Rico-Rivas (Salvador) v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                  extrinsic evidence of those acts to prove state of mind, see id. at 51546, 78
    P.3d at 902, we never held that the admissibility of such extrinsic evidence
    is unrestricted, see id. at 516, 78 P.3d at 902. Here, the detective was not
    competent to testify about the substance of the police report because he
    had no personal knowledge of the incident and was not being called as an
    expert, see NRS 50.025(1), and the police report itself was inadmissible
    hearsay as it consisted of out-of-court statements made by witnesses to
    police about the battery, see NRS 51.035; NRS 51.065(1). Rico-Rivas
    wrongly contends that the police report was admissible as a public record
    under NRS 51.155, as the police report did not contain "factual findings
    resulting from an investigation" and the circumstances of the police report
    indicate a lack of trustworthiness, given that the victim was never
    arrested or prosecuted for battery.   See NRS 51.155. To the extent that
    Rico-Rivas argues that the district court prevented him from presenting
    any evidence that the victim had committed battery, this argument is
    belied by the record. Rico-Rivas was allowed to cross-examine a State
    witness about her personal knowledge that the victim "beat-up another gal
    because she was jealous."
    Second, Rico-Rivas contends that the district court abused its
    discretion in admitting evidence of prior bad acts. We disagree. Rico-
    Rivas first challenges the admission of evidence of a temporary protective
    order (TPO) obtained by the victim against him and argues that the TPO
    was relevant only as to his sentence and should not have been admitted at
    trial. Rico-Rivas's argument is incorrect. Rico-Rivas was charged with
    murder in violation of a TPO against domestic violence. NRS 193.166
    provides for an additional penalty when a felony is committed in violation
    of a TPO. In order for this additional penalty to apply to Rico-Rivas, a
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    jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed
    in violation of a TPO.      See Apprendi v. New Jersey,    
    530 U.S. 466
    , 490
    (2000); Abrego v. State, 
    118 Nev. 54
    , 60, 
    38 P.3d 868
    , 871 (2002); NRS
    193.166(1), (5). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    admitting evidence of the TPO at trial.
    Next, Rico-Rivas challenges testimony by a State witness
    about the victim's fear of Rico-Rivas. Defense counsel did not object to or
    move to strike this testimony at trial and thus we review this challenge for
    plain error.    See Cordova v. State, 
    116 Nev. 664
    , 666, 
    6 P.3d 481
    , 482
    (2000). The prosecutor asked a State witness about her conversation with
    Rico-Rivas regarding conflict resolution, and the State witness responded,
    "Marisol [the victim] had expressed that she was afraid of --." The
    prosecutor interrupted her and asked her not to testify about the victim's
    statements. Given that the improper testimony was brief and not solicited
    by the prosecutor, we conclude that the district court did not commit plain
    error in failing to sua sponte strike this testimony. See Richmond v. State,
    
    118 Nev. 924
    , 935, 
    59 P.3d 1249
    , 1256 (2002).
    Rico-Rivas also challenges testimony about his gang affiliation
    and prior arrest. This testimony was elicited by defense counsel on cross-
    examination and counsel made no objection or request for a limiting
    instruction at trial. Because defense counsel invited the error, Rico-Rivas
    cannot now challenge the testimony on appeal.         See Rhyne v. State, 
    118 Nev. 1
    , 9, 
    38 P.3d 163
    , 168 (2002). To the extent that he complains about
    the gang-affiliation testimony elicited on redirect examination, he failed to
    make any objection to this testimony at trial, and we discern no plain
    error in the admission of this testimony.
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    Third, Rico-Rivas argues that the district court erred in
    rejecting his proposed instruction on the proportional use of self-defense
    and finding that Runion v. State, 
    116 Nev. 1041
    , 1051-52, 
    13 P.3d 52
    , 59
    (2000), mandates "stock" instructions in self-defense cases. We review the
    settling of jury instructions for an abuse of discretion but review de novo
    whether a jury instruction accurately states the law. Funderburk v. State,
    
    125 Nev. 260
    , 263, 
    212 P.3d 337
    , 339 (2009). In general, "the defense has
    the right to have the jury instructed on a theory of the case as disclosed by
    the evidence, no matter how weak or incredible that evidence may be."
    Runion, 116 Nev. at 1050, 
    13 P.3d at 58
    .
    Rico-Rivas proposed the following instruction: "Where the
    original aggressor is not guilty of a deadly attack, but of a simple assault
    or trespass, the victim has no right to use deadly or other excessive force.
    If the victim uses such force, the aggressor's right of self-defense arises."
    Contrary to Rico-Rivas's assertion, the district court did not reject this
    proposed instruction under the belief that the Runion stock instructions
    were mandatory; rather, the district court found that the proposed
    instruction did not correctly state the law and was substantially covered •
    by other jury instructions. Rico-Rivas's proposed instruction was an
    incomplete and incorrect statement of the law because it failed to account
    for the original aggressor's duty to retreat, see Culverson v. State, 
    106 Nev. 484
    , 489, 
    797 P.2d 238
    , 241 (1990), and to "decline any further struggle,"
    NRS 200.200(2). Further, the instruction as to when the victim could use
    force to protect herself was an incorrect statement of the law. Thus, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Rico-Rivas's proposed
    instruction.
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    Finally, Rico-Rivas argues that the cumulative effect of errors
    denied him a fair trial. As we have found no error, there is nothing to
    cumulate.
    Having considered Rico-Rivas's contentions and concluded
    that they lack merit, we
    ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
    Saitta
    reC
    ALtA
    Pickering
    cc: Hon. Jerome Polaha, District Judge
    Law Office of Thomas L. Qualls, Ltd.
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Washoe County District Attorney
    Washoe District Court Clerk
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