Johnson (Corey) v. State ( 2022 )


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  •                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    COREY B. JOHNSON,                                       No. 83727
    Appellant,
    vs.
    THE STATE OF NEVADA,
    FILED
    Respondent.                                                  AUG 1 1 2022
    ELIZABETH A. BROWN
    CLERK OF SIPREME COURT
    5
    BY       •
    DEPUTY CLERK
    ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
    This is a pro se appeal from a district court order denying a
    petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
    County; Joseph Hardy, Jr., Judge.' Appellant Corey B. Johnson challenges
    the revocation of parole and the computation of his credits.
    Johnson first argues that the district court violated his right to
    due process when it did not timely hold a preliminary inquiry on his parole
    revocation. He argues that he was arrested on April 16, 2020, and that a
    hearing was untimely held on May 21, 2020.           "Parole and probation
    revocations are not criminal prosecutions; the full panoply of constitutional
    protections afforded a criminal defendant does not apply." Anaya v. State,
    
    96 Nev. 119
    , 122, 
    606 P.2d 156
    , 157 (1980). Due process in such an instance
    requires that a preliminary inquiry into probable cause for revocation be
    held "as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and
    sources are available." Morrissey v. Brewer, 
    408 U.S. 471
    , 485 (1972). NRS
    213.1511 states the inquiry generally must be held "within 15 working days
    1Having  considered the pro se brief filed by appellant, we conclude
    that a response is not necessary, NRAP 46A(c), and that oral argument is
    not warranted, NRAP 34(f)(3). This appeal therefore has been decided
    based on the pro se brief and the record. 
    Id.
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    after the arrest." NRS 213.1511(3) (emphasis added). In the time period
    between April 1 and June 30, 2020, however, the Governor's Emergency
    Directive 009 (Revised) tolled the time to commence a legal action by 30
    days where that limit is set by statute or regulation. Emergency Directive
    009 (Revised) (April 1, 2020), § 1-2 (giving effect to the directive and
    providing that la]ny specific time limit set by state statute or regulation
    for the commencement of any legal action is hereby tolled from the date of
    this Directive until 30 days from the date the state of emergency declared
    on March 12, 2020 is terminated"); see also Emergency Directive 026 (June
    29, 2020), § 5 (terminating Emergency Directive 009 (Revised) effective
    June 30).
    The violation report indicates that Johnson was arrested on
    April 16, 2020. But for the emergency tolling, the hearing should have been
    held by May 7, 2020. See NRS 241.015(8) (providing that lw]orking day'
    means every day of the week except Saturday, Sunday and any day declared
    to be a legal holiday pursuant to NRS 236.015" for purposes of Nevada's
    Open Meeting Law); Williams v. Clark Cty. Dist. Att'y, 
    118 Nev. 473
    , 487,
    
    50 P.3d 536
    , 545 (2002) (Rose, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
    (distinguishing "working days" from all calendar days and urging that
    c`working" must not be made surplusage). Due to Emergency Directive 009
    (Revised), the preliminary inquiry was required to be held by Monday, June
    8. See NRAP 26(a)(1) (stating rules for computing time where the method
    for counting time is not specified). The summary of the hearing officer's
    inquiry and disposition indicates that the inquiry was timely held on May
    10, 2020. The district court neglected to count the working days or consider
    the emergency tolling in concluding that the deadline in NRS 213.1511(3)
    was satisfied.    Nevertheless, the district court reached the correct
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    disposition in concluding that the preliminary inquiry was not untimely.
    See Wyatt v. State, 
    86 Nev. 294
    , 298, 
    468 P.2d 338
    , 341 (1970) (affirming a
    decision reaching the correct result, albeit on an incorrect basis).
    Johnson next argues that his right to due process was violated
    when he did not receive notice of the preliminary inquiry, denying him the
    opportunity to obtain counsel or present           witnesses or supporting
    documentation. Due process protections for parole revocations require a
    parolee to be provided with notice; the evidence against him; a neutral
    arbiter; and opportunities to speak at the hearing, obtain counsel, present
    supporting documents, and confront adverse witnesses. See NRS 213.1513;
    Morrissey, 
    408 U.S. at 485-87
    . The record shows that Johnson received a
    copy of his violation report stating the alleged violation of his parole,
    specifically that he absconded, and that he received notice of the
    preliminary inquiry. The record further shows that Johnson wanted to call
    an inmate witness who could not be located and otherwise did not have
    supporting evidence or witnesses to present. The record does not show that
    Johnson was deprived of opportunities to obtain counsel or present
    supporting evidence. The district court therefore did not err in concluding
    that Johnson's right to due process was not violated in this regard.
    Lastly, Johnson argues that the district court erroneously found
    that he absconded from parole and thus erroneously applied a statute in
    concluding that he was not eligible to receive credits for the period of
    absconding.     He argues that he had been reinstated to parole and
    accordingly could not be deemed to be an escapee, which may only apply to
    inmates. The record shows that Johnson was reinstated to parole on June
    25, 2019; was subject to supervision under NRS 213.124; absconded from
    supervision on August 22, 2019; and accordingly violated the conditions of
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    his parole. Regardless of whether Johnson could assert his status as a
    parolee as a defense to a charge of escape, cf. NRS 212.095, being a parolee
    is a condition precedent, not a defense, to revocation of parole. And Johnson
    did not demonstrate any error in the computation of his credits. See NRS
    213.15185(1), (4) (providing that a parolee who has absconded does not
    receive credit on his or her sentence for that period of absconding). The
    district court therefore did not err in this regard.
    Accordingly, we
    ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.2
    C>4'°‘
    Parraguirre
    Sr.J.
    Silver
    cc:      Hon. Joseph Hardy, Jr., District Judge
    Corey B. Johnson
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Clark County District Attorney
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    2TheHonorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
    decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 83727

Filed Date: 8/11/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/17/2022