WELLS FARGO, N.A. VS. SHERRI Y. SCAFE(F-023370-12, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0503-15T3
    WELLS FARGO, N.A.,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    SHERRI Y. SCAFE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________
    Submitted February 7, 2017 – Decided August 10, 2017
    Before Judges Suter and Guadagno.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New
    Jersey, Chancery Division, Camden County,
    Docket No. F-023370-12.
    Sherri Y. Scafe, appellant pro se.
    Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones, PC,
    attorneys for respondent (Brian Yoder, on
    the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Pro se defendant, Sherri Y. Scafe, also known as Nin el
    Ameen Bey1, appeals from the August 14, 2015 Chancery Division
    order denying her motion to vacate a June 9, 2014 final judgment
    of foreclosure.    We affirm.
    On January 7, 2008, defendant executed a promissory note to
    AmTrust Bank (AmTrust) for repayment of a loan in the amount of
    $288,900.   The note was secured by a non-purchase money mortgage
    on real property located at 60 Orlando Drive, Sicklerville, in
    favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS)
    as nominee for AmTrust.    The mortgage was recorded in the Camden
    County Clerk's Office on January 14, 2008.    MERS, as nominee for
    AmTrust, subsequently assigned the mortgage to plaintiff, Wells
    Fargo Bank, N.A.
    In September 2011, defendant defaulted on the required
    monthly payments and Wells Fargo Home Mortgage sent defendant a
    notice of intention to foreclose dated October 9, 2011, by
    regular and certified mail at the mortgaged premises.
    After defendant failed to cure the default, plaintiff filed
    a complaint for foreclosure on October 17, 2012.   Defendant was
    served by regular and certified mail at the mortgaged premises
    1
    When the Chancery judge addressed defendant as Sherri Scafe,
    she promptly corrected the judge, stating her name was Nin El
    Ameen Bey.
    2                         A-0503-15T3
    on April 29, 2013.    Defendant failed to file responsive
    pleadings and a default was entered against her on September 5,
    2013.    On February 20, 2014, plaintiff mailed notice of entry of
    default to defendant.
    On March 4, 2014, defendant filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
    petition, but the matter was dismissed by the bankruptcy court
    twenty days later.    In May 2014, plaintiff moved for a final
    judgment of foreclosure.    While that motion was pending,
    defendant attempted to remove the matter to federal district
    court.   On June 18, 2014, District Judge Robert B. Kugler
    remanded the matter to the Chancery Division.
    Final judgment of foreclosure was entered on June 9, 2014
    and a copy of the judgement was mailed to defendant at the
    mortgaged premises.     A sheriff's sale was scheduled for August
    20, 2014, but defendant filed a second petition for bankruptcy
    on August 1, 2014.    After the bankruptcy court entered a
    discharge on June 19, 2015, defendant moved to vacate the June
    9, 2014 judgment of foreclosure and dismiss the foreclosure
    complaint.    The Chancery judge denied defendant's motion on
    August 14, 2015.
    On appeal, defendant claims the Chancery judge erred in not
    vacating the judgment of foreclosure; the court lacked subject
    matter jurisdiction to enter the foreclosure judgment; plaintiff
    3                          A-0503-15T3
    failed to join an indispensable party; and defendant pled a
    meritorious defense.
    None of defendant's arguments have sufficient merit to
    warrant further discussion in our opinion beyond these brief
    observations. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    During oral argument on her motion to vacate the judgment
    of foreclosure, defendant objected to Wells Fargo being a party
    to the matter and argued that the Federal National Mortgage
    Association ("Fannie Mae"), should have been joined as a party.
    When counsel for plaintiff noted that defendant had not
    challenged plaintiff's standing in her moving papers, defendant
    claimed that plaintiff failed to serve her with "notice of
    acceleration."   The Chancery judge then read the acceleration
    provision in the mortgage to defendant and explained that the
    October 9, 2011, notice of intent to foreclose was served one
    year before the foreclosure complaint was filed.   Because
    defendant failed to contest the foreclosure and default was
    entered, the judge explained that defendant waived any challenge
    to standing or to the sufficiency of the notice.
    Almost six years after defendant defaulted on this
    mortgage, the matter is still pending, with defendant continuing
    4                            A-0503-15T3
    to reside in the mortgaged premises without paying the mortgage
    or property taxes.2
    We affirm the denial of defendant's motion to vacate the
    June 9, 2014 final judgment of foreclosure and direct that,
    absent a stay by the Supreme Court, a sheriff's sale be
    scheduled within sixty days of the filing of this opinion.
    2
    We note the observation of District Judge Kugler in his opinion
    dismissing a related complaint submitted by defendant against
    several Wells Fargo employees, which he described as "gibberish-
    filled":
    this Court cannot rule out the possibility
    that Plaintiffs did not commence this matter
    with bona fide litigation in mind.    Indeed,
    the content of the Pleading suggests that
    Plaintiffs might be attempting to capitalize
    on the docketing system of federal courts in
    general, and this District in particular, in
    order to: (a) assert that their Pleading is
    "on file" with this District; and then (b)
    build on this fact by self-declaring their
    right to a certain real estate property
    (seemingly, 60 Orlando Drive, Sicklerville,
    New Jersey), and by claiming that this
    property is free from mortgage encumbrances
    held, seemingly, by the Wells Fargo Bank.
    [Bey v. Stumpf, 
    825 F. Supp. 2d 537
    , 556
    (D.N.J. 2011).]
    5                         A-0503-15T3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-0503-15T3

Filed Date: 8/10/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021