CAPRIATI CONSTR. CORP., INC. VS. YAHYAVI C/W 80821 , 2021 NV 69 ( 2021 )


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  •                                                   137 Nev., Advance Opinion 4,1
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    CAPRIATI CONSTRUCTION CORP.,                            No. 80107
    INC., A NEVADA CORPORATION,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    BAHRAM YAHYAVI, AN INDIVIDUAL,
    Respondent.
    CAPRIATI CONSTRUCTION CORP.,                            No. 80821
    INC., A NEVADA CORPORATION,
    Appellant,
    vs.                                                     FILED
    BAHRAM YAHYAVI, AN INDIVIDUAL,
    Respondent.                                             NOV 1 0 2021
    BY
    IEF DEPUTY CLERK
    Consolidated appeals from a final district court judgment
    pursuant to a jury verdict and a post-judgment order awarding attorney
    fees in a tort action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Ronald
    J. Israel, Judge.
    Affirmed.
    Hutchison & Steffen, PLLC, and Michael K. Wall, Las Vegas; Law Offices
    of Eric R. Larsen and Eric R. Larsen, Las Vegas; Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz,
    Edelman & Dicker, LLP, and David S. Kahn and Mark Severino, Las Vegas,
    for Appellant.
    Prince Law Group and Dennis M. Prince and Kevin T. Strong, Las Vegas,
    for Respondent.
    BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.
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    OPINION
    By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:
    In this opinion, we clarify two points of law. First, evidence of
    a defendanes liability insurance is admissible under NRS 48.135(2) if the
    defendant first introduces evidence suggesting its inability to pay a
    judgment. Second, a plaintiff represented on a contingency-fee basis may
    recover the entirety of the contingency fee as post-offer attorney fees under
    NRCP 68. As the district court adhered to this law when rendering its
    decisions, we discern no error from these proceedings and affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    An employee of appellant Capriati Construction Corp., Inc.,
    drove a forklift into a street travel lane and collided with respondent
    Bahram Yahyavi's vehicle, resulting in injury to Yahyavi. Yahyavi brought
    an action against Capriati alleging negligence, and in its answer, Capriati
    denied liability. Capriati then filed a petition for bankruptcy. Following
    the conclusion of Capriati's bankruptcy proceedings, the negligence case
    proceeded to trial. Prior to trial, Yahyavi served Capriati with an offer of
    judgment for $4 million, pursuant to NRCP 68, which Capriati rejected. In
    his opening statement at trial, Yahyavi told the jury that Capriati had
    discarded the forklift operator's employment file. Capriati did not object.
    Yahyavi called the forklift operator as a witness, who admitted fault.
    Because of conflicting schedules, two of Capriati's experts also testified
    during Yahyavi's case in chief. They explained that Yahyavi's damages
    were exaggerated.
    After Yahyavi rested his case, Capriati elicited testimony that
    its business had filed for reorganization. Yahyavi objected and moved for
    sanctions on the ground that his recovery would be prejudiced by Capriati's
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    intentional elicitation of inadmissible evidence suggesting to the jury that
    it was unable to pay a judgment. Capriati asserted that it was rebutting
    Yahyavi's allegations of spoliation. The district court agreed with Yahyavi
    and, as relevant here, (1) struck Capriati's answer as to liability and
    disallowed its remaining witnesses to testify, and (2) instructed the jury
    that Capriati had liability insurance to satisfy any verdict. The jury
    returned a $5.9 million verdict in favor of Yahyavi.
    After trial, Yahyavi moved for $2.3 million in attorney fees—his
    contingency fee—under NRCP 68 on the ground that the jury's verdict of
    $5.9 million exceeded the $4 million offer ofjudgment that Capriati rejected
    nine months before trial. The district court weighed the appropriate factors
    and awarded Yahyavi $2.3 million in attorney fees.
    Capriati appeals, arguing that the district court erroneously
    (1) imposed case-concluding sanctions, (2) instructed the jury that it could
    consider Capriati's liability insurance, and (3) awarded Yahyavi attorney
    fees that were incurred before the offer of judgment was rejected.
    DISCUSSION
    Sanctions
    Capriati argues that the district court erroneously imposed
    case-concluding sanctions by striking its additional witnesses. It adds that
    this constituted an unduly harsh sanction because it barred Capriati from
    showing the jury evidence that Yahyavi's damages were exaggerated.
    However, Capriati concedes that striking its answer as to liability was
    supported by substantial evidence because its employee admitted fault at
    trial.
    We review a district court's sanctions order for an abuse of
    discretion. MEI-GSR Holdings, LLC v. Pepperrnill Casinos, Inc., 
    134 Nev. 235
    , 242, 
    416 P.3d 249
    , 256 (2018). We employ "a somewhat heightened
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    standard of review for case-concluding sanctions." 
    Id.
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Noncase-concluding sanctions, however, include those
    after which a party is still able "to defend on the amount of damages."
    Valley Health Sys., LLC v. Estate of Doe, 
    134 Nev. 634
    , 639, 
    427 P.3d 1021
    ,
    1027 (2018). We uphold noncase-concluding sanctions if substantial
    evidence supports the district court's sanction order. 
    Id.
     "Substantial
    evidence is that which a reasonable mind could find adequate to support a
    conclusion." Kolnik v. Nev. Emp't Sec. Dep't, 
    112 Nev. 11
    , 16, 
    908 P.2d 726
    ,
    729 (1996).
    The district court struck Capriati's answer as to liability.
    Because Capriati's employee admitted fault, the district court concluded
    that striking Capriati's answer as to liability alone would serve as a nominal
    sanction. Thus, the district court also struck Capriati's additional
    witnesses. Although Capriati argues that this was a case-concluding
    sanction, we disagree because it was still allowed to defend on the amount
    of damages. Specifically, Capriati presented testimony from two witnesses
    to show that Yahyavi's damages were exaggerated. Moreover, Capriati
    commented on Yahyavi's damages in its closing argument. Thus, we are
    unpersuaded that striking Capriati's additional witnesses amounted to a
    case-concluding sanction.
    We further conclude that substantial evidence supported the
    district court's decision to strike Capriati's additional witnesses. The record
    shows that Capriati intentionally elicited inadmissible testimony
    describing its bankruptcy.     See RPC 3.4(e) (providing that a lawyer's
    allusion to any matter unsupported by admissible evidence is misconduct);
    see also Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 
    559 F.2d 557
    , 560 (9th Cir. 1977)
    (explaining "that the financial standing of the defendant is inadmissible as
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    evidence [to] determin[e] . . . compensatory damages"). Moreover, the
    record supports the district court's conclusion that striking Capriati's
    answer as to liability alone would serve as a nominal sanction because
    Capriati's employee admitted fault.         Because substantial evidence
    supported the district coures sanctions order, it imposed sanctions within
    its discretion.'
    Jury instruction
    Capriati argues that the district court erroneously instructed
    the jury, "ECapriati] has liability insurance to satisfy in whole or part any
    verdict you may reach in this case." It argues that this instruction was
    prejudicial because it informed the jury that it could reach any verdict,
    which violates NRS 48.135.2 Yahyavi argues that, once a defendant
    introduces evidence suggesting its inability to pay a judgment, NRS
    48.135(2) allows the plaintiff to introduce evidence of the defendant's
    liability insurance to cure any resulting prejudice.
    We review the district coures "decision to admit or refuse jury
    instructions for an abuse of discretion." MEI-GSR Holdings, 134 Nev. at
    237, 416 P.3d at 253 (internal quotation marks omitted). We review
    'Capriati adds that this sanction was also unduly harsh because it
    elicited evidence of its bankruptcy to rebut Yahyavi's allegations of
    spoliation. We reject this argument because Capriati could have objected
    to Yahyavi's opening statement, see NRS 47.040(1)(a), rather than eliciting
    inadmissible evidence regarding its bankruptcy. We further reject
    Capriati's unsupported argument that a lay juror would not understand
    that the term "reorganization" is synonymous with bankruptcy.
    2Insofar as Capriati argues that this jury instruction was an improper
    sanction, we conclude that it was a proper curative instruction, given
    Capriati's misconduct. See BMW v. Roth, 
    127 Nev. 122
    , 133, 
    252 P.3d 649
    ,
    656 (2011) (explaining that a curative instruction may be issued as a
    sanction).
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    whether the instruction "accurately states Nevada law" de novo. 
    Id. at 238,
    416 P.3d at 253 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We have not addressed whether evidence of a defendant's
    liability insurance is admissible under NRS 48.135(2) after the defendant
    introduces evidence suggesting its inability to pay a judgment. We interpret
    a statute consistently with its plain meaning. See Leven v. Frey, 
    123 Nev. 399
    , 403, 
    168 P.3d 712
    , 715 (2007). Turning to the statutory text,
    1. Evidence that a person was or was not
    insured against liability is not admissible upon the
    issue whether the person acted negligently or
    otherwise wrongfully.
    2. This section does not require the exclusion
    of evidence of insurance against liability when it is
    relevant for another purpose, such as proof of
    agency, ownership or control, or bias or prejudice of
    a witness.
    NRS 48.135. We have explained that NRS 48.135(2) "use[s] 'such as to
    introduce a nonexclusive list." Bigpond v. State, 
    128 Nev. 108
    , 115 n.5, 
    270 P.3d 1244
    , 1248 n.5 (2012). Thus, under the plain meaning of NRS
    48.135(2), evidence of liability insurance may be admissible in situations
    other than those expressly listed in the statute.
    Persuasive authorities lead us to conclude that evidence of a
    defendanes liability insurance is admissible under NRS 48.135(2) if the
    defendant first introduces evidence suggesting its inability to pay a
    judgment. See Wheeler v. Murphy, 
    452 S.E.2d 416
    , 426 (W. Va. 1994)
    ("[O]nce the defendant offers evidence of his financial status to influence
    the jury . . . , then the plaintiff may rebut such evidence by introducing
    proof of the defendanes liability insurance."); see also Younts v. Baldor Elec.
    Co., Inc., 
    832 S.W.2d 832
    , 834 (Ark. 1992) (holding the same).
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    Capriati first introduced evidence of its bankruptcy, thereby
    suggesting that it was unable to pay a judgment in favor of Yahyavi. Thus,
    to cure the resulting prejudice, the district court appropriately instructed
    the jury that Capriati had liability insurance to satisfy any judgment. This
    instruction accurately states Nevada law, and the district court therefore
    acted within its discretion.3
    Attorney fees
    Capriati argues that the district court erroneously awarded
    Yahyavi $2.3 million in attorney fees—the 40-percent contingency fee from
    the $5.9 million verdict—after Capriati rejected a $4 million offer of
    judgment nine months before trial. Capriati asserts that the plain meaning
    of NRCP 68 requires the district court to analyze which fees were incurred
    after the offer of judgment was rejected. It further argues that, when the
    plaintiff is represented on a contingency basis, district courts should apply
    the lodestar method to apportion NRCP 68 fees to those earned post-offer.
    Yahyavi argues that Nevada precedent interpreting NRCP 68 allows a
    party to collect the entire contingency fee as post-offer attorney fees because
    the contingency fee does not vest until the plaintiff prevails.
    This court "review [s] an award of attorney fees for an abuse of
    discretion." Logan v. Abe, 
    131 Nev. 260
    , 266, 
    350 P.3d 1139
    , 1143 (2015).
    3We  reject Capriati's argument that this instruction was erroneous
    because it told jurors that Capriati's insurance could satisfy any verdict.
    Although such language could be improper in other cases, the language
    used here was warranted to cure the prejudicial effect of Capriati's
    misconduct. We also reject Capriati's argument that this instruction was
    improper under the collateral-source rule, which bars evidence showing
    that an injured party received a collateral payment. See Khowy v.
    Seastrand, 
    132 Nev. 520
    , 538, 
    377 P.3d 81
    , 93-94 (2016). Because Capriati
    was the tortfeasor, this rule is inapplicable.
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    In exercising that discretion, the district court must make findings under
    the Beattie and Brunzell factors. See Beattie v. Thomas, 
    99 Nev. 579
    , 588-
    89, 
    668 P.2d 268
    , 274 (1983); Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 
    85 Nev. 345
    , 349, 
    455 P.2d 31
    , 33 (1969). Under Beattie, the district court considers
    (1) whether the plaintiffs claim was brought in
    good faith; (2) whether the defendants offer of
    judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both
    its timing and amount; (3) whether the plaintiffs
    decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial
    was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and
    (4) whether the fees sought by the offeror are
    reasonable and justified in amount.
    99 Nev. at 588-89, 
    668 P.2d at 274
    . Under Brunzell, the district court
    considers
    (1) the qualities of the advocate: his ability, his
    training, education, experience, professional
    standing and skill; (2) the character of the work to
    be done: its difficulty, its intricacy, its importance,
    time and skill required, the responsibility imposed
    and the prominence and character of the parties
    where they affect the importance of the litigation;
    (3) the work actually performed by the lawyer: the
    skill, time and attention given to the work; (4) the
    result: whether the attorney was successful and
    what benefits were derived.
    85 Nev. at 349, 
    455 P.2d at 33
    . Insofar as an attorney-fees award invokes
    a question of law, we review it de novo. See In re Estate & Living Tr. of
    Miller, 
    125 Nev. 550
    , 553, 
    216 P.3d 239
    , 241 (2009).
    Under NRCP 68(f)(1)(B), if an offeree rejects an offer of
    judgment and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, the offeree must
    pay "reasonable attorney fees, if any be allowed, actually incurred by the
    offeror from the time of the offer."       (Emphases added.) NRCP 68
    "authorize[s] a party who makes an offer of judgment that is not improved
    8
    upon to recover the reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred after the
    offer of judgment was made." Logan, 131 Nev. at 265, 350 P.3d at 1142.
    District courts may award NRCP 68 attorney fees based on a
    contingency-fee agreement without billing records so long as the party
    seeking fees satisfies the Beattie and Brunzell factors. O'Connell v. Wynn
    Las Vegas, LLC, 
    134 Nev. 550
    , 562, 
    429 P.3d 664
    , 673 (Ct. App. 2018).
    Consistent with NRCP 68's plain meaning, the court of appeals in O'Connell
    explained that NRCP 68 attorney fees based on a contingency-fee
    agreement must be limited to those fees earned post-offer." 
    Id.
     However,
    O'Connell did not address whether a party may recover the entirety of the
    contingency fee as post-offer attorney fees. 
    Id.
    We now clarify that a district court may award the entire
    contingency fee as post-offer attorney fees under NRCP 68 because the
    contingency fee does not vest until the client prevails.4 See Grasch v.
    Grasch, 
    536 S.W.3d 191
    , 194 (Ky. 2017) (holding that "the attorney does not
    possess a vested right to the actual contingent fee itself until the case is won
    or settled"); see also Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 
    206 S.W.3d 557
    , 562
    (Tex. 2006) (holding the same). A contingency fee is contingent on the
    plaintiff prevailing, which will happen only after an offer of judgment is
    rejected—never before. Our holding is consistent with public policy
    justifications supporting contingency-fee agreements, see O'Connell, 134
    Nev. at 559-60, 429 P.3d at 671-72, as the contingency-fee-based award
    properly serves as a punishment for rejecting a reasonable offer of
    4We reject Capriati's argument that the lodestar method is necessary
    to apportion an award of NRCP 68 attorney fees based on a contingency-fee
    agreement. See Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holdings Corp., 
    121 Nev. 837
    , 864,
    
    124 P.3d 530
    , 549 (2005) (explaining district courts are "not limited to one
    specific approach" in determining reasonable attorney fees).
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    judgment, see MEI-GSR Holdings, 134 Nev. at 245, 416 P.3d at 258
    (explaining that one purpose of NRCP 68 is to punish parties for not
    accepting a reasonable offer ofjudgment). We reiterate that a party seeking
    NRCP 68 attorney fees based on a contingency-fee agreement must still
    satisfy the Beattie and Brunzell factors.
    Based on our holding, the district court did not err by
    concluding that Yahyavi was entitled to recover the entirety of his
    contingency fee under NRCP 68. The district court methodically weighed
    the Beattie and Brunzell factors and concluded that the attorney fees were
    reasonable. Based on this record, we conclude that the district coures
    application of the Beattie and Brunzell factors does not constitute an abuse
    of discretion. Thus, we affirm the attorney-fees award.5
    CONCLUSION
    Evidence of a defendant's liability insurance is admissible
    under NRS 48.135(2) if the defendant first introduces evidence suggesting
    its inability to pay a judgment. Moreover, a plaintiff represented on a
    contingency-fee basis may recover the entirety of the contingency fee as
    post-offer attorney fees under NRCP 68, so long as that party satisfies the
    Beattie and Brunzell factors. We conclude that Capriati has presented no
    5Insofar  as Capriati argues that the district court's application of the
    Beattie and Brunzell factors constitutes an abuse of discretion, we decline
    to address this argument because Capriati did not cite the record to support
    any of its fact-based assertions, including those pertaining to whether its
    decision to proceed to trial was in bad faith. See NRAP 28(a)(10)(A), Allianz
    Ins. Co. v. Gagnon, 
    109 Nev. 990
    , 997, 
    860 P.2d 720
    , 725 (1993) ("This court
    need not consider the contentions of an appellant where the appellanes
    opening brief fails to cite to the record on appeal."). Thus, we cannot
    conclude that the district court abused its discretion.
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    meritorious claims of error. Likewise, Capriati has not shown that the
    district court's sanctions order constitutes an abuse of discretion. Because
    the district court correctly applied Nevada law, we affirm the final judgment
    and attorney-fees order.6
    1   J.
    Parraguirre
    We concur:
    ZIA. ter-4.               , C.J.
    Hardesty
    ,   J
    ,   J.
    Silver
    district court also denied Capriati's motions for a new trial and
    6The
    to retax costs. In Capriati's notice of appeal, it states that Capriati is also
    appealing these post-judgment orders. However, Capriati's briefs provided
    no argument as to these motions, and therefore we affirm them. See
    Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 
    122 Nev. 317
    , 330 n.38, 
    130 P.3d 1280
    ,
    1288 n.38 (2006) (stating that arguments unsupported by citations to
    relevant authority need not be considered by this court).
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    HERNDON, J., with whom STIGLICH and PICKERING, JJ.,
    agree, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
    I concur with the decision to affirm the district court's sanctions
    order and jury instruction. I disagree, however, with the majority's
    conclusion that the district court properly exercised its discretion in
    awarding the entirety of the contingency fee under NRCP 68 in the manner
    in which the district court did so in the underlying case.
    As the majority recognizes, NRCP 68 provides for awards of
    post-offer attorney fees only. Logan v. Abe, 
    131 Nev. 260
    , 265, 
    350 P.3d 1139
    , 1142 (2015). In determining whether awarding such fees is
    appropriate, a district court must first consider the factors laid out in
    Beattie u. Thomas, 
    99 Nev. 579
    , 588-89, 
    668 P.2d 268
    , 274 (1983), and
    Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 
    85 Nev. 345
    , 349, 
    455 P.2d 31
    , 33
    (1969). Gunderson u. D.R. Horton, Inc., 
    130 Nev. 67
    , 81, 
    319 P.3d 606
    , 615-
    16 (2014). The fourth Beattie factor specifically requires the district court
    to consider whether the attorney fees sought "are reasonable and justified
    in amount." Beattie, 99 Nev. at 589, 
    668 P.2d at 274
    . Other jurisdictions
    have concluded that a district court cannot determine the reasonableness of
    attorney fees actually incurred post-offer based solely on a contingency-fee
    agreement. Cooper v. Thompson, 
    353 P.3d 782
    , 798-99 (Alaska 2015); Ga.
    Dep't of Corr. v. Couch, 
    759 S.E.2d 804
    , 815 (Ga. 2014); cf. Blanchard u.
    Bergeron, 
    489 U.S. 87
    , 92-93 (1989) (concluding that a contingency-fee
    agreement can be a factor in determining the reasonableness of an attorney-
    fee award but is not singularly determinative).
    The majority concludes that an award of the entirety of the
    contingency fee is reasonable because a client who has agreed to a
    contingency-fee agreement has not incurred any attorney fees until the
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    judgment is entered, which occurs after the NRCP 68 offer. However, those
    fees begin to be earned at the inception of the case, when the attorney's
    representation of the client begins, and they continue to be earned
    throughout the pendency of the case. They do not materialize only upon
    entry of the judgment. Thus, while fees are not yet owed by the client at
    the time of offer, they have clearly been accrued by the attorney. Indeed,
    under the attorney's contingency-fee agreement with the client, if the
    attorney is unsuccessful, the attorney alone is responsible for those fees.
    See Couch, 759 S.E.2d at 817 (recognizing that there is a "common sense
    understanding that attorneys are accruing reasonable fees as they work on
    a case; they simply are not entitled to collect the amount of fees agreed to
    under a contingency fee contract from their client until the conditions of the
    contract have been 'nee).
    This court has previously recognized that recoverable post-offer
    fees are not limited to those incurred by the client. Logan v. Abe, 
    131 Nev. 260
    , 265-66, 
    350 P.3d 1139
    , 1142-43 (2015) ("Because the statute (1 [is]
    limited to the costs incurred rather than the party who pays them, we
    therefore hold that . . . NRCP 68 allow[s] a party to recover qualifying
    attorney fees and costs that were paid on its behalf by a third party.").
    Therefore, even if the client does not owe payment for his or her attorney
    fees until judgment is entered, those fees have been accrued by the attorney,
    and it is unreasonable to require the offeree party to be responsible for the
    entirety of the contingency fee when NRCP 68 only permits recovery of fees
    incurred "from the time of the offer." NRCP 68(f)(B).
    Moreover, it would be unfair to require the offeree party to pay
    the entirety of the contingency fee when the offeree was unaware of the
    private contingency-fee agreement when he or she rejected the offer of
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    , 711
    (E.D. Tex. 1996). A contingency-fee agreement "is a gamble for both the
    lawyer and the client, because the value of the professional services actually
    rendered by the lawyer may be considerably higher or lower than the
    agreed-upon amount, depending on how the litigation proceeds." Couch,
    759 S.E.2d at 816. The offeree should not be forced to bear the risk the
    opposing party and his or her counsel agreed to when the offeree was not
    subject to that agreement. The Texarkana court aptly described why
    shifting the burden to the offeree to cover the entirety of the contingency fee
    is unreasonable;
    If the opposing counsel, in entering into a
    contingency fee agreement with a client, assumes
    the risk of nonpayment, then any compensation
    that opposing counsel may ultimately receive on
    account of the contingency should be paid by the
    client—not the opposing party that did not prevail
    at trial. Similarly, when the prevailing client
    assumed the risk of having to pay its counsel a large
    contingency fee rather than payment by the hour,
    the risk assumed by the client cannot equitably be
    shifted to the party that did not prevail at trial.
    After all, it was the client that struck the
    contingency fee agreement with its counsel, not the
    party that lost at trial.
    920 F. Supp. at 711-12. Thus, without additional evidence supporting a
    contingency-fee-based award, a district court cannot find that awarding the
    entirety of the contingency fee as post-offer attorney fees under NRCP 68 is
    reasonable.
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    Further, the district court erred in finding that "there is no way
    to reasonably divide a contingency fee." While O'Connell v. Wynn Las
    Vegas, LLC, concluded that a district court cannot deny attorney fees
    because an attorney working on a contingency-fee basis does not submit
    hourly billing records, the court of appeals recognized that in order to satisfy
    the Beattie and Brunzell factors, an attorney would have to submit some
    sort of evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of the fees sought. 
    134 Nev. 550
    , 558, 562, 
    429 P.3d 664
    , 670, 673 (Ct. App. 2018). While a
    contingency-fee agreement may be "a guidepost to the reasonable value of
    the services the lawyer performed, . . . [it] is not conclusive, and it cannot
    bind the court in determining that reasonable value." Couch, 759 S.E.2d at
    816. This can work both ways, as there may be times when the contingency
    fee does not reflect the fees incurred by the attorney and a larger or a
    smaller award may be necessary, as demonstrated with additional evidence
    or a lack thereof. Id. (recognizing that a larger award may be necessary
    when the opposing party is "unnecessarily litigious or otherwise [fails] to
    follow the law governing civil litigation in a sanctionable way"). If a party
    is seeking recovery of post-offer attorney fees, that party has the burden to
    provide support for the reasonableness of the fees sought, which may
    include the contingency-fee agreement but should also include additional
    evidence or argument.1 See O'Connell, 134 Nev. at 561-62, 429 P.3d at 672-
    1The   majority recognizes that there must be different approaches
    available to district courts in determining reasonable attorney fees.
    However, by concluding it is appropriate to award the entirety of the
    contingency fee post-offer, the majority is either (1) limiting the district
    court's ability to determine reasonable attorney fees under NRCP 68 when
    there is a contingency-fee agreement by requiring the entirety of the
    contingency fee to be awarded in these circumstances, or (2) discouraging
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    73 (recognizing that there are ways to determine the reasonableness of
    attorney fees sought by the party besides hourly billing records).
    Therefore, I conclude that the district court abused its
    discretion by awarding the entirety of the contingency fee as post-offer
    attorney fees under NRCP 68 without additional support demonstrating the
    reasonableness of those attorney fees having been incurred post-offer.
    Accordingly, I dissent and would reverse and remand the award of attorney
    fees to the district court so that it can determine what fees were reasonably
    incurred post-offer.
    Herndon
    We concur:
    ,   J.
    Stiglich
    iddit               J.
    Pickering (I- °I
    attorneys from keeping accurate records of their time spent on contingency-
    fee cases so that they can seek the entirety of the contingency fee under
    NRCP 68 on the ground that they lack any evidence, other than the
    contingency-fee agreernent itself, to demonstrate what fees were reasonably
    incurred post-offer, see O'Connell, 134 Nev. at 562 n.7, 429 P.3d at 673 n.7
    (recognizing that the best practice for an attorney working on a contingency-
    fee case is "to keep hourly statements or timely billing records to later
    justify the requested feee).
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    5
    (0) 1947A    itSOD