SPIRTOS VS. YEMENIDJIAN , 2021 NV 73 ( 2021 )

137 Nev., Advance Opinion 73
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
NICOLA SPIRTOS, AN INDIVIDUAL, No. 80922
Appellant,
vs.
ARMEN YEMENIDJIAN, AN
INDIVIDUAL,
FILE
Respondent. DEC 0 2 2021
BY
I EF DEPUTY CLERK
Appeal from a district court order denying an anti-SLAPP
motion to dismiss in a tort action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; Susan Johnson, Judge.
Affirmed.
McNutt Law Firm, P.C., and Daniel R. McNutt and Matthew C. Wolf, Las
Vegas,
for Appellant.
Pisanelli Bice PLLC and Todd L. Bice, Jordan T. Smith, and Emily A.
Buchwald, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, HARDESTY, C.J., STIGLICH and
CADISH, JJ.
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OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, C.J.:
NRS 41.635-.670 are commonly referred to as Nevada's "anti-
SLAPP" statutes, which stands for "anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation." Generally speaking, the anti-SLAPP statutes provide a two-
step procedural mechanism by which a district court, upon a party's special
motion to dismiss, can summarily dismiss a meritless lawsuit aimed at
chilling speech. See NRS 41.660(3)(a)-(b).
Under step one of the anti-SLAPP evaluation, the district court
must "[d]etermine whether the moving party has established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based upon a good faith
communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free
speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern." NRS
41.660(3)(a). The primary issue presented in this case is how a district court
at step one of the anti-SLAPP evaluation should proceed when the moving
party denies making the alleged communication. Based on the plain
language of NRS 41.660(3)(a), we conclude that a moving party's denial has
no relevance at step one of the anti-SLAPP evaluation. Consequently, the
district court in this case correctly used plaintiff/respondent Armen
Yemenidjian's version of the alleged defamatory statement during its step-
one analysis.
Nonetheless, defendant/appellant Nicola Spirtos argues on
appeal that the district court should have granted his anti-SLAPP motion,
as even Yemenidjian's version of Spirtos statement was entitled to anti-
SLAPP protection. In this, Spirtos asserts that because the alleged
statement was made in good faith in furtherance of an issue of public
concern, it was covered by anti-SLAPP protections. Alternatively, Spirtos
argues that the district court should have granted his motion because
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Yemenidjian's version of his statement was a nonactionable opinion. While
we agree that the district court erroneously determined Spirtos alleged
statement did not fall within the definition of a public interest
communication, Spirtos has not attempted to show that the alleged
statement was true or made without knowledge of its falsehood.
Consequently, he has not established by a preponderance of the evidence
that his statement was made in good faith. And, because we disagree with
Spirtos' alternative argument that his alleged statement was a
nonactionable opinion, we affirm the district court's order denying Spirtos'
anti-SLAPP motion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant Nicola Spirtos is a self-described "prominent and
highly accomplished gynecologic oncologist." Spirtos is also the former co-
owner of D.H. Flamingo, Inc., a Nevada corporation with a medical-
marijuana license and a medical-marijuana establishment in Las Vegas.
Respondent Armen Yemenidjian is a self-described "executive [ ] in the legal
cannabis businese whose companies have successfully applied for 22
medical- and recreational-marijuana licenses in Nevada and California. By
all accounts, Spirtos and Yemenidjian's relationship can be described as
acrimonious.
In 2018, D.H. Flamingo submitted three applications for
recreational-marijuana licenses to the Nevada Department of Taxation.
The Department denied D.H. Flamingo's applications. Following the
Department's denial, D.H. Flamingo and several other unsuccessful
applicants sued the Department and many of the successful applicants,
including some of Yemenidjian's former companies. They alleged, among
other things, that the licensing process "was corrupted and certain
application [s] were favored over others." Two weeks after the suit was filed,
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Spirtos attended Governor Steve Sisolak's inaugural gala on behalf of D.H.
Flamingo. While at the gala, Spirtos spoke with John Oceguera, a former
Nevada Assemblyperson and then-lobbyist for certain Nevada marijuana
companies, including Yemenidjian's former companies. The specifics of
Spirtos conversation with Oceguera are disputed, but it is undisputed that
Spirtos conveyed his belief (as D.H. Flamingo had alleged in its lawsuit
against Yemenidjian's former companies) that the Department's licensing
process was corrupt. It is likewise disputed whether Spirtos specifically
mentioned Yemenidjian during the conversation, but it is undisputed that
following the conversation, Oceguera relayed the contents of the
conversation to Yemenidjian.
Nine months after the conversation between Spirtos and
Oceguera, Yemenidjian sued Spirtos for slander and conspiracy, alleging
that Spirtos had accused him of criminal activity in Spirtos' conversation
with Oceguera. In particular, Yemenidjian's complaint alleged that
"Spirtos proceeded to slander Mr. Yemenidjian, claiming to Oceguera that
Mr. Yemenidjian had engaged in outright corruption in order to secure
licenses. This statement falsely accused Mr. Yemenidjian of criminal
activity, just as Spirtos had intended it."
Spirtos filed an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, in which he
denied mentioning Yemenidjian by name in his conversation with Oceguera
and alleged that he instead had commented that the marijuana-licensing
process in general had been corrupted. Spirtos contended that his version
of his statement could not form the basis for liability because it was "a good
faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to
free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern" and thus
protected by the anti-SLAPP statutes. See NRS 41.660(3). In particular,
Spirtos contended that his statement satisfied NRS 41.637(4)s definition of
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the type of "good faith communication" protected under NRS 41.660(3),
namely, one "made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a
place open to the public or in a public forum, which is truthful or is made
without knowledge of its falsehood."1 NRS 41.637(4). Spirtos attached a
declaration to his motion wherein he listed several reasons why he believed
the licensing process had been corrupted, and he reiterated that he never
mentioned Yemenidjian by name in his conversation with Oceguera.
Yemenidjian opposed Spirtos motion, arguing that Spirtos
could not deny making a statement about Yemenidjian in his conversation
with Mr. Oceguera while simultaneously contending that any such
statement was truthful or made without knowledge of its falsity. Relatedly,
Yemenidjian also observed that Spirtos' declaration failed to explain how
any such statement about Yemenidjian could have been truthful or made
without knowledge of its falsity. Additionally, Yemenidjian attached a
declaration from Oceguera, wherein he attested that
[d]uring our conversation, Dr. Spirtos stated that
ArmenYemenidjian was knee deep in the corruption
at the center of the licensing process for
recreational cannabis licenses that the State of
Nevada had awarded in early December 2018. I
was taken aback about the allegation that Mr.
Yemenidjian had supposedly corrupted the process.
I was sufficiently startled by Dr. Spirtos'
statements that insinuated a crime that I
subsequently spoke with Mr. Yemenidjian about
Dr. Spirtos' accusation.
1Spirtos also argued that his statement satisfied NRS 41.637(3)s
definition of a protected good faith communication. In light of our resolution
of this appeal, we need not decide whether Spirtos' statement satisfied NRS
41.637(3).
5
(Emphasis added.) Yemenidjian's opposition additionally argued that
Spirtos statement could not satisfy NRS 41.637(4)s definition because
Yemenidjian's alleged corruption was not a matter of public interest and
because Spirtos' private conversation with Oceguera was not a public forum.
In reply, Spirtos contended that even if Yemenidjian's version
of Spirtos' conversation with Oceguera were accurate, that version would
constitute a nonactionable opinion because no reasonable person would
believe that Spirtos' statement was a factual statement. Cf Abrams v.
Sanson, 136 Nev. 83, 89, 458 P.3d 1062, 1068 (2020) ("Because there is no
such thing as a false idea, statements of opinion are statements made
without knowledge of their falsehood under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes."
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Following a hearing, the district court denied Spirtos' motion to
dismiss. In so doing, the district court accepted as accurate Yemenidjian's
version of Spirtos' statement to Oceguera and found that the statement did
not satisfy NRS 41.637(4)s definition because Spirtos' allegation that his
competitor was corrupt was a personal matter and was made in a private
conversation. The district court did not consider Spirtos' argument that his
statement was a nonactionable opinion. Spirtos now appeals.
DISCUSSION
We review de novo a district court's denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion to dismiss. Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8, 11, 432 P.3d 746, 749
(2019). In so doing, "[w] e exercise independent judgment in determining
whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise
from protected activity. In addition to the pleadings, we may consider
affidavits concerning the facts upon which liability is based." Id. (quoting
Park v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 393 P.3d 905, 911 (Cal. 2017)).
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Spirtos denial that he made the alleged statement is irrelevant to step one of
the anti-SLAPP analysis
As indicated, evaluation of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss
involves a two-step analysis. See NRS 41.660(3)(a)-(b). At step one, the
court must Id] etermine whether the moving party has established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based upon a good faith
communication in furtherance of . . . the right to free speech in direct
connection with an issue of public concern." NRS 41.660(3)(a). If successful,
the court advances to step two, wherein the court must "determine whether
the plaintiff has demonstrated with prima facie evidence a probability of
prevailing on the claim." NRS 41.660(3)(b). If the defendant fails to satisfy
step one, the court need not evaluate step two. Coker, 135 Nev. at 12, 432
P.3d at 749.
Spirtos' primary argument on appeal in support of reversal is
that he did not mention Yemenidjian by name in his conversation with
Oceguera and that, consequently, he could not have slandered Yemenidjian.
For support, he relies on his own declaration wherein he acknowledged
saying that the Department's licensing process had been corrupted but
reiterated that he did not mention Yemenidjian by name, much less
insinuate that Yemenidjian was corrupt.
We conclude that the district court correctly disregarded
Spirtos' declaration at step one of its analysis. This conclusion is based on
the plain language of NRS 41.660(3)(a), which, again, requires the district
court to Id] etermine whether the moving party has established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based upon a good faith
communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free
speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern." (Emphasis
added.) See City Council of Reno v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 105 Nev. 886,
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891, 784 P.2d 974, 977 (1989) ("When the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, a court should give that language its ordinary meaning and
not go beyond it."). By hinging the step-one analysis on "the claim," NRS
41.660(3)(a) unambiguously provides that the district court should evaluate
the statement forming the basis of the plaintiffs complaint, which, in this
case, was the version of the statement that Yemenidjian alleged Spirtos
made. See Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 466-67 (Tex. 2017) (holding
that under Texas's analog to NRS 41.660(3)(a), the relevant step-one
inquiry is to consider the statement as alleged in the plaintiffs pleadings).
Additionally, NRS 41.660(3)(a) unambiguously requires that the statement
be a "good faith communication," which NRS 41.637 defines as a
communication that "is truthful or is made without knowledge of its
falsehood." In other words, when pursuing an anti-SLAPP special motion
to dismiss, Spirtos cannot deny accusing Yemenidjian of corruption in his
conversation with Oceguera while simultaneously contending that this
(non)accusation was truthful or made without Spirtos knowledge of its
falsehood. Cf. Shapiro v. Welt, 133 Nev. 35, 40, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (2017)
("[Nlo communication falls within the purview of NRS 41.660 unless it is
'truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.'" (quoting NRS
41.637)).
Accordingly, we conclude that at step one of the anti-SLAPP
analysis, a district court and this court must evaluate the communication
as it is alleged in the plaintiffs complaint and in any of the plaintiffs
clarifying declarations. Rosen v. Tarkanian, 135 Nev. 436, 441, 453 P.3d
1220, 1224 (2019) (observing that at step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a
court should evaluate whether the "gist or stine of the at-issue statement
is a protected communication). Therefore, Spirtos' denial that he mentioned
Yemenidjian in his conversation with Oceguera does not provide a basis for
8
reversing the district court's order. Cf Freeman v. Schack, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d
867, 877-78 (Ct. App. 2007) (noting that a defendant's denial of the
plaintiffs allegations is a merits-based defense and that "merits based
arguments have no place in our threshold analysis of whether plaintiffs'
causes of action arise from protected activity [under California's analog to
NRS 41.660(3)(a)]," because where the defendant "cannot meet his
threshold showing, the fact he might be able to otherwise prevail on the
merits under the probability step is irrelevant" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Spirtos alleged statement was made in direct connection with an issue of
public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum, but he has
not shown that the alleged statement was made in good faith
Spirtos next contends that reversal is warranted because the
district court erroneously determined his statement, as alleged by
Yemenidjian, was not "in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to
free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern." NRS
41.660(3)(a). He contends that under NRS 41.637(4)s definition of that
requirement, the district court erroneously determined that his statement
did not fall within NRS 41.660(3)(es protection by finding that Spirtos'
statement involved a personal grudge (with Yemenidjian) and was made in
a private conversation (with Oceguera).
We agree with Spirtos that his statement, as alleged by
Yemenidjian, was "made in direct connection with an issue of public interest
in a place open to the public or in a public forum." NRS 41.637(4). In
Shapiro v. Welt, this court adopted the California courts' following five-
factor framework for evaluating whether a statement falls within NRS
41.637(4)s definition:
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(1) "public interest" does not equate with
mere curiosity;
(2) a matter of public interest should be
something of concern to a substantial number of
people; a matter of concern to a speaker and a
relatively small specific audience is not a matter of
public interest;
(3) there should be some degree of closeness
between the challenged statements and the
asserted public interest—the assertion of a broad
and amorphous public interest is not sufficient;
(4) the focus of the speaker's conduct should
be the public interest rather than a mere effort to
gather ammunition for another round of private
controversy; and
(5) a person cannot turn otherwise private
information into a matter of public interest simply
by communicating it to a large number of people.
133 Nev. at 39-40, 389 P.3d at 268 (quoting Piping Rock Partners, Inc. v.
David Lerner Assocs., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 957, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2013)).
Here, we acknowledge the district court's undisputed finding
that Spirtos made his alleged statement to only one person (Oceguera).
However, this finding has relevance, arguably, to only the fourth factor.2
2Yemenidjian contends that "[a] plain reading of NRS 41.637(4)
should exclude private conversations like the one between Spirtos and
Oceguera." While it may be intuitively appealing to exclude private
conversations from the anti-SLAPP statutes purview, a "plain reading" of
NRS 41.637(4) requires that the communication simply be made "in a place
open to the public or in a public forum," such as the inaugural gala in this
case. Beyond Yemenidjian's "plain readine argument, he has not provided
any authority to support the proposition that a private communication
cannot be subject to anti-SLAPP protection. And our own research of
California caselaw suggests a split in holdings as to the protections afforded
private conversations. See, e.g., Macias v. Hartwell, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222,
225 (Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing that private conversations are afforded
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On the other hand, under the first and second factors, it cannot reasonably
be disputed that alleged corniption in a public agency is of concern to a
substantial number of people, including the thousands of Nevada taxpayers
who fund the Department. See, e.g., Silvester v. Am. Broad. Cos., 839 F.2d
1491, 1493 (11th Cir. 1988) ("The public is legitimately interested in all
matters of corruption . . . ."); see also Healthsmart Pac., Inc. v. Kabateck, 212
Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 599 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding that "assertions of a
widespread illegal physician kickback scheme raise issues concerning the
integrity of the health care system, which is a matter of widespread public
concern"). And under the third factor, there was some degree of closeness
between Spirtos statement and the asserted public interest of public
corruption, as Oceguera's declaration attested that Spirtos said that
"Yemenidjian was knee deep in the corruption at the center of the licensing
process for recreational cannabis licenses that the State of Nevada had
awarded" and "had supposedly corrupted the process," which is directly
related to the specifics of the alleged corruption. Finally, returning to the
fourth factor, it is apparent from Oceguera's declaration—wherein he
attested that "I was sufficiently startled by Dr. Spirtos' statements that
insinuated a crime that I subsequently spoke with Mr. Yemenidjian about
Dr. Spirtos' accusation"—that Oceguera interpreted Spirtos' statement as
something more than "a mere effort to gather ammunition for another
anti-SLAPP protection); see also Bikkina v. Mahadevan, 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d
499, 507-08 (Ct. App. 2015) (recognizing that a statement's entitlement to
anti-SLAPP protection "depends on whether the means of communicating
the statement permits open debate (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Thus, we conclude that this particular case is ill suited to consider adopting
such a rule. Cf. Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38,
130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (observing that it is a party's responsibility
to provide salient authorities in support of an argument).
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round of private controversy." Shapiro, 133 Nev. at 39, 389 P.3d at 268
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that Spirtos'
alleged statement was "made in direct connection with an issue of public
interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum." NRS 41.637(4).
Nonetheless, this conclusion does not provide a viable basis to
reverse the district coures order because, as discussed previously, as part
of the district court's analysis during the first step, the district court must
also find Spirtos statement was a "good faith communication." NRS
41.660(3)(a). A "good faith communicatioe is a communication that "is
truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood." NRS 41.637. In
his declaration that he attached to his anti-SLAPP motion, Spirtos listed
several factual bases in support of his belief that the Department's licensing
process was corrupted. However, as mentioned above, Spirtos' declaration
contained no factual bases for why he believed Yemenidjian was involved in
the corruption and instead denied mentioning Yemenidjian by name.
Absent a factual basis for why Spirtos believed his alleged statement
regarding Yemenidjian's involvement in corruption was true, Spirtos
necessarily failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his
statement, as alleged by Yemenidjian, was "truthful or [was] made without
knowledge of its falsehood." NRS 41.637. He therefore failed to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that his alleged statement was a "good
faith communication," even if the alleged statement was "in furtherance of
the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an
issue of public concern." NRS 41.660(3)(a). Cf. Stark v. Lackey, 136 Nev.
38, 43, 458 P.3d 342, 347 (2020) (holding that under NRS 41.660(3)(a)'s
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, "an affidavit stating that the
defendant believed the communications to be truthful or made them
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without knowledge of their falsehood is sufficient to meet the defendant's
burden absent contradictory evidence in the record").
Spirtos alleged statement did not constitute a nonactionable opinion
Spirtos' final argument in support of reversal is that his
statement, as alleged in Yemenidjian's complaint and clarified in
Oceguera's declaration, was simply Spirtos' "opinion" that was not capable
of being untrue or being made with knowledge of its falsehood. Cf. Abrams
v. Sanson, 136 Nev. 83, 89, 458 P.3d 1062, 1068 (2020) ("Because there is
no such thing as a false idea, statements of opinion are statements made
without knowledge of their falsehood under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes."
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In support of this
argument, Spirtos relies primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., which held that a statement of opinion on
a matter of public concern "which does not contain a provably false factual
connotation" constitutes a nonactionable opinion, 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990), and
recognized that loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language [tends to] negate
the impression that the [speaker] was seriously maintaining that [the
defamed party] committed [a] crime," id. at 21. Under Milkovich, Spirtos
contends that his alleged statement that Yemenidjian "was knee deep in the
corruption at the center of the licensing process" is "too vague and
generalized" to have any provably false factual connotation and that the
phrase "knee deep" is the type of hyperbolic language that negates any
impression that Spirtos was seriously accusing Yemenidjian of committing
a crime.
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We disagree.3 To be sure, the accusation that Yemenidjian was
"knee deep" in corruption arguably is the sort of hyperbolic and factually
unprovable language that would negate the impression that Spirtos was
seriously alleging that Yemenidjian was corrupt. Cf. 600 West 115th St.
Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d 930, 937-38 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that an
accusation that a landlord's lease was "as fraudulent as you can get and it
smells of bribery and corruption" was an opinion because of the colloquial
language, the absence of specific allegations, and because it was delivered
as part of a "rambling, table-slapping monologue at a community board
meeting (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, "[a]ccusing a public
official of corruption is ordinarily defamatory per se,"4 Bentley v. Bunton, 94
S.W.3d 561, 582 (Tex. 2002) (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 112, at 791-92 (5th ed. 1984)), and "expressions
of opinion may suggest that the speaker knows certain facts to be true or
may imply that facts exist which will be sufficient to render the message
defamatory if false," K-Mart Corp. v. Washington, 109 Nev. 1180, 1192, 866
P.2d 274, 282 (1993) (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 22), receded from on other
31n passing, Spirtos cites Miller v. Jones, 114 Nev. 1291, 1296, 970
P.2d 571, 575 (1998), for the proposition that "where a statement is
susceptible of multiple interpretations, one of which is defamatory, the
resolution of this ambiguity is left to the finder of fact." As indicated, the
district court did not address Spirtoe argument that his statement
constituted a nonactionable opinion, and Spirtos does not coherently argue
on appeal that a remand to the district court for resolution of any potential
ambiguity is appropriate at step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis. We
therefore exercise our independent judgment in concluding that his alleged
statement constituted an actionable factual statement.
4We recognize that Yemenidjian may not be a public "official."
Nonetheless, Spirtos contended in district court that Yemenidjian should be
deerned a limited-purpose public "figure."
14
grounds by Pope v. Motel 6, 121 Nev. 307, 316, 114 P.3d 277, 283 (2005).
Here, we believe it is disingenuous for Spirtos to pass himself off as simply
an uninformed member of the general public who is incapable of having
factual support for his allegations of corruption when he has previously
described himself in this case as "a prominent and highly accomplished
gynecologic oncologist" who "spearheadee the marijuana license
applications that D.H. Flamingo presented to the Department.
Moreover, in determining whether a statement is an opinion or
a fact, this court considers "whether a reasonable person would be likely to
understand the remark as an expression of the sources opinion or as a
statement of existing fact." Lubin v. Kunin, 117 Nev. 107, 112, 17 P.3d 422,
426 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Oceguera, the sole
person to whom Spirtos allegedly made the accusation, stated in his
affidavit that "I was sufficiently startled by Dr. Spirtos statements . . . that
I subsequently spoke with Mr. Yemenidjian about [them]." Thus, if we
accept the undisputed proposition that Oceguera is a "reasonable person"
who happens to have a relationship with both Spirtos and Yemenidjian, it
is apparent that Oceguera inferred that Spirtos made the accusation with
knowledge of factual support for the accusation. Accordingly, we conclude
that Spirtos' alleged statement was not nonactionable opinion and that
Spirtos' argument in this respect does not provide a basis for reversing the
district court's order.
CONCLUSION
Step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires a district court to
etermine whether the moving party has established, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the claim is based upon a good faith communication in
furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct
connection with an issue of public concern." NRS 41.660(3)(a). Based on
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NRS 41.660(3)(a)'s plain language, we conclude that a moving party's denial
that he or she made the alleged statements has no relevance at step one of
the anti-SLAPP evaluation. Consequently, the district court correctly
assumed the accuracy of Yemenidjian's version of Spirtos alleged
defamatory statement for purposes of conducting the step-one evaluation.
Although the district court erroneously concluded that the alleged version
of Spirtos' statement was not "made in direct connection with an issue of
public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum," NRS
41.637(4), Spirtos failed to demonstrate that the alleged version of his
statement was "a good faith communication," NRS 41.660(3)(a).
Accordingly, the district court correctly denied Spirtos' anti-SLAPP motion
to dismiss. Further, because we disagree with Spirtos' alternative
argument that his alleged statement was a nonactionable opinion, we affirm
the district court's order denying his motion. We decline to consider Spirtos'
remaining arguments, as they are beyond the scope of the step-one anti-
SLAPP analysis.
7 CJ
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We concur:
IX.sfwg J.
Stiglich
, J.
Cadish
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