County of Lyon v. Giron ( 2015 )

 Giron subsequently appealed the hearing officer's decision
regarding the RTAA, and an appeals officer consolidated that appeal with
the appeal of Lyon County and PACT. The RTAA moved to dismiss
Giron's appeal on the grounds that it was untimely. The appeals officer
denied the RTANs motion.
The appeals officer affirmed the hearing officer's decision
finding only Lyon County liable for Giron's workers' compensation
benefits. Lyon County and PACT filed a petition for judicial review of the
appeals officer's decision in the district court. The RTAA filed a cross-
petition for judicial review, contending that the appeals officer lacked
jurisdiction to address the merits of Giron's appeal of the decision
regarding the RTAA's liability. The district court denied Lyon County and
PACT's petition and granted the RTAA's cross-petition. Lyon County and
PACT now appeal both petitions.
An RTAA security officer is a police officer under NRS 617.135
The RTAA argues that because the position of an RTAA
security officer is not explicitly included under NRS 617.135's definition of
police officer, an RTAA security officer is not a police officer for the
purposes of NRS 617.457(1).
Our review of an administrative agency's decision is identical
to that of the district court. Elizondo v. Hood Mach., Inc., 129 Nev. Adv.
Op. No. 84, 312 P.3d 479, 482 (2013). "Although we normally defer to an
agency's conclusions of law [that] are closely related to its view of the
facts," we independently review purely legal issues, including matters of
statutory interpretation. Harrah's Operating Co. v. State, Dep't of
Taxation, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 15, 321 P.3d 850, 852 (2014) (alteration
in original) (internal quotations omitted).
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"The ultimate goal of interpreting statutes is to effectuate the
Legislature's intent." In re CityCenter Constr. & Lien Master Litig., 129
Nev. Adv. Op. No. 70, 310 P.3d 574. 578 (2013). We interpret clear and
unambiguous statutes based on their plain meaning. Cromer v. Wilson,
126 Nev. 106, 109, 225 P.3d 788, 790 (2010). A statute is ambiguous if it
"is capable of being understood in two or more senses by reasonably
informed persons." McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 649, 730
P.2d 438, 442 (1986). When a statute is ambiguous, "[we] consult other
sources such as legislative history, legislative intent and analogous
statutory provisions." State, Div. of Ins. v. State Farm, 116 Nev. 290, 294,
995 P.2d 482, 485 (2000). We will "constru[e] the statute in a manner that
conforms to reason and public policy," Great Basin Water Network v. State
Eng'r, 126 Nev. 187, 196, 234 P.3d 912, 918 (2010), and "seek to avoid an
interpretation that leads to an absurd result." City Plan Deu. v. State,
Labor Comm'r, 121 Nev. 419, 435, 117 P.3d 182, 192 (2005).
Ordinarily, an injured employee must show that his or her
injury "arose out of and in the course of his or her employment" to be
eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits. NRS 616C.150(1). In
contrast, police officers who seek workers' compensation benefits for heart
disease are excused from having to prove that the disease arose out of and
in the course of employment. NRS 617.457(1). In relevant part, NRS
617.135, which defines "police officer" for the purpose of workers'
compensation, states: 'Police officer' includes[ ] . . . [a] sheriff, deputy
sheriff, officer of a metropolitan police department or city police officer."
Neither RTAA security officer nor quasi-municipal police officer is among
the professions listed in NRS 617.135.
When a statute "employs the term 'includes' when prefacing
its definition of [a term], [it] indicates that the definition is not all-
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inclusive. MGM Mirage v. Nevada Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 125 Nev. 223, 230,
209 P.3d 766, 771 (2009); see also Frame v. Nehls, 550 N.W.2d 739, 742
(Mich. 1996) (stating that the word "includes," when used in the text of a
statute, "can be . . . a term of [either] enlargement or of limitation"). Thus,
the omission of an RTAA security officer from NRS 617.135 is not
dispositive, and this statute is ambiguous as to whether an RTAA security
officer is considered within the statutory definition of a police officer.
Therefore, we next consult the legislative history of NRS 617.135 and NRS
617.457(1) to discern the Legislature's intent in enacting these statutes.'
The legislative history of NRS 617.457 shows that the
Legislature intended to cover individuals engaged in specific occupations
that could more readily cause heart disease. For example, Senator Bill
Farr stated that the bill, which became NRS 617.457, would "protect those
individuals who, through stress, strain, hypertension, and excitement in
the performance of their duties" developed heart disease. Hearing on S.B.
224 Before the Senate Conf. Comm., 55th Leg. (Nev., March 18, 1969)
(testimony of Senator Bill Farr). When it was first enacted, the bill only
included firefighters, and not police officers. See NRS 617.457 (1969).
Senator John Fransway stated that although they had not been able to
pass it at the time with police officers included, police officers would be
included in a future bill because they faced similar risks for heart disease.
Hearing on S.B. 224 Before the Senate Conf. Comm., 55th Leg. (Nev.,
'NRS 617.135 was not enacted until 1981, twelve years after NRS
617.457 was enacted. Prior to 1981, the list of occupations covered by
NRS 617.457 were included in the statute itself and not defined in a
separate statute. See NRS 617.457 (1975). Therefore, in discussing the
legislative history of NRS 617.457 and NRS 617.135, we necessarily focus
on that of NRS 617.457.
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March 18, 1969) (testimony of Senator John Fransway). Senator
Fransway's statement suggests that the later addition of police officers to
the statute was for the same reason that the statute was originally
enacted for firefighters: to cover those whose heart diseases could be
brought on by the unique stress of their employment. See id.
NRS 617.457 was later amended to include various law
enforcement officers, including DMV field agents and inspectors. 1981
Nev. Stat., ch. 339, § 2, at 623-24. William Goddard, speaking on behalf of
the DMV in support of the amendment, stated that the DMV field agents
and inspectors should be covered under the bill because "Nis agents have
the same duties, powers and responsibilities as the Nevada Highway
Patrol Officers. They are uniformed officers . . . [and t]hey make arrests
and assist other agencies." Hearing on A.B. 32 Before the Assembly Labor
Comm., 61st Leg. (Nev., February 9, 1981) (testimony of Mr. William
Goddard). Mr. Goddard's testimony suggests that amendments to include
additional occupations for coverage under NRS 617.457 were contemplated
because such occupations were similar to those already covered by the
statute, and thus, were at similar risk for heart disease that could be
brought on by the unique stress of their employment.
An RTAA security officer is similar to the other professions
listed under NRS 617.135(1)'s non-exhaustive definition of police officer.
For example, an RTAA security officer "has the powers and must have the
training required of a law enforcement officer." Reno-Tahoe Airport Auth.
Act, § 10(13). Similarly, an RTAA security officer "shall be deemed to be a
peace officer for the purposes of determining retirement benefits under the
Public Employees' Retirement System." Id. Other airports in
Nevada, such as McCarran Airport in Clark County, are under the
jurisdiction of the city or county in which they are located and thus
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are policed by city or county police officers, who are specifically listed
under NRS 617.135. See Airport Bureau of the Las Vegas Metro. Police
Dep't, http://www lvmp d.com/Sections/Airport/tabid/167/D efault. aspx . See
generally 49 C.F.R. §§ 1540, 1542 (2014).
Excluding an RTAA security officer, who has nearly the same
powers, training, and retirement benefits of a metropolitan or city police
officer, from a definition of police officer that includes those occupations,
as well as that of "investigator of the Division of Compliance Enforcement
of the Department of Motor Vehicles," NRS 617.135(8), would produce an
absurd result. See City Plan Dev., 121 Nev. at 435, 117 P.3d at 192.
Therefore, we hold that an RTAA security officer is a police officer for the
purposes of NRS 617.135.
Lyon County and PACT are not liable for Giron's benefits under the last
injurious exposure rule
The last injurious exposure rule resolves which employer is
liable for workers' compensation benefits owed to an employee who
incurred an industrial injury while working for one employer and then
sustained a subsequent, related industrial injury while working for
another employer. Las Vegas Hous. Auth. v. Root, 116 Nev. 864, 866, 8
P.3d 143, 144 (2000). This rule imposes full liability on the most recent
employer for a new injury or the "aggravation of a prior injury that bears
even a slight causal relation to the disability." Grover C. Dils Med. Ctr. u.
Menditto, 121 Nev. 278, 284, 112 P.3d 1093, 1097-98 (2005). As it relates
to NRS 617.457(1)'s statutory presumption, the last injurious exposure
rule "places responsibility for compensation [for the injury] on the
employer [to whom the presumption applies] in closest temporal proximity
to the disabling event." Emp'rs Ins. Co. of Nev. v. Daniels, 122 Nev. 1009,
1011, 145 P.3d 1024, 1025-26 (2006).
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Here, Giron had his disabling event while employed as a
security officer by the RTAA. Because we have determined that an RTAA
security officer is a police officer for the purposes of NRS 617.135, we
conclude that the RTAA is the employer to whom NRS 617.457's
presumption applies and is in closest temporal proximity to the disabling
event. Therefore, Lyon County and PACT are absolved of liability for
Giron's workers' compensation benefits under the last injurious exposure
rule.
The appeals officer did not have jurisdiction over the RTAA
"Any party aggrieved by a decision of the hearing officer
relating to a [workers' compensation] claim" must file "a notice of
appeal. . . within 30 days after the date of the decision." NRS 616C.345.
Here, Giron failed to file an appeal of the hearing officer's
decision denying the RTAA's liability within the 30 days required by NRS
616C.345. Furthermore, Giron's appeal does not fall under one of NRS
616C.345's exceptions to the statutory time limit. Therefore, the appeals
officer lacked jurisdiction over the RTAA. 2
2 LyonCounty and PACT also argue that the appeals officer had the
authority to join the RTAA under NRCP 20(a) or, alternatively, had the
authority to ignore the statute of limitations under this court's decision in
Ayala v. Caesars Palace, 119 Nev. 232, 71 P.3d 490 (2003). However, they
fail to identify any meaningful authority in support of how joinder can
defeat a lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the appeals officer. We also
find Ayala to be inapposite to the present case. In Ayala, the court held
that "[o]nce the jurisdiction of the appeals officer is invoked," the appeals
officer has jurisdiction to hear "any matter raised before [the appeals
officer] on its merits." 119 Nev. at 236, 71 P.3d at 492 (citation omitted).
In the present case, however, jurisdiction over the RTAA was never
properly invoked by the appeals officer.
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Conclusion
Because Lyon County and PACT were not liable under the last
injurious exposure rule, the district court erred in denying their petition
for judicial review. Furthermore, because the appeals officer lacked
jurisdiction over the RTAA, the district court did not err in granting
RTANs cross-petition for judicial review. 3 Therefore, we
ORDER the district court's grant of RTAA's cross-petition for
judicial review AFFIRMED and REVERSE AND REMAND the district
court's denial of Lyon County and PACT's petition for judicial review to
the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.
J.
J.
Gibbons
Pickering 7 Johns.
3 We find that Lyon County and PACT's argument that the RTAA is
estopped or has waived the right to challenge the timeliness of Giron's
appeal is without merit because a party's conduct during litigation or
consent cannot establish a court's jurisdiction where it would not
otherwise exist. See Vaile v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 118 Nev. 262,
275, 44 P.3d 506, 515 (2002) ("Parties may not confer jurisdiction upon the
court by their consent when jurisdiction does not otherwise exist.").
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cc: Hon. William Rogers, District Judge
Laurie A. Yott, Settlement Judge
Thorndal Armstrong Delk Balkenbush & Eisinger/Reno
McDonald Carano Wilson LLP/Reno
Nevada Attorney for Injured Workers/Carson City
Third District Court Clerk
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