Jones v. State, Bd. of Med. Exam'rs , 2015 NV 4 ( 2015 )

131 Nev., Advance Opinion )4
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
CARMEN JONES, M.D., No. 64381
Appellant,
vs.
NEVADA STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL FLED
EXAMINERS,
Respondent. FEB 5
suxt
ER}(
Appeal from a district court order denying a motio o change
venue. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Jerome Polaha,
Judge.
Affirmed.
Hafter Law and Jacob L. Hafter, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.
Bradley 0. Van By, Reno,
for Respondent.
BEFORE HARDESTY, C.J., DOUGLAS and CHERRY, JJ.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
In this appeal, we must determine where venue is appropriate
for a petition for contempt, arising from a party's failure to comply with an
administrative subpoena issued by the Nevada State Board of Medical
Examiners, or to otherwise properly participate in a proceeding before the
Board. We conclude that NRS 630.355(1)'s language, providing that venue
is proper in "the district court of the county in which the proceeding is
being conducted," means that venue lies in the county where the work of
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the Board takes place, rather than the county where the conduct being
investigated occurred. Thus, we affirm the district court's order denying
the motion to change venue.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
After a preliminary investigation, respondent Nevada State
Board of Medical Examiners filed an administrative complaint against
appellant Carmen Jones, M.D., alleging among other things that Dr. Jones
aided a third party in the unauthorized practice of medicine. In
furtherance of the Board's investigation, it issued a subpoena to Dr. Jones
to obtain patient records in accordance with NRS 630.140(1)(b), which
authorizes the Board to issue administrative subpoenas to compel the
production of documents. When Dr. Jones failed to comply with the
subpoena, the Board petitioned the Second Judicial District Court, located
in Washoe County, for an order compelling compliance with its
administrative subpoena under NRS 630.140 and NRS 630.355.
Relying on a general venue statute, NRS 13.040, which states
in part that "the action shall be tried in the county in which the
defendants, or any one of them, may reside at the commencement of the
action," Dr. Jones filed a motion to change the venue of the subpoena
contempt petition to the Eighth Judicial District Court, which is located in
Clark County, arguing that the petition to enforce the subpoena should
have been brought in Clark County where she resides and practices
medicine. Dr. Jones also argued that if the Legislature intended for Board
contempt petitions to be filed in Washoe County, the statute should have
been drafted to state that specifically. Dr. Jones further contended that it
would be inconvenient for her to participate in the proceedings in Washoe
County, and as the Board is a statewide agency and that Board
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investigators visited her practice in Clark County, it thus would not be a
hardship for the Board to pursue its contempt proceeding in Clark County.
In opposition to Dr. Jones's motion to change venue, the Board
argued that the subpoena contempt petition against Dr. Jones was
properly filed in the Second Judicial District Court because the statute
governing venue for contempt petitions brought by the Board, NRS
630.355(1), provides that the Board may seek a contempt order in the
"district court of the county in which the proceeding is being conducted."
The Board stated that its administrative proceeding against Dr. Jones is
taking place in and arises from its office in Washoe County, that all formal
complaints and summary suspensions are filed in its office in Washoe
County, and that all hearings on formal complaints and summary
suspensions are held at its office in Washoe County. Thus, the Board
contended, venue is proper in the Second Judicial District Court under
NRS 630.355(1). The Board also argued that the general venue rules
contained in NRS Chapter 13 and relied on by Dr. Jones apply to actions
to be tried in the district court, and thus, changing the place of trial. Since
a Board of Medical Examiners' subpoena contempt petition is not a trial or
substantially related district court action, the Board asserted that its
petition was therefore not subject to NRS Chapter 13.
The district court denied Dr. Jones's motion for a change of
venue, finding that under NRS 630.355(1) venue in the Second Judicial
District Court was proper. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Dr. Jones argues that the district court failed to
consider NRS Chapter 13, including the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
in denying her motion to change venue. And because Dr. Jones and all of
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the witnesses are located in Clark County, Dr. Jones insists that venue is
proper in Clark County.' Dr. Jones also argues that "proceeding," as used
in NRS 630.355(1), should be interpreted to mean the Board's
investigation, which she contends is taking place in Las Vegas because
that is where she practices medicine. The Board contends that because it
had filed a formal administrative complaint against Dr. Jones and had
previously issued an order of summary suspension of her license in its
Washoe County office, and the administrative proceeding was taking place
in that county at the time the Board petitioned the district court for an
order of contempt, the Second Judicial District Court is the proper venue
to bring the contempt proceeding. 2
NRAP 3A(b)(6) allows for an appeal from a district court order
denying a motion to change venue. This court reviews such an order for a
manifest abuse of discretion, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian,
1Dr. Jones raises several other arguments in her opening brief
related to the district court's order on the subpoena contempt proceedings,
as well as procedural issues related to that order. As only the portion of
the district court's order regarding the motion to change venue is properly
at issue in this appeal, see NRAP 3A(b)(6), we do not address Dr. Jones's
additional arguments.
2 The Board also argues that this appeal should be dismissed as moot
on the basis that no controversy exists because the Board has already
acquired information that will enable it to obtain the documents it
requested from Dr. Jones. A review of the district court's docket shows
that the Board has not moved to dismiss or withdraw the contempt
proceedings, however, and, if contempt is demonstrated, the Board would
be entitled to sanctions against Dr. Jones for her contempt in failing to
comply with the subpoena. See NRS 630.355(3). This appeal is therefore
not moot. See Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. „ 245 P.3d 572,
574 (2010) (providing that a case is moot when a live controversy no longer
exists).
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113 Nev. 610, 613, 939 P.2d 1049, 1051 (1997), but we review questions of
law, such as statutory interpretation, de novo. See Washoe Cnty. v. Otto,
128 Nev. „ 282 P.3d 719, 724 (2012). If the statute is clear on its
face, we will not look beyond its plain language. Wheble v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 128 Nev. „ 272 P.3d 134, 136 (2012).
NRS 630.355(1) states in relevant part: "If a person, in a
proceeding before the Board, a hearing officer or a panel of the Board: (a)
Disobeys or resists a lawful order [j . . . the Board, hearing officer or panel
may certify the facts to the district court of the county in which the
proceeding is being conducted." (Emphasis added.) We have previously
held that a specific venue statute takes precedence over the general venue
statutes. Cnty. of Clark v. Howard Hughes Co., LLC, 129 Nev. ,
305 P.3d 896, 897 (2013) (concluding that because NRS 361.420(2), a
specific venue statute regarding challenges to property tax valuations,
conflicts with NRS 13.030's general venue rule, NRS 361.420(2)'s specific
venue rules control). Because NRS 630.355(1) specifically addresses
where venue is proper in a contempt action arising from Board
proceedings, and NRS Chapter 13's provisions are general venue statutes,
we conclude that NRS 630.355(1) is the controlling statute. Cnty. of Clark,
129 Nev. at , 305 P.3d at 897. Dr. Jones's arguments regarding NRS
Chapter 13's general venue provisions, including NRS 13.050(2)(c)'s
consideration of the convenience of the witnesses, are thus unavailing.
Having concluded that NRS 630.355(1) controls venue in this
matter, we now address the statute's language, which provides that venue
is proper in "the district court of the county in which the proceeding is
being conducted." Although the language of the statute appears to be
unambiguous, the parties each ascribe a different meaning to the statute's
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use of the word "proceeding." Dr. Jones contends that "proceeding" as
used in the statute refers to the Board's investigation of Dr. Jones, which
she asserts is taking place in Clark County where she practices medicine
and where the alleged conduct being investigated occurred. The Board
argues that "proceeding" means its administrative process, including its
hearings regarding Dr. Jones's conduct, which take place at its Washoe
County office. Because the statute does not define "proceeding," and the
parties each advance a different definition, we may look beyond the plain
meaning of the statute to determine where venue properly lies. State, Div.
of Ins. v. State Farm Mitt. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 Nev. 290, 294, 995 P.2d 482,
485 (2000) (holding that a court should consult other sources, including
analogous statutory provisions, when a statute has no plain meaning); see
also Transwestern Pipeline Co., LLC v. 17.19 Acres of Prop. Located in
Maricopa Cnty., 627 F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 2010) ("When determining
the plain meaning of language, we may consult dictionary definitions."
(internal quotation omitted)); Nat. Coalition for Students v. Allen, 152
F.3d 283, 289 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that courts "customarily turn to
dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in a statute has a
plain or common meaning").
To determine the meaning of "proceeding" as used in NRS
630.355(1), we look to the word's plain and ordinary meaning and to
analogous statutory provisions. Black's Law Dictionary defines
"proceeding" as "Mlle business conducted by a court or other official body;
a hearing." Black's Law Dictionary 1324 (9th ed. 2009). This definition
supports the Board's contention that proceeding should be read to mean
the "business conducted by" the Board, including hearings, suspensions,
and the issuance of subpoenas and orders.
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Looking next to analogous Nevada statutes that allow other
administrative boards, commissions, and agencies to institute contempt
actions in the district court also supports the Board's argument that the
Legislature intended for it to pursue contempt orders in Washoe County.
See NRS 485.197 (Department of Motor Vehicles); NRS 632.390 (State
Board of Nursing); NRS 637.190 (Board of Dispensing Opticians); NRS
637B.137 (Board of Examiners for Audiology and Speech Pathology); NRS
638.144 (State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners); NRS 640.163
(State Board of Physical Therapy Examiners); NRS 640E.320 (State Board
of Health); NRS 641A.185 (Board of Examiners for Marriage and Family
Therapists and Clinical Professional Counselors); NRS 641B.425 (Board of
Examiners for Social Workers); NRS 645.720 (Real Estate Commission);
NRS 645G.560 (Division of Financial Institutions); NRS 648.160 (Private
Investigator's Licensing Board); NRS 673.453 (Department of Business
and Industry); NRS 703.370 (Public Utilities Commission). In each of
these statutes, the Legislature has provided that administrative boards,
commissions, and agencies may seek contempt orders to enforce subpoenas
in the district court of the county where the administrative hearing is
taking place. See State, Div. of Ins., 116 Nev. at 294, 995 P.2d at 485
(explaining that statutes should be construed together when they seek to
accomplish the same purpose); see also We the People Nev. v. Miller, 124
Nev. 874, 881, 192 P.3d 1166, 1171 (2008) (noting that when possible,
courts should interpret statutes in harmony with other statutes).
Although a hearing on the Board's formal complaint against Dr. Jones has
apparently not yet occurred, Dr. Jones does not dispute that the hearings
on this complaint will take place in the Board's offices in Washoe County.
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NRS 630.355(1) governs the specific situation when a party
fails to comply with an administrative subpoena or otherwise refuses to
properly participate in a proceeding before the Nevada State Board of
Medical Examiners. The statute allows the Board to enforce compliance
with its administrative process. Considering this statute's effect and that
"proceeding" is commonly defined as the business or hearings conducted
by an official body, Black's Law Dictionary 1324 (9th ed. 2009), we
interpret NRS 630.355(1) to mean that venue for a contempt proceeding
brought by the Board under that statute is proper in the county where the
administrative work of the Board is taking place. In this case, the Board's
administrative work, including its filing of a formal complaint and its
previous issuance of an order of summary suspension of Dr. Jones's
license, took place in the Board's Washoe County office. Thus, the Second
Judicial District Court is the proper venue for the contempt proceeding
against Dr. Jones, and the district court did not manifestly abuse its
discretion in denying her motion to change venue. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 113 Nev. at 613, 939 P.2d at 1051. For these reasons, we affirm the
district court's order.
, CA.
Hardesty
.s 117A<. J. , J.
Douglas
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