Gayler (Brandyn) v. State ( 2014 )

 that the plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently. Bryant v.
State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986); see also Hubbard v.
State, 110 Nev. 671, 675, 877 P.2d 519, 521 (1994). In determining the
validity of a guilty plea, this court looks to the totality of the
circumstances. State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 1105, 13 P.3d 442, 448
(2000); Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367.
Appellant claimed that his plea was not knowingly or
voluntarily entered because the district court failed to adequately canvass
him about the factual basis of the plea, he did not understand the charges
against him, and he did not commit the offense of attempted sexual
assault. We conclude that appellant failed to demonstrate that his plea
was invalid. During the plea canvass, appellant affirmed that he
understood that he was being charged with attempted sexual assault, he
had read and understood the plea agreement, and he had no questions
about it. The district court read the charge of attempted sexual assault to
appellant and appellant affirmed that he was pleading guilty because he
was actually guilty. Thus, the record belies his claim that he did not
knowingly and voluntarily enter in the plea agreement. See Hargrove v.
State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). Furthermore,
appellant received substantial benefits by pleading guilty. In exchange for
his guilty plea to one count of attempted sexual assault, the State
dismissed four counts of sexual assault as well as three other felony
counts, did not oppose probation, and agreed to allow appellant to
withdraw his plea upon successful completion of probation and enter a
guilty plea for the non-sex offense of felony coercion. Therefore, the
totality of the circumstances demonstrates that appellant's plea was valid,
and the district court did not err in denying this claim.
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Next, appellant claimed that the district court relied on false
assumptions at sentencing and that his sentence was excessive and
disproportionate to the offense. These claims were not permissible in a
post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus that challenges a
judgment based upon a guilty plea. See NRS 34.810(1)(a). Therefore, the
district court did not err in denying these claims.
Finally, appellant also claimed that his due process rights
were violated during the probation revocation proceedings. Specifically,
he claimed that the State did not present sufficient evidence of the
probation violations at the hearing and thus the revocation was not based
on verified facts, the alleged violations did not warrant revocation, and the
district court revoked his probation based on improper information and
biased assumptions. Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was entitled
to relief. Appellant stipulated at the hearing to the following probation
violations: using marijuana, being behind in restitution payments, having
impermissible contact with a probationer, and being arrested for
obstructing a police officer. In light of his stipulation, he failed to
demonstrate that there was insufficient evidence to justify the probation
revocation or that the district court abused its discretion in revoking
probation. See Lewis v. State, 90 Nev. 436, 438, 529 P.2d 796, 797 (1974)
("The evidence and facts must reasonably satisfy the judge that the
conduct of the probationer has not been as good as required by the
conditions of probation."); see also MeNallen v. State, 91 Nev. 592, 540
P.2d 121 (1975) (affirming revocation of probation where probationer did
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not refute violation). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not
err in denying these claims. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 3
J.
Pickering
ciackat•StCy'rs'," J.
"un
Parraguirre
J.
Saitta
cc: Hon. Jerome T. Tao, District Judge
Brandyn William Gayler
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
3We deny appellant's proper person motions to stay all pending
appeals, to join cases on appeal, and to clarify.
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10) I 947A et,