Engelson (Cole) v. State ( 2022 )


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  •           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
    COLE DUANE ENGELSON,                                    No. 82691
    Appellant,
    vs.
    THE STATE OF NEVADA,
    FILED
    Respondent.                                                  MAR 1 8 2022
    ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
    This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a
    jury verdict, of first-degree murder. Fifth Judicial District Court, Nye
    County; Robert W. Lane, Judge.
    Appellant Cole Engelson was taking care of his girlfriend's
    three-year-old daughter, Yessenia Camp, when she was killed. Yessenia's
    mother, Victoria, had left Yessenia alone with Engelson at the time of the
    murder and, although Engelson asserted he did not remember how
    Yessenia died, he stated multiple times to detectives that he was
    responsible for Yessenia's death, including that the cause of her death was
    "literally" at his hands. A jury convicted Engelson of first-degree murder
    and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole.
    On appeal, Engelson advances multiple arguments in support
    of a new trial, including that the district court improperly admitted
    evidence of two prior bad acts, denied a motion to suppress statements he
    made to detectives, and admitted a witness's deposition transcript. For the
    reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of conviction.'
    We have reviewed the record and the additional arguments on appeal
    1
    and we conclude (1) that the district court did not err by denying Engelson's
    motion to disqualify the Nye County District Attorney's Office where the
    evidence does not support that Engelson's prior attorney was not properly
    2      -03C/
    We first address the prior bad acts evidence. The district court
    allowed the State to introduce evidence that, three months before the
    murder, Yessenia fell and cut her chin while Engelson was babysitting her
    and that Engelson immediately notified Victoria of that injury. The district
    court also admitted a statement Engelson made to Victoria, about a month
    prior to the murder, that he had spanked Yessenia too hard.
    We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's decision
    to admit prior bad act evidence and we will not reverse absent an abuse of
    discretion. Randolph v. State, 
    136 Nev. 659
    , 661, 
    477 P.3d 342
    , 346 (2020).
    A threshold requirement for admission is that the evidence must be
    relevant. NRS 48.025(1). NRS 48.045(2) provides that evidence of prior bad
    acts "is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
    that the person acted in conformity therewith" although it may be
    admissible for other purposes, including to show absence of mistake or
    accident.   However, the probative value must not be substantially
    outweighed by the prejudicial effect. See Randolph, 136 Nev. at 661, 477
    P.3d at 346. We assess unfair prejudice by looking at the need for the
    evidence, the basis for its admission, "the use to which the evidence was
    actually put," and whether the evidence will "rouse the jury to
    screened off the case or that any prejudice was fairly imputed to the entire
    office; (2) Yessenia's autopsy photographs were properly admitted to help
    explain the expert's testimony; and (3) Engelson's sentence fell within the
    statutory limits and was appropriate for the crime. To the extent there was
    any error regarding mention of Engelson's "jail calls," the error was
    harmless considering the overwhelming evidence against Engelson
    presented at trial, as addressed below. See NRS 178.598. Finally, even
    assuming, arguendo, any non-victim gave improper victim-impact
    statements at sentencing, any error was harmless because the non-victims
    and the victims asked for the same sentence. See id.
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    1M   1947A
    overmastering hostility."   id. at 665, 477 P.3d at 349 (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    The prior bad act evidence here was inadmissible. The State
    sought to introduce evidence of the chin injury to contrast it with the
    murder and to argue that Engelson's failure to immediately alert Victoria
    of Yessenia's injuries on the day she died suggested that the killing, unlike
    the earlier chin injury, was not an accident. The district court admitted
    evidence of the cut to Yessenia's chin to prove absence of mistake. But
    evidence concerning the chin injury has little, if any, relevance here.
    Engelson argued he did not remember what happened to Yessenia, and so
    contrasting the two incidents proves little about the nature of the killing.
    Moreover, an accidental chin cut three months before the murder bears no
    similarity to the extensive, traumatic, and deadly injuries Yessenia
    sustained on the day she was killed. The evidence also lacked probative
    value considering the fact that Engelson confessed to killing Yessenia and
    the circumstantial evidence adduced at trial supported the conclusion that
    the killing was not accidental. Finally, the prejudice accompanying this
    evidence was high, where the jury could view it as a possible earlier incident
    of child abuse.
    Similarly, Victoria's testimony that sometime prior to the
    killing Engelson said he had spanked Yessenia "too hard, that he had
    popped her a good one," should not have been admitted. The State argued
    the testimony shows Engelson knew to not hit Yessenia too hard and the
    evidence therefore went to Engelson's mens rea. The district court likewise
    admitted this evidence to prove absence of mistake, but the evidence has no
    relevance. Again, because Engelson's defense was that he did not know
    what happened to Yessenia, showing that he knew what constituted hitting
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    11)1   14137A    ...‘aV.M.,
    "too hard" does little to counter his defense, and, moreover, spanking a child
    "too hard" is distinct from beating a child to death, as the State argued
    happened here. Further, the prejudice outweighs any probative value, as
    the jury could improperly infer from this evidence a propensity to hit
    Yessenia and a pattern of child abuse. And, again, this evidence was
    unnecessary in light of the evidence adduced at trial. Therefore, the district
    court erred by admitting the prior bad act evidence.
    We nevertheless conclude the error was harmless here.         See
    NRS 178.598 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not
    affect substantial rights shall be disregarded"); Hubbard v. State, 
    134 Nev. 450
    , 459, 
    422 P.3d 1260
    , 1267 (2018) (explaining an error that does "not
    have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
    verdict" will not warrant reversal). Engelson was the only person present
    with Yessenia at the time of the murder, he confessed to killing Yessenia—
    i ndicating he caused her death "literally" with his hands—and Engelson
    had marks on his knuckles that were consistent with hitting a person.
    Yessenia had abrasions and contusions over her entire head and body, and
    the autopsy showed that Yessenia had been injured so severely her internal
    organs were damaged, including her brain and eyes, and she had sustained
    blunt force trauma similar to the trauma caused by a car accident. The
    doctor who perforrned the autopsy concluded the manner of death was
    homicide. As to the spanking evidence in particular, Engelson also told
    detectives that he had previously spanked Yessenia and that he was "heavy-
    handed." Moreover, although Engelson claimed he could not recall what
    happened to cause Yessenia's death, he was able to provide details
    regarding events that occurred the day before and after she died,
    undermining the veracity of his defense. Given the overwhelming evidence
    4
    against Engelson, the admission of the prior bad act evidence does not
    warrant reversa1.2
    Next, we address the district court's denial of Engelson's motion
    to suppress the statements he made to the detectives. Engelson talked to
    Detective Fernandes when she arrived at the scene, and he later confessed
    to her. Detective Fernandes did not read him his Miranda rights when she
    first made contact with him, but she read him his Miranda rights after he
    confessed.
    We conclude Engelson was not in custody when Detective
    Fernandes initially questioned him and that when Detective Fernandes
    first arrived on the scene, she was investigating the crime and gathering
    facts about the criine. State v. Taylor, 
    114 Nev. 1071
    , 1082-83, 
    968 P.2d 315
    , 323-24 (1998) (deciding an individual is generally not in custody for
    Miranda purposes when he is questioned during the fact-finding process
    and concluding the defendant was not in custody where officers did not
    move or restrain him, did not handcuff or draw their guns on defendant,
    and did not accuse defendant of anything or inform him he was not free to
    leave); Belcher v. State, 
    136 Nev. 261
    , 264, 
    464 P.3d 1013
    , 1021 (2020)
    (reviewing the totality of the circumstances "including the interrogation
    site, any objective indicia of arrest, 'and the length and form of questioning"'
    to determine whether defendant is in custody and entitled to a Miranda
    warning)(quoting Carroll v. State, 
    132 Nev. 269
    , 282, 
    371 P.3d 1023
    , 1032
    2Enge1son also argues the evidence was insufficient to support his
    conviction for first-degree murder. For the reasons stated here, we are not
    persuaded by this argument. See Valentine v. State, 
    135 Nev. 463
    , 467-68,
    
    454 P.3d 709
    , 715 (2019) (evidence is sufficient if, when viewed in the light
    most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence is such that any rational
    factfinder could find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt).
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    ,01 IY47A    •z4&-5
    (2016)). Here, Engelson and Detective Fernandes were standing outside
    Engelson's house, and Engelson—who had not been arrested, detained, or
    told he was not free to leave—voluntarily described bathing Yessenia and
    showed Fernandes the bathroom. Moreover, Engelson was not restrained
    or handcuffed during this time. And as soon as Engelson stated he killed
    Yessenia, Fernandes stopped questioning him, handcuffed him, and read
    him his Miranda rights. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
    denying Engelson's motion to suppress his statement to Detective
    Fernandes.
    Later, while in custody, Engelson was interviewed by
    detectives, was read his Miranda rights, and waived them. However, he
    argues he was intoxicated, hungover, sleep deprived, and mentally unstable
    as evidenced by the suicide smock he was placed in, and therefore, he could
    not have voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda
    rights.
    We conclude the record does not support Engelson's arguments
    and instead shows he was coherent and able to recall detailed facts during
    the three times he spoke to detectives. See Tucker v. State, 
    92 Nev. 486
    ,
    488, 553 1.2d 951, 952 (1976) (deciding proof of the defendant's intoxication
    during the time of the confession will not, in the absence of additional facts
    demonstrating distress, prevent the admission of his confession); Pickworth
    v. State, 
    95 Nev. 547
    , 549, 
    598 P.2d 626
    , 627 (1979) (deciding a defendant's
    confession was voluntary where the defendant suffering frorn withdrawal
    was coherent, able to recall facts in great detail, and showed no signs of
    discomfort). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying his motion
    to suppress the staternents he made to detectives during this interview.
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    1947A .4MS,
    Another detective interviewed Engelson later in the same day,
    and this detective did not re-read Engelson his Miranda rights. The
    detective did ask Engelson if he remembered the earlier Miranda warning
    and understood his Miranda rights.
    We conclude the district court did not err in denying Engelson's
    motion to suppress his statements in the later interview. See Taylor v.
    State, 
    96 Nev. 385
    , 386, 
    609 P.2d 1238
    , 1239 (1980) (explaining warnings do
    not need to be repeated each time questioning is commenced); Koger v.
    State, 
    117 Nev. 138
    , 142-44, 1.
    7 P.3d 428
    , 431-32 (2001.) (deciding the most
    relevant factor in determining whether an earlier warning has become stale
    is the arnount of time lapsed between warnings, but other factors include
    "the degree to which the defendant was reminded of [his] rights in the
    subsequent interrogation before questioning and the degree to which the
    defendant indicated she remembered and understood those rights prior to
    questioning.") Although the two interviews were conducted by different
    detectives, the detective that interviewed Engelson later in the same day
    reminded Engelson that his Miranda rights still applied during that later
    interview.3
    Finally, we address the district court's decision to admit a
    witness's deposition at trial. Prior to trial, the State deposed Christopher
    Pullen, who had been incarcerated with Engelson. Pullen testified that
    Engelson related that on the day of the murder, he spanked Yessenia on
    two occasions, both times causing Yessenia to fall and hit her head, after
    3Engelson also argues his state of mind was different for the earlier
    interview because he was hungover, exhausted, and mentally unstable . We
    conclude the record does not support this argument for the same reasons
    stated above.
    7
    which Engelson put Yessenia to bed. Engelson was present and represented
    by counsel at the deposition. Pullen promised the court and the State that
    he would appear at trial, but instead he disappeared after he was released
    from prison and did not respond when the State emailed his subpoena to
    the prison system. The State moved to admit the deposition during trial,
    explaining they had been unable to locate Pullen, and the district court
    granted the motion.
    NRS 174.125 required the State to move to admit the deposition
    at least 15 days prior to trial, unless the opportunity did not exist before
    trial or the State was then unaware of the grounds for the motion. NRS
    174.125(1) (3). The State's failure to timely file the motion here is
    uncontroverted, and nothing in the record suggests that the State was
    unaware that Pullen would likely be unavailable at trial or did not have an
    opportunity to timely file the motion. Moreover, even assuming the
    untimely motion was proper here, NRS 174.125(4) requires a party to
    support an untimely motion with an affidavit—something the State again
    did not do. See also Hernandez v. State, 
    124 Nev. 639
    , 648, 
    188 P.3d 1126
    ,
    1132-33 (2008) (explaining that to support an untimely motion the State
    must provide an affidavit or sworn testimony explaining its efforts to timely
    procure the evidence prior to the deadline), abrogated on other grounds by
    State v. Eighth judicial Dist. Court (13aker), 
    134 Nev. 104
    , 412 13.3d 18
    (2018). Accordingly, we conclude the district court erred by admitting
    Pullen's deposition at trial. However, other evidence established that
    Yessenia was fatally injured while in Engelson's care, and because the
    evidence against Engelson was overwhelming we conclude this error was
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    ([1, 1,147A
    ultimately harm1ess.4 See Hernandez, 12/1 Nev. at 652, 188 13.3d at 11.35-36
    (reviewing a decision to admit prior testimony for harmless error).
    Accordingly, we
    ORDER, the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
    J.
    Silver
    Cadish
    C40K                   J.
    J.
    Pickering
    cc:   Hon. Robert W. Lane, District Judge
    Special Public Defender
    Boskovich :Law Group, PlA,C
    Attorney General/Carson City
    Nye County District Attorney
    Nye County Clerk
    4 We also conclude the cumulative effect of the errors did not violate
    Engelson's right to a fair trial or warrant reversal under these facts. See
    Turner v. State, 
    136 Nev. 545
    , 556, 
    473 P.3d 438
    , 449 (2020) ("When
    evaluating a claim of cumulative error, we consider the following factors: (1)
    whether the issue of guilt is close, (2) the quantity and character of the
    error, and (3) the gravity of the crime charged.").
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 82691

Filed Date: 3/18/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/23/2022