Snyder v. Clear Recon Corp. ( 2022 )


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  • IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    —_—
    NATHAN SNYDER; AND SAMANTHA No. 82390
    ORR,
    Appellants,
    vs.
    CLEAR RECON CORP., AND SANAM
    LIMITED,
    Respondents.
    ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
    This is an appeal from a final judgment in a real property
    matter. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Eric Johnson,
    Judge.!
    Appellants purchased a home, funded by a mortgage loan, on
    which they later defaulted. Respondent Clear Recon Corp. recorded a notice
    of default in March 2019 and a notice of trustee sale thereafter. Appellants
    then filed for bankruptcy and, after the bankruptcy’s dismissal, Clear Recon
    recorded another notice of sale. Appellants then again filed, and had
    dismissed, another bankruptcy case, after which Clear Recon recorded a
    third notice of sale. When appellants’ third bankruptcy filing was
    dismissed, Clear Recon proceeded with the foreclosure sale in July 2020.
    Before respondent Sanam Limited recorded the trustee’s deed upon sale,
    appellants filed a complaint for injunctive relief, arguing that Clear Recon
    had materially violated NRS 107.550 because no foreclosure sale occurred,
    and more than 90 days passed between the recording of the second and third
    notices of sale. The district court denied injunctive relief and granted
    summary judgment in respondents’ favor.
    Supreme Court 1Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
    fiemas is not warranted
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    Appellants argue that NRS 107.550(1) requires rescission of a
    notice of default when a lender fails to complete a foreclosure sale within 90
    calendar days after a notice of sale. And they argue that such recission is
    required here because Clear Recon failed to conduct a foreclosure sale
    within 90 days after recording the second notice of sale, regardless of the
    fact that fewer than 90 days elapsed between the third notice of sale and
    the foreclosure sale. As this is an issue of statutory interpretation, we
    review the district court’s decision de novo. See Senjab v. Alhulaibi, 137
    Nev., Adv. Op. 64, 
    497 P.3d 618
    , 619 (2021).
    “If [a] statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce
    the statute as written.” Hobbs v. State, 
    127 Nev. 234
    , 237, 
    251 P.3d 177
    ,
    179 (2011). But, “if following the statute’s apparent plain meaning results
    in a meaning that runs counter to the ‘spirit’ of the statute, this court may
    look outside the statute’s language.” MGM Mirage v. Nev. Ins. Guar. Ass’n,
    
    125 Nev. 223
    , 228-29, 
    209 P.3d 766
    , 769-70 (2009). Similarly, “when [a]
    statute is ambiguous, meaning that it is subject to more than one reasonable
    interpretation ... we [may also] look beyond the language [of the statute]
    to consider its meaning in light of its spirit, subject matter, and public
    policy.” Jd. (fourth alteration in original) (G@mternal quotation marks
    omitted); see also State v. Lucero, 
    127 Nev. 92
    , 95, 
    249 P.3d 1226
    , 1228
    (2011) (explaining that when a statute is ambiguous, this court may then
    look to legislative history and construe the statute in a manner consistent
    with reason and public policy).
    NRS 107.550(1) provides:
    1. A civil action for a foreclosure sale
    pursuant to NRS 40.430 involving a failure to make
    a payment required by a residential mortgage loan
    must be dismissed without prejudice, any notice of
    default and election to sell recorded pursuant to
    Supreme Count subsection 2 of NRS 107.080 or any notice of sale
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    recorded pursuant to subsection 4 of NRS 107.080
    must be rescinded, and any pending foreclosure
    sale must be cancelled, if:
    (c) A foreclosure sale is not conducted within
    90 calendar days after a notice of sale is recorded
    pursuant to subsection 4 of NRS 107.080.
    Appellants present a reasonable reading of the statute, under
    which a violation of the foreclosure process occurs when a foreclosure sale
    does not occur within 90 days after a notice of sale is recorded. And here,
    even accounting for NRS 107.550(2)’s tolling periods, the foreclosure sale
    was not conducted within 90 calendar days after the second notice of sale.?
    Nevertheless, we conclude that NRS 107.550(1) is ambiguous as applied in
    this case, where a foreclosure sale occurred within 90 days of the most
    recent recorded notice of sale, but more than 90 days passed between notice
    of sale recordings. The district court reasonably interpreted the statute as
    requiring a recission of the notice of default only where a foreclosure sale
    occurs more than 90 days after the recording of a notice of sale, and because
    the sale took place within 90 days of the recording of the third notice of sale,
    the court concluded that the sale met the statute’s requirements. Because
    the statute is ambiguous, we look beyond its language to determine its
    meaning. Hobbs, 127 Nev. at 237, 
    251 P.3d at 179
    .
    NRS 107.550 is part of the “the Nevada Homeowner's Bill of
    Rights.” Relevant legislative history shows that the bill’s sponsors intended
    to provide homeowners with adequate notice and certainty regarding
    foreclosure proceedings and with information on ways to avoid foreclosure.
    Hearing on S.B. 321 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 77th Leg.
    2Respondents dispute that more than 90 days elapsed between the
    Supreme Court second and third notice of sale, but the record belies this contention.
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    (May 2, 2013) (testimony of Assemblyman James Healey) (testifying that
    the bill was intended to “protect . .. homeowners” by “requir[ing] borrowers
    to be sent a foreclosure notice, a preforeclosure notice with information
    about their loan, and options on how to avoid foreclosure”); Hearing on S.B.
    321 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 77th Leg. (April 10, 2013)
    (testimony of Senator Justin Jones) (noting that the bill addressed the
    concern that foreclosure notices would “sit out forever” and that the bill
    would “increase[] predictability for all parties involved in the foreclosure
    process,” and provide “strong but fair accountability measures by extending
    protections to all residential mortgages written in Nevada”). The sponsors
    were also aware of the potential for abuse by homeowners in default,
    though, stating that it was “not the intent of the bill” to give “those who go
    through this process the ability to abuse the process.” Hearing on 8.B. 321
    Before the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary 77th Leg. (May 16, 2013)
    (testimony of Senator Justin Jones). Sponsors further stated that they had
    worked with various stakeholders
    to make sure that we are not enabling people who
    are simply trying to game the system. I think what
    we have done is ensure that there is notice at the
    beginning and that there is an opportunity for
    someone to go into either the foreclosure mediation
    process or into another loss mitigation process.
    Hearing on S.B. 321 Before the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary 77th Leg.
    (May 2, 2013) (testimony of Senator Jones).
    Based on the legislative history, we conclude that Clear Recon
    did not violate the statute because it did not conduct a foreclosure sale more
    than 90 days after recording a notice of sale. This interpretation balances
    the bill sponsors’ concerns that homeowners were not receiving sufficient
    notice about the foreclosure proceedings with their countervailing concern
    Supreme Count that homeowners could potentially abuse the process.
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    Here, appellants do not dispute that they received all due notice
    regarding the foreclosure proceedings, which is further evidenced by their
    bankruptcy petitions filed immediately before, or on the day of, each of the
    scheduled foreclosure sales. Most importantly, they do not dispute that
    they had notice as to the third notice of sale. And they also do not dispute
    that the foreclosure sale occurred within 90 days after the third notice of
    sale.3 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err by
    granting summary judgment and denying injunctive relief. We, therefore,
    ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.4
    O ae
    Parraguirre
    Silver
    ec: Hon. Eric Johnson, District Judge
    Kristine M. Kuzemka, Settlement Judge
    Kern Law, Ltd.
    Law Office of Andrew H. Pastwick, LLC
    Aldridge Pite, LLP
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    3Because this issue is dispositive, we need not address the parties’
    remaining arguments regarding NRS 107.560 and whether respondent
    Sanam Limited was a bona fide purchaser.
    4We lift the stay imposed by this court on June 10, 2021 (as clarified
    by order entered on January 3, 2022).
    The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
    Supreme COURT decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 82390

Filed Date: 8/11/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/12/2022