State v. Smith (Terrance) ( 2015 )

 a clear showing of an abuse of discretion." Bryant 102 Nev. at 272, 721
P.2d at 368.
Smith argued that his no-contest plea was not voluntary
because it was coerced by representations that it was the only way that
the Washoe County Department of Social Services (DSS) would fully
reunite his wife and child. The district court made the following factual
findings, which the State does not dispute: Smith's two-month-old
daughter suffered a spiral fracture of her femur on November 30, 2010,
purportedly while in Smith's care. Smith has always maintained his
innocence of child abuse, but DSS concluded that Smith broke the leg in
an act of child abuse and instituted an emergency safety plan. While
Smith's wife often had physical custody, DSS had legal, and at times
physical, custody of the infant. DSS's consent to reunifying Smith's wife
and child both physically and legally "was solely dependent upon [Smith's]
incarceration." After Smith was sentenced to prison in May 2012, DSS
closed the case, returning legal and physical custody of the child to the
mother. Based on its findings, the district court concluded that Smith was
coerced into pleading no contest. The State argues on appeal that DSS's
actions did not coerce Smith's no-contest plea.
The State first argues that the district court ignored
important facts regarding Smith's behavior with DSS and regarding DSS's
intent to protect the child. However, this evidence was presented to the
district court, and it was the district court's province to weigh the evidence
and state the facts as it found them. See NRS 34.830(1); see also Bryant,
102 Nev. at 272, 721 P.2d at 367-68 (noting the factual nature of an
invalid-plea claim and that it is "the duty of the trial court to review the
entire record to determine whether the plea was valid").
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The State next argues that Smith's analogy to package plea
deals, where a defendant pleads guilty in order to benefit a third party,
does not apply. The district court did not base its decision on Smith's
analogy.
The State next argues that the plea was not coerced just
because it was motivated by a desire to avoid a more serious consequence.
The district court specifically found, however, that there was no evidence
to support the theory that Smith entered the no-contest plea to avoid a
greater charge or to get a lesser penalty. Rather, the district court found
that Smith was motivated by the "unique" circumstances of DSS's
"inflexible," "unyielding," and "uncompromising" position in his family
court case. The State has not demonstrated that the district court's
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or exceeded the bounds of law or
reason. See Jackson v. State, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001)
(defining "abuse of discretion").
The State finally argues that nothing about DSS's actions
were unconstitutional and implies that constitutional, lawful actions of an
agency cannot amount to coercion. In support, the State cites only to Plea
v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1986), but that case tends to support the
opposite conclusion. The defendant in that case argued that his guilty
plea was coerced by a threat from his brother to withdraw bail and a
threat from his counsel to withdraw from the case if he took it to trial.
Iaea, 800 F.2d at 866-67. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals observed
that voluntariness is determined based on an examination of the totality
of the circumstances and, therefore, "[Alien a guilty plea is challenged as
being the product of coercion, [the court's] concern is not solely with the
subjective state of mind of the defendant, but also with the constitutional
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acceptability of the external forces inducing the guilty plea." Id. at 866.
The reference to the "constitutional acceptability of the external forces
inducing the guilty plea" does not relate to the constitutionality of the
external forces in isolation but instead relates to whether the external
•
forces, such as promises or threats, deprived the plea of the nature of a
voluntary act, making the plea involuntary. See id. at 866-67. This is
reflected in the Ninth Circuit's decision to remand in laea for _the district
court to determine whether the threats were made and, if so, to consider
their coercive impact on the voluntariness of the plea, without finding that
either challenged action was unconstitutional. Id. at 867-68. laea thus
suggests that actions that may be lawful and constitutional can be unduly
coercive and thereby render a plea involuntary.
We conclude that the State has failed to demonstrate that the
district court abused its discretion in granting the petition. Accordingly,
we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 1
Saitta
, J.
'We need not address Smith's argument that the district court's
decision could be affirmed based on an alternative ground (newly
discovered evidence) that was rejected below.
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cc: Hon. Scott N. Freeman, District Judge
Attorney General/Carson City
Washoe County District Attorney
Richard F. Cornell
Washoe District Court Clerk
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