State v. Allen , 2023 Ohio 714 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Allen, 2023-Ohio-714.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 111538
v. :
CALVIN ALLEN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 9, 2023
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-21-662461-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Poula E. Hanna, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
L. Bryan Carr, for appellant.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J.:
Defendant-appellant Calvin Allen (“Allen”) appeals his conviction
and sentence for felonious assault. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
I. Procedural and Factual History
On August 24, 2021, Allen was charged with two counts of felonious
assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and 2903.11(A)(2), second-degree felonies. Allen
pleaded not guilty, and the jury trial commenced on March 23, 2022. On March 25,
2022, Allen was convicted of both counts. On April 25, 2022, Allen was sentenced
on Count 1 of the allied offenses to a three-year prison term. The following facts
presented at trial gave rise to the convictions.
Detective Michael Hale (“Det. Hale”) of the Cleveland Police
Department (“CPD”) testified that he responded to a crime-scene on War Avenue in
Cleveland, Ohio, on August 15, 2021, at approximately 9:00 a.m. The detective took
photos of the scene and placed evidence markers. (Tr. 184.)
Photographs depicted a yellow handled hammer laying at the left
driveway apron at the curb, and a purple towel heavily stained with blood laying in
a large blood stain at the left side of the driveway just before the sidewalk area. The
stone base of the front right corner of the house was crumbled with a large hole, and
the siding area above it damaged from an impact. The grassy area below the damage
contained blood. A bloodied headlight unit and bumper portion were located on the
right side of the driveway across from the damaged area of the house. It is unknown
whether those items landed in that area or were possibly moved by EMS or police.
The victim and suspect were not at the scene. Det. Hale did not speak
with bystanders or search for witnesses. The detective clarified that his role as the
crime-scene detective was to depict the crime-scene as accurately as possible and to
preserve the evidence.
Victim Tamieyah McCord (“McCord”) testified next. McCord had
been dating Julie Leonetti (“Leonetti”) for almost two years. Leonetti was in the
process of divorcing Allen with whom Leonetti had three children. McCord moved
into the War Avenue residence with Leonetti and the children about a year prior to
the incident. McCord stated Allen arrived at the residence about 8:00 a.m. that
morning, though on cross-examination and based on McCord’s 911 call, the time was
established to be closer to 9:00 a.m.
McCord testified that Allen’s visitation with the children was limited
pursuant to the divorce papers, that Allen was not entitled to visitation the day of
the incident, and that Leonetti was seeking a protection order against Allen. McCord
usually accompanied Leonetti to meet Allen to exchange the children for visitation
purposes. Allen would usually make derogatory comments to McCord about her
lifestyle.
Allen began “banging on the door” and screaming for the children “to
come to the window.” (Tr. 209-210.) McCord stated she opened the door and told
Allen he was not supposed to be there at that time for the children. McCord said
Leonetti was standing on the porch screaming. McCord called 911 and the recording
was played for the jury.
This court reviewed the 911 call that began at 9:09 a.m. McCord could
be heard calmly telling the 911 dispatcher the address of the residence and the
children to stay in the bedroom. A male voice identified by McCord as Allen could
be heard yelling in the background as McCord speaks with the dispatcher. McCord
told the dispatcher that Allen was banging on the door and was not supposed to be
there. At one point Allen was heard loudly saying that he wanted to see his children.
McCord told the dispatcher that Allen had pulled into the driveway in a Chevy Blazer
and blocked their car, and she provided the plate number.
At that point, multiple voices began yelling and sounds that McCord
identified during testimony as a scuffle could be heard. Subsequently, someone
yelled “Oh my God.” Loud screams, crying, and additional unintelligible words were
heard. Six minutes and 25 seconds into the call, the dispatcher said another call had
just been received regarding the altercation and the first call was ended.
McCord testified that Allen hit her in the face and the two “were
tussling and that is when you probably heard the phone drop” during the 911 call.
(Tr. 214.) McCord continued, “three minutes after he hit me, it kind of triggered me
so I went back in the house and I grabbed a hammer.” (Tr. 215.) Allen was backing
a Chevy Tahoe out of the driveway into the street when McCord threw the hammer,
which she stated did not hit Allen or the truck. McCord went back into the house.
McCord assumed that Allen was gone and returned outside to retrieve
the hammer, but Allen had not departed. (Tr. 221-222.) McCord said that Allen
“locked eyes with me” “[a]nd he basically put his car in drive and pinned me between
the house and his car.” (Tr. 222.)
McCord stated that when she was pinned against the house, Leonetti
“came out screaming and I remember him dragging me down the driveway a little
bit and I was not released off his vehicle until she pulled me out of his grill.”
(Tr. 222.) McCord was transported to the hospital by ambulance and suffered
serious damage to her left leg, a broken tailbone, and loss of movement in her foot.
McCord used a walker, has had several surgeries, and will require more. McCord,
Leonetti, and the children left the house on War Avenue and stayed in hotels
reportedly due to fear of Allen. The injuries seriously impacted McCord’s quality of
life and ultimately contributed to conflict that ended the relationship with Leonetti.
The two were no longer on speaking terms by the time of trial.
Leonetti and one of the children pulled McCord back into the house
during McCord’s brief scuffle with Allen. McCord clarified that the crime-scene
photograph of the hammer’s location at the end of the driveway is not where the
hammer landed when McCord originally threw it at Allen’s vehicle. The photograph
showed the hammer’s location after McCord was hit by Allen’s vehicle.
CPD officer John Hannwald (“Officer Hannwald”) and his partner
were dispatched to East 131st Street in Cleveland where the suspect reportedly
worked at a body shop to look for the damaged Chevy Blazer and suspect Allen. The
officers observed a Blazer with front end damage and a male riding a bicycle nearby.
They called Allen’s name, and the individual who was indeed Allen pedaled away
more quickly. The officers secured Allen after a foot chase. Allen was Mirandized
and transported to War Avenue in the zone car where he was further interviewed.
Allen told the officers that McCord hit him in the face, which caused the small
amount of blood observed on Allen’s upper lip. The officers took Allen to St. Vincent
Charity Hospital and next to the county jail.
CPD officer James Kertcher (“Officer Kertcher”) and his partner
responded to a 911 call that originally was “just an open line, 911 call with a lot of
commotion in the background. Our radio dispatch did not really have a lot of
information to give us as it was just sort of screaming into the phone.” (Tr. 289-
290.) Officer Kertcher described it as a “pretty typical call, a sound 911 or an open
911 line. Essentially we have to just figure it out when we get there.” (Tr. 290.)
The officers arrived on War Avenue to see McCord sitting on the
ground where the driveway met the sidewalk in a “significant pool of blood
surrounding her entire body.” (Tr. 291.) EMS was summoned. Leonetti was
“crying, screaming” and trying to assist McCord who had a “massive laceration on
her leg” and was shrieking in agony. (Tr. 292.)
Leonetti told police that her ex-husband, Allen, arrived at the house
unannounced, “banging on the door.” “An altercation ensued within the doorway
between [McCord] and [Allen] and next thing you know [McCord] was being pinned
against the side of the house with [Allen’s] vehicle,” a gold Chevy Blazer. (Tr. 294.)
“[T]he vehicle fled eastbound on War towards East 71st and [Leonetti] mentioned
that he * * * works at an auto body shop on East 131st and Union.” (Tr. 294.)
Officer Kertcher broadcasted the information to fellow officers and
subsequently interviewed Allen when he was brought to the scene. Allen told
officers that he had a physical altercation with McCord, “both parties were struck,”
McCord picked up a hammer and stood in front of Allen’s vehicle, and Allen left the
scene. (Tr. 295.) Allen stated, “he panicked when she threw the hammer at the car”
and “threw the vehicle in drive and then struck her before fleeing.” (Tr. 300.) Allen
provided varying explanations of the vehicle’s location during the altercation.
During cross-examination, Officer Kertcher confirmed that Leonetti
said that McCord was upset when she answered the door and told Allen he was not
welcome, called 911 and continued outside to further confront him. Leonetti also
said that Allen punched McCord in the face and Leonetti went outside and brought
McCord back inside. The officer also confirmed that Allen told him that McCord
threw a small bottle of wine in his face and punched him in the lip when she exited
the home. Officer Kertcher estimated the distance from the point where McCord
was hit to the point where she was found to be “more than five feet.” (Tr. 311.) The
second call to 911 referenced in the McCord recording was from Leonetti.
The state rested. Allen moved for judgment of acquittal under
Crim.R. 29 on the ground that there was no evidence that Allen acted knowingly.
The motion was denied.
Allen testified in his defense and said he had visitation rights on
alternating weeks and weekends, there had been no previous issues seeing the
children, and the temporary restraining order that was issued after the incident had
been terminated. Allen stated that on the day of the incident, he parked the car,
knocked on the door, and “introduced myself, Calvin. I am here to pick up the kids.”
(Tr. 330.) Allen stated McCord “shot straight out the door, angry” and began
swearing at him to “get the f**k out of here.” (Tr. 330.) Allen said he tried to look
past McCord to see where the kids were at when McCord poured wine in his face and
punched him in the mouth.1
Allen stated he walked off after McCord hit him and no scuffle
occurred. Allen was sitting in the Blazer examining his lip in the mirror when he
looked up and saw McCord running toward him on the driver’s side of the SUV
holding a hammer. Allen “jumped and put the car in reverse but it was in drive.”
(Tr. 332-333.) “I was scared for my life.” (Tr. 333.)
During cross-examination, Allen admitted McCord and Leonetti had
been together for a year and he had met McCord previously. Allen added that he
was supposed to pick the children up on Saturday. The Blazer belonged to one of
Allen’s car repair customers. Allen took the Blazer for a test drive to pick up the
children, “[t]wo stones, one bird.” (Tr. 348.)
Allen recounted the events. Allen knocked on the door and stepped
back, McCord came outside, upset. They were standing in the driveway between a
red vehicle and the Blazer.
So we’re in between the two cars. She’s arguing with me. Then she goes
back to the back of the truck — the truck that I was driving, calls out the
plate number, comes back up. I’m still standing in between the two
cars in the front. She’s yelling at me this whole time while she was on
the phone [with 911]. Now I’m calling out for the kids.
1 According to the medical records evidence, McCord tested negative for alcohol.
(Tr. 349.) Allen claimed he did not get into the Blazer until McCord punched him
and went into the house, retrieved the hammer, and “ran * * * towards the [Blazer]”
while Allen examined his lip in the mirror. Allen intended to put the car in reverse
but accidentally put it in drive and veered to the left, pinning McCord to the house.
Allen described hitting McCord as a “freak accident.” (Tr. 354.) Allen did not call
police or for an ambulance after he discovered McCord was injured because he
panicked.
Allen’s renewed Crim.R. 29 motion reiterated that the act was not
committed knowingly and was a freak accident. The motion was denied, Allen was
convicted of the allied offenses and sentenced to three years in prison on Count 1.
II. Assignments of Error
Allen poses three assignments of error:
I. Allen’s conviction was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
II. Allen’s conviction was against the sufficiency of the evidence.
III. The sentence imposed by the trial court was erroneous,
unreasonable, and contrary to law.
III. Discussion
A. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence
We combine Allen’s first and second assignments of error for ease of
analysis. We find that the errors lack merit.
“A Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal tests the sufficiency of the
evidence.” State v. Capp, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102919, 2016-Ohio-295, ¶ 19.
Crim.R. 29 mandates that the trial court issue a judgment of acquittal
where the state’s evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for an
offense. Id. Accordingly, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s
denial of a defendant’s motion for acquittal using the same standard it
applies when reviewing a sufficiency-of- the-evidence claim. Id.State v. Hoskin-Hudson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103615, 2016-Ohio-5410, ¶ 7.
“‘A claim of insufficient evidence raises the question whether the
evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law.’” State v.
Parker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110716, 2022-Ohio-1237, ¶ 7, citing State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). The relevant inquiry in
a sufficiency challenge is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime existed beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
When making a sufficiency determination, an appellate court does
not review whether the state’s evidence is to be believed but whether, if believed, the
evidence admitted at trial supports the conviction. State v. Starks, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 91682, 2009-Ohio-3375, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins at id. Under a
sufficiency challenge, witness credibility is immaterial; the appellate court must
defer to credibility determinations of the trier of fact and only review issues of law.
Parker at ¶ 7.
A manifest weight challenge and a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge are two distinct challenges to the evidence presented. State v. Miree, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110749, 2022-Ohio-3664, ¶ 30, citing State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio
St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25. A challenge to the manifest
weight of the evidence ‘“involves the inclination of the greater amount of credible
evidence.’” State v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109060, 2021-Ohio-856, ¶ 32,
quoting Thompkins at id. Weight of the evidence examines “‘the evidence’s effect of
inducing belief.’” Id., quoting Wilson at ¶ 25, citing Thompkins at 386-387.
In reviewing a manifest-weight claim, the court must consider all the
evidence in the record, the reasonable inferences drawn from it, and the credibility
of the witnesses to determine “‘whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
factfinder clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial order.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting
State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). Finally,
the discretionary power to grant a new trial should be reserved for exceptional cases
where ‘“the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Id., quoting id.Allen was convicted of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and 2903.11(A)(2), which
provide:
(A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:
(1) Cause serious physical harm to another or to another’s unborn;
(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another’s
unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.
R.C. 2901.22(B) specifies:
A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is
aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or
will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of
circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances
probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is
an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person
subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and
fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning
the fact.
R.C. 2901.22(B).
Allen argues that he did not “knowingly” commit the act. The fact that
McCord suffered serious physical injury is not disputed. Allen declared he was so
startled that he accidentally put the car in drive and not only moved forward but
moved forward at an angle that pinned McCord to the house. Allen then put the
Blazer in reverse and began to back out of the driveway while McCord was still
attached to the bumper, and after she was dislodged, was laying in the driveway,
along with a bloodied piece of the Blazer’s headlight and bumper.
“Felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A), combined with the
definition found in R.C. 2901.22(B), does not require that a defendant intend to
cause ‘serious physical harm,’ but that the defendant acts with an awareness that the
conduct probably will cause such harm.” State v. Reed, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 89137, 2008-Ohio-312, ¶ 7, citing State v. Lee, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97APA12-
1629, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4150 (Sept. 3, 1998). “A defendant acts knowingly
when, although not intending the result, he or she is nevertheless aware that the
result will probably occur.” Id., citing Id.On the issue of knowledge, the jury was instructed:
A person acts knowingly regardless of his purpose or intent when the
person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain
result or probably be of a certain nature.
A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware
that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the
existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, that knowledge
is established if a person subjectively believes that there’s a high
probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a
conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
And knowledge since you cannot look into the mind of another is
determined from all the facts and circumstances in evidence.
You will decide from these facts and circumstances whether there
existed at the time in the mind of the defendant an awareness of the
probability that his conduct would cause serious physical harm to
[McCord].
(Tr. 393-394.)
The jury was also instructed regarding weighing the evidence and
direct and circumstantial evidence. Over the state’s objection, the jury was further
instructed regarding whether Allen used force against McCord in self-defense2 that
rendered the conduct legally justifiable, and on the inferior offense of aggravated
assault.3 We presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions. State v.
Walker-Curry, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106228, 2019-Ohio-147, ¶ 35.
2 Allen does not assert on appeal that the evidence supported a self-defense claim.
Furthermore, self-defense is an affirmative defense and is not an element of a crime
subject to a sufficiency of the evidence analysis because of due process concerns. State v.
Messenger, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 24, citing State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio
St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 35. While self-defense is subject to a
manifest weight challenge, this court does not find that the conviction in this case is
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
3 “Aggravated assault is an inferior degree of felonious assault because its elements
are identical to or contained within the offense of felonious assault, coupled with the
additional presence of one or both mitigating circumstances of sudden passion or a
sudden fit of rage brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim.” (Internal
citations omitted.) State v. Martin, 2018-Ohio-1098, 109 N.E.3d 652, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.).
The jury heard the testimony of the police, the victim, and Allen, were
privy to McCord’s medical evidence, listened to the 911 call, and viewed photographs
of the scene. While Leonetti did not testify at the trial, Leonetti provided
information to police that was consistent with McCord’s testimony and the evidence.
Based on our review of the record, we find that Allen’s conviction for
felonious assault is legally sufficient and is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
The first and second assigned errors are overruled.
B. Sentence Contrary to Law
We review felony sentences under the standard set forth in
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59
N.E.3d 1231. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that an appellate court may increase,
reduce, modify, or vacate and remand a felony sentence if the court clearly and
convincingly finds either that the record does not support the sentencing court’s
findings, or the sentence is otherwise “contrary to law.”
A sentence is not contrary to law if the trial court considered the
purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and
recidivism factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, properly applied postrelease control, and
imposed a sentence within the applicable statutory range. State v. Lenard, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 105998, 2018-Ohio-3365, ¶ 79, citing State v. A.H., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 98622, 2013-Ohio-2525, ¶ 10.
Allen’s third and final assignment of error contends the sentence was
unreasonable and contrary to law. Specifically, Allen charges the trial court “said
nothing about: (1) the appellant’s lack of a prior record; (2) the issue of recidivism;
(3) the need to protect the public; etc.” Appellant’s brief, p. 11. These factors were
presented to the trial court as mitigating factors during sentencing. McCord also
made a statement to the trial court.
The trial court declared it had “taken into account everything I know
about you and your case which is considerable” including “the presentence report,
supervised release officer’s report regarding Allen’s multiple positive tests for
alcohol and marijuana [and] comments during sentencing.” (Tr. 489-490.) “I am
also taking into account the sentencing laws of Chapter 2929 of the Ohio Revised
Code.” (Tr. 490.)
Although the trial court must consider the purposes and principles of
felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors listed in
R.C. 2929.12, the court is not required to make findings or give reasons for its
sentence. State v. Pavlina, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99207, 2013-Ohio-3620, ¶ 15,
citing State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470. “A trial
court’s general statement that it considered the required statutory factors, without
more, is sufficient to fulfill its obligations under the sentencing statutes.” Id. at ¶ 10,
citing State v. Wright, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95096, 2011-Ohio-733, ¶ 4.
The trial court’s judgment entry provides, “[t]he court considered all
required factors of the law.” Journal entry No. 122994783, p. 2. (signed Apr. 4,
2022, and filed May 20, 2022). “This court has held that a trial court’s statement in
its sentencing journal entry that it considered the required statutory factors, without
more, is sufficient to fulfill its obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v.
Paulino, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104198, 2017-Ohio-15, ¶ 37, citing State v.
Gonzalez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102579, 2015-Ohio-4765, ¶ 6. In addition,
because courts have full discretion to impose sentences within the statutory range,
a sentence imposed within the statutory range is “presumptively valid” if the court
considered the applicable sentencing factors. Id., citing State v. Collier, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 95572, 2011-Ohio-2791, ¶ 15.
Therefore, the third assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to
the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_____________________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCURS AND CONCURS WITH
THE SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION;
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURRING:
I concur with the majority’s conclusions and analysis, but that
analysis must be placed into context. The majority’s conclusion is directly based on
the arguments as presented by the parties. With respect to the third assignment of
error, Allen challenges the length of his prison term imposed on the individual
felony offense under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Appellate review of a three-year stated
minimum term for a second-degree felony is prohibited under R.C. 2953.08(A).
Under that division of the appellate sentencing review statute, an offender may
appeal a maximum definite or longest stated minimum sentence under subdivision
(A)(1), a sentence imposed upon a fourth- or fifth-degree felony or felony drug
offense under subdivision (A)(2), a sentence imposed upon certain offenses through
R.C. 2971.03 under subdivision (A)(3), a sentence that is contrary to law under
subdivision (A)(4), or a sentence that consists of an additional prison term through
R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a) under subdivision (A)(5). In addition, an offender may appeal
consecutive sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a).
None of those provisions applies, and R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is expressly
limited to appeals filed under R.C. 2953.08(A)-(C). Id. (“The court hearing an
appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section shall review the record,
including the findings underlying the sentence or modification given by the
sentencing court.” (Emphasis added.)) Since the sentencing challenge does not
arise under R.C. 2953.08(A)-(C), Allen’s arguments pertaining to
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) are misplaced.
There is no statutory basis to review the underlying sentence imposed
on the solitary count in this case. As the parties recognize, the underlying sentence
is within the lower end of the sentencing range under R.C. 2929.14(A)(2) and is not
contrary to law. No other provision of R.C. 2953.08(A) applies to authorize
appellate review of the sentence. Nevertheless, neither party has addressed this
concern. As a result, I concur.