United States v. Gagliardi ( 1997 )


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    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit

    ____________________

    No. 96-1239

    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    JOHN P. GAGLIARDI,

    Defendant - Appellant.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________

    Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

    and Lynch, Circuit Judge. _____________

    _____________________

    Michael C. Bourbeau, by appointment of the court, Victoria ____________________ ________
    M. Bonilla and Bourbeau & Bourbeau, Bonilla, Tocchio & Floyd, LLP __________ __________________________________________________
    on brief for appellant.
    Kevin P. McGrath, Assistant United States Attorney, and _________________
    Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee. _______________



    ____________________

    June 25, 1997
    ____________________















    Per Curiam. Upon due consideration of the briefs of Per Curiam. __________

    counsel and the record in this case, we affirm the district affirm ______

    court's sentencing determination.

    Defendant-Appellant John Gagliardi ("Gagliardi") pled

    guilty on April 26, 1995 to six counts involving conspiracy to

    possess with intent to distribute marijuana, under 21 U.S.C.

    846, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, under 21

    U.S.C. 841(a), and liability for criminal forfeiture, under 21

    U.S.C. 853. At his sentencing hearing, the government

    requested that Gagliardi's base offense level be reduced from 32,

    which the Presentencing Report ("PSR") recommended, to 30,

    pursuant to the plea agreement. The government also requested

    that a three-level enhancement be added for Gagliardi's role in

    the offense. That upward adjustment was made, and ultimately,

    his total offense level was determined to be 30,1 corresponding

    to a range under the Sentencing Guidelines of 97 to 121 months.

    The government recommended, and the sentencing court approved, a

    sentence of 97 months imprisonment. The court also denied a

    motion for downward departure.

    Gagliardi alleges two errors by the sentencing court:

    first, that he was improperly given a three-level upward

    adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b)2 for being a manager
    ____________________

    1 Gagliardi received a three-level decrease in offense level
    pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b)(2) for timely acceptance of
    responsibility.

    2 Sentencing Guideline 3B1.1(b) mandates a three-level
    increase if "the defendant was a manager or supervisor . . . and
    the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was

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    or supervisor in a criminal activity involving five or more

    participants; and second, that the sentencing court failed to

    consider facts relevant to his motion for a downward departure

    under U.S.S.G. 5K2.0 based on unusual family circumstances.

    Both allegations are without merit.

    Gagliardi appears to concede that four other men

    assisted in the storage and re-packaging of the marijuana which

    he had acquired, thereby satisfying the requirement of "five or

    more participants" -- when one counts Gagliardi himself as the

    fifth participant -- under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1. Moreover, there was

    ample factual support in the PSR for the district court's finding

    that Gagliardi was a "manager or supervisor."

    Contrary to Gagliardi's insinuations on appeal, the

    fact that there were other persons who had greater managerial

    responsibilities does not render the section 3B1.1 enhancement

    inapplicable to him. See United States v. Goldberg, 105 F.3d ___ _____________ ________

    770, 777 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[A] defendant need not be at the top

    of a criminal scheme to be a manager or supervisor."). Indeed,

    the well-established standard for upward adjustments under

    section 3B1.1 requires only that there be "'evidence that a

    defendant, in committing the crime, exercised control over, or

    was otherwise responsible for overseeing the activities of, at

    least one other person.'" United States v. Voccola, 99 F.3d 37, _____________ _______

    44 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d _____________ ______

    612, 616 (1st Cir. 1993)). The PSR confirms that this requirement
    ____________________

    otherwise extensive."

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    was met. It states, for example, that Gagliardi directed a co-

    conspirator to bring large amounts of money he needed to purchase

    marijuana in Arizona, and that Gagliardi directed another co-

    conspirator to find a suitable location for storing and

    repackaging the marijuana that he had purchased. Furthermore,

    evidence related to role in the offense determinations may be

    probative "'by fair inference.'" See Voccola, 99 F.3d at 45 ___ _______

    (quoting United States v. Tejada-Beltr n, 50 F.3d 105, 113 (1st _____________ ______________

    Cir. 1995)). In this case, one can reasonably infer Gagliardi's

    supervisory control over those who were engaged in repackaging

    the marijuana at the storage location (an airplane hangar) from

    Gagliardi's responsibility for arranging the storage location, as

    well as from the fact that, after the four men were discovered in

    the hangar, they drove away and called Gagliardi. In sum, there

    is no basis for finding any error in the district court's role in

    the offense determination, clear or otherwise.

    Finally, there is no support in the record for

    Gagliardi's contention that the district court failed to

    consider, or prevented Gagliardi from producing, facts relevant

    to his motion for a downward departure on the basis of unusual

    family circumstances. On review of the record, it appears that

    the facts presented in Gagliardi's eleventh hour memorandum,

    which Gagliardi claims the district court improperly ignored, had

    already been substantially brought to the court's attention in a

    previous sentencing memorandum, in the PSR, as well as through

    defense counsel's statements at the sentencing hearing. We


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    further note that the district court did not abuse its discretion

    in determining that the facts regarding Gagliardi's family

    circumstances -- the most noteworthy of which are that

    Gagliardi's youngest daughter has an attention deficit disorder

    and that her mother is being treated for breast cancer -- are not

    of a kind so extraordinary as to warrant a downward departure.

    See U.S.S.G. 5H1.6 ("Family ties . . . are not ordinarily ___

    relevant."); United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, (1st Cir. ______________ ______

    1993) (family circumstances do not ordinarily warrant downward

    departure); compare United States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970, 972 _______ ______________ ______

    (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming downward departure for defendant where

    psychologist concluded that defendant's stepson, who had been

    abused by his biological father, had unique relationship with

    defendant and needed defendant's presence to continue recovery);

    United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1992) ______________ _______

    (affirming downward departure where defendant was sole caregiver

    to four very young children).

    Affirmed. Affirmed ________


















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