In the Matter of Peter J. Cammarano, III, an Attorney at Law (073714) , 219 N.J. 415 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                      SYLLABUS
    (This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
    convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
    interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
    In the Matter of Peter J. Cammarano, III, An Attorney at Law (D-46-13) (073714)
    Argued April 9, 2014 -- Decided September 17, 2014
    ALBIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
    In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Court considers the appropriate level of discipline for respondent
    Peter J. Cammarano, III, who, as a consequence of misconduct occurring during his campaign for, and brief term as,
    Mayor of Hoboken, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce by extortion under color
    of official right.
    Respondent was admitted to practice in New Jersey in 2002 and was never professionally disciplined prior
    to the conduct giving rise to this matter. In 2009, respondent ran for Mayor of Hoboken. In late April and early
    May 2009, during the mayoral campaign, respondent and two of his political operatives twice met at a Hoboken
    diner with a cooperating government witness, Solomon Dwek. Dwek, posing as a real-estate developer in need of
    zoning approvals for future projects, offered to make illegal campaign contributions in exchange for preferential
    treatment. Respondent assured Dwek that he would keep his contributions confidential and would “be there” to
    expedite the processes associated with Dwek’s development plans. In exchange, Dwek provided one of
    respondent’s operatives with a total of $10,000 in cash.
    The May 13, 2009, election resulted in a run-off between respondent and the other highest vote-getter. A
    few days later, Dwek met for a third time with respondent, the two operatives, and another associate of respondent’s.
    Dwek promised another $5000 and respondent reiterated his earlier assurances regarding the confidentiality of the
    contributions and the promised preferential treatment. Respondent assured Dwek that, in contrast to people who
    were against respondent, Dwek would have his support.
    On June 9, 2009, respondent won the run-off election. On June 23, 2009, respondent and his operatives
    met with Dwek for a fourth time, informing him that the campaign ran a $19,000 deficit. Dwek offered respondent
    $10,000, and respondent assured him that they would “be friends for a good long time.” On July 16, 2009, Dwek,
    respondent, his two operatives, and his associate met for the last time. Dwek discussed some of his development
    ideas, and respondent indicated that Dwek had his wholehearted support. Dwek gave respondent’s associate
    $10,000 in cash and promised another $10,000 the following week. In total, respondent accepted $25,000 from
    Dwek, with the understanding that Dwek had purchased the right to preferential treatment in land-development
    matters in Hoboken. Shortly thereafter, federal authorities arrested respondent and he resigned as mayor.
    On April 20, 2010, respondent pled guilty in United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to
    one count of conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce by extortion under color of official right, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 1951
    (a). He was sentenced to two years in federal prison, followed by two years of supervised release,
    and ordered to make restitution of $25,000. Shortly thereafter, this Court temporarily suspended respondent
    pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(b)(1). In re Cammarano, 
    202 N.J. 8
     (2010). On the basis of the criminal conviction, the
    Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) filed a motion for final discipline with the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB),
    pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(c)(2), recommending disbarment.
    The DRB conducted a hearing, noting that, pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(c)(1), respondent’s guilty plea and
    judgment of conviction were conclusive proof that he engaged in the federal crime of conspiracy to obstruct
    interstate commerce by extortion. It also found that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC)
    by committing a criminal act that adversely reflects on his honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, RPC
    8.4(b), and by engaging “in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,” RPC 8.4(c). A four-
    member majority of the DRB voted to impose a three-year prospective suspension, opting to spare respondent from
    the ultimate sanction of disbarment because he was targeted by a government operation and was a passive
    participant in the bribe. Two dissenting members voted to disbar respondent.
    This Court granted the OAE’s petition for review and ordered respondent to show cause on April 9, 2014,
    why he should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined.
    HELD: Respondent’s unethical conduct, consisting of offering favored treatment to a private developer in
    exchange for money, betrays a solemn public trust and undermines public confidence in honest government, thereby
    warranting his disbarment.
    1. The disciplinary review process is intended to protect the public from unfit lawyers and promote public
    confidence in the legal system. The proper measure of discipline generally depends on a number of factors,
    including prior disciplinary history and the harm caused by the attorney’s transgressions. However, certain
    violations are so patently offensive to the elementary standards of a lawyer’s professional duty that disbarment is per
    se warranted. Thus, misconduct that breaches a fundamental and solemn trust, such as a lawyer’s involvement in a
    public-corruption bribery scheme, invariably triggers automatic disbarment. (pp. 7-8)
    2. The public’s confidence in honest government and the democratic system cannot be sustained when bribery is the
    basis for official decisionmaking. An attorney and office holder who accepts bribes violates both the oath he took as
    an attorney and the one he took on assuming his public position, and such conduct is wholly incompatible with the
    high standards expected of members of the bar. Caselaw in New Jersey and other jurisdictions establishes precedent
    for disbarring attorneys who, as public officials, have accepted bribes in exchange for preferential treatment, as well
    as attorneys who have themselves bribed public officials. Attorneys who commit such misconduct are unlikely to
    find refuge in the few exceptions in New Jersey jurisprudence to the general rule that disbarment is the discipline for
    attorneys who engage in official bribery. Going forward, any attorney who is convicted of official bribery or
    extortion should expect to lose his license to practice law in New Jersey. (pp. 8-11)
    3. Here, the Court disagrees with the DRB majority that the seriousness of respondent’s misconduct is mitigated
    because his betrayal occurred during a federal sting operation. Moreover, the Court did not view respondent as a
    passive player in the scheme. The Court acknowledges respondent’s prior unsullied reputation, service to the
    community, and expression of remorse, and applauds the steps he has taken to right his life. However, the concerns
    raised by this case are greater than whether this respondent is capable of rehabilitation. Any discipline short of
    disbarment will not keep faith with the Court’s charge to insure that the public will have confidence in members of
    the bar and in those attorneys who are privileged to serve as public officials. Consequently, respondent is disbarred.
    (pp. 11-12)
    So Ordered.
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON and FERNANDEZ-VINA;
    and JUDGES RODRÍGUEZ and CUFF (both temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion.
    2
    SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    D-46 September Term 2013
    073714
    IN THE MATTER OF
    PETER J. CAMMARANO, III,
    An Attorney at Law
    Argued April 9, 2014 – Decided September 17, 2014
    On an Order to show cause why respondent
    should not be disbarred or otherwise
    disciplined.
    Melissa A. Urban, Deputy Ethics Counsel,
    argued the cause on behalf of the Office of
    Attorney Ethics.
    Joseph A. Hayden, Jr., argued the cause for
    respondent (Walder, Hayden & Brogan,
    attorneys; Mr. Hayden and Kevin A. Buchan,
    of counsel and on the briefs).
    JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.
    Respondent/Attorney, Peter J. Cammarano, III, during his
    campaign for Mayor of Hoboken and after his election as Mayor,
    accepted monies from a cooperating government witness disguised
    as a developer, and, in exchange, assured him that he would
    receive expedited zoning approvals for unspecified construction
    projects.    As a consequence, on April 20, 2010, respondent pled
    guilty in the United States District Court for the District of
    New Jersey to one count of conspiracy to obstruct interstate
    commerce by extortion under color of official right, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 1951
    (a).       Respondent was sentenced to
    two years in federal prison to be followed by two years of
    supervised release and ordered to make restitution of $25,000 --
    the amount of illicit monies received by respondent.       Shortly
    after entry of the guilty plea, this Court temporarily suspended
    respondent from the practice of law pursuant to Rule 1:20-
    13(b)(1).   In re Cammarano, 
    202 N.J. 8
     (2010).
    On the basis of the criminal conviction, the Office of
    Attorney Ethics (OAE) filed a motion for final discipline with
    the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB), pursuant to Rule 1:20-
    13(c)(2).   The OAE recommended disbarment.      After conducting a
    hearing to determine the appropriate level of discipline, a
    four-member majority of the DRB voted to impose a three-year
    prospective period of suspension.      Two dissenting DRB members
    voted to disbar respondent.   This Court granted the OAE’s
    petition for review.
    An elected official who sells his office -- who offers
    favored treatment to a private developer in exchange for money -
    - betrays a solemn public trust.       This form of corruption is
    corrosive to our democracy and undermines public confidence in
    honest government, and its rippling pernicious effects are
    incalculable.   An attorney who engages in this form of public
    corruption, forsaking his oath of office and the oath taken when
    admitted to the bar, should expect that he will be disbarred.
    2
    Accordingly, and for the reasons that follow, an order will be
    entered disbarring respondent.
    I.
    Respondent was admitted to the bar of New Jersey in 2002.
    Before his campaign for Mayor of Hoboken in 2009, respondent
    practiced at a private law firm where one of his areas of
    expertise was election law.     He enjoyed an unblemished
    reputation and had never been professionally disciplined.     In
    the four years before the mayoral election, he served as a
    Hoboken councilman.
    In the heat of the mayoral campaign, on April 27, 2009,
    respondent and two of his political operatives met at a Hoboken
    diner with a cooperating government witness, Solomon Dwek.     Dwek
    was posing as a real-estate developer in need of zoning
    approvals for future projects and offered to make illegal
    campaign contributions for preferential treatment.     Dwek, among
    other things, wanted to know whether he could count on the
    would-be mayor if “I need a zone change.”     Respondent assured
    Dwek, “You can put your faith in me” and “you’re gonna be
    treated like a friend.”   Respondent also assured Dwek that his
    name would not be recorded as a contributor.     Dwek offered $5000
    that day and $5000 following the election.     Dwek gave an
    envelope containing $5000 in cash to one of respondent’s
    operatives after the meeting.
    3
    On May 8, 2009, respondent and his two operatives met again
    with Dwek at the diner.   In conversation, Dwek said that he
    would give “five thousand green” to one of the operatives but
    wanted the matter kept confidential.    Respondent responded,
    “Understood.”   Dwek also referred to properties that he hoped to
    develop and wanted assurance that he would have respondent’s
    support to “expedite my stuff.”   Respondent told Dwek, “I’ll be
    there.”   Again, after leaving the diner, Dwek handed one of
    respondent’s operatives an envelope containing $5000.
    On May 13, 2009, Hoboken held its election for mayor, but
    no candidate received more than fifty percent of the vote,
    forcing a run-off between the two highest vote-getters.
    Respondent, who received the most votes, proceeded to the next
    stage.
    On May 19, 2009, Dwek met again with respondent, the two
    earlier operatives, and a third associate of respondent’s.      Dwek
    said that he had another $5000, which he would give to the
    associate.   To that, respondent replied, “Beautiful,” and again
    assured Dwek that his name would remain confidential.    When Dwek
    asked respondent to make certain not to “forget to expedite my
    stuff,” respondent assured him, “I won’t.”    Respondent described
    his approach to governing to his diner companions, “breaking the
    world down into three categories”:     “people who were with us”
    from the beginning; those “who climbed on board in the runoff” -
    4
    - they would have to “get in line”; and those “who were against
    us the whole way.”   Those in the third category, respondent
    explained, would “get ground into powder” and would have to wait
    “three years” for their projects’ approvals, which would be
    placed at the “[b]ottom of the pile.”    Respondent told Dwek he
    was in the preferred group and would have his support.    At the
    close of the meeting, Dwek stated that, after the election, he
    would give another $5000 when they met again.    Respondent
    answered, “Definitely,” and left the diner.
    On June 9, 2009, respondent won the run-off election in a
    very close race.
    On June 23, 2009, at a meeting at the diner in the presence
    of his two operatives, respondent told Dwek that his campaign
    ran a $19,000 deficit.   Dwek offered $10,000 to defray that
    amount but indicated, “Just don’t put my name on anything.     I
    don’t want any trace.”   Respondent assured Dwek, “We’re going to
    be friends for a good long time.”    Dwek added, “Just make sure
    you cover my back.   Expedite my stuff when it comes in front of
    you.”
    On July 16, 2009, at the usual place, Dwek met for the last
    time with respondent, his two operatives, and his associate.
    Dwek discussed in general terms properties he might develop in
    Hoboken, suggesting with respect to one apartment building,
    “[M]aybe there’s an opportunity to go higher, add some density,
    5
    go wider.”   Respondent let Dwek know that he had his support,
    “wholeheartedly.”   Dwek told respondent that he would give
    $10,000 that day and another $10,000 the next week so that
    “we’ll be in good graces.”   Outside the diner, Dwek gave the
    associate $10,000 in cash in an envelope.
    In total, respondent accepted $25,000 from Dwek, giving
    Dwek the understanding that he had purchased the right to
    preferential treatment in land-development matters in Hoboken.
    On July 23, 2009, federal authorities arrested respondent.      A
    week later, respondent resigned as mayor.   He had spent just one
    month in office.
    Respondent’s guilty plea and judgment of conviction were
    conclusive proof that respondent engaged in the federal crime of
    conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce by extortion.      See R.
    1:20-13(c)(1).   As a result of that conviction, the DRB also
    found that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct
    (RPC) by committing “a criminal act that reflects adversely on
    the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
    other respects,” RPC 8.4(b), and by engaging “in conduct
    involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,” RPC
    8.4(c).
    As noted earlier, a majority of the DRB voted to impose a
    three-year prospective suspension.   The majority “spare[d]
    respondent from the ultimate sanction of disbarment,” in part,
    6
    because “respondent was the target of a government operation”
    and because he “was a passive, not an active, participant in the
    bribe.”   In particular, the DRB concluded that “because
    [respondent] did not orchestrate the scheme, his actions were
    less serious than those” cases involving attorneys who
    instigated the payment of bribes.
    II.
    This Court is charged with the responsibility of
    determining the fitness of lawyers to practice law in this
    State.    N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3.   “[T]he purpose of the
    disciplinary review process is to protect the public from unfit
    lawyers and promote public confidence in our legal system.”        In
    re Gallo, 
    178 N.J. 115
    , 122 (2003).    Typically, “[t]he proper
    measure of discipline will depend on a number of factors,
    including the nature and number of professional transgressions,
    the harm caused by those transgressions, the attorney’s ethical
    history, and whether the attorney is capable of meeting the
    standards that must guide all members of the profession.”     In re
    Harris, 
    182 N.J. 594
    , 609 (2005).
    Nevertheless, certain “ethical violations are, by their
    very nature, so patently offensive to the elementary standards
    of a lawyer’s professional duty that they per se warrant
    disbarment.”   In re Conway, 
    107 N.J. 168
    , 180 (1987).     Thus,
    “[m]isconduct that breaches a fundamental and solemn trust . . .
    7
    is itself sufficient to trigger automatic disbarment.”     Harris,
    
    supra,
     
    182 N.J. at 610
    .   Such a breach occurs when a lawyer
    knowingly misappropriates a client’s funds, ibid., and generally
    occurs when a lawyer is involved in a public-corruption bribery
    scheme, see In re Coruzzi, 
    98 N.J. 77
    , 81 (1984) (“Bribery is
    viewed as so reprehensible as almost invariably to call for
    disbarment.”); In re Hughes, 
    90 N.J. 32
    , 38 (1982) (“[B]ribery
    of a public official has invariably resulted in disbarment.”).
    The public’s confidence in honest government and our
    democratic system cannot be sustained when bribery -- rather
    than the public good -- is the basis for official
    decisionmaking.   The selling of one’s office for private gain is
    a betrayal of a fundamental trust and has the capacity to cast
    unfair suspicion on all government officers who honestly toil to
    promote the public’s best interests.     See In re Callahan, 
    70 N.J. 178
    , 184 (1976) (“[B]ribery of public officials [is] a
    blight that destroys the very fabric of government.”).     An
    attorney who, as an office holder, accepts bribes violates both
    the oath he took as an attorney and the one he took on assuming
    his public position.   Such conduct is wholly incompatible with
    the high standards expected of members of the bar and tarnishes
    the repute of an honorable profession.    See In re Magid, 
    139 N.J. 449
    , 455 (1995) (“Attorneys who hold public office are
    8
    invested with a public trust and . . . are held to the highest
    of standards.”).
    We have disbarred a judge who accepted bribes in exchange
    for giving preferential treatment at sentencing, Coruzzi, 
    supra,
    98 N.J. at 78, 81
    ; a deputy attorney general who solicited a
    bribe in exchange for influencing a case before a state
    licensing board, In re Jones, 
    131 N.J. 505
    , 507, 513 (1993); and
    a county executive who obstructed justice and engaged in mail
    fraud, in part, by receiving thousands of dollars in unrecorded
    campaign contributions from a sewer-repair firm that received a
    no-bid contract, In re Treffinger, DRB No. 04-145 (July 26,
    2004) (slip op. at 11), aff’d, 
    181 N.J. 390
     (2004).
    In addition, we have repeatedly disbarred attorneys who
    have bribed public officials.   See, e.g., In re Izquierdo, 
    209 N.J. 5
    , 5-7 (2012) (disbarring attorney who bribed local zoning
    official); In re Tuso, 
    104 N.J. 59
    , 62-66 (1986) (disbarring
    attorney who bribed public official); Hughes, 
    supra,
     
    90 N.J. at 34-39
     (disbarring attorney who bribed IRS agent); Callahan,
    
    supra,
     
    70 N.J. at 179-85
     (disbarring attorney for bribing local
    officials); In re Sabatino, 
    65 N.J. 548
    , 554 (1974) (holding
    that “only appropriate discipline [for conspiracy to bribe
    public official] is disbarment”); In re Hyett, 
    61 N.J. 518
    , 524,
    537 (1972) (disbarring attorney who bribed police officer).
    9
    Other jurisdictions, likewise, have not hesitated to disbar
    attorneys who have involved themselves in bribery schemes,
    whether the attorney received a bribe as an officeholder or
    offered one to influence a public official.    See, e.g., In re
    Johnson, 
    48 A.3d 170
    , 173 (D.C. 2012) (holding that both bribery
    and extortion under color of official right involve moral
    turpitude requiring automatic disbarment); Ky. Bar Ass’n v.
    Carmichael, 
    244 S.W.3d 111
    , 115 (Ky. 2008) (holding that
    prosecutor’s abuse of public office in attempting to extort
    monies under color of official right was aggravating factor
    warranting disbarment); In re Margiotta, 
    456 N.E.2d 798
    , 799-801
    (N.Y. 1983) (holding that any attorney convicted of extortion
    under color of official right shall be automatically disbarred).
    We recognize that in our jurisprudence there have been a
    few exceptions to the general rule that disbarment is the
    discipline for an attorney who engages in official bribery.
    See, e.g., In re Caruso, 
    172 N.J. 350
     (2002) (three-year
    suspension of attorney convicted of brokering bribe for mayor),
    implementing DRB No. 01-343 (Nov. 15, 2001).   Nevertheless,
    attorneys taking bribes as public officers and those giving
    bribes to peddle influence are unlikely to find refuge in such
    exceptions.   Going forward, any attorney who is convicted of
    official bribery or extortion should expect to lose his license
    to practice law in New Jersey.
    10
    III.
    We disagree with the DRB majority that the seriousness of
    respondent’s professional misconduct is mitigated because he
    betrayed his office -- even before he assumed the position of
    mayor -- in a federal sting operation.   Respondent accepted
    bribe monies that were not reported in accordance with state
    election laws and that were used to gain an advantage in a close
    race.   That respondent did not purchase a car or some other item
    with the illicit monies but rather used those monies to win a
    professional prize -- the position of mayor -- does not render
    his conduct less blameworthy.   Moreover, we do not view
    respondent as a passive player in this corruption scheme.
    Respondent did not display any timidity or hesitation about
    accepting bribes in exchange for giving preferential treatment
    to a developer.   Respondent presented a very clear picture to
    all those present at those meetings at the diner:   he was open
    to selling favors in the performance of his official duties.
    That respondent cannot be characterized as orchestrating the
    scheme in no way detracts from his culpability.   The public’s
    confidence in government -- a government operating fairly and
    honestly for the general welfare of the people -- is undermined
    just as thoroughly by a mayor with his hand out waiting for a
    bribe as by one actively seeking a bribe.
    11
    We acknowledge respondent’s prior unsullied reputation, his
    service to the community, the adverse impact of his conviction
    on his personal and professional life, and his expression of
    remorse, as well as fifteen letters attesting to his good
    character.   We applaud the steps he has taken to right his life.
    But the concerns raised by this case are greater than whether
    this respondent is capable of rehabilitation, of which we have
    little doubt.   Cf. Hughes, supra, 
    90 N.J. at 36-37
     (stating that
    although “it is unlikely that the attorney will repeat the
    misconduct, certain acts by attorneys so impugn the integrity of
    the legal system that disbarment is the only appropriate means
    to restore public confidence in it”).
    In the end, we are charged with insuring that the public
    will have confidence in members of the bar and in those
    attorneys who are privileged to serve as public officials.
    In this case, any discipline short of disbarment will not be
    keeping faith with that charge.
    IV.
    For those reasons, an order will be entered disbarring
    respondent from the practice of law in this State.
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, and
    FERNANDEZ-VINA, and JUDGES RODRÍGUEZ and CUFF (both temporarily
    assigned) join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion.
    12
    SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    NO.    D-46                                    SEPTEMBER TERM 2013
    APPLICATION FOR
    Order to Show Cause Why Respondent Should
    DISPOSITION
    Not be Disbarred or Otherw ise Disciplined
    IN THE MATTER OF
    PETER J. CAMMARANO, III,
    An Attorney at Law
    DECIDED                September 17, 2014
    OPINION BY                 Justice Albin
    CONCURRING OPINION BY
    DISSENTING OPINION BY
    CHECKLIST                            DISBAR
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER                      X
    JUSTICE LaVECCHIA                         X
    JUSTICE ALBIN                             X
    JUSTICE PATTERSON                         X
    JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA                    X
    JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (t/a)                     X
    JUDGE CUFF (t/a)                          X
    TOTALS                                    7
    2
    3