In Re: S.H. ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN THE MATTER OF: S. H., DOB: No. 82846
04/22/2000, AN ADULT OVER THE AGE
OF 21.
S. H., FILED
Appellant,
vs. FEB 1 7 2022
THE STATE OF NEVADA, ELIZABEIN A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
Res • ondent. BY
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a juvenile court order adjudicating S.H.
as a sex offender for purposes of registration and notification. First Judicial
District Court, Carson City; James Todd Russell, Judge.'
Appellant admitted to the charge of lewdness with a child under
14 years of age in the juvenile court and was placed under supervision
pursuant to a supervision and consent decree and submitted to a residential
treatment program. After four years and several sporadic consent-decree
violations, the court adjudicated appellant a delinquent on the underlying
charge of lewdness with a child under 14 and placed him on formal
probation. After he turned 21, the court held a hearing to determine
whether it would require appellant to register as a sex offender pursuant to
NRS 62F.340. Following that hearing, the court found that appellant was
not rehabilitated, posed a continuing threat to the community, and should
be subject to sex offender registration and reporting requirements.
Appellant raises two contentions on appeal.
'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
is not warranted in this appeal.
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First, appellant argues that the juvenile court erred in applying
a heightened standard of proof during the hearing. We conclude that this
argument lacks merit. The statute places the burden on the juvenile to
show by "clear and convincing evidence . . . that the child has been
rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the juvenile court and that the child is
not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others." NRS 62F.340(3). The
court repeatedly referenced the correct burden of proof throughout the
hearing and its written order. While some evidence showed that appellant
made progress in therapy, the court's conclusions that the charged crime
was serious, that some diagnostic instruments indicated appellant had an
above average risk to reoffend, and that appellant still experienced impulse
control issues were not manifestly erroneous and did not indicate that the
court held appellant to a different burden than the one set forth in NRS
62F.340(3). See NRS 62F.340(5) (listing factors to guide a court's
determination in an NRS 62F.340 hearing); Bongiovi v. Sullivan, 122 Nev.
556, 575, 138 P.3d 433, 447 (2006) (affording facts found by clear and
convincing evidence "great deference" that will not be reversed "absent
manifest error").
Second, appellant argues that the juvenile court abused its
discretion by not sua sponte continuing the hearing to receive expert
testimony after it questioned the reliability of one of the assessments used.
We discern no abuse of discretion. See Sparks v. State, 96 Nev. 26, 28, 604
P.2d 802, 803-04 (1980) (recognizing that a district court has discretion to
continue proceedings when good cause exists). Appellant's counsel did not
request a continuance for additional testimony but instead stated that the
exhibits presented, including those drafted by the witness who could not
attend, spoke for themselves. The record does not suggest that the court
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needed the expert to clarify the reports. Instead, the court relied on the
generally accepted actuarial assessment described in the reports in
assessing appellant's risk to reoffend because that assessment has been
shown to be accurate and appellant's most recent violation occurred when
he was 18 years old. The court noted the expert's use of another evaluation
but did not rely upon those findings because the evaluation had been
described in the expert's report as experimental. Accordingly, appellant
failed to demonstrate prejudice from the failure to grant a continuance. See
Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. 1, 9, 222 P.3d 648, 653 (2010) ([I]f a defendant fails
to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the denial of a continuance, then
the district court's decision to deny the continuance is not an abuse of
discretion.").
Having considered appellant's contentions and concluded that
they lack merit, we
ORDER the judgment of the juvenile court AFFIRMED.
Pgjsegii_acarsammo7 C.J.
arraguirre
, J. Sr.J.
Hardesty
cc: Hon. James Todd Russell, District Judge
State Public Defender/Carson City
Attorney General/Carson City
Carson City District Attorney
Carson City Clerk
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