Frauenfeld v. Dist. Ct. (State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles) ( 2016 )


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  •                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    MATTHEW FRAUENFELD,                                   No. 70370
    Petitioner,
    vs.
    THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
    IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
    CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
    FILED
    KERRY LOUISE EARLEY, DISTRICT                            MAY 2 3 2016
    JUDGE,
    TRACIE K. LINDEMAN .
    Respondents,                                         CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
    and                                                 BY
    DEPUTY CLERK
    THE STATE OF NEVADA
    DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
    Real Party in Interest.
    ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
    WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION
    This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
    challenges the district court's refusal to expedite a petition for judicial
    review of a driver's license revocation on the ground that the revocation
    period will expire on May 30, 2016, arguably rendering the proceedings
    moot under Langston v. State, Department of Motor Vehicles,              
    110 Nev. 342
    , 
    871 P.2d 362
    (1994).
    Having reviewed petitioner Matthew Frauenfeld's petition and
    appendices, as well as real party in interest State of Nevada, Department
    of Motor Vehicles' answer thereto, we conclude that our extraordinary
    intervention is not warranted. NRS 34.160 (mandamus is available to
    compel a legally required action); NRS 34.320 (prohibition is available to
    arrest acts taken in excess of jurisdiction); Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
    Court, 
    120 Nev. 222
    , 228, 
    88 P.3d 840
    , 844 (2004) (noting that the
    petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is
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    warranted). In particular, Frauenfeld challenged his license revocation in
    a full evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge and has
    alleged no violation of that process. Although he asserts that his case
    cannot receive full judicial review without expediting that procedure, he
    has not demonstrated that this interferes with his constitutional right to
    due process. See State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety v. Root,    
    113 Nev. 942
    , 947, 
    944 P.2d 784
    , 787 (1997); see also Mackey v. Montrym, 
    443 U.S. 1
    , 11, (1979) (discussing due process rights with respect to driver's
    license revocation procedures); Carroll v. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 
    907 N.E.2d 16
    , 23 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) ("There is no constitutional due process right to
    judicial review of an administrative decision.").
    Further, NRS 233B.133(6) provides that "[t]he court, for good
    cause, may extend the times allowed in this section for filing memoranda."
    Frauenfeld has not shown that the briefing deadlines set forth in NRS
    233B.133 are necessarily subject to shortening as well as extension,
    despite the statute's failure to so state.   See In re Estate of Prestie, 
    122 Nev. 807
    , 814, 
    138 P.3d 520
    , 524 (2006) ("We have previously recognized
    the fundamental rule of statutory construction that the mention of one
    thing implies the exclusion of another." (internal alterations and quotation
    marks omitted)); Waite v. Burgess, 
    69 Nev. 230
    , 233-34 
    245 P.2d 994
    , 996
    (1952) (indicating that the legislature may set fixed time limits for
    individuals' actions but not for the actions of courts); cf. Urshan v.
    Musicians' Credit Union, 
    15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839
    , 843-44 (Ct. App. 2004)
    (noting that courts do not have authority to shorten statutory minimum
    notice periods for summary judgment hearings).
    Finally, we are not convinced that the future deprivation
    alleged—Frauenfeld's inability to pursue his challenge to the
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    administrative decision and revocation after the revocation period's
    expiration—will necessarily come to pass. In   Langston, we concluded that
    the expiration of the driver's license revocation period rendered the appeal
    
    moot. 110 Nev. at 343-44
    , 871 P.2d at 363. In that case, however, the
    appellant had not cogently argued that a collateral consequence exception
    applied and we concluded that the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-
    review exception did not apply because the issues were factually specific to
    the appellant.   
    Id. Here, it
    is unclear whether any exceptions to the
    mootness doctrine might apply. Therefore, we
    ORDER the petition DENIED.
    Hardesty
    (15aat
    Saitta
    cc: Hon. Kerry Louise Earley, District Judge
    The Hayes Law Firm
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Attorney General/Las Vegas
    Eighth District Court Clerk
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