Shinal, M., et ux, Aplts. v. Toms M.D., S. ( 2017 )


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  •                                  [J-106-2016] [MO:Wecht, J.]
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    MIDDLE DISTRICT
    MEGAN L. SHINAL AND ROBERT J.                             :   No. 31 MAP 2016
    SHINAL, HER HUSBAND,
    Appeal from the Order of the Superior
    Appellants                              Court dated August 25, 2015 at No.
    1714 MDA 2014, affirming the
    Judgment of the Court of Common
    v.                                            Pleas of Montour County, Civil Division,
    dated September 29, 2014 at No. 588 -
    CV -2009
    STEVEN A. TOMS, M.D.,
    ARGUED: November 2, 2016
    Appellee
    CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
    JUSTICE TODD                                                                     DECIDED: June 20, 2017
    I   join the Majority Opinion with the exception of the majority's formulation and
    application, in Part II.A.2, of its rule for determining whether a prospective juror should
    be dismissed on the ground that his employment relationship with a party-defendant is
    sufficiently close to warrant a presumption of prejudice.               In   my view, the majority's rule
    does not account for the circumstance, implicated herein, where a prospective juror
    perceives his relationship as closer than it actually is. For that reason, dissent, in part.
    I
    Specifically, three of the jurors challenged herein               -   Linda Woll, Denny Ackley,
    and W. Stephen Nagle       - testified   that they or close family members worked for the
    "same company" as the party -defendant, Dr. Steven Toms.'                           However, they or their
    1 See N.T. Jury Selection, 4/15/14, at 66 (R.R. at 246a) ("[Woll:] It is a big umbrella.
    Yes, we do work for the same company          .  ."); 
    id. at 71
    (R.R. at 251a) ("[The Court:]
    .   .
    Do you regard Dr. Toms as being employed by the same company as your wife?
    [Ackley:] Yes."); 
    id. at 130
    (R.R. at 310a) ("[The Court:] Would you regard your son and
    Dr. Toms as working for the same company? [Nagle:]                 suppose, yes."); Majority
    I
    Opinion at 28-31.
    family members actually worked for entities within Geisinger Health System's corporate
    structure other than the entity which employed Dr. Toms. The majority acknowledges
    the jurors' perceptions, but nevertheless evaluates only their actual employment
    relationships with Dr. Toms, ultimately determining that none of the jurors has a
    sufficiently close relationship to warrant a presumption of prejudice because, in part,
    and contrary to the jurors' perceptions, "none of the jurors worked directly for Dr. Toms'
    employer." Majority Opinion at 27.
    In   my view, where a prospective juror's perceived relationship with a party-
    defendant differs from his actual relationship, it is the former that should guide the trial
    court in determining whether the prospective juror may view his interests and the party -
    defendant's as aligned, and, thus, whether to presume prejudice. Indeed, it is a juror's
    perception of his relationship with, rather than his actual relationship with, the party -
    defendant that warrants our concern that he may be biased. See Majority Opinion at 12
    (citing United States   v.   Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C. D.Va. 1807) ("Why is it that the
    most distant relative of a party cannot serve upon his jury?            .   .   .   The real reason of the
    rule is, that the law suspects the relative of partiality; suspects his mind to be under a
    bias, which will prevent his fairly hearing and fairly deciding on the testimony which may
    be offered to him."). In this regard, my focus on a juror's perceptions, rather than fact, is
    in accord with then -Judge, now -Justice Donohue's position in Cordes v.                    Associates of
    Internal Medicine, 
    87 A.3d 829
    (Pa. Super. 2014), albeit she stressed juror perceptions
    of the impact of a judgment, rather than the employment relationship.                       See 
    id. at 869
    (Opinion in Support of Reversal by Donohue, J.) (opining that a juror's view that a
    judgment against a party -defendant would negatively impact his own employer, even if
    mistaken, warrants his dismissal for cause). As a result, in the instant case,                     I   would
    consider whether a person holding the misapprehension that Woll, Ackley, or Nagle
    [J-106-2016] [MO: Wecht, J.]   -   2
    held might view his interests and the party -defendant's interests to be aligned,
    warranting a presumption of bias. On that question, in my view, a person deriving his
    income from (or whose close family members derive their income from) an employer
    may well view his (or his loved ones') financial interests as aligned with the employer's
    financial and reputational interests, and, thus, be predisposed to protect its employees
    from professional liability or embarrassment. Additionally, although not argued herein, a
    juror called upon to decide issues that might bear on his employer's financial or
    reputational interests may feel he has an interest in aiding his employer to curry favor or
    avoid reprobation.
    Accordingly,   I   would hold that Woll, Ackley, and Nagle should have been
    dismissed for cause and would grant a new trial on that basis as well.2 For that reason,
    I   dissent, in part.
    2 With respect to Nagle, additionally disagree with the majority's view that he believed
    I
    a judgment against Dr. Toms would not negatively impact his employer. Although
    Nagle indicated as much, he subsequently acknowledged that a judgment would
    negatively impact his employer via "the knowledge in the community through the
    newspapers and the news media and so forth.              think that any time that any
    .   .   .   I
    Geisinger physician gets a negative result there is bound to be some impact on the
    community."      N.T. Jury Selection, 4/15/14, at 130-131 (R.R. at 310a -311a).
    Accordingly, would hold that Nagle should have been dismissed on this basis as well.
    I
    Nevertheless, because, in my view, Woll's or Ackley's empanelment alone is sufficient
    to warrant a grant of a new trial, express no view as to whether the failure to dismiss
    I
    Nagle was harmless error because he was empaneled as an alternate juror.
    [J-106-2016] [MO: Wecht, J.]          -   3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Shinal, M., et ux, Aplts. v. Toms M.D., S. - No. 31 MAP 2016

Filed Date: 6/20/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/20/2017