Ott v. Lammers ( 2023 )


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  •                           IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
    (Memorandum Web Opinion)
    OTT V. LAMMERS
    NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
    AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).
    STACY A. OTT, APPELLEE,
    V.
    JESS T. LAMMERS, APPELLANT.
    Filed August 1, 2023.   No. A-22-755.
    Appeal from the District Court for Phelps County: JOHN H. MARSH, Judge. Affirmed.
    Jess T. Lammers, pro se.
    Kari R. Fisk, Acting Phelps County Attorney, for appellee State of Nebraska.
    RIEDMANN, BISHOP, and ARTERBURN, Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    INTRODUCTION
    Jess T. Lammers appeals after the district court for Phelps County entered an order finding
    him to be in contempt for failure to pay child support. In his appeal, Lammers purports to challenge
    the underlying child support orders he was found to have not complied with, rather than the actual
    contempt order he appeals from. Because Lammers is precluded from challenging the prior child
    support orders, we affirm the district court’s order.
    BACKGROUND
    In 2004, a South Dakota trial court entered an order requiring Lammers to pay Stacy A.
    Ott, the mother of his two minor children, $150 per month in child support. Subsequently, in April
    2005, an order was entered by the South Dakota court modifying Lammers’ child support
    obligation such that he was now required to pay $225 per month in child support. As a part of the
    modification proceedings, Lammers had requested a reduction in his child support obligation as a
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    result of the children receiving monthly “social security disability payments because of a social
    security disability decision in favor of . . . Lammers.” The court declined to reduce Lammers’ child
    support obligation in this regard after finding that he was capable of full-time employment.
    In October 2005, after a hearing, the district court for Phelps County, Nebraska, entered an
    order confirming the registration of the April 2005 South Dakota child support order. Therein, the
    court found: “That . . . Lammers has failed to provide sufficient evidence to vacate the registration,
    to establish a defense to the validity or enforcement of the registered order and therefore the
    registration has been confirmed.” At the time this order was entered, Lammers continued to owe
    $225 per month in child support. In addition, he owed $3,829.48 in arrearages.
    In 2013, Lammers’ child support obligation was modified for a second time. Beginning
    January 1, 2013, Lammers was required to pay $252 per month in child support for the benefit of
    his two minor children.
    In October 2019, the Phelps County Attorney filed an affidavit and application for order to
    show cause, which alleged that Lammers was in contempt of the court’s previous order that he pay
    $252 per month in child support. The affidavit and application alleged that Lammers owed at least
    $1,553.92 in arrearages as of October 24. The district court entered an order to show cause
    directing Lammers
    to appear before the [court] to show cause why he should not be held in contempt by the
    court for failing to pay child support as previously ordered. The current, actual and present
    ability of . . . Lammers to pay the Court ordered support constitutes the critical question
    that will be reviewed by this Court at the show cause/contempt hearing.
    After numerous continuances, the show cause hearing was held before the district court on
    September 22, 2022.
    At the show cause hearing, the State presented evidence that Lammers owed $4,647.92 in
    child support arrearages as of June 1, 2022. The court found that such evidence provided a
    rebuttable presumption that Lammers was in contempt of the prior child support orders. Lammers
    testified in order to rebut that presumption. Lammers indicated during his testimony his belief that
    he was not in contempt of the child support orders because he was not provided an “offset credit
    of Social Security payments provided directly to [Ott] by . . . treasury warrant, those payments
    total $38,287.73, approximately.” Lammers testified that he has more than paid his child support
    in full. Upon the State’s objection, the district court found Lammers’ testimony regarding the
    social security disability payments to be irrelevant, as the issue had been raised and finally
    determined by the South Dakota trial court in 2005.
    Lammers went on to testify that he is still suffering from pain and range of motion issues
    as a result of the 2000 accident which resulted in him receiving the social security disability
    payments. In the years after his accident, Lammers worked for various construction companies,
    but testified that often such employment ended quickly because he could not physically complete
    all of the jobs’ requirements. In 2005, Lammers began work answering phones in a call center. He
    went on to work as a bartender, at a gas station, and in a warehouse. Lammers indicated he
    struggled physically in each of these jobs.
    In 2012, Lammers completed vocational rehabilitation when he obtained a bachelor’s
    degree. His degree prepared him for employment in the areas of ecology, forestry, wildlife biology,
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    conservation, and research. Lammers then obtained employment at various times with the U.S.
    Department of Agriculture; as a manager at a pork farm; as a chemical applicator for multiple lawn
    care businesses and for Lincoln County; as a home inspector; and as a service writer for an
    automotive company. The average wage Lammers earned for these jobs was $20 an hour.
    Most recently to the show cause hearing, Lammers was employed by a company called Ag
    Valley as a chemical applicator beginning in January 2020. He earned $21 per hour plus bonuses.
    However, in April 2020, he was arrested while at work and charged with a felony. As a result, his
    employment was terminated. He received 69 weeks of unemployment benefits after this
    termination.
    Lammers has remained unemployed since April 2020, indicating that he has “been
    engrained in a battle with the State of Nebraska,” regarding his criminal charges. Additionally,
    Lammers was hospitalized at the Lincoln Regional Center for 52 days during March and April
    2022 to determine his competency to stand trial. Lammers did testify that he has continued to seek
    out gainful employment. He explicitly indicated that he has not willfully failed to pay his child
    support by not seeking employment. He testified that he is currently homeless and unable to
    support himself.
    At the close of the evidence, the district court orally ruled from the bench: “Well, the Court
    finds that [the State has] establishe[d] a rebuttable presumption of willful contempt. Mr. Lammers
    has failed to rebut that presumption. There were periods of time there has been no payment at all
    despite some employment [and] ability to pay.” The court then entered an order on September 26,
    2022, finding that Lammers was in willful contempt of court for failure to pay child support as
    ordered. The court found that Lammers owed $4,647.92 in past due child support. The court then
    found that a plan to purge the contempt was appropriate, as Lammers “has the present ability to
    comply with the requirements of [the purge] plan through exercising reasonable efforts including
    [his] ability to obtain and maintain gainful employment, his history of gainful employment, use of
    other available resources, and his ability to control any behaviors which may interfere with
    employment.”
    The specifics of the purge plan imposed by the district court required that, beginning on
    January 1, 2023, three months after the contempt order issued, Lammers shall make payments of
    no less than $100 per month toward his child support arrearages. Then, beginning in 2024,
    Lammers shall pay no less than $200 per month until he has paid his past due child support in full,
    or made all required payments through September 2025. However,
    [i]f [Lammers] fails to make payments as required by this purge plan he shall report to the
    Phelps County Jail beginning on January 1, 2023 and remain in jail until he has purged his
    contempt by payment in full of any remaining past due child support, or until he has served
    fifteen (15) days in jail exclusively on this contempt sanction whichever occurs sooner.
    After the entry of the district court’s order, Lammers timely filed this appeal.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    In his brief on appeal, Lammers assigns 20 errors. Each of these errors challenges the prior
    orders of various courts which imposed, modified, and enforced his child support obligation. Many
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    of his assigned errors concern whether Lammers should have received a credit for the social
    security disability payments made on his behalf to his minor children.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    In a civil contempt proceeding where a party seeks remedial relief for an alleged violation
    of a court order, an appellate court employs a three-part standard of review in which (1) the trial
    court’s resolution of issues of law is reviewed de novo, (2) the trial court’s factual findings are
    reviewed for clear error, and (3) the trial court’s determinations of whether a party is in contempt
    and of the sanction to be imposed are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Vyhlidal v. Vyhlidal, 
    309 Neb. 376
    , 
    960 N.W.2d 309
     (2021).
    ANALYSIS
    Although Lammers has appealed from the district court’s order finding him in contempt
    for failure to pay child support as ordered, his assertions on appeal do not challenge the contempt
    order in any way. Rather, Lammers’ numerous assignments of error on appeal challenge the prior
    child support orders. Specifically, Lammers believes that the prior child support orders were
    flawed in that he was not provided any credit for social security disability payments received by
    his minor children as a result of an injury he sustained. As such, Lammers believes that he has
    more than paid his child support in full.
    As the district court found, however, the issue of Lammers’ entitlement to a credit for the
    social security disability payments was raised before the trial court in South Dakota as part of the
    2005 modification proceeding. The South Dakota court resolved the issue and found that Lammers
    was not entitled to such a credit. We agree with the district court that
    [t]here is no dispute of the South Dakota Circuit Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The
    parties to this action are the same; this matter involves a registration of a support order
    from that case. The Court finds that the issue of credit for Social Security disability was
    raised and determined in a final judgment by the South Dakota Court.
    Essentially, through this appeal, Lammers is attempting to collaterally attack a prior, final
    judgment.
    When a judgment is attacked in a way other than by a proceeding in the original action to
    have it vacated, reversed, or modified, or by a proceeding in equity to prevent its enforcement, the
    attack is a collateral attack. Fetherkile v. Fetherkile, 
    299 Neb. 76
    , 
    907 N.W.2d 275
     (2018). Even
    if erroneous, a judgment is not subject to collateral attack unless it is void, such as would be the
    case where a judgment is entered without jurisdiction over the person or subject matter. 
    Id.
     A
    judgment entered by a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at
    any time in any proceeding. Davis v. Moats, 
    308 Neb. 757
    , 
    956 N.W.2d 682
     (2021). And refusal
    to obey a void order or judgment is not contempt. 
    Id.
     Here, Lammers does not assert that the prior
    child support orders are void, only that they contain an error in their handling of the social security
    disability payments.
    Lammers is appealing from an order of contempt in which the only issues are whether the
    court erred in finding that he willfully violated the child support order and in imposing its sanction
    and purge order. Because Lammers does not assign and argue any error relating to these issues,
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    we affirm the order of the district court. We agree with the district court that the validity of the
    support order cannot be collaterally attacked in this proceeding; therefore, we need not address
    Lammers’ assigned errors which, as stated above, relate solely to this issue.
    CONCLUSION
    We find that Lammers’ assigned errors constitute an improper collateral attack on prior
    child support orders. Because he assigns no error related to the contempt order, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    ARTERBURN, Judge, dissenting.
    While I agree with the majority that the assignments of error contained within Lammers’
    brief constitute an improper collateral attack on prior child support orders, I disagree that we should
    have evaluated Lammers’ appeal at all. Instead, I believe that we should have dismissed the appeal
    as moot.
    After both Lammers and the State filed their briefs with this court, the State filed a
    suggestion of mootness and a motion for summary dismissal, asking that we dismiss Lammers’
    appeal as moot. In its filings, the State indicated that contrary to the purge plan ordered by the
    district court, Lammers failed to make his first payment on or before January 1, 2023. As a result,
    according to the State, Lammers was placed in the Phelps County jail on January 21, 2023.
    Lammers served the 15-day sentence imposed by the district court and was released from jail on
    February 4. The State did attach the warrant and commitment dated January 19 to its suggestion
    of mootness. It also attached the service return which indicated that Lammers had been served
    with the warrant on January 21, 2023. Lammers did not file any objection to the State’s suggestion
    of mootness. As such, he did not challenge the State’s information that he had served the 15-day
    sentence imposed by the district court.
    Given that Lammers has completed serving the suspended jail sentence imposed by the
    court for his contempt conviction, his appeal from that same sentence is now moot. Lammers
    appealed from the district court’s order finding him in contempt and instituting a purge plan. As
    part of that purge plan, Lammers was to serve a maximum of 15 days in jail if he failed to make
    payments toward his child support arrearages. Upon serving 15 days in jail, Lammers would be
    deemed to have purged his contempt pursuant to the terms of the order. The State has provided
    this court with evidence that Lammers has served the maximum 15-day jail sentence in relation to
    his contempt conviction. As such, given the terms of the district court’s order, he has purged his
    contempt. The Nebraska Supreme Court has regularly held that when an action an appellant seeks
    to prevent is completed while an appeal is pending, that completion renders the appeal moot. See
    Nesbitt v. Frakes, 
    300 Neb. 1
    , 
    911 N.W.2d 598
     (2018).
    As a general rule, a moot case is subject to dismissal. See 
    id.
     Because Lammers has
    appealed from the district court’s order finding him in contempt for failure to pay child support
    and has now purged himself of that contempt, his personal interest in the resolution of the dispute
    that existed at the beginning of the litigation has been eradicated. Moreover, the facts of this case
    do not warrant the application of the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. See Yancer
    v. Kaufman, 
    22 Neb. App. 320
    , 
    854 N.W.2d 640
     (2014) (it has been recognized that under certain
    circumstances, appellate court may entertain issues presented by moot case when claims presented
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    involve matter of great public interest or when other rights or liabilities may be affected by case’s
    determination). As such, I believe we should have granted the State’s motion for summary
    dismissal and dismissed the appeal as moot. For this reason, I dissent from the majority’s opinion.
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