Rogler v. Millard ( 2014 )

 the decedent had promised to give appellant an additional $25,000 beyond
her residual share of the estate. Thereafter, in their June 2012 summary
judgment motion, respondents pointed out that there was no evidence to
support the existence of such a promise,' and they also contended that
appellant's conduct fell squarely within the terms of the trust's no-contest
clause. In opposing respondents' summary judgment motion, appellant
did not address this argument, much less explain how her conduct fell
within the exceptions to either NRS 163.00195 (addressing the
enforcement of no-contest clauses in trusts) or NRS 137.005 (addressing
the enforcement of no-contest clauses in wills). Thus, at the time that the
district court granted summary judgment, appellant had produced no
evidence from which to infer the existence of the $25,000 promise, and had
provided no legal argument as to why the explicit terms of the no-contest
clause should not be enforced in light of the allegation regarding the
$25,000 promise contained in appellant's January 2012 objection. 2 Wood,
121 Nev. at 729, 121 P.3d at 1029. Nor has appellant provided any
argument on appeal demonstrating why, in light of these circumstances,
the district court's grant of summary judgment to respondents on this
'Notably, in contradiction to appellant's allegation that "prior
amended trusts had this [$25,000 promise] clause in it," respondents
submitted copies of the two previous versions of the decedent's trust,
neither of which contained such a clause.
2Appellant argues on appeal that the district court improperly
granted summary judgment without ruling on several of her pending
motions. But a review of these motions reveals that they contain no
discussion of the alleged $25,000 promise, nor any references to discovery-
related matters that could have reasonably been directed toward obtaining
evidence in support of the promise's existence.
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issue was erroneous. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
properly enforced the trust's no-contest clause against appellant.
Further, in light of our conclusion that the district court
properly enforced the no-contest clause against appellant, appellant is no
longer an "interested person" capable of challenging the remaining
determinations in the district court's summary judgment order. See NRS
132.185; NRS 164.005; Linthicum v. Rudi, 122 Nev. 1452, 1455, 148 P.3d
746, 748 (2006) (recognizing generally that only an interested person has
standing to seek judicial intervention in a trust's administration).
Accordingly, we need not consider appellant's arguments regarding the
propriety of the distribution to the decedent's widow or the propriety of
appointing respondents as co-personal representatives of the decedent's
estate. Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. , 245 P.3d 572, 574
(2010) ("This court's duty is not to render advisory opinions but, rather, to
resolve actual controversies . . . ."). We therefore
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
ceert4; J.
Hardesty
Douglas
Cksza
Cherry
, J.
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cc: Hon. Gloria Sturman, District Judge
Edar Y. Rogler
Jeffrey L. Burr, Ltd.
Eighth District Court Clerk
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