Mgm Mirage-City Center v. Dorough ( 2013 )


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  •                 herniated disc in March 2008. 1 In April 2008, MGM Mirage's insurer,
    appellant Chartis Insurance, accepted respondent's workers' compensation
    claim, and in so doing, it categorized respondent's injury as a "lumbar
    strain." 2
    After his claim for a lumbar strain had been accepted,
    respondent requested temporary total disability (TTD) benefits from
    Chartis. Respondent submitted a physician's progress report completed by
    his own neurosurgeon that certified respondent as TTD from the date of
    his initial January 2008 examination. Chartis denied respondent's
    request for TTD benefits, as did a hearing officer.
    Respondent then appealed the denial to an appeals officer.
    Before the appeals officer, appellants argued that respondent's herniated
    disc was not a compensable injury because it was a preexisting condition
    that was not aggravated by respondent's November 2007 fall. The appeals
    officer disagreed and awarded TTD benefits to respondent, as well as
    medical benefits. Appellants then filed a petition for judicial review,
    which the district court denied. This appeal followed.
    "This court, like the district court, reviews an appeals officer's
    decision for clear error or abuse of discretion."      Dickinson v. Am. Med.
    Response, 
    124 Nev. 460
    , 465, 
    186 P.3d 878
    , 882 (2008); see also NRS
    233B.135(3) (setting forth the standard for judicial review of an agency's
    decision). Although we review issues of law de novo, "the appeals officer's
    'Respondent underwent a follow-up surgery roughly one year later.
    2 Wenote that AIG, and not appellant Chartis, was actually the
    insurer responsible for the initial processing of respondent's claim. We
    refer to Chartis in this disposition for the sake of clarity.
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    fact-based legal conclusions are entitled to deference and will not be
    disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial
    evidence is evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequately
    supporting a conclusion." Dickinson, 124 Nev. at 465-66, 
    186 P.3d at 882
    (footnotes omitted). Moreover, our review is limited to the record before
    the appeals officer. Id. at 466, 
    186 P.3d at 882
    ; see NRS 233B.135(1)(b).
    Substantial evidence supports the appeals officer's finding that
    respondent's fall aggravated his preexisting condition
    Under NRS 616C.175, if an employee sustains a work-related
    injury that "aggravates, precipitates or accelerates" a nonwork-related
    preexisting condition, the employee is entitled to compensation "unless the
    insurer can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the subsequent
    injury is not a substantial contributing cause of the resulting condition."
    NRS 616C.175(1). Appellants argued before the appeals officer that there
    was no evidence to support respondent's contention that his fall
    aggravated, precipitated, or accelerated his preexisting condition. Rather,
    appellants contended that the pain respondent experienced following his
    fall was merely a recurrence of the pain associated with his already-
    herniated disc. The appeals officer disagreed and awarded TTD benefits
    to respondent.
    On appeal, appellants contend that it was clearly erroneous
    for the appeals officer to find that respondent's fall aggravated his
    herniated disc. We disagree, as substantial evidence supports the appeals
    officer's finding. First, respondent testified that immediately before his
    fall, he was able to discharge his occupational duties, whereas
    immediately after his fall and in the ensuing days, he struggled to stand
    under his own power. This is the epitome of an "aggravation." See Grover
    C. Dils Med. Ctr. v. Menditto, 
    121 Nev. 278
    , 286-87, 
    112 P.3d 1093
    , 1099
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    (2005) (indicating that an "aggravation" is "the result of a specific,
    intervening work-related trauma," whereas a "recurrence" is when
    "   symptoms of an original injury persist and when no specific incident can
    independently explain the worsened condition"). Moreover, the physician
    who treated respondent after his fall referred him to a neurosurgeon,
    which is something that his pre-fall treating physicians never did.
    Finally, the doctor who conducted an independent review of respondent's
    medical records expressly opined that respondent's surgeries were "done
    as a direct result of the industrial accident."
    Thus, substantial evidence supports the appeals officer's
    finding that respondent's fall aggravated his herniated disc. NRS
    616C.175(1); Grover C. Dils Med. Ctr., 121 Nev. at 286-87, 
    112 P.3d at 1099
    . As this was the only meaningful argument that appellants put forth
    before the appeals officer to support the denial of TTD benefits, the officer
    did not clearly err in awarding these benefits. 
    3 Dickinson, 124
     Nev. at
    465-66, 
    186 P.3d at 882
    ; NRS 233B.135(1)(b).
    3Appellants   argued alternatively that TTD benefits were
    unwarranted because respondent moved out of state shortly after his fall,
    which, according to appellants, prevented them from offering respondent
    modified light-duty employment. See NRS 616C.475(5)(b) (relieving an
    employer of the obligation to pay TTD benefits if the employer offers the
    employee light-duty employment that complies with restrictions imposed
    by the employee's physician). Appellants presented no evidence to the
    appeals officer to suggest that they had a viable light-duty employment
    offer for respondent and were simply unable to communicate this offer to
    respondent or his attorney. Accordingly, the appeals officer did not clearly
    err in rejecting this argument.
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    Medical benefits were properly awarded once the appeals officer determined
    that respondent's herniated disc was a compensable injury
    Appellants contend that the appeals officer improperly
    awarded medical benefits for the treatment associated with respondent's
    herniated disc because appellants initially accepted respondent's claim for
    only a "lumbar strain" and respondent did not directly challenge the scope
    of his claim. We disagree. Because appellants' primary argument before
    the appeals officer was that respondent's herniated disc was not
    aggravated by his fall, the issue of whether his herniated disc was a
    compensable injury was squarely before the appeals officer. 4 See NRS
    616C.360(2) (indicating that an appeals officer must hear any matter
    raised before him or her on its merits). Thus, once the appeals officer
    determined that the herniated disc was a compensable injury, medical
    benefits were clearly part of the "compensation" to which respondent was
    entitled. See NRS 616A.090 (defining "compensation" to include "accident
    benefits"); NRS 616A.035(1) (defining "accident benefits" as "medical,
    surgical, hospital or other treatments").
    In sum, the award of TTD benefits was not clearly erroneous
    because substantial evidence supported the appeals officer's finding that
    respondent's fall aggravated his herniated disc.   Dickinson, 124 Nev. at
    465-66, 
    186 P.3d at 882
    ; NRS 233B.135(1)(b). Additionally, the officer
    properly awarded medical benefits as part of the compensation to which
    4We  note that the appeals officer's May 2009 interim order expressly
    stated as much: "[T]here remains an underlying medical issue in this
    appeal as to whether the claim includes the disc pathology and subsequent
    surgery or whether the claim is limited to a [lumbar] strain only with all
    other conditions denied."
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    respondent was entitled. NRS 616A.090; NRS 616A.035. Accordingly, we
    affirm the district court's denial of appellants' petition for judicial review. 5
    It is so ORDERED.
    cc: Chief Judge, The Eighth Judicial District Court
    Hon. Jack B. Ames, Senior Judge
    Janet Trost, Settlement Judge
    Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP/Las Vegas
    Michael Paul Wood
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    5Any   concerns about respondent's TTD certification from his
    neurosurgeon that were not properly advanced as arguments to the
    appeals officer were not considered on appeal. See City of Las Vegas v.
    Lawson, 126 Nev. , n.2, 
    245 P.3d 1175
    , 1179 n.2 (2010) (indicating
    that a party is precluded from raising an argument on appeal that was not
    raised before the appeals officer); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 
    122 Nev. 317
    , 330 n.38, 
    130 P.3d 1280
    , 1288 n.38 (2006) (noting that this court
    need not consider an issue when a party fails to provide cogent argument
    supported by salient authority).
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