in Re: Parental Rights as to J.E. ( 2013 )


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  •                                When a petition to terminate parental rights is filed, NRS
    128.060(2) requires that notice of the petition and hearing must be
    personally served on the parent unless his address is unknown, in which
    case the notice must be personally served on the nearest known relative,
    who is residing in this state and whose residence and relationship are
    known to the petitioner. See NRS 128.060(2)(a). When the parent cannot
    be found after the exercise of due diligence, the court may grant service by
    publication.    See NRS 128.070. If the service of process is ineffective, a
    default judgment may be set aside as void.     See NRCP 60(b)(4); Browning
    v. Dixon, 
    114 Nev. 213
    , 218, 
    954 P.2d 741
    , 744 (1998) (finding that failure
    to exercise due diligence rendered service of process improper and voided
    the default judgment); Dobson v. Dobson, 
    108 Nev. 346
    , 348, 
    830 P.2d 1336
    , 1338 (1992). The district court's decision on whether to set aside a
    default judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.     Fagin v. Fagin,
    
    91 Nev. 794
    , 798, 
    544 P.2d 415
    , 417 (1975). The policy of resolving cases
    on their merits is heightened in domestic relations matters.         Price v.
    Dunn, 
    106 Nev. 100
    , 105, 
    787 P.2d 785
    , 788 (1990), disapproved on other
    grounds by NC-DSH, Inc. v. Garner, 
    125 Nev. 647
    , 
    218 P.3d 853
     (2009).
    Here, the district court found that appellant failed to comply
    with NRS 128.060 and did not exercise due diligence in attempting to
    locate respondent or his relatives in Nevada. The district court found that
    appellant misled the court into approving service by publication and made
    misrepresentations about the extent of her and the child's contact with
    respondent and her knowledge of respondent's relatives living in Clark
    County, Nevada. The district court also noted that deciding a termination
    case on the merits would serve the child's best interest, which is the
    primary consideration in parental termination cases.              See In re
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    Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 
    116 Nev. 790
    , 799, 
    8 P.3d 126
    ,
    132 (2000).
    Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the district
    court's factual findings are supported by the record and the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the parental termination order
    as void under NRCP 60(b)(4) for improper service. Moreover, respondent's
    purported consent to the termination of his parental rights, which the
    district court found was not witnessed or notarized, did not dispense of the
    requirement that respondent be properly serve with the petition to
    terminate his parental rights and have an opportunity to be heard in that
    proceeding. A parent cannot voluntarily terminate his own parental
    rights and obligations unless a court determines that such termination is
    in the child's best interest.   See In re T.M.C., 
    118 Nev. 563
    , 569, 
    52 P.3d 934
    , 937 (2002). Accordingly, because the district court properly set aside
    the parental termination, we
    ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
    J.
    Gibbons
    t,-re            J.
    Saitta
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
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    cc:   Hon. Vincent Ochoa, District Judge
    Steven R. Scow
    Pecos Law Group
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
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