Polk (Renard) v. State ( 2014 )


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  •                    constituted an abuse of the writ as he raised claims new and different
    from those raised in his previous petitions. 3 See NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); NRS
    34.810(2). Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a
    demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.       See NRS 34.726(1);
    NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). Moreover, because the State specifically
    pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the rebuttable
    presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2).
    First, appellant claimed he had good cause because he did not
    have adequate access to the prison's law library. Appellant failed to
    demonstrate that lack of access to the library deprived him of meaningful
    access to the courts.    See Bounds v. Smith, 
    430 U.S. 817
    , 828 (1977),
    limited by Lewis v. Casey,     
    518 U.S. 343
    , 354-56 (1996). Appellant's
    previous proper person motions filed in the district court indicate that his
    access to the court was not improperly limited by restrictions on use of the
    prison law library or due to prison law library policies. Accordingly,
    appellant failed to demonstrate that official interference caused him to be
    unable to comply with the procedural bars.     See Hathaway ix State, 
    119 Nev. 248
    , 252, 
    71 P.3d 503
    , 506 (2003).
    Second, appellant claimed that he needed to again raise
    certain claims because they were previously denied due to
    misrepresentations by the District Attorney. Appellant did not support
    this claim with sufficient factual support and bare claims are insufficient
    3Polk  v. State, Docket No. 44087 (Order of Affirmance and Limited
    Remand to Correct the Judgment of Conviction, January 25, 2005).
    Appellant also filed post-conviction petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in
    the district court on January 27, 2010, May 19, 2011, and April 9, 2013.
    Appellant did not appeal the denial of those petitions.
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    to demonstrate a petitioner is entitled to relief. See Hargrove v. State, 
    100 Nev. 498
    , 502-03, 
    686 P.2d 222
    , 225 (1984).
    Third, appellant claimed that the procedural bars in NRS
    chapter 34 are unconstitutionally vague, ambiguous, and burdensome.
    This court has previously held that the procedural bars are constitutional.
    See Pellegrini v. State, 
    117 Nev. 860
    , 878, 
    34 P.3d 519
    , 531 (2001) (citing
    Passanisi   V.   Dir., Nev. Dep't of Prisons, 
    105 Nev. 63
    , 66, 
    769 P.2d 72
    , 74
    (1989)). Moreover, the procedural bar statutes discussed previously
    provide to a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the regulations
    governing post-conviction petitions. See generally State a Castaneda, 126
    Nev. , 
    245 P.3d 550
    , 553 (2010).
    Fourth, appellant claimed that the State withheld exculpatory
    evidence in the form of the victim's recantation. Appellant failed to
    support this claim with any factual support and unsupported claims are
    insufficient to demonstrate that a petitioner is entitled to relief.       See
    Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502-03, 
    686 P.2d at 225
    . Further, appellant failed
    to demonstrate that the State withheld this supposed evidence or that
    there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have
    been different had he possessed this evidence as he confessed to
    committing the crimes.        See State a Huebler, 128 Nev. „ 
    275 P.3d 91
    , 95 (2012) (citing State a Bennett, 
    119 Nev. 589
    , 599, 
    81 P.3d 1
    , 8
    (2003)), cert. denied, U.S. , 
    133 S. Ct. 988
     (2013). Therefore, the
    district court did not err in dismissing appellant's petition as procedurally
    barred.
    Finally, appellant claimed that the Nevada prisons are
    impermissibly overcrowded. This claim challenged the conditions of
    appellant's confinement and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was not
    the proper vehicle to raise such a claim. See Bowen a Warden, 100 Nev.
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    489, 490, 
    686 P.2d 250
    , 250 (1984). Therefore, appellant is not entitled to
    relief for this claim. Accordingly, we
    ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
    i-"tsA           J.
    Hardesty r
    J.
    Douglas
    J.
    Cherry
    cc: Hon. Douglas W. Herndon, District Judge
    Renard Truman Polk
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Clark County District Attorney
    Eighth District Court Clerk
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