Luxx Lighting, Inc. v. Dist. Ct. (Fohse, Inc.) ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
LUXX LIGHTING, INC., No. 84368
Petitioner,
vs.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
F LE
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE OCI 11 2022
NADIA KRALL, DISTRICT JUDGE, BF:nwN
Respondents, CL 'UPREMe COURT
and DEPUTY í. RK
FOHSE, INC.,
Real Party in Interest.
ORDER DENYING PETITION
This original petition for a writ of prohibition challenges a
district court order denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Having
considered the petition, answer, and reply, we conclude that our
intervention is not warranted at this time.
Because a writ petition seeks extraordinary relief, the
consideration of the petition is within our sole discretion. Okada v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 6, 8, 408 P.3d 566, 569 (2018). When there
is no "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,"
NRS 34.170, a writ of prohibition may be available to "arrest[ the
proceedings of any tribunal . . . exercising judicial functions, when such
proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal,"
NRS 34.320; Daane v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 654, 655, 261
P.3d 1086, 1087 (2011.).
As a general rule, we will not entertain a writ petition that
challenges a district court order denying a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Chur v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 136 Nev. 68, 70, 458 P.3d
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
( 0) I947.A
2.i_ -5206Z
336, 339 (2020). And we are not convinced that this petition implicates any
exception to that general rule. See id. (reviewing such orders only where
"(1) no factual dispute exists and the district court is obligated to [grant the
motion] pursuant to clear authority under a statute or rule; or (2) an
important issue of law needs clarification and considerations of sound
judicial economy and administration militate in favor of granting the
petition"). First, petitioner has not demonstrated that the district court was
obligated to grant the motion under clear legal authority. Petitioner moved
for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over petitioner. A defendant may use a motion for judgment on
the pleadings "to raise various rule 12(b) defenses regarding procedural
defects." Alexander v. City of Chicago, 994 F.2d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1993).
But this is limited to "only certain procedural defenses after the close of the
pleadings, as authorized by Rule 12(h)(2) and (3)." Mussat v. Enclarity, Inc.,
362 F. Supp. 3d 468, 472 (N.D. Ill. 2019); see 5C Charles A. Wright and
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 (3d ed. 2018).
Because NRCP 12(h)(2) and (3) do not include the defense of a lack of
personal jurisdiction, a motion for judgment on the pleadings cannot be
used to assert that defense. See Mussat, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 472 (concluding
that "the only 12(b) defenses that may properly be brought after the close of
pleadings in a 12(c) motion" include a failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, failure to join a necessary party, and lack of subject
matter jurisdiction); 5C Wright & Miller, supra, § 1367 (explaining "that
r`Federal cases interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
strong persuasive authority, because the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure
are based in large part upon their federal counterparts." McClendon v.
Collins, 132 Nev. 327, 330, 372 P.3d 492, 494 (2016) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
i0) 1,47A
the defenses of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
failure to join a party under Rule 19 without whom the action cannot
proceed, and failure to state a legal defense to a claim may be raised on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings"). Second, because petitioner can
move for an evidentiary hearing on personal jurisdiction or challenge it at
trial (provided it has not been waived), considerations of sound judicial
economy and administration do not militate in favor of granting the
petition.2 See Trump v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev. 687, 693-94,
857 P.2d 740, 744-45 (1993) (discussing the different manners a defendant
may challenge personal jurisdiction before and at trial). For these reasons,
we
ORDER the petition DENIED.3
C.J.
arraguirre
Sr.J.
Herndon
2 Theparties dispute whether petitioner waived personal jurisdiction,
see Superpurnper, Inc. v. Leonard, Tr. for Bankr. Est. of Morabito, 137 Nev.,
Adv. Op. 43, 495 P.3d 101, 106 (2021) (holding that personal jurisdiction is
an affirmative defense which is waived if not raised in the responsive
pleading), but we do not reach this issue because the district court order
does not explicitly address it. See 9352 Cranesbill Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank,
136 Nev. 76, 82, 459 P.3d 227, 232 (2020) (providing that "this court will not
address issues that the district court did not directly resolve").
3The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
p)) PAM
3
cc: Hon. Nadia Kra11, District Judge
Snell & Wilmer, LLP/Las Vegas
Lamkin IP Defense
Simons Hall Johnston PC/Reno
Eighth District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
(_.» I \
4