Kancilia v. Claymore and Dirk Ltd. P'ship. ( 2014 )

 judgment as a matter of law, NRCP 56(c); Wood, 121 Nev. at 729, 121 P.3d
at 1029, including when the statute of limitations bars a cause of action.
Clark v. Robison, 113 Nev. 949, 950-51, 944 P.2d 788, 789 (1997).
Appellant argues on appeal that the statute of limitations was
tolled until he discovered facts giving rise to the claims and that he did not
discover such facts until 2005, when respondents allegedly ceased
communicating with him Nevada requires causes of action for breach of
fiduciary duty, conversion, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation to be
brought within three years, NRS 11.190(3)(c)-(d); Nev. State Bank v.
Jamison Family P'ship, 106 Nev. 792, 799-800, 801 P.2d 1377, 1382
(1990), and causes of action for negligence to be brought within two years.
NRS 11.190(4)(e). The causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud,
and negligent misrepresentation are deemed to begin to accrue on the
discovery of the facts constituting the breach or fraud. NRS 11.190(3)(d).
Here, the record demonstrates that appellant was aware of the
facts giving rise to his causes of action by September 22, 2002, at the
latest, as his e-mails to respondent Jennifer De Lima attest. Appellant's
affidavit in support of his motion for summary judgment likewise asserts
that he learned that respondents had made false representations to him
regarding his accounts in 2002. Thus, the statute of limitations had run
on appellant's causes of action by September 22, 2005, at the latest. See
Day v. Zubel, 112 Nev. 972, 977, 922 P.2d 536, 539 (1996) (noting that
determining the date when the statute of limitations began to run is a
question of law if the facts are uncontroverted).
Appellant further argues that the statute of limitations was
tolled for the period in which he exercised due diligence in investigating
facts related to his suspected causes of action without actually knowing
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the salient facts. Under the discovery rule, a cause accrues when the
plaintiff knew the facts constituting the elements of that cause of action or
reasonably should have known those facts through the exercise of due
diligence in investigating. Bemis v. Estate of Bemis, 114 Nev. 1021, 1025,
967 P.2d 437, 440 (1998). If uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that a
plaintiff either discovered or should have discovered the facts giving rise
to the cause of action, the cause may be dismissed on statute of limitations
grounds. Id. Although appellant contends that he exercised due diligence
in investigating the relevant facts between 2002 and 2005, his 2002 e-
mails demonstrate that he already knew the facts giving rise to his causes
of action, which thus accrued in 2002. Thus, we conclude that no
questions of fact exist regarding the discovery rule so as to warrant
reversal.'
Finally, appellant contends that laches does not warrant
judgment for respondents because the delay provided respondents with
additional time to destroy relevant documents and equity should favor his
'We need not consider appellant's argument that the statute of
limitations was tolled as to appellant's children, who are not parties to
this appeal. A proper person party may not represent other parties.
Salman v. Newell, 110 Nev. 1333, 1336, 885 P.2d 607, 608 (1994).
Appellant's guardianship for his children terminated when his children
attained the age of majority, at which point his adult children must be
substituted as parties on their own behalf. Ricord v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co.,
15 Nev. 167, 175 (1880) (concluding that it was error when a minor was
not substituted as a party for his guardian when he reached the age of
majority at the time of trial); cf. 39 Am. Jur. 2d Guardian & Ward § 75
(2008) ("A guardianship for a minor terminates when the ward attains
majority."). Thus, appellant may not appeal on behalf of his adult
children, who did not file instruments on their own behalf to commence an
appeal, despite having filed substitutions of counsel with the district court
to represent their own interests in proper person.
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causes of action as he was the victim of the purported fraudulent acts. We
disagree. Laches is an equitable doctrine that applies when one party
causes delay that prejudices the other party such that granting relief to
the delaying party would be inequitable. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
v. Pub. Works Board, 108 Nev. 605, 610-11, 836 P.2d 633, 636-37 (1992).
In determining whether laches bars an action, we consider whether the
plaintiff inexcusably delayed filing suit, and if yes, whether the plaintiffs
inexcusable delay constitutes acquiescence to the condition challenged and
whether the inexcusable delay prejudiced others. Miller v. Burk, 124 Nev.
579, 598, 188 P.3d 1112, 1125 (2008).
The appellate record in this case does not support a finding
that appellant's delay in filing suit in 2008 after learning of the facts
giving rise to his claim in 2002 was excusable. See Carson City v. Price,
113 Nev. 409, 412, 934 P.2d 1042, 1043 (1997) (noting that the
applicability of laches depends on the facts of the case); cf. Adair v.
Hustace, 640 P.2d 294, 300-03 (Haw. 1982) (declining to disturb a jury
finding of laches when plaintiff unduly and unreasonably delayed bringing
his claim after learning of the facts giving rise to his claim). As a result of
this delay, respondents destroyed certain documents within the terms of
their documentation retention policies that would not have been destroyed
had appellant timely filed his suit, and thus, the delay prejudiced
respondents by impairing their ability to present evidence supporting
their positions that otherwise would have been available. See Price, 113
Nev. at 412, 934 P.2d at 1042 (noting that the court may apply laches
when the condition of the party asserting laches has become so changed
that it cannot be restored to its prior state). Thus, we conclude that
applying the equitable doctrine of laches was appropriate. See Bldg. &
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Constr. Trades Council, 108 Nev. at 610-11, 836 P.2d at 636-37.
Therefore, appellant's arguments regarding laches do not warrant
reversal.
For the reasons discussed above, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 2
Pickering
0....aceenrg.
Parraguirre
Cliaf
Saitta
cc: Chief Judge, The Eighth Judicial District Court
Hon. Sally Loehrer, Senior Judge
Dirk Kancilia
Larry D. Hankins
Larry C. Johns
Eighth District Court Clerk
2Having considered appellant's other arguments, we conclude that
these arguments do not warrant reversal.
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