Com. v. Campbell, D. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S47035-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    DARNELL M. CAMPBELL
    Appellant                No. 102 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order December 22, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0000885-2012
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                     FILED NOVEMBER 01, 2016
    Darnell M. Campbell appeals from the order, entered in the Court of
    Common Pleas of Franklin County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to
    the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.        Upon
    careful review, we affirm.
    On January 13, 2014, Campbell entered a guilty plea to one count of
    possession with intent to deliver cocaine and was sentenced to 54 to 120
    months’ imprisonment on February 19, 2014. Campbell filed a direct appeal,
    but withdrew it on March 31, 2014.
    On April 22, 2015, Campbell filed a pro se PCRA petition,1 in which he
    alleged that the trial court had imposed an illegal sentence under the Drug
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Several of the documents related to Campbell’s April 22, 2015 PCRA
    petition, including the petition itself, are missing from the certified record.
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    J-S47035-16
    Free   School   Zone       Act,   18   Pa.C.S.A.   §   6317,   which   was   rendered
    unconstitutional in light of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
    Alleyne v. United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
    (2012). The Honorable Shawn
    D. Meyers appointed counsel, who ultimately filed a Turner/Finley2 no-
    merit letter.   On July 30, 2015, Judge Meyers issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
    notice of intent to dismiss.        On August 17, 2015, Campbell filed a pro se
    “Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief” in response to the court’s Rule
    907 notice. On August 31, 2015, Judge Meyers issued an order dismissing
    Campbell’s petition.        For reasons which are unclear, and despite having
    already issued an order dismissing Campbell’s PCRA petition, upon receipt of
    Campbell’s August 17, 2015 pro se Rule 907 response, Judge Meyers
    appointed new counsel to represent Campbell and granted counsel 30 days
    to file either a Turner/Finley letter or an amended PCRA petition.              After
    receiving an extension of time from Judge Meyers, counsel filed a motion to
    withdraw and a Turner/Finley letter on December 9, 2015.
    Inexplicably, the matter subsequently was reassigned to the Honorable
    Angela R. Krom for disposition.           Judge Krom determined that Campbell’s
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    Thus, we rely on the PCRA court’s characterization of the contents of those
    documents. Because we dispose of this matter on jurisdictional grounds, we
    do not find it imperative to review the original documents. Moreover,
    Campbell does not dispute the date on which his petition was filed.
    2
    See Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
    (Pa. 1988);
    Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
    -2-
    J-S47035-16
    claim was meritless and, by order dated December 22, 2015, denied relief.
    This timely appeal follows.
    Before we can address the merits of Campbell’s claim, we must first
    determine whether his PCRA petition was timely filed. Although neither the
    trial court nor the Commonwealth raised this issue, “it is well-settled that we
    may raise it sua sponte since a question of timeliness implicates the
    jurisdiction of our Court.” Commonwealth v. Callahan, 
    101 A.3d 118
    , 121
    (Pa. Super. 2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Gandy, 
    38 A.3d 899
    , 902
    (Pa. Super. 2012). As the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a question of law,
    our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See
    Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    65 A.3d 462
    , 468 (Pa. Super. 2013).
    Here, Campbell was sentenced on February 19, 2014 and filed a timely
    notice of appeal on March 17, 2014.        However, on March 31, 2014, his
    appeal was withdrawn and discontinued.         Accordingly, as of that date,
    Campbell’s judgment of sentence became final.       See Commonwealth v.
    Conway, 
    706 A.2d 1243
    , 1244 (Pa. Super. 1997) (judgment of sentence
    becomes final for purposes of PCRA timeliness determination when direct
    appeal discontinued at defendant’s request). Therefore, Campbell had one
    year from that date, or until March 31, 2014, to file a timely PCRA petition.
    See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (PCRA petition, including second or
    subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of date underlying
    judgment of sentence becomes final).        Even assuming that Campbell’s
    August 17, 2015 filing was properly treated as an amendment to Campbell’s
    -3-
    J-S47035-16
    earliest PCRA filing of April 22, 2015, that petition was filed more than one
    year after his judgment of sentence became final and, accordingly, was
    untimely unless Campbell pled and proved one of the three statutory
    exceptions to the PCRA time bar.3 Campbell did not do so. Accordingly, the
    PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Campbell’s petition and should
    have dismissed it as untimely filed.4
    Order affirmed.      Application for relief denied.
    ____________________________________________
    3
    The statutory exceptions are as follows:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
    interference by government officials with the presentation of the
    claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
    Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
    to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
    exercise of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
    recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
    this section and has been held by that court to apply
    retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
    4
    Although the PCRA court erroneously reached the merits of Campbell’s
    claim, we may affirm the decision of the PCRA court if there is any basis in
    the record to support the court’s action. This is so even if we rely on a
    different basis in our decision to affirm. Commonwealth v. Wiley, 
    966 A.2d 1153
    , 1157 (Pa. Super. 2009).
    -4-
    J-S47035-16
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/1/2016
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 102 MDA 2016

Filed Date: 11/1/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/1/2016