Mueller v. Hinds C/W 84077 ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
CRAIG A. MUELLER, No. 83412
Appellant,
vs.
CRISTINA A. HINDS,
Res ondent.
CRISTINA A. HINDS, No. 84077
Appellant,
vs.
CRAIG A. MUELLER, FILED
Res e ondent.
SEP 1 5 2022
ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
13Y-S • \
DEPUTY CLERK
ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
These are consolidated appeals from district court orders
denying a motion to set aside or modify a divorce decree and marital
settlement agreement and denying a request for attorney fees and costs.
Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County;
Rebecca Burton, Judge.'
Respondent/appellant Cristina Hinds filed for divorce from
appellant/respondent Craig Mueller in 2018. On June 20, 2019, during
Cristina's deposition, the parties reached a marital settlement agreement
(MSA) concerning the division of community property and placed the terms
of that agreement on the record pursuant to EDCR 7.50 (requiring
agreements to be in writing or "entered in the minutes in the form of an
order" to be effective). On July 28 and 29, 2019, the parties signed the
'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
is not warranted in this matter.
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written MSA, and, on July 29, 2019, the district court entered a stipulated
decree of divorce, incorporating the MSA.
A few months later, Cristina moved to hold Craig in contempt
of court, largely due to his failure to make the property equalization
payment provided in the MSA. Craig opposed and filed a countermotion
seeking to set aside or modify the MSA. Throughout the litigation, both
parties made multiple requests for an award of attorney fees and costs as
sanctions and pursuant to the MSA's provision entitling the prevailing
party to reasonable attorney fees and costs for any action to enforce or
interpret the MSA. At some point, Cristina conceded that, after the parties
reached a settlement but before they signed the written MSA, she had taken
$36,871 from a joint account that the MSA awarded to Craig. She then
agreed that Craig should be entitled to an offset from the property
equalization payment in that amount. After an evidentiary hearing, the
district court granted Cristina's request to enforce the MSA's property
equalization payment requirement subject to the offset, denied each of
Craig's requests, and ordered that Cristina should be awarded her attorney
fees and costs from the date she agreed to the offset. The district court set
a 15-day deadline for Cristina to submit a memorandum of fees and costs;
Cristina filed her memorandum one day late and the district court entered
an order declining to award any fees or costs. Both parties now appeal.
In Docket No. 83412, Craig appeals frorn the district court's
order denying his request to modify or set aside the MSA. We first reject
Craig's argument that the MSA was not a valid, binding contract due to lack
of material terms or mutual assent. See Grisham v. Grisham, 128 Nev. 679,
685, 289 P.3d 230, 234-35 (2012) (providing that "a stipulated settlement
agreement requires mutual assent" and must include material terms which
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are "[ lsufficiently certain and definite for a court to ascertain what is
required of the respective parties" (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted)). The record contains substantial evidence that the parties agreed
to all material terms at the time of Cristina's deposition, including a
division of assets and the amount of the community property equalization
award.2 See May v. Anderson, 121 Nev. 668, 672-73, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257
(2005) (explaining that, when determining whether a contract exists, this
court will "defer to the district court's findings unless they are clearly
erroneous or not based on substantial evidence"). Moreover, both parties
affirmed under oath at that deposition that all material terms had been
addressed and that they intended the agreement to be enforceable pursuant
to EDCR 7.50. And, because the MSA was already a binding agreement
before Cristina withdrew the money from their joint account, we agree with
the district court that Craig failed to prove that Cristina fraudulently
induced him to enter into the MSA. See J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Lehrer
McGovern Bovis, Inc., 120 Nev. 227, 290-91, 89 P.3d 1009, 1018 (2004)
(listing elements to prove fraudulent inducement and holding that a party
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that they justifiably relied
upon a misrepresentation by the other party which was intended to induce
them to enter into a contract); Havas v. Alger, 85 Nev. 627, 631, 461 P.2d
857, 860 (1969) ("Fraud is never presumed; it must be clearly and
satisfactorily proved.").
2 To the extent that Craig argues on appeal that the MSA was not
binding until they signed it in July 2019, he acknowledged in his pretrial
brief that the MSA was a binding settlement when they agreed to its terms
on June 20, 2019.
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We also reject Craig's argument that the district court failed to
adjudicate his pretrial motion pursuant to NRS 125.150(3) (concerning
postjudgment motions to adjudicate community property omitted from the
divorce decree by fraud or mistake).3 Substantial evidence supports the
court's findings that there was a full and fair disclosure of all accounts when
the parties reached their settlement, and that Craig failed to identify any
community assets that were missing or omitted from the MSA. See Ogawa
v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009) (providing that this
court will give deference to and uphold a district court's factual findings if
they are supported by substantial evidence).
Substantial evidence also supports the district court's finding
that Craig failed to provide credible evidence to support his claim that
Cristina's act of withdrawing the money from their joint account made it
impossible for him to perform under the MSA. See id. Craig argues that he
needed that money to serve as collateral for a loan to make the property
equalization payment, but he fails to point to anything in the record to show
that he formally applied for a loan, or that he was denied a loan for want of
those funds, and we will not reweigh the district court's credibility
determination on appeal.4 See Ellis v. Caru,cci, 123 Nev. 145, 152, 161 P.3d
3The record belies Craig's contention that the district court found he
waived the right to bring a motion pursuant to NRS 125_150(3). Rather, the
district court pointed out that, pursuant to the terms of the MSA, Craig
waived the right to any further discovery and agreed to settle all claims in
the divorce case. Cf. Davi.s v. Beling, 128 Nev. 301, 321, 278 P.3d 501, 515
(2012) (explaining that "clear and unambiguous [language in a] contract
will be enforced as written").
4While the parties agree they contemplated that Craig would have to
obtain a loan to make the property equalization payment, they also agree
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239, 244 (2007) (refusing to reweigh the district court's credibility
determinations). Finally, we are not persuaded by Craig's arguments that
he, not Cristina, was the prevailing party, as the district court granted
Cristina's request to enforce the MSA and it denied each of Craig's
requests.5 See Chowdhry v. NLVH, Inc., 109 Nev. 478, 485-86, 851 P.2d
459, 464 (1993) ("A plaintiff may be considered the prevailing party for
attorney's fee purposes if it succeeds on any significant issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit sought in bringing the suit.").
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment in Docket No. 83412.
In Docket No. 84077, Cristina appeals from the district court's
order denying her motion for attorney fees and costs. Reviewing de novo,
we conclude that the district court erred when it relied on NRCP 54(d)(2)(C)
in denying Cristina's motion. See Pardee Homes of Nev. v. Wolfram, 135
Nev. 173, 176, 444 P.3d 423, 425-26 (2019) (explaining that this court
reviews attorney fees decisions de novo when the matter implicates
questions of law). While the district court is correct that NRCP 54(d)(2)(C)
prohibits it from extending the time for a party to file a motion for attorney
fees after the thne to do so has expired, Cristina timely filed her motion for
fees before trial. Because Cristina's motion for attorney fees and costs was
timely filed, NRCP 54(d)(2)(C) did not constrain the district court's ability
to extend the deadline for Cristina to file her supporting memorandum and
that Craig obtaining the loan was not a condition precedent to him paying
Cristina by the deadline set in the MSA.
5We decline Cristina's request to impose sanctions on Craig for
providing an inadequate appendix.
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related documents.° See NRCP 54(d)(2)(C) ("The court may not extend the
time for filing the motion after the time has expired." (emphasis added)).
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order denying Cristina her
attorney fees and costs and remand for the court to consider whether to
extend the deadline for Cristina to file her memorandum. Based on the
foregoing, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN
PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the
district court for proceedings consistent with this order.7
, C.J.
Parraguirre
J. , Sr.J.
Cadish
cc: Hon. Rebecca Burton, District Judge, Family Court Division
Willick Law Group
McAvoy Amaya & Revero, Attorneys
Eighth District Court Clerk
°Given our conclusion, we need not reach Cristina's remaining
arguments.
7 The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.
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