Nev. Dep't of Corrs. v. York Claims Servs. , 2015 NV 25 ( 2015 )

131 Nev., Advance Opinion 25
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF No. 64473
CORRECTIONS; AND NEVADA RISK
MANAGEMENT,
Appellants, FILED
vs.
YORK CLAIMS SERVICES, INC.; AND MAY 0 7 2015
WASHWORKS RAINBOW, LLC, TRACI . K LINDEMAN
CLE 0 SU JEML T
Respondents. BY
Pa)? CLERK
Appeal from a district court order granting judicial review in a
workers' compensation matter. First Judicial District Court, Carson City;
James E. Wilson, Judge.
Reversed.
Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, and Clark G. Leslie, Senior Deputy
Attorney General, Carson City,
for Appellant Nevada Department of Corrections.
Beckett, Yott, McCarty & Spann and James A. McCarty, Reno,
for Appellant Nevada Risk Management.
Gordon Silver and Anjali D. Webster, John P. Desmond, and Molly Malone
Rezac, Reno,
for Respondents.
BEFORE SAITTA, GIBBONS and PICKERING, JJ.
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OPINION
By the Court, GIBBONS, J.:
Appellants Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and
State of Nevada Risk Management are contesting the district court's
finding that they, and not respondent York Claims Services, Inc., are
responsible for Jonathan Piper's workers' compensation coverage
stemming from two incidents in which Piper was injured. At the
administrative level, the appeals officer found York liable for Piper's
workers' compensation coverage for both injuries. Upon judicial review,
the district court set aside the appeals officer's decision, finding that
NDOC was responsible for Piper's workers' compensation coverage
pursuant to NRS 616B.028(1). We conclude that the district court erred in
setting aside the decision of the appeals officer because NRS 616B.028(1)
does not apply to offenders like Piper, who are participating in the work
release program.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2010, Jonathan Piper, who was convicted and imprisoned
for burglary two years earlier, was transferred to Casa Grande
Transitional Housing in Las Vegas, Nevada, to serve out the remainder of
his sentence. Casa Grande is similar to a halfway house and is operated
by NDOC for offenders participating in NDOC's work release program.
Among other various rules and restrictions, an offender at Casa Grande
must either have a job or be in the process of searching for a job in the
private sector.
Washworks Rainbow, LLC, a full-service car wash in Las
Vegas, hired Piper to wipe down vehicles after they were washed.
Washworks paid premiums on behalf of Piper to York so that Piper was
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covered under its workers' compensation insurance coverage, just as
Washworks did for all of its employees. After discovering that Piper had a
background in gardening, Washworks' owner, Richard Olden, asked Piper
to trim some trees on Washworks' property. While trimming the trees,
Piper fell off his ladder and struck his head on the ground. Piper,
rendered unconscious by the fall, suffered a traumatic brain injury and
was taken to the hospital. An emergency craniotomy was performed in
order to accommodate brain swelling, essentially saving Piper's life. Over
the next four months, Piper underwent various brain surgeries and was
transferred between hospitals and rehabilitation centers.
Following Piper's injury, Olden submitted the standard
insurance forms he used anytime an employee was injured. York, the
workers' compensation insurance provider for Washworks, notified Piper
that it denied his claim from his ladder fall. York asserted that Piper was
in the legal custody of NDOC while working at Washworks. Thus, York
asserted that pursuant to NRS 209.492 and NRS 616B.028, NDOC was
financially responsible for Piper's workers' compensation coverage under
its own insurance program.
NDOC and co-appellant Risk Management appealed York's
denial of coverage to the State of Nevada Department of Administration
Hearings Division. The assigned hearing officer found that York's denial
of Piper's claim was improper. The hearing officer concluded that York
was responsible for coverage because Piper was injured in the course and
scope of his employment at Washworks.
Eight days later, while walking around his recovery facility,
Piper suffered a major seizure and fell, striking his head. Once again
Piper required emergency brain surgery. York notified Piper that it would
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not cover any medical charges following the date of his second head injury.
York asserted that Piper's second head injury was not work-related nor
was it a result of his first head injury because the seizure was a
nonindustrial intervening event.
Following York's second coverage denial, Piper, NDOC, Risk
Management, and York stipulated to forego the initial hearing on York's
second denial of coverage and consolidate both issues—York's challenge of
the hearing officer's decision and Piper's challenge of York's second
denial—before an appeals officer. The hearing officer granted the
stipulation.
Following two days of hearings and written closing
statements, the appeals officer was tasked with determining two issues.
First, whether the hearing officer's decision finding York responsible for
Piper's workers' compensation coverage from his first injury was correct.
Second, whether Piper's seizure was an intervening act precluding York
from responsibility for workers' compensation coverage for Piper's second
injury.
The appeals officer found York liable for workers'
compensation coverage for both of Piper's injuries. As to the first issue,
the appeals officer found York liable because it found that Piper was an
employee of Washworks. Further, the appeals officer found that York's
reliance on NRS 616B.028 was without merit. As to the second issue, the
appeals officer again agreed with NDOC, finding that the first injury was
the substantial contributing cause of Piper's second injury.
York then petitioned for judicial review of the appeals officer's
decision. On review, the district court focused entirely on York's NRS
616B.028 argument. The district court posited that the critical question is
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"what did the legislature intend when it used the term 'work program' in
NRS 616B.028(1)." After a plain-language reading, the district court
found that "work program" in NRS 616B.028(1) included the work release
program. Thus, the district court concluded that York was not responsible
for workers' compensation coverage because NDOC was responsible under
NRS 616B.028(1). Accordingly, the district court set aside the appeals
officer's decision. NDOC appealed the district court's order.
DISCUSSION
NDOC argues that the district court misinterpreted NRS
616B.028 because it was not meant to apply to a participant, like Piper, in
the work release program. We agree.
Standard of review
"On appeal from orders deciding petitions for judicial review,
this court reviews the administrative decision in the same manner as the
district court." Nassiri v. Chiropractic Physicians' Bd., 130 Nev., Adv. Op.
27, 327 P.3d 487, 489 (2014); see also Kay v. Nunez, 122 Nev. 1100, 1105,
146 P.3d 801, 805 (2006) ("[T]his court affords no deference to the district
court's ruling in judicial review matters.").
"We review the factual determinations of administrative
agencies for clear error 'in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
evidence on the whole record' or for an 'abuse of discretion.'" Nassiri, 130
Nev., Adv. Op. 27, 327 P.3d at 489 (quoting NRS 233B.135(3)(e), (0).
"Thus, factual findings will only be overturned if they are not supported by
substantial evidence, which, we have explained, is evidence that a
reasonable mind could accept as adequately supporting the agency's
conclusions." Id. at 489.
We review questions of law de novo. City of N. Las Vegas v.
Warburton, 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 62, 262 P.3d 715, 718 (2011); see NRS
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233B.135(3)(a)-(d). "Although statutory construction is generally a
question of law reviewed de novo, this court defer [s] to an agency's
interpretation of its governing statutes or regulations if the interpretation
is within the language of the statute." Taylor v. State, Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 99, 314 P.3d 949, 951 (2013) (internal
quotations omitted).
The district court misinterpreted NRS 616B.028
NRS 616B.028(1) entitles a person to "coverage under the
modified program of industrial insurance established by regulations
adopted by the Division" if that person is an "offender confmed at the state
prison, while engaged in work in a prison industry or work program."
NDOC argues that the district court erred when it found that
"work program" in NRS 616B.028(1) encompasses the work release
program that Piper participated in. In response, York argues that the
district court correctly determined that the plain and ordinary meaning of
NRS 616B .028 shows that the work release program falls within the ambit
1 NRS 616B.028(1) reads, in pertinent part:
Any offender confined at the state prison, while
engaged in work in a prison industry or work
program, whether the program is operated by an
institution of the Department of Corrections, by
contract with a public entity or by a private
employer, is entitled to coverage under the
modified program of industrial insurance
established by regulations adopted by the Division
if the Director of the Department of Corrections
complies with the provisions of the regulations,
and coverage is approved by a private carrier.
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of "work program." Each side relies upon a number of statutory
construction arguments in support of its position.
"[W]hen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, a
court should give that language its ordinary meaning and not go beyond
it." Employers Ins. Co. of Nev. v. Chandler, 117 Nev. 421, 425, 23 P.3d
255, 258 (2001). In conducting a plain language reading, we avoid an
"interpretation that renders language meaningless or superfluous." In re
George J., 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 32, 279 P.3d 187, 190 (2012) (internal
quotations omitted). "If, however, a statute is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous, and the plain meaning rule
does not apply." Savage v. Pierson, 123 Nev. 86, 89, 157 P.3d 697, 699
(2007). "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined
[not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the specific
context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the
statute as a whole." Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. „ 135 S. Ct.
1074, 1081-82 (2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). When a statute is ambiguous, we
construe it 'consistently with what reason and public policy would
indicate the Legislature intended." Star Ins. Co. v. Neighbors, 122 Nev.
773, 776, 138 P.3d 507, 510 (2006) (quoting Banegas v. State Indus. Ins.
Sys., 117 Nev. 222, 225, 19 P.3d 245, 247 (2001)). Furthermore, when a
statute is ambiguous we "may look to [its] legislative history to ascertain
the Legislature's intent." Potter v. Potter, 121 Nev. 613, 616, 119 P.3d
1246, 1248 (2005).
We conclude that "work program" in NRS 616B.028(1) is
"subject to more than one reasonable interpretation" and is thus
ambiguous. Savage, 123 Nev. at 89, 157 P.3d at 699. On the one hand,
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"work program" could be broadly construed to include the work release
program, as the district court concluded. On the other hand, it could be
narrowly construed to refer to a specific type of program under the
auspices of the prison industries. A plain reading does not indicate one
way over the other. Context is unhelpful because NRS 616B.028 is found
in a different chapter than the statutes controlling prison industries and
the work release program, NRS Chapters 209 and 213, respectively, and
the phrase "work program" does not appear on its own in either chapter.
Reading NRS 616B.028(1) broadly, as the district court did, begs the
question of why the Legislature would not have simply used the phrase
"work release program," considering that the alternative, prison industry,
was already provided for. This interpretation renders "release" in "work
release program" meaningless. Reading NRS 616B.028(1) narrowly begs
the question of why "work program" exists at all in the statute, if "work
program" only refers to a program under the purview of the prison
industry, when prison industry is already listed. This interpretation
renders "work program" superfluous. Due to the ambiguity of what
exactly constitutes a "work program," we turn to NRS 616B.028's
legislative history.
The original version of NRS 616B.028(1) was codified in 1989.
It read, "while engaged in work in a prison industry program," as opposed
to today's version, which reads "while engaged in work in a prison
industry or work program." NRS 616B.028(1) (emphasis added). The "or
work" addition was implemented by the Legislature in 1995. The
legislative history reveals that "or work" was added to curtail a specific
situation in which inmates who were participating in prison work camps
with the Division of Forestry were suing the Division of Forestry for
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failure to train and inadequate equipment. 2 Hearing on A.B. 587 Before
the Senate Commerce and Labor Comm., 68th Leg. (Nev., June 27, 1995).
While NRS 616B.028's legislative history might not precisely
state the extent of what "work program" is meant to encompass, it is clear
that it does not contemplate the work release program under
consideration here. The work release program is codified in MRS Chapter
213. Prison industries and programs concerning forestry are codified in
NRS Chapter 209. There is no evidence indicating that the Legislature
intended to expand NRS 616B.028(1) in 1995 to include the work release
program, which was already enacted at the time, by adding "or work."
Therefore, we conclude that "or work," which was added to the statute in
2 In pertinent part the legislative history reads:
Senator O'Connell discussed the provisions in
section 4.5 of A.B. 587. She pointed out the
prisoners' medical care is covered in the prison
system. Mr. Higgins stated when inmates are in
prison work camps they are employees of the
Division of Forestry. He stated they are
technically employees and the medical care is paid
for, but incidences have arisen where the
prisoners have sued the Division of Forestry for
failure to train, and having inadequate equipment.
He stated the Division of Forestry is not covered
by exclusive remedy. Senator O'Connell
commented it is amazing that a prisoner, who is
covered under the prison system, can sue the
Division of Forestry for care. Mr. Higgins pointed
out this is a legal loophole which attorneys have
found and it needs to be filled.
Hearing on A.B. 587 Before the Senate Commerce and Labor Comm., 68th
Leg. (Nev., June 27, 1995).
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order to resolve issues surrounding inmates working for the Division of
Forestry, merely clarifies that NRS 616B.028(1) refers to prison industry
programs codified in NRS Chapter 209, whether they take place inside the
prison walls, e.g., producing license plates, or outside the prison walls,
e.g., outdoor day-labor projects.
Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the district court
and reinstate the decision of the appeals officer, which held York liable for
Piper's workers' compensation coverage for both injuries. 3
Gibbons
Saitta
J.
3Additionally,
the fact that Washworks paid for Piper to be covered
under its workers' compensation coverage provided by York supports this
result. See NRS 616B.033.
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