Moore (Herbie) v. State ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                  opportunity to view Moore and be familiar with his appearance, and the
    certainty with which she identified Moore and the attendant
    circumstances of the identification did not suggest a due process violation.
    The record supports the district court's findings and we conclude that it
    did not abuse its discretion in this regard.    See Browning v. State, 
    104 Nev. 269
    , 274, 
    757 P.2d 351
    , 354 (1988) (discussing in-court
    identifications); Jones v. State, 
    95 Nev. 613
    , 617, 
    600 P.2d 247
    , 250 (1979).
    Second, Moore contends that the State violated Brady v.
    Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963), by failing to disclose exculpatory or
    impeachment evidence before the preliminary hearing.          "Brady and its
    progeny require a prosecutor to disclose evidence favorable to the defense
    when that evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment." State v.
    Huebler, 128 Nev. „ 
    275 P.3d 91
    , 95 (2012) (internal quotation
    marks omitted), cert. denied, U.S. , 
    133 S. Ct. 988
     (2013). However,
    Brady only requires the State "to turn over the evidence in time for it to be
    of use at trial." United States v. Fernandez, 
    231 F.3d 1240
    , 1248 n.5 (9th
    Cir. 2000); see also United State v. Gordon, 
    844 F.2d 1397
    , 1403 (9th Cir.
    1988) ("Brady does not necessarily require that the prosecution turn over
    exculpatory material before trial. To escape the Brady sanction, disclosure
    must be made at a time when disclosure would be of value to the accused."
    (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Wilson,       
    160 F.3d 732
    , 742 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[A] new trial is rarely warranted based on a
    Brady claim where the defendants obtained the information in time to
    make use of it."). Here, the record demonstrates that Moore received a
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    2
    (0) 194M    en
    transcript of Angel Grant's police statement a full two years before his
    case went trial, and it does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that
    the result of the preliminary hearing would have been different if the
    statement had been provided sooner.          See Sheriff Washoe Cnty. v.
    Middleton, 
    112 Nev. 956
    , 961, 
    921 P.2d 282
    , 286 (1996) ("[P]robable cause
    to bind a defendant over for trial may be based on slight, even marginal
    evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude
    that this contention is without merit.
    Third, Moore contends that the State obtained Laura
    Fradiue's testimony through coercion by threatening to place her in jail
    and take her children away. Because Moore failed to object to Fradiue's
    testimony on these grounds at trial, we review this contention for plain
    error.   See Mclellan, 124 Nev. at 269, 182 P.3d at 110. `Witness
    intimidation by a prosecutor can warrant a new trial if it results in a
    denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial." Rippo v. State, 
    113 Nev. 1239
    , 1251, 
    946 P.2d 1017
    , 1025 (1997). The record reveals that Fradiue
    testified on direct examination that a uniformed officer and homicide
    detective came to her house to talk about an incident involving her car.
    The detective told her that she would have been taken to jail and her
    children would have been taken away if a different officer had responded
    to the incident. And she did not feel threatened by the officers or that she
    had to tell them "one thing in order not to be arrested or not have [her]
    children taken or anything." However, on cross-examination she testified
    that the officers told her that her children would be taken away if she lied
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    3
    (0) (947A    .(Ari i.
    f
    or did not cooperate with them and this scared her as a mother. Because
    the circumstances under which Fradiue talked to the police were
    presented to the jury and constituted factors that the jury could weigh
    when assessing the credibility of her testimony, see Wise v. State, 
    92 Nev. 181
    , 183, 
    547 P.2d 314
    , 315 (1976), we conclude that Moore has not
    demonstrated plain error.
    Having concluded that Moore is not entitled to relief, we
    ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
    J.
    Hardesty
    J.
    Douglas
    CHERRY, J., dissenting:
    I dissent. I would have set the matter for oral argument.
    J.
    Cherry
    cc:   Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge
    Sandra L. Stewart
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Clark County District Attorney
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    SUPREME COURT
    OF
    NEVADA
    4
    (0) 1947A