Sergio Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture(074603) , 225 N.J. 343 ( 2016 )

SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
Sergio Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Company, Inc. (A-27-14) (074603)
Argued December 1, 2015 -- Decided June 15, 2016
LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court addresses whether the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49,
which was established to fulfill a public-interest purpose, can be contravened by private agreement.
In August 2007, plaintiff Sergio Rodriguez, applied for a job with defendant Raymours Furniture
Company, Inc., t/a Raymour & Flanigan. The last page of the job application contained a section which applicants
were instructed to read carefully before signing. A portion of that section read, in bolded capital letters, “I agree that
any claim or lawsuit relating to my service with Raymour & Flanigan must be filed no more than six (6) months
after the date of the employment action that is the subject of the claim or lawsuit. I waive any statute of limitations
to the contrary.” Plaintiff signed the application and returned it.
In mid-September 2007, plaintiff was hired as a Helper, an at-will position. In November 2008, he was
transferred to another location and promoted to Driver. Early in April 2010, plaintiff injured his knee in a work-
related accident, requiring surgery and physical therapy. On October 1, 2010, two days after he returned to full-duty
work, plaintiff was terminated. Although informed that his termination was due to a company-wide reduction in
force, plaintiff asserted that others with less seniority or distinguishing features were retained.
On July 5, 2011, nearly seven months after his termination, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in
Superior Court, alleging, in part, illegal employment discrimination based on actual or perceived disability, in
violation of the LAD. Defendant moved for summary judgment based on the waiver provision, asserting that
plaintiff’s complaint was filed beyond the agreed-upon six-month limitations period. Plaintiff contended, in part,
that the provision was unconscionable and unenforceable. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant,
finding that the provision was clear and unambiguous, and that the contractual shortening of the limitations period
was neither unreasonable nor against public policy.
Plaintiff appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 436 N.J.
Super. 305 (App. Div. 2014). Although the panel found that the employment application amounted to a contract of
adhesion, it determined that it was enforceable in light of its clear, unambiguous language and the ample time
plaintiff had to review it. The panel further held that, absent a controlling prohibitory statute, parties may modify a
statute of limitations if, as here, the shortened time period is reasonable and does not violate public policy. The
Court granted plaintiff’s petition for certification. 220 N.J. 100 (2014).
HELD: A private agreement that frustrates the LAD’s public-purpose imperative by shortening the two-year
limitations period for private LAD claims cannot be enforced.
1. New Jersey’s decisional law respects that private interests are intertwined with the public interests furthered by
the LAD. Here, the Appellate Division focused on the general principle of the existence of a broad right to contract,
but it did not sufficiently assess the public-interest purpose of the LAD, which seeks unequivocally to eradicate
discrimination against any of New Jersey’s inhabitants. To enforce the LAD and further this goal, the Legislature
created a division now known as the Division on Civil Rights (DCR), where aggrieved parties can file
discrimination complaints. In 1979, the LAD was amended to also provide for a right of action in Superior Court.
Because the LAD is silent as to a limitations period for LAD claims, the Court, in Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282(1993), found that a two-year limitations period comported with the purpose of the LAD and provided needed
uniformity among claims. In the twenty-three years since Montells, the Legislature has registered tacit approval of
the two-year period by failing to take legislative action disavowing it. (pp. 14-20)
2. To pursue relief under the LAD, a person alleging discrimination can file a complaint with the DCR within six
months of the cause of action or file a direct suit in the Superior Court within two years. Permitting an aggrieved
party to first bring a claim to the DCR furthers important public policies, such as the settlement of litigation through
alternative dispute resolution and the prosecution of alleged discrimination. However, although the DCR process is
intended to provide more timely resolution than an action in Superior Court, the Legislature recognized that this goal
may not always be met. Consequently, an injured party may withdraw its DCR complaint at any time before the
DCR makes a final decision and proceed instead in Superior Court. This allows a litigant to potentially use both
forums, subject to the outer limit of the two-year limitations period for court actions. (pp. 20-23)
3. This cases raises a question of first impression. Although the issue arises in a private action, this matter, like all
LAD actions, also advances and fulfills the legislatively declared public interest in the elimination of discrimination.
Because, more than two decades after Montells, the two-year limitations period is woven into the fabric of the LAD,
a contractual shortening of the period must be examined for its substantive impact to determine if it is impliedly
prohibited by the LAD scheme. The availability of two avenues of relief in the event the administrative process
extends too long reflects the Legislature’s understanding that public policy requires a lengthier period of time to
obtain LAD relief. Its tacit approval of the two-year limitations period accommodates these two avenues.
Consequently, a shortening of that period undermines and thwarts the legislative scheme by effectively divesting the
aggrieved party of the right to pursue an administrative remedy. Additionally, since claimants may not immediately
be aware of their cognizable claims, shortening of the period will effectively eliminate claims and frustrate the
public policy of uniformity and certainty. Conversely, the shortened period may also compel attorneys to file
premature LAD actions. Finally, the two-year period also allows an employer the opportunity to protect itself and
promote the eradication of discrimination by investigating and resolving complaints before an LAD claim is filed.
(pp. 24-28)
4. While New Jersey law recognizes that an individual may agree by contract to submit a statutory LAD claim to
alternative dispute resolution, the contract must nevertheless be examined to ascertain whether substantive rights
have been precluded. Here, the contractual shortening of the limitations period effectively foreclosed plaintiff’s
substantive right to utilize all available avenues of relief since there was not enough time to choose to begin with a
filing with the DCR. In light of the interplay between the LAD’s administrative remedy and the right to file in
Superior Court, as well as the joint public and private interests advanced by a claim pursued in either forum,
contractual shortening of the two-year limitations period for a private action is contrary to public policy. The DCR
remedy must remain accessible and vibrant, and the anti-discrimination public policy to be fulfilled through LAD
claims may not be contractually curtailed. Thus, the waiver provision here is unenforceable. This decision is rooted
in the unique importance of New Jersey’s LAD and the necessity for its effective enforcement. The Court notes that
at least two other states have deemed similar provisions contrary to public policy. (pp. 28-32)
5. Although the Court’s holding is not derived from consideration of plaintiff’s unconscionability argument, it adds
that courts may refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts or discrete contract provisions. In the instant matter,
because the provision at question was contained within an employment application and plaintiff could not bargain,
the contract was one of adhesion, containing indicia of procedural unconscionability. Because further analysis
would require consideration of, among other factors, the public interests affected by the contract, had this matter
been analyzed through the prism of an unconscionability analysis, the Court would have reached the same outcome
based on the anti-discrimination concerns expressed in the LAD. (pp. 32-34)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, and SOLOMON; and JUDGE
CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA did
not participate.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-27 September Term 2014
074603
SERGIO RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RAYMOURS FURNITURE COMPANY,
INC., a corporation, t/a
RAYMOUR & FLANIGAN,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued December 1, 2015 – Decided June 15, 2016
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is
reported at 436 N.J. Super. 305 (App. Div.
2014).
Alan L. Krumholz argued the cause for
appellant (Krumholz Dillon, attorneys).
Patricia A. Smith argued the cause for
respondent (Ballard Spahr, attorneys; Ms.
Smith, Edward T. Groh, and Amy L. Bashore,
on the briefs).
Bennet D. Zurofsky argued the cause for
amicus curiae National Employment Lawyers
Association-New Jersey (Mr. Zurofsky, Schall
& Barasch, and Sarah Fern Meil, attorneys;
Mr. Zurofsky, Ms. Meil, and Richard M.
Schall, on the brief).
John E. Keefe, Jr., argued the cause for
amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar
Association (Miles S. Winder III, President,
attorney; Paris P. Eliades, of counsel; Mr.
Keefe, Mr. Eliades, Stephen T. Sullivan,
Jr., Liana M. Nobile, and Javier J. Diaz, on
the brief).
1
Nancy Erika Smith argued the cause for
amicus curiae New Jersey Association for
Justice (Smith Mullin, attorneys; Ms. Smith
and Neil Mullin, of counsel; Ms. Smith, Mr.
Mullin, and Virginia A. Pallotto, on the
brief).
Ronald K. Chen argued the cause for amicus
curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New
Jersey (Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic
Center for Law & Justice, attorneys; Mr.
Chen, Edward L. Barocas, Jeanne M. LoCicero,
and Alexander R. Shalom, of counsel and on
the brief).
Martin W. Aron argued the cause for amicus
curiae Academy of New Jersey Management
Attorneys (Jackson Lewis, attorneys; Mr.
Aron and Maggie L. Gousman, of counsel and
on the brief).
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal we address whether the Law Against
Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49 -- a law
established to fulfill a public-interest purpose -- can be
contravened by private agreement.
Here an employment application contained a provision
requiring the applicant, if hired, to agree to bring any
employment-related cause of action against the employer within
six months of the challenged employment action and waive any
statute of limitations to the contrary. After being hired and
employed for a period of time, plaintiff filed a complaint in
Superior Court against his former employer, claiming among other
2
things an LAD violation premised on disability discrimination.
The trial court dismissed the action, enforcing the six-month
limitations period for filing that employment-related claim, and
the Appellate Division affirmed.
We reverse. The challenged provision cannot be viewed as a
private contractual agreement by which private parties contract
to limit private claims by shortening the generally applicable
statute of limitations for such actions. The cause of action
that plaintiff brings is factually premised on his employment
relationship, but it is not a simple private claim. Plaintiff
alleges an LAD violation –- a law designed for equal parts
public and private purposes.
The LAD plays a uniquely important role in fulfilling the
public imperative of eradicating discrimination. One searches
in vain to find another New Jersey enactment having an
equivalently powerful legislative statement of purpose, along
with operative provisions that arm individuals and entities with
formidable tools to combat discrimination not only through their
use but also by the threat of their use. There is a huge
incentive for employers to thoroughly investigate and respond
effectively to internal complaints in order to limit or avoid
liability for workplace discrimination. Responsible employers
are partners in the public interest work of eradicating
discrimination, but such responsible behavior takes time. A
3
shortened time frame for instituting legal action or losing that
ability hampers enforcement of the public interest.
Presently, a dual-enforcement scheme allows litigants to
bring direct suit or utilize the resources of the Division on
Civil Rights (DCR). Although the LAD has private and
administrative remedies, election of either statutorily created
course of action furthers the public and private purpose of the
LAD –- preventing and eliminating discrimination. See Fuchilla
v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334 (stating that LAD seeks “nothing
less than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination”
(quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
826, 109 S. Ct. 75, 102 L. Ed. 2d 51 (1998)). Restricting the
ability of citizens to bring LAD claims is antithetical to that
societal aspiration and defeats the public policy goal.
We hold that a private agreement that frustrates the LAD’s
public-purpose imperative by shortening the two-year limitations
period for private LAD claims cannot be enforced.
I.
In August 2007, plaintiff Sergio Rodriguez, recently laid
off from his previous job, sought to apply for the position of
Helper with defendant, Raymours Furniture Company, Inc., t/a
Raymour & Flanigan. He went to defendant’s Customer Service
Center in Monmouth Junction and obtained a job application,
which was written in English. Plaintiff, a native of Argentina
4
who was not proficient in the English language, brought the
application home. A friend assisted plaintiff in filling out
the application, translating sections in which plaintiff had to
provide information.
The bottom of the second (and last) page of the application
contained a section titled, “Applicant’s Statement - READ
CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING – IF YOU ARE HIRED, THE FOLLOWING
BECOMES PART OF YOUR OFFICIAL EMPLOYMENT RECORD AND PERSONNEL
FILE.” That section contained the following paragraphs:
I understand this employment application is
not a promise of an offer of employment. I
further understand that should I receive and
accept an offer of employment, my employment
does not constitute any form of contract,
implied or expressed, and such employment will
be terminable at will either by myself or
Raymour & Flanigan upon notice of one party to
the other. My continued employment would be
dependent on satisfactory performance and
continued need for my services as determined
by Raymour & Flanigan.
I authorize investigation of all statements
contained in this application. I understand
that misrepresentation or omission of facts
called for are grounds for a refusal to offer
employment or a cause of dismissal if hired.
I AGREE THAT ANY CLAIM OR LAWSUIT RELATING TO
MY SERVICE WITH RAYMOUR & FLANIGAN MUST BE
FILED NO MORE THAN SIX (6) MONTHS AFTER THE
DATE OF THE EMPLOYMENT ACTION THAT IS THE
SUBJECT OF THE CLAIM OR LAWSUIT. I WAIVE ANY
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO THE CONTRARY.
I WAIVE TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY LITIGATION
ARISING OUT OF, OR RELATING TO, MY EMPLOYMENT
WITH RAYMOUR & FLANIGAN, INCLUDING CLAIMS OF
5
WRONGFUL OR RETALIATORY DISCIPLINE OR
DISCHARGE; CLAIMS OF AGE, SEXUAL, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION, RELIGIOUS, PREGNANCY OR RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION, CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, TITLE IX, AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT, EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AND
ALL OTHER APPLICABLE NON-DISCRIMINATION,
EMPLOYMENT OR WAGE AND HOUR STATUTES.
Plaintiff returned the signed application to the Customer
Service Center the next day. When asked by the manager on duty
if he had any questions about the application, plaintiff
responded in the negative. Plaintiff later certified in this
action that he “ha[d] no understanding of the term Statute of
Limitations,” that he “d[id] not know what the word ‘waive’
mean[t],” and that he “did not understand that [his] rights
would be limited in case the company treated [him] illegally or
unfairly.”
In mid-September 2007, plaintiff was hired by defendant as
a Helper. There is no dispute that his position with the
company was at-will. He worked at the Monmouth Junction
location, until November 2008, when he transferred to a Customer
Service Center in Randolph.
At some point after transferring to the Randolph location,
plaintiff was promoted to Driver.1 For his new position,
1 It is unclear precisely when plaintiff was promoted. The
record as it stands contains conflicting information.
6
plaintiff was required to fill out an additional employment
application. That second application did not contain the same
provision -- limiting the applicant’s time for filing any
potential employment-related claims -- that the first
application did.
Early in April 2010, plaintiff injured his knee in a work-
related accident during a furniture delivery. Plaintiff ceased
working shortly after his injury. Defendant reported the
accident to its third-party workers’ compensation benefits
administrator. The injury was determined to be compensable and
payments were made for plaintiff’s medical treatments.
During the summer of 2010, plaintiff underwent surgery and
physical therapy for his knee injury. He was cleared to return
to light-duty work effective September 14, 2010, for a period of
two weeks. On October 1, 2010, two days after resuming full-
duty work, plaintiff was terminated. His supervisor informed
him that business was slow. Defendant maintains that it laid
plaintiff off as part of a company-wide reduction in force
(RIF). Plaintiff disputes that a RIF was the reason for his
termination when others with less seniority or distinguishing
features were retained for service. Plaintiff filed a Claim
Petition with the Division of Workers’ Compensation on June 9,
2011.
7
Thereafter, on July 5, 2011, nearly seven months after
being terminated, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant
in Superior Court, which action gives rise to this appeal. His
complaint alleges illegal employment discrimination based on an
actual or perceived disability, in violation of the LAD, and
retaliation for obtaining worker’s compensation benefits, in
violation of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that
plaintiff had agreed, pursuant to the waiver provision in
defendant’s employment application, to limit to six months the
statute of limitations for any employment-related claims against
defendant. Plaintiff responded that the provision was
unconscionable and unenforceable and, alternatively, that his
second application for the Driver position, which did not
contain a similar limiting provision, constituted a novation.
The trial court rejected plaintiff’s arguments and granted
summary judgment to defendant. According to the trial court,
the provision was clear and unambiguous, citing particularly its
capital letters and bold print, which commanded the attention of
the reader. The trial court also concluded that the contractual
shortening of the statute of limitations was neither
unreasonable nor against public policy.
Plaintiff appealed, again arguing that the provision was
unconscionable and void as against public policy and that the
8
second Driver application constituted a novation. The Appellate
Division judgment affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment. Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 436 N.J. Super.
305, 311-12 (App. Div. 2014).
The appellate panel recognized that plaintiff’s employment
application amounted to a contract of adhesion but found it
nonetheless enforceable, pointing to the clear, unambiguous
language of the application and the fact that plaintiff had
ample time to review the application when he took it home. Id.
at 323-24.
The panel also rejected plaintiff’s argument that, because
a two-year statute of limitations applies to LAD claims, the
time frame for bringing such actions could not be modified by
private contract. Id. at 319. The panel held that, absent a
controlling prohibitory statute, parties may modify a statute of
limitations so long as the shortened time period is reasonable.
The Appellate Division relied on Eagle Fire Protection Corp. v.
First Indemnity of America Insurance Co., 145 N.J. 345 (1996),
and Mirra v. Holland America Line, 331 N.J. Super. 86 (App. Div.
2000), for support in concluding that generally parties can
shorten a statute of limitations so long as the shortened period
is reasonable and does not violate public policy. Id. at 319-
20.
9
The panel held that both of those conditions were satisfied
here. There was no express prohibitory statute, and the panel
determined that the six-month period was reasonable in length.
The panel noted that the statute of limitations for bringing an
LAD claim by means of the administrative process offered through
the DCR, as opposed to filing a complaint in Superior Court,
also was six months. Id. at 320. According to the panel,
therefore, contractually shortening the statute of limitations
to six months did not preclude plaintiff from pursuing any
remedy offered under the LAD. Id. at 322.
Finally, plaintiff’s novation argument was summarily
rejected on appeal. Id. at 329.
We granted plaintiff’s petition for certification. 220
N.J. 100 (2014). We also granted amicus curiae status to the
New Jersey State Bar Association, the New Jersey Association for
Justice, the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, the
National Employment Lawyers Association, and the Academy of New
Jersey Management Attorneys.
II.
A.
Plaintiff’s first line of argument rests on principles of
contract unenforceability based on unconscionability. He
contends that a job application with a provision shortening the
statute of limitations for any future employment-related claims
10
is a contract of adhesion, and that in this instance that
contract of adhesion is both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable and unenforceable.
Procedurally, plaintiff emphasizes that, unlike commercial
contracts negotiated between sophisticated parties, an
employment application consists of an inherent imbalance of
power: Applicants have varying degrees of financial security
and education levels, which may influence their understanding of
the contract and prevent them from asking questions of potential
employers for fear of not being hired.
Substantively, plaintiff argues that the provision
frustrates public policy. Plaintiff argues that the LAD was
enacted to protect employees, and that allowing private
companies to create their own periods of limitation overrides
the legislative policy of encouraging discrimination-free
workplaces. Plaintiff points out that this Court in Montells v.
Haynes, 133 N.J. 282 (1993), interpreted the LAD to have a two-
year statute of limitations and the Legislature has given that
interpretation its imprimatur based on more than twenty years of
silence in the wake of Montells. Plaintiff highlights the LAD’s
administrative recourse through the DCR. Allowing such a
constricted contractual limitations period, plaintiff says,
frustrates the LAD remedial scheme overall and limits the option
to pursue a claim through the DCR. In other words, the
11
shortened time frame precludes plaintiff from exercising both
options that the LAD otherwise makes available within the two-
year time frame for filing an LAD claim in Superior Court.
In the event that the Court were to conclude that the
limitations period is enforceable, plaintiff’s remaining
argument focuses on whether the trial court was correct in
determining that his second employment application (for the
position of Driver) did not constitute a novation. Plaintiff
maintains that the question should have been presented to the
jury and not dismissed on summary judgment.
B.
Defendant asserts that the employment application is
neither unconscionable nor unenforceable. Relying on Eagle Fire
and Mirra, defendant argues that it is well settled in New
Jersey that parties can privately contract to shorten statutes
of limitations, and notes further a New York appellate
determination to enforce the same provision at issue here. Just
as the trial and appellate courts found, defendant contends that
the waiver was clear and unambiguous, rendering it easy to read
and understand.
Because no statute to the contrary prohibits a contractual
provision from shortening the time for suit to six months,
defendant argues that parties can freely contract to modify
statutory rights. Defendant asserts that the provision does not
12
interfere with the DCR’s role in investigating and settling LAD
claims because, unlike the federal scheme, New Jersey does not
have an administrative exhaustion requirement that in itself
could take six months to pursue. According to defendant,
plaintiffs are free either to pursue the administrative remedy
or to file suit in Superior Court, so long as they act within
six months.
C.
Amici New Jersey State Bar Association, the New Jersey
Association for Justice, the American Civil Liberties Union of
New Jersey, and the National Employment Lawyers Association all
support plaintiff’s arguments and express concern about allowing
a private agreement to modify a public law by constricting the
otherwise applicable limitations period to pursue that statutory
claim. Their arguments focus on public policy and the singular
public-interest importance of the LAD.
Amicus curiae Academy of New Jersey Management Attorneys
argues that shortening the two-year statute of limitations for
LAD claims is not against public policy and is within private
parties’ right to contract. Decisions are cited from other
jurisdictions finding shortened limitations periods reasonable
and enforceable. Finally, the Academy argues that shortening
the time for filing suit encourages employees’ quick pursuit of
claims, which benefits employers, employees, and the public.
13
III.
Referencing the general principle that a broad private
right to contract exists, the appellate panel in this matter
found that principle to govern -- essentially because it could
find no “controlling statute to the contrary” within the LAD
that prohibited a shortened limitations period. Rodriguez,
supra, 436 N.J. Super. at 319 (quoting Order of United
Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608, 67 S.
Ct. 1355, 1365, 91 L. Ed. 1687, 1700 (1947)). The panel had
available to it, and cited, only cases that generally dealt with
private agreements to shorten statutes of limitations pertaining
to common law actions and cases that did not engage in any
searching analysis of whether public policy was contravened by
the shortening of a limitations period for a public interest
statute. See id. at 319-20.2 Consequently, the appellate panel
determined that it had no basis on which to interfere with the
substance of the parties’ contract in this matter. In viewing
the analysis as nothing more than a search for a preempting
statute, the panel did not sufficiently assess the public-
2 The only New Jersey decision that the Appellate Division had
available to cite that concerned a statutory claim was Mirra,
supra, 331 N.J. Super. 86. But that decision relies on prior
cases approving the shortening of non-statutory common law
actions. Id. at 90-91.
14
interest purpose of the LAD. The LAD deserves a closer
assessment.
A.
The LAD occupies a privileged place among statutory
enactments in New Jersey. In 1945, prior to passage of our
modern state constitution, the Legislature enacted the LAD to
prevent and eliminate practices of discrimination based on race,
creed, color, national origin or ancestry, and created an
enforcement agency to achieve that goal. L. 1945, c. 169.
The LAD is an express exercise of the state’s police
powers. N.J.S.A. 10:5-2. In relying on police powers when
enacting the LAD, the Legislature recognized nothing less than a
civil right. The exercise of police power was deemed necessary
“for the protection of the public safety, health and morals and
to promote the general welfare and in fulfillment of the
provisions of the Constitution of this State guaranteeing civil
rights.” Ibid.In justifying the LAD’s enactment, the Legislature voiced
its reasons for declaring abhorrence to discrimination in this
state. It stated that practices of forms of discrimination
against any of New Jersey’s inhabitants “are matters of concern
to the government of the State, and that such discrimination
threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of the
inhabitants of the State but menaces the institutions and
15
foundation of a free democratic State[.]” N.J.S.A. 10:5-3.
Further, the Legislature declared “its opposition to such
practices of discrimination when directed against any person”
for the forbidden reasons, and certain others connected by
family, or employment, or otherwise listed, “in order that the
economic prosperity and general welfare of the inhabitants of
the State may be protected and ensured.” Ibid. And connecting
the harm to the individual to the harm that is visited on the
State and the public interest by such actions, the Legislature
did not mince words: “The Legislature further finds that
because of discrimination, people suffer personal hardships, and
the State suffers a grievous harm.” Ibid.Accordingly, it has long been recognized that the LAD seeks
unequivocally to “eradicate” discrimination. Jackson v. Concord
Co., 54 N.J. 113, 124 (1969). Our decisional law respects that
private interests are intertwined with the public interests
furthered by the LAD. See e.g., Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, 132
N.J. 587, 600 (1993) (stating that LAD was enacted “to protect
not only the civil rights of individual aggrieved employees but
also to protect the public’s strong interest in a
discrimination-free workplace” (citation omitted)). As further
proof that eradication of discrimination is a public interest,
the Legislature cast a wide net in crafting what is included
among LAD violations. The LAD is violated not only when an
16
individual of a protected class is discriminated against, but
also when reprisal is taken against any person who opposed such
actions or practices forbidden by the LAD or who aided or
encouraged any person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right
granted or protected under the LAD. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d).
B.
To “prevent and eliminate” discrimination, the Legislature
created a division now known as the Division on Civil Rights.
See L. 1945, c. 169, § 6. Recognizing that “prevention of
unlawful discrimination vindicates not only the rights of
individuals but also the vital interests of the State,” the DCR
enforces the LAD to further both. Ibid. The LAD originally
“provided for the filing of complaints with the Division Against
Discrimination,” L. 1945, c. 169, § 12, which was replaced by
the DCR, L. 1960, c. 59, § 3. In 1979, the LAD was amended to
provide for a right of action in the Superior Court, in addition
to the administrative remedy originally available. L. 1979, c.
404, § 1.
In Montells, supra, 133 N.J. at 285, this Court determined
what statute of limitations would apply to LAD claims because
the LAD was silent as to a limitations period. Montells held
that the two-year limitations period of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which
is applicable in personal injury actions, comported with the
purpose of the LAD and, importantly, provided needed uniformity,
17
regardless of the underlying factual nature of the particular
LAD claim. Id. at 291-92. Twenty-three years later, the
Legislature has registered its tacit approval of that
determination. The lack of legislative action to signal
disavowal of the two-year limitations period is significant in
light of the many times since Montells was decided that the
Legislature has taken affirmative steps to amend the LAD in
other respects. See L. 1996, c. 126, §§ 1, 2, 4-10; L. 1997, c.
179, § 1; L. 2001, c. 254, §§ 1, 2; L. 2001, c. 385, § 1; L.
2002, c. 82, §§ 1-4, 6; L. 2003, c. 72, § 1; L. 2003, c. 180, §§
3-25 ; L. 2003, c. 246, §§ 11, 12; L. 2003, c. 293, § 1; L.
2004, c. 130, § 37; L. 2005, c. 258, § 1; L. 2006, c. 88, §§ 1-
4; L. 2006, c. 100, §§ 1-15; L. 2006, c. 103, §§ 1, 88; L. 2007,
c. 325, §§ 1, 2; L. 2009, c. 205, § 1; L. 2013, c. 154, § 1; L.
2013, c. 220, §§ 1, 2.
Indeed, the LAD has been amended many times since
originally enacted. The Legislature’s activity has been in one
direction. It has acted only to strengthen the LAD, adding more
protections and for more classes of individuals. See L. 1951,
c. 64, § 1 (adding service in Armed Forces of United States as
protected class); L. 1962, c. 37, § 2 (adding age as protected
class); L. 1970, c. 80, § 8 (adding marital status and sex as
protected classes); L. 1972, c. 114, § 2 (adding disability as
protected class); L. 1977, c. 456, § 5 (adding public access to
18
facilities for service and guide dog trainers); L. 1980, c. 46,
§§ 4, 5 (extending disability protections to deaf persons); L.
1981, c. 185, § 1 (extending disability protections to persons
with blood traits for numerous disorders); L. 1983, c. 412, § 2
(imposing penalties for violating LAD); L. 1990, c. 12, § 1
(authorizing recovery of emotional distress damages); L. 1990,
c. 12, § 2 (providing jury trials in LAD cases); L. 1991, c.
493, § 1 (amending definition of handicapped to include persons
with AIDS and HIV); L. 1991, c. 519, § 1 (adding affectional or
sexual orientation as protected class); L. 1992, c. 146, § 1
(adding familial status as protected class); L. 1996, c. 126, §
5 (making it unlawful to discriminate for refusing to submit to
genetic testing or refusing to reveal genetic testing
information); L. 1997, c. 179, § 1 (making it unlawful to
discriminate based on genetic information); L. 2001, c. 385, § 1
(making it unlawful to discriminate against employee who
displays American flag); L. 2002, c. 82, § 3 (making it unlawful
for landlords to discriminate based on source of income or age
of children); L. 2003, c. 180, § 12 (providing “substantially
same protections against discrimination as provided under
Federal Fair Housing Act”); L. 2003, c. 246, § 12 (adding
protections for individuals in domestic partnerships); L. 2003,
c. 72, §§ 2, 3 (providing separate standards for handicapped
access in public buildings versus multi-family dwellings); L.
19
2006, c. 100, § 2 (adding gender identity or expression as
protected class); L. 2006, c. 103, §§ 1, 88 (adding protections
for individuals in civil unions); L. 2013, c. 220, § 1
(requiring accommodations for pregnant women and women
recovering from childbirth).
C.
To pursue relief under the LAD, a person alleging
discrimination can file a complaint with the DCR within six
months of the cause of action or file a direct suit in the
Superior Court within two years. N.J.S.A. 10:5-13; N.J.S.A.
10:5-18; see Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology
Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 131 (2001) (“[T]here is a clear
mandate of public policy permitting persons alleging violations
of the LAD to proceed administratively or judicially.” (quoting
Ackerman v. The Money Store, 321 N.J. Super. 308, 324 (Law Div.
1998))). However, the Legislature requires an election of
remedy for an LAD action. Once a party files a Superior Court
action, he or she may not file a complaint with the DCR while
that action is pending. N.J.S.A. 10:5-13. The same is true if
an aggrieved party first files with the DCR; during the pendency
of the matter with the DCR, an aggrieved party cannot file with
the Superior Court. N.J.S.A. 10:5-27. Once a finding is made
in either the Superior Court or the DCR, “the final
determination therein shall exclude any other action, civil or
20
criminal, based on the same grievance of the individual
concerned.” Ibid.3
Permitting an aggrieved party to bring a discrimination
claim to the DCR (within six months) furthers important public
policies of this state. First, it allows for an alternative
dispute resolution of the discrimination claim, and New Jersey
has a “strong public policy in favor of the settlement of
litigation.” Gere v. Louis, 209 N.J. 486, 500 (2012); see also
Bell Tower Condo. Ass’n v. Haffert, 423 N.J. Super. 507, 510
(App. Div.) (noting “the long-established public policy of this
State” favoring alternative dispute resolution), certif. denied,
210 N.J. 217 (2012). Discrimination claims take time and
require resources to pursue. Investigation, discovery between
the parties, and possible conciliation or settlement discussions
3 The LAD does not contain an administrative exhaustion
requirement that a party first file his or her complaint with
the DCR before filing suit in Superior Court. N.J.S.A. 10:5-13.
Because of that, our scheme differs from the federal employment
discrimination scheme, which requires a party to first file his
or her complaint with the EEOC within 180 days and receive a
right-to-sue letter before commencing litigation. 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-5(e), (f)(1). An aggrieved party would therefore be
foreclosed from filing suit under federal law if he or she had
agreed to a shortened six-month period of limitations. For
those reasons, federal courts have invalidated a six-month
period if there is an administrative exhaustion requirement.
Our statutory scheme differs and accordingly our analysis does
as well. However, the absence of an administrative exhaustion
requirement does not answer whether a contractually shortened
limitations period contravenes the public-interest purpose
advanced in our anti-discrimination scheme.
21
can prove lengthy and expensive. For those reasons, the LAD
expects that the DCR will play an important role. When a party
elects to purse a claim administratively, he or she is “availing
himself [or herself] of a means of redress normally swifter and
less expensive than formal litigation.” Sprague v. Glassboro
State Coll., 161 N.J. Super. 218, 226 (App. Div. 1978); see
N.J.S.A. 10:5-14, -15, -16, -17, -19. Thus, the DCR’s ability
to evaluate and investigate discrimination claims is consistent
with the public policy of our State that favors alternative
dispute resolution.
Although the DCR process is designed to provide more timely
resolution than an action in Superior Court, that aspirational
goal may not always be met.4 “When that means of redress fails
to achieve those goals, an injured party is entirely free to
proceed in Superior Court . . . . and [the] pending complaint
before the DCR may be withdrawn at any time provided that the
DCR has not made a final determination.” Wilson v. Wal-Mart
4 The administrative remedy of the LAD may not always work
swiftly. The Legislature anticipated that a DCR investigation
may require more than six months from the filing of the
complaint with the DCR. If the DCR investigation extends beyond
six months from the filing of the complaint, the complainant may
request that the matter be transferred for a hearing with the
Office of Administrative Law and, upon such request, the DCR
“shall file the action with the Office of Administrative Law,”
unless the DCR has already determined there is no probable cause
to credit the allegations. N.J.S.A. 10:5-13.
22
Stores, 158 N.J. 263, 270 (1999). An aggrieved party can thus
avail himself or herself of more than one forum as a complaint
winds its way through the administrative and judicial process.
The legislatively designed scheme acknowledges and allows a
litigant to potentially utilize both forums, subject to the
outer limit of the two-year limitations period for bringing an
action in court, when the administrative procedure lags.
Second, permitting the aggrieved person to bring his or her
claim to the DCR allows the DCR to perform the function that the
LAD mandates –- to prevent and eliminate discrimination. See L.
1945, c. 169. In addition to making the aggrieved party whole,
the DCR has responsibility for curbing the behavior of the
discriminator. When a complaint is brought to the DCR, the
DCR’s role is not simply to stand in the shoes of the aggrieved
party and bring the claim on his or her behalf. The DCR “has a
completely separate law enforcement interest in prosecuting the
alleged discrimination[.]” Dixon v. Rutgers, 110 N.J. 432, 459
(1988). The DCR represents the aggrieved public, which has been
injured by the perpetuation of discrimination that our society
deems intolerable.
IV.
A.
23
This case raises for us a question of first impression.
Undoubtedly, there is a strong belief in this state, as
elsewhere, in the freedom to contract.
[Persons] of “full age and competent
understanding” have the “utmost liberty of
contracting.” Contracts so freely and
voluntarily made, in the absence of express or
implied prohibition, are sacred and are
enforced by courts of justice. And courts do
“not lightly interfere with this freedom of
contract.”
[Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 325,
335 (1985) (quoting Printing Registering Co.
v. Sampson, 19 Eq. 462, 465 (quoted in Driver
v. Smith, 89 N.J. Eq. 339, 359 (1918))).]
But the right of freedom to contract “is not such an
immutable doctrine as to admit of no qualification.” Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 388 (1960). The right
must recede to “prevent its abuse, as otherwise it could be used
to override all public interests.” Ibid. (quoting Morehead v.
New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 627, 56 S. Ct. 918, 80
L. Ed. 1347, 1364 (1936) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)).
Here we have the public interest to consider. The LAD
exists for the good of all the inhabitants of New Jersey.
N.J.S.A. 10:5-3. The LAD and its processes are imbued with a
public-interest agenda. See supra at ___ (slip op. at 15-17).
Although the question before us arises in a private action under
the LAD, this matter, like all LAD actions, concerns more than a
purely private cause of action affecting only private interests.
24
The private right of action authorized by the LAD advances and
fulfills the private and legislatively declared public interest
in the elimination of discrimination. N.J.S.A. 10:5-2, -3.
Hence a contractual limitation on an individual’s right to
pursue and eradicate discrimination of any form prohibited under
the LAD is not simply shortening a limitations period for a
private matter. If allowed to shorten the time for filing
plaintiff’s LAD action, this contractual provision would curtail
a claim designed to also further a public interest. As to the
LAD, there is a marriage of interests that cannot be divorced.
In respect of the limitations period for LAD actions, a
two-year period is the span of time within which an LAD claim
may be brought in Superior Court. Montells so holds, but there
is more to it than that. The Legislature’s more than two-
decades-long acceptance of the two-year limitations period
established by Montells for LAD claims has woven that
limitations period into the fabric of the LAD. It is part of
the statutory program and how it operates. Thus, a shortening
of that limitations period must be examined for its substantive
impact to determine whether any shortening is impliedly
prohibited by the LAD scheme.
First, it bears immediate consideration that shortening the
time permitted for bringing an LAD action in Superior Court
directly impacts and undermines the integrated nature of the
25
statutory avenues of relief and the election of remedies that
are substantively available to victims of discrimination under
the LAD.
An LAD complainant has two years to file his or her action
in Superior Court, and, during that time, the individual may
choose between the two means of relief that the LAD authorizes.
See N.J.S.A. 10:5-13. The Legislature allows an LAD litigant to
take advantage of the less costly and more efficient process
offered through the administrative remedy, but, if that process
extends too long, the aggrieved individual can opt to withdraw
his or her administrative complaint and file in Superior Court,
using that action as his or her means to pursue vindication of
the private and public interest in eradicating and remedying the
challenged discriminatory practice. Ibid. Explicitly then, the
Legislature understood and accepted that public policy requires
a more lengthy period of time to obtain LAD relief through that
permissible combination of avenues.
The Legislature’s tacit approval of the two-year
limitations period accommodates the two processes available
under the LAD. A shortening of the limitations period
applicable under law undermines and thwarts the legislative
scheme that includes the DCR remedy as a meaningful option. In
fact, the instant contractual limitations period works as an
effective divestiture of the right to pursue an administrative
26
remedy. The two forums that the LAD makes available both
protect the public interest in identifying, rectifying, and
eliminating discrimination. That public interest in rooting out
forbidden discrimination may not be lightly contracted away by
private arrangement.
Second, a statute of limitations period short of two years
effectively eliminates claims. As a practical matter, it takes
time for an individual to bring his or her claim to an attorney.
The individual may not immediately realize that he or she has
been a victim of discrimination. See, e.g., Henry v. N.J. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 335-39 (2010) (recognizing that
claimants in LAD cases may not be immediately aware of their
cognizable claims). Having arrived at an attorney’s office, an
individual may not realize that he or she signed or agreed to a
waiver of the two-year limitations period. The two-year period
established in Montells, supra, was designed purposefully to
impose uniformity and certainty. 133 N.J. at 291-92. The
contractual shortening of the limitation period will frustrate
that public policy, and lead to the dismissal of otherwise
meritorious LAD claims.
Conversely, a shortened statute of limitations might compel
an attorney to file a premature LAD action, whereas a thorough
investigation might reveal a lack of a meritorious claim. One
cannot ignore that an attorney’s investigation into the
27
purported claim may take many months after the client arrives
for a consultation. Even the LAD itself acknowledges that the
DCR investigatory process may take more than six months, and it
includes a means for a complainant to accelerate the matter
directly to the OAL after 180 days. N.J.S.A. 10:5-13. Such
necessary steps and more, which are involved in bringing a
complaint to an attorney, and investigating the matter, must be
considered in weighing the substantive effect of any contractual
shortening of the otherwise applicable two-year statute of
limitations for LAD actions.
Moreover, it cannot be overlooked that our case law has
built in powerful incentives for employers to first receive
workplace complaints, investigate them, and respond
appropriately to limit their liability. See Aguas v. State, 220
N.J. 494, 516-17 (2015). Any shortening of the current two-year
statute of limitations period imposed by law would seriously
affect an employer’s ability to protect itself. Employers are
partners in promoting the public policy of this state to deter
and eradicate forbidden discrimination.
Our law does recognize that an individual may agree by
contract to submit his or her statutory LAD claim to alternative
dispute resolution and therefore different processes. See
Garfinkel, supra, 168 N.J. at 131 (acknowledging LAD claim may
be submitted to arbitration forum). However, in permitting the
28
submission of an LAD claim to an alternative forum by operation
of contract, the contract is examined to determine whether
substantive rights have been precluded. See Martindale v.
Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 93-94 (2002) (holding same and
noting that “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral
rather than a judicial forum” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S. Ct.
3346, 3354, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444, 456 (1985))). In this instance,
plaintiff’s substantive right to utilize all available avenues
of relief, in tandem, is effectively foreclosed. As the six-
month period runs, litigants would be forced to choose between
filing with the DCR or filing in Superior Court because there
would not be enough time to choose to begin with a filing with
the DCR. Further, the shortening of the applicable statute of
limitations, if allowed here, results in cutting off the
opportunity to fulfill the public interest in eradicating
discrimination.
Review of the interplay between the LAD’s administrative
remedy and right to file in Superior Court, and the joint public
and private interests that are advanced by an LAD discrimination
claim pursued in either forum, compel the conclusion that the
contractual shortening of the LAD’s two-year limitations period
29
for a private action is contrary to the public policy expressed
in the LAD. The DCR remedy must remain accessible and vibrant.
It cannot be eviscerated, as would occur if a shortening of the
present two-year limitations period were to be contractually
permitted. And the anti-discrimination public policy to be
fulfilled through LAD claims may not be contractually curtailed
by a limitation on the time for such actions. The waiver
provision at issue in this matter is therefore unenforceable as
to the LAD.5
In concluding, we note that the decision that we reach
today is rooted in the unique importance of our LAD and the
necessity for its effective enforcement. Other courts across
the country have evaluated the enforceability of similar
shortening of statute-of-limitations provisions as applied to
their own state employment discrimination laws. At least two
states have deemed these provisions contrary to public policy
and refused to enforce them –- focusing on the public purpose
and benefit of anti-discrimination laws.
The Supreme Court of Kansas voided a provision in an
employee handbook that required all potential claims against the
employer to be brought within six months of the cause of action.
5 To the extent that plaintiff’s worker’s compensation
retaliation claim is derivative of his LAD action, the waiver is
inapplicable to that claim as well.
30
Pfeifer v. Fed. Express Corp., 304 P.3d 1226 (Kan. 2013). At
issue was the worker’s retaliation claim brought after the
contracted-for six-month period. Id. at 1229. The court held
that the provision “restricting an employee’s time to bring a
retaliatory discharge claim for a job termination suffered
following that employee’s exercise of a statutory right
necessarily impedes the enforcement of that right and the public
policy underlying it.” Id. at 1234. Similarly, a California
appellate court refused to enforce a provision in an employment
application that shortened the statute of limitations for
employment claims to six months. Ellis v. U.S. Sec. Assocs.,
169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 752, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). Although
California’s scheme has an administrative exhaustion
requirement, the court’s focus was more broad, emphasizing that
anti-discrimination laws “inure[] to the benefit of the public
at large rather than to a particular employer or employee.” Id.
at 756 (citation omitted). But see Hunt v. Raymour & Flanigan,
105 A.D.3d 1005 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (upholding six-month
statute of limitations provision contained in Raymour &
Flanigan’s job application without engaging in analysis of
contrary public policy or public benefit reaped through anti-
discrimination laws).
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Appellate
Division on the enforceability of the waiver provision as to
31
plaintiff’s LAD claim. In light of our holding, it is
unnecessary to reach the novation argument advanced by
plaintiff.
V.
This matter was argued in part on the basis of
unconscionability of the challenged waiver provision. Although
our holding has proceeded down a different analytic path, we add
that, undoubtedly, courts may refuse to enforce contracts, or
discrete contract provisions, that are unconscionable. See
Muhammad v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 189 N.J. 1, 15 (2006),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1338, 127 S. Ct. 2032, 167 L. Ed. 763(2007). The unconscionability determination requires evaluation
of both procedure and substance. Procedural unconscionability
“can include a variety of inadequacies, such as age, literacy,
lack of sophistication, hidden or unduly complex contract terms,
bargaining tactics, and the particular setting existing during
the contract formation process.” Ibid. (quoting Sitogum
Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 352 N.J. Super. 555, 564 (Ch. Div.
2002)).
Here the reduced period for bringing an LAD action, among
other employment-related claims, was contained in an employment
application. Simply because the contract term was in an
employment application does not end the inquiry for
enforceability. In Martindale, supra, 173 N.J. at 81, we upheld
32
an agreement to arbitrate contained in an employment
application. However, the employee was a human resources
officer, a more sophisticated employee than plaintiff, an
applicant for an entry-level position. To apply for the needed
job, plaintiff in this case was presented with a take-it-or-
leave-it application. There was no bargaining here. The
instant matter plainly involves a contract of adhesion and
therefore necessarily involves indicia of procedural
unconscionability. See Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J.
28, 39 (2006). Moreover, the employment application at issue in
Martindale did not restrict the rights of employees to bring
claims; it merely utilized an arbitration clause to agree in
which forum to bring them.
When a contract is one of adhesion, the inquiry requires
further analysis of unconscionability. Rudbart v. N. Jersey
Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 127 N.J. 344, 354, cert. denied sub.
nom. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Rudbart, 506 U.S. 871, 113 S.
Ct. 203, 121 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1992). Our Court has applied four
factors for evaluating unconscionability of contracts of
adhesion: “[1] the subject matter of the contract, [2] the
parties’ relative bargaining positions, [3] the degree of
economic compulsion motivating the ‘adhering’ party, and [4] the
public interests affected by the contract.” Id. at 356. Those
factors focus on procedural and substantive aspects of the
33
contract “to determine whether the contract is so oppressive, or
inconsistent with the vindication of public policy, that it
would be unconscionable to permit its enforcement.” Delta
Funding, supra, 189 N.J. at 40 (citations omitted). In this
instance, were an unconscionability analysis to be the prism
through which a shortening of the LAD’s statute of limitations
should be analyzed, Rudbart’s fourth factor, namely “the public
interests affected by the contract,” Rudbart, supra, 127 N.J. at
356, would feature in the analysis and would have led us to the
same outcome based on the anti-discrimination concerns expressed
in the LAD.
VI.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, and
SOLOMON; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE
LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA did not
participate.
34
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-27 SEPTEMBER TERM 2014
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
SERGIO RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RAYMOURS FURNITURE COMPANY,
INC., a corporation, t/a
RAYMOUR & FLANIGAN,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED June 15, 2016
Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST REVERSE
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE PATTERSON X
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA ------------------
JUSTICE SOLOMON X
JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X
TOTALS 6