In Re: Parental Rights as to G.R.N. and N.T.A. ( 2015 )

 parent, and to eliminate the risk of serious injury to the children. This
appeal followed.
We directed a response to appellant's civil appeal statement
addressing, among other things, appellant's competency to understand the
requirements of her case plan and the termination proceedings and
whether a permanent guardianship pursuant to NRS 432B.466-.468
(2003) (amended 2015) was considered as an alternative to termination of
appellant's parental rights. Having considered the response, we conclude
that the issue of competency does not warrant reversal because appellant
was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, her competency
was never raised as an issue below, and the record does not include
substantial evidence that she was incompetent. See NRCP 17(c)
(requiring appointment of a guardian ad litem for an incompetent litigant
when the litigant is "not otherwise represented" or protected). Further, we
are unpersuaded by respondent Clark County Department of Family
Services' assertion that termination and adoption are preferred over the
establishment of a permanent guardianship under NRS 432B.466-.468
(2003) (amended 2015). A guardianship should be considered if it is in the
child's best interests, such as when maintaining contact with the natural
parent benefits the child. CASA v. Dep't of Servs. for Children, Youth and
Their Families, 834 A.2d 63, 66-67 (Del. 2003). Nevertheless, there is no
evidence here that the children's interests are better served by a
guardianship than by adoption.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the district
court's order granting the petition to terminate appellant's parental
rights. See In re Parental Rights as to A.J.G., 122 Nev. 1418, 1423, 148
P.3d 759, 763 (2006) (explaining that this court will uphold a termination
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order if the district court's factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence). Appellant failed to rebut the presumption in NRS 128.109(2)
(1999) (amended 2015) that termination is in the children's best interest
as they had resided outside of her care for 14 of 20 consecutive months at
the time of trial, and substantial evidence supports the district court's
finding that the children's best interests will be served by terminating
appellant's parental rights because the children are thriving under the
maternal grandmother's care and the maternal grandmother wishes to
adopt them. NRS 128.105(1) (1999) (amended 2015); A.J.G., 122 Nev. at
1423, 148 P.3d at 763.
Substantial evidence also supports the district court's finding
of parental fault.' A.J.G., 122 Nev. at 1423, 148 P.3d at 763; see NRS
128.105(2)(c)-(f) (1999) (amended 2015) (providing that parental fault is
established when the parent is unfit, the parent has failed to adjust the
circumstances that led to the child's removal, there is a risk of injury to
the child, or the parent has only made token efforts to eliminate the risk of
injury to the child). Appellant had over three years to comply with the
requirements in her case plan and not only did she fail to do so, but she
failed to make substantial progress during that time, and thus,
substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that she is an
'We note that while the district court's order provides that appellant
neglected the children, the court orally concluded the opposite at the trial.
Nevertheless, because only one ground of parental fault need be
established to terminate parental rights, it is unnecessary to consider
whether substantial evidence supports the district court's conclusion
regarding neglect. See NRS 128.105 (1999) (amended 2015) (providing
that termination of parental rights is appropriate when it is in the child's
best interest and one of the parental fault grounds has been established).
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unfit parent and failed to adjust the circumstances that led to the
children's removal. See A.J.G., 122 Nev. at 1423, 148 P.3d at 763.
Because appellant's failure to complete her individual counseling and
address her mental health issues prevented her from attending family
counseling with the children, substantial evidence supports the district
court's finding that the children are at risk of mental or emotional injury if
returned to appellant. Id. Additionally, appellant failed to rebut the
presumption in NRS 128.109(1)(a) (1999) (amended 2015) that she had
demonstrated only token efforts to eliminate the risk of injury to the
children as they had resided outside of her care for 14 of 20 consecutive
months at the time of trial . Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 2
710.4.31. j.
Parraguitir
, J.
Douglas Cherry
cc: Hon. Cynthia N. Giuliani, District Judge, Family Court Division
Angi L.A.
Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division
Gentile, Cristalli, Miller, Armeni & Savarese, PLLC
Eighth District Court Clerk
2To the extent appellant's arguments are not addressed in this
order, we conclude they lack merit.
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