdiction” between the courts as set forth in
    § 43-246.01(3), and since § 43-246.01(2)(a) granted the juve-
    nile court “[e]xclusive original jurisdiction” over any juvenile,
    age 16 or 17, who has committed a misdemeanor offense, then
    there was no concurrent jurisdiction and the case could not be
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    transferred. But as noted previously, there would be concurrent
    jurisdiction over Luis’ misdemeanor offenses in adult court
    if the juvenile court determined the circumstances justified
    granting a transfer. Also, of significance, the juvenile court’s
    interpretation necessarily requires ignoring the last sentence of
    § 43-246.01(2), which very clearly states that “[p]roceedings
    initiated under this subdivision (2) may be transferred as pro-
    vided in section 43-274[.]” And a court must attempt to give
    effect to all parts of a statute, and if it can be avoided, no word,
    clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or meaning-
    less; it is not within the province of a court to read anything
    plain, direct, and unambiguous out of a statute. In re Interest of
    Sabrina K., 
    262 Neb. 871
    , 
    635 N.W.2d 727
     (2001).
    Additionally, as pointed out by the State, the Nebraska
    Supreme Court has already construed §§ 43-246.01(2) and
    43-274(5) to allow for a transfer from the juvenile court to the
    county or district court.
    2. Nebraska Supreme Court Cases
    (a) In re Interest of Tyrone K.
    The Nebraska Supreme Court first examined the construc-
    tion of § 43-246.01 in In re Interest of Tyrone K., 
    295 Neb. 193
    , 
    887 N.W.2d 489
     (2016). The court’s primary focus in
    that case was whether an order granting a motion to transfer
    proceedings from juvenile court to county court was a final,
    appealable order; it ultimately concluded it was not. However,
    the court first provided an overview of new juvenile statutes
    enacted in 2014 through 2014 Neb. Laws, L.B. 464. The
    court pointed out that “[f]rom 1974 to 2014, when a juvenile
    committed a law violation, the relevant juvenile delinquency
    statute gave the prosecuting attorney substantial discretion
    regarding whether to file charges in criminal court, file delin-
    quency proceedings in juvenile court, or offer juvenile pretrial
    diversion or mediation.” In re Interest of Tyrone K., 
    295 Neb. at 197
    , 887 N.W.2d at 493. The court described that L.B. 464
    “limited the discretion of prosecutors to decide whether a
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    case should be filed in juvenile or criminal court” by installing
    “a three-tiered jurisdictional structure that specifies the court
    in which a case should be filed, depending on the age of the
    juvenile and the nature of the alleged law violation” as “first
    set out” in § 43-246.01. In re Interest of Tyrone K., 
    295 Neb. at 198
    , 887 N.W.2d at 494. Under an opinion subheading entitled
    “Exclusive Original Jurisdiction,” the court addressed the first
    of the three subsections of § 43-246.01, clarifying that
    [s]ection 43-246.01(1) grants exclusive original juris-
    diction to the juvenile court over offenders who (1) are
    under 16 years of age and committed a misdemeanor or
    infraction, other than a traffic offense, or (2) are under 14
    years of age and committed a felony. Proceedings against
    these juvenile offenders must always be filed via a juve-
    nile petition and must always proceed to completion in
    juvenile court.
    In re Interest of Tyrone K., 
    295 Neb. at 198
    , 887 N.W.2d at 494
    (emphasis supplied).
    Under an opinion subheading entitled “Original Jurisdiction
    Subject to Transfer,” the court described the second subsection
    of § 43-246.01, further clarifying that
    [s]ection 43-246.01(2) grants original jurisdiction to
    the juvenile court over juvenile offenders who are (1)
    16 years of age and committed a misdemeanor or (2)
    14 years of age or older and committed a felony lesser
    in grade than a Class IIA. Actions against these juvenile
    offenders must always be initiated in juvenile court by
    filing a juvenile petition, but are subject to transfer to
    county or district court for further proceedings under the
    criminal code.
    In re Interest of Tyrone K., 
    295 Neb. at 198-99
    , 887 N.W.2d
    at 494 (emphasis supplied). (We note that because the juvenile
    court petition at issue was filed in 2015, the court’s explana-
    tion above only refers to juvenile offenders who are 16 years of
    age who have committed a misdemeanor. The statute in effect
    at that time also indicated that beginning January 1, 2017, this
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    same provision would apply to juvenile offenders who are 16
    or 17 years of age.)
    Under an opinion subheading entitled “Concurrent Jurisdic-
    tion,” the court described the third subsection of § 43-246.01,
    stating that
    [s]ection 43-246.01(3) grants to the juvenile court and
    the county or district courts concurrent jurisdiction over
    juvenile offenders who (1) commit a traffic offense that is
    not a felony or (2) are 14 years of age or older and com-
    mit a Class I, IA, IB, ID, II, or IIA felony. Actions against
    these juveniles may be initiated either in juvenile court or
    in the county or district court.
    In re Interest of Tyrone K., 
    295 Neb. 193
    , 199, 
    887 N.W.2d 489
    , 494 (2016) (emphasis supplied).
    [6] When addressing the petition filed in the juvenile court
    and the prosecutor’s simultaneous motion to transfer the pro-
    ceedings to criminal court, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated
    that § 43-274(5) controlled in that circumstance. It noted that
    § 43-274(5) “authorizes a city or county attorney to seek a
    transfer to criminal court when both the juvenile court and
    the criminal court have statutory jurisdiction.” In re Interest
    of Tyrone K., 
    295 Neb. at 200
    , 887 N.W.2d at 495. And as we
    discussed previously, the county court and district court have
    statutory jurisdiction over criminal matters, except in those
    instances where the Legislature has preserved such matters
    to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court, such as in
    § 43-246.01(1).
    In In re Interest of Tyrone K., supra, the juvenile court peti-
    tion alleged that 16-year-old Tyrone K. committed four counts
    of theft by receiving stolen property and one count of operat-
    ing a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. The violations were clas-
    sified as “two Class III felonies, a Class IV felony, and two
    Class I misdemeanors.” Id. at 195, 887 N.W.2d at 492. The
    court found that for purposes of classification, all of the allega-
    tions against Tyrone, except the allegation of operating a motor
    vehicle to avoid arrest, put Tyrone in the category of juvenile
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    offenders described in § 43-246.01(2), which “must always be
    initiated in juvenile court by filing a juvenile petition, but are
    subject to transfer to county or district court for further pro-
    ceedings under the criminal code.” In re Interest of Tyrone K.,
    
    295 Neb. at 198-99
    , 887 N.W.2d at 494. However, the count
    of operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest put Tyrone in the
    category of juvenile offenders described in § 43-246.01(3),
    which may be initiated either in the juvenile court or in the
    county or district court. See In re Interest of Tyrone K., supra.
    Importantly, the court stated:
    All of the offenses allegedly committed by Tyrone are
    offenses over which both the juvenile court and the crim­
    inal court can exercise jurisdiction under the new statu-
    tory scheme. With respect to such offenses, if the action
    is initiated in juvenile court, a party can move to transfer
    it to county or district court via § 43-274(5) (Reissue
    2016) . . . .
    In re Interest of Tyrone K., 
    295 Neb. at 199
    , 887 N.W.2d at 494.
    Luis attempts to distinguish In re Interest of Tyrone K. on
    the basis that one of Tyrone’s offenses was a traffic offense,
    which would subject him to the concurrent jurisdiction of
    the juvenile court and criminal court under § 43-246.01(3).
    Luis appears to be suggesting that In re Interest of Tyrone K.
    should not be applied here, because in addition to involving
    offenses falling under § 43-246.01(2), that case also involved
    an offense falling under § 43-246.01(3), which specifically
    provides for “[c]oncurrent original jurisdiction.” Presumably,
    Luis is suggesting that because § 43-246.01(3) specifically
    refers to “[c]oncurrent original jurisdiction,” then the “concur-
    rent jurisdiction” language of § 43-274(5) supports transfer
    of only those cases falling under § 43-246.01(3). We do not
    read In re Interest of Tyrone K. to support Luis’ distinction. In
    fact, as discussed next, another case decided by the Supreme
    Court 1 week after In re Interest of Tyrone K. was decided
    reiterates its determination in In re Interest of Tyrone K. that
    § 43-246.01(2) provides for transfer from the juvenile court to
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    the county or district court, even when the offenses charged all
    fall under § 43-246.01(2), as in the present case.
    (b) In re Interest of Sandrino T.
    In In re Interest of Sandrino T., 
    295 Neb. 270
    , 
    888 N.W.2d 371
     (2016), the juvenile charges included three Class IIIA felo-
    nies and three Class IV felonies, all of which would fit within
    the category described in § 43-246.01(2)(b). The Nebraska
    Supreme Court stated:
    Although actions against juvenile offenders who fall
    under § 43-246.01(2) must always be initiated in juve-
    nile court by filing a juvenile petition, they are subject to
    transfer to county or district court for further proceed-
    ings under the criminal code. . . . As noted, the State
    filed motions to transfer each case to county court under
    § 43-274(5) and the juvenile court granted the motions.
    In re Interest of Sandrino T., 295 Neb. at 273-74, 888 N.W.2d
    at 374 (emphasis supplied).
    Although the offenses alleged in the present matter fall
    under § 43-246.01(2)(a) rather than § 43-246.01(2)(b), as in In
    re Interest of Sandrino T., the last sentence of § 43-246.01(2)
    states that “[p]roceedings initiated under this subdivision (2)
    may be transferred as provided in section 43-274”; there is no
    distinction made between § 43-246.01(2)(a) and (b) in terms of
    which proceedings may be transferred.
    (c) In re Interest of Steven S.
    In In re Interest of Steven S., 
    299 Neb. 447
    , 
    908 N.W.2d 391
     (2018), the juvenile was 17 years old when he and another
    juvenile escaped from custody while being transported to a
    youth rehabilitation and treatment center. A petition was filed
    in juvenile court, charging the juvenile with escape, a Class
    IV felony offense. The State simultaneously filed a motion to
    transfer the case from the juvenile court to the county court.
    After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court concluded
    that the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence
    that the matter should be transferred to the county court. The
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    juvenile appealed, claiming the evidence was insufficient to
    support the transfer.
    In reaching its decision to affirm the juvenile court’s deci-
    sion, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that “transfers from
    juvenile to ‘adult’ court [were] a recent development.” Id.
    at 453, 908 N.W.2d at 396. It pointed out that in 2014, “legis-
    lation dictated that the county attorney or city attorney file the
    petition in the court with jurisdiction as outlined in what became
    codified as 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-246.01
     (Reissue 2016).” In re
    Interest of Steven S., 
    299 Neb. at 454
    , 908 N.W.2d at 396. The
    court then proceeded to consider the appropriate standard of
    review to be applied to such appeals, and it concluded in its de
    novo review of the record that the juvenile court did not abuse
    its discretion in ordering the case transferred from the juvenile
    court to the county court.
    Notably, in In re Interest of Stephen S., supra, because the
    juvenile was charged with a Class IV felony, § 43-246.01(2)(b)
    would have applied, as in In re Interest of Sandrino T., supra.
    That subsection applies to any juvenile who was 14 years of
    age or older at the time of the alleged offense and the offense
    was a felony classified lower than a Class IIA felony. Although,
    as previously discussed, the juvenile court had “[e]xclusive
    original jurisdiction” under § 43-246.01(2)(b), any proceedings
    brought under § 43-246.01(2)(a) or (b) may be transferred to
    county or district court once initially filed in the juvenile court.
    Nothing in In re Interest of Steven S., supra, suggests that the
    juvenile court lacked the authority to transfer the case from the
    juvenile court to the county court; rather, the juvenile court’s
    decision to transfer the matter to the county court was affirmed
    by our Supreme Court.
    3. Summary
    The statutory language itself, along with the Supreme Court
    cases construing the pertinent statutes as discussed above,
    indicate that § 43-246.01(2) and § 43-274(5) do in fact allow
    for cases described in § 43-246.01(2) to be transferred to the
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    county or district court once the case is initially filed in the
    juvenile court.
    [7] We also observe that since the Nebraska Supreme Court’s
    decisions discussed above, neither § 43-246.01, § 43-247, nor
    § 43-274 have been amended in any way to ­demonstrate
    the Legislature’s disagreement with how our Supreme Court
    has construed these statutes. The Legislature did amend
    § 43-274 to address the issue of whether a juvenile trans-
    fer order was a final, appealable order in the new statutory
    scheme. Section 43-274(5) was amended in 2017 to provide
    that “[a]n order granting or denying transfer of the case from
    juvenile court to county or district court shall be considered
    a final order for the purposes of appeal.” See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-274
    (5) (Cum. Supp. 2018). See, also, 2017 Neb. Laws,
    L.B. 11, § 2. Section 43-274 was again amended in 2019, alter-
    ing the processes concerning restorative justice practices or
    services with respect to juvenile offenders. See § 43-274 (Supp.
    2019). See, also, 2019 Neb. Laws, L.B. 595, § 28. Of note, the
    language stating that “[w]hen a transfer from juvenile court
    to county court or district court is authorized because there
    is concurrent jurisdiction, the county attorney or city attorney
    may move to transfer the proceedings” has not changed. See
    § 43-274(5) (Supp. 2019). Where a statute has been judicially
    construed and that construction has not evoked an amendment,
    it will be presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced in the
    court’s determination of the Legislature’s intent. Drought v.
    Marsh, 
    304 Neb. 860
    , 
    937 N.W.2d 229
     (2020).
    VI. CONCLUSION
    The juvenile court erred in concluding that § 43-246.01(2)
    and § 43-274(5) precluded the transfer of this case from the
    juvenile court to the criminal court. We therefore reverse, and
    remand for further proceedings, beginning with consideration
    of the merits of the State’s motion to transfer.
    Reversed and remanded for
    further proceedings.