In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of P.D. (083027)(Essex County & Statewide) ( 2020 )


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  •                                        SYLLABUS
    This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
    Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
    Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.
    In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of P.D. (A-94-18) (083027)
    Argued January 7, 2020 -- Decided August 11, 2020
    PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court.
    In this appeal, the Court considers whether the State must provide discovery to a
    person facing civil commitment under the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act
    (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38.
    In August 2017, the State filed a petition to civilly commit P.D., relying on P.D.’s
    conviction for an offense that qualified as a “sexually violent offense” as defined in
    N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26, and other offenses. The State submitted two clinical certificates
    from psychiatrists who opined that P.D. suffered from a mental abnormality or
    personality disorder that made him “likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not
    confined to a secure facility for control, care and treatment.” The trial court entered an
    order temporarily civilly committing P.D. to the Special Treatment Unit. P.D. waived his
    right under the SVPA to a court hearing within twenty days of the court’s temporary
    commitment order.
    Relying on Rule 4:10-1, which enumerates the discovery devices available in civil
    cases, and Rules 4:17 and 4:18, the general civil court rules governing interrogatories and
    requests for discovery and inspection of documents, P.D.’s counsel propounded
    interrogatories to the State. The State, which had provided documents to P.D. in
    accordance with its standard practice in SVPA proceedings, declined to answer the
    interrogatories or produce documents in response to P.D.’s request.
    P.D. filed a motion to compel discovery, which the trial court denied. The court
    found no support for P.D.’s contention that a person facing an SVPA commitment
    hearing may seek discovery under the general civil discovery rule, Rule 4:10-1, or other
    rules governing civil cases. The Appellate Division denied P.D.’s motion for leave to
    appeal the trial court’s decision.
    The Court granted leave to appeal. 
    238 N.J. 503
    (2019).
    HELD: A person facing a civil commitment hearing under the SVPA may not take
    discovery under Rule 4:10-1, Rule 4:17-1, or Rule 4:18-1. The discovery permitted by
    1
    those rules is not authorized by the SVPA and cannot be accomplished on the expedited
    schedule that the statute prescribes. However, based on the terms of the SVPA, a person
    subject to an SVPA civil commitment hearing is entitled to limited discovery focused on
    the elements of the State’s burden of proof. The Court therefore adopts a new court rule
    in which it enumerates the categories of documents subject to discovery in an SVPA
    proceeding and sets forth the requirements for the reports of the State’s experts.
    1. The SVPA imposes on the State the burden to prove three elements by clear and
    convincing evidence: (1) that the individual has been convicted of a sexually violent
    offense; (2) that he suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder; and (3) that
    as a result of his psychiatric abnormality or disorder, it is highly likely that the individual
    will not control his or her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend. The State’s expert
    testimony and the risk assessment instruments on which the experts rely comprise the
    core of the State’s proofs in a typical SVPA civil commitment hearing and are often the
    pivotal proofs on the question whether the individual is highly likely to offend again.
    (pp. 10-17)
    2. As N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29 and -27.30 make clear, the Legislature intended that our courts
    conduct SVPA civil commitment hearings expeditiously. The parties to an SVPA
    commitment hearing cannot proceed under Rule 4:10-1, Rule 4:17-1, and Rule 4:18-1, let
    alone use the other forms of discovery allowed under the civil rules, without delaying the
    hearing for months or even years. Accordingly, P.D. is not entitled to discovery under
    the civil discovery rules. The Court concurs with P.D. that Rule 4:74-7 does not govern
    civil commitment proceedings under the SVPA. The limited discovery available under
    Rule 4:74-7 is focused on the terms of the general civil commitment statute, not that of
    the SVPA, and the Rule was not amended after the SVPA was enacted to apply to that
    statute. (pp. 18-20)
    3. Although a person facing an SVPA civil commitment hearing may not obtain
    discovery pursuant to the civil discovery rules, the Court considers limited and
    expeditious sharing of information by the State to be essential to the person’s meaningful
    exercise of the “right to present evidence” and “right to cross-examine witnesses” in
    defense of the State’s application for civil commitment, as guaranteed by N.J.S.A. 30:4-
    27.31(c) and (d). The Court views the State’s pre-hearing discovery obligation to consist
    of the exchange of two categories of information: (1) the production of documents in its
    possession, custody or control relating to the history and treatment of the person whose
    civil commitment is at issue; and (2) the service of expert reports that fully disclose the
    basis for the expert’s opinion regarding the person’s mental abnormality or personality
    disorder and the likelihood that the person will reoffend. (pp. 20-21)
    4. The State represented that shortly after it initiates a proceeding for civil commitment
    pursuant to the SVPA, it immediately produces all documents in its possession relating to
    the person’s criminal history, incarceration, treatment, and the basis for civil
    2
    commitment. In combination with disclosures concerning the State’s experts, those
    enumerated categories of documents enable a person facing an SVPA commitment
    hearing to present evidence and counter the State’s proofs. Those documents go to the
    heart of the State’s burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. (pp. 21-22)
    5. The State’s experts’ reports should fully disclose the substance and foundation of the
    expert’s opinion in advance of the hearing, and, in combination with the expert’s CV,
    should set forth the expert’s qualifications to render the opinion. The report should
    contain a complete statement of the expert’s opinion regarding the need for civil
    commitment, and the basis for that opinion. The expert should state any diagnosis
    relevant to the opinion and explain the basis for each diagnosis. If the expert has utilized
    a risk assessment instrument that has been deemed reliable and admissible in a decision
    by this Court or the Appellate Division, the report need not generally establish the
    reliability of that risk assessment instrument. However, the expert must identify any risk
    assessment instrument used in the evaluation, address any relevant static and dynamic
    factors, and summarize any findings with respect to the likelihood that the person will
    reoffend. An individual subject to civil commitment who contends that the State’s expert
    report is deficient may challenge that report under the net opinion rule or other relevant
    grounds. (pp. 22-23)
    6. In a given case, discovery other than the discovery described above must be sought in
    a motion filed with the trial court on notice to the State, on a showing of exceptional
    circumstances. The court, in its discretion, may enter an order granting or denying the
    person’s application to take such additional discovery. (pp. 23-24)
    7. The Court exercises its rulemaking authority to promulgate a rule limited to pre-
    hearing discovery by the individual subject to civil commitment under the SVPA as
    discussed above, effective thirty days after the date of this decision. (pp. 24-26)
    The trial court’s decision is AFFIRMED, and the matter is REMANDED to
    the trial court.
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-
    VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion.
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    A-94 September Term 2018
    083027
    In the Matter of the Civil Commitment
    of P.D.
    On appeal from the Superior Court,
    Appellate Division.
    Argued                      Decided
    January 7, 2020              August 11, 2020
    Susan Remis Silver, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
    argued the cause on behalf of appellant P.D. (Joseph E.
    Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Susan Remis Silver,
    on the briefs).
    Stephen Slocum, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
    cause on behalf of respondent State of New Jersey
    (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa
    H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and
    Stephen Slocum, on the briefs).
    Karen Thompson argued the cause on behalf of amicus
    curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
    (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
    Foundation, attorneys; Karen Thompson, Alexander
    Shalom, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).
    JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
    1
    In this appeal, the Court considers whether the State must provide
    discovery to a person facing civil commitment under the New Jersey Sexually
    Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38.
    Appellant P.D., whom the State seeks to civilly commit under the SVPA,
    served interrogatories on the State and requested documents in accordance
    with Rule 4:10-1, Rule 4:17-1, and Rule 4:18-1 -- court rules that govern
    discovery in civil proceedings generally. The State, which had provided
    documents to P.D. in accordance with its standard practice in SVPA
    proceedings, declined to answer the interrogatories or produce documents in
    response to P.D.’s request. P.D. filed a motion to compel discovery. The trial
    judge denied the motion, and the Appellate Division denied P.D.’s motion for
    leave to appeal.
    We granted leave to appeal and affirm the trial judge’s determination.
    We agree with the trial judge that a person facing a civil commitment hearing
    under the SVPA may not take discovery under Rule 4:10-1, Rule 4:17-1, or
    Rule 4:18-1. The discovery permitted by those rules is not authorized by the
    SVPA and cannot be accomplished on the expedited schedule that the statute
    prescribes.
    We hold, however, that based on the terms of the SVPA, a person
    subject to an SVPA civil commitment hearing is entitled to limited discovery
    2
    focused on the elements of the State’s burden of proof. We therefore adopt a
    new court rule in which we enumerate the categories of documents subject to
    discovery in an SVPA proceeding and set forth the requirements for the reports
    of the State’s experts.
    I.
    A.
    1.
    On August 18, 2017, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28(c), the State filed a
    petition to civilly commit P.D., a forty-eight-year-old inmate at Northern State
    Prison.
    In its petition, the State relied on P.D.’s conviction for an offense that
    qualified as a “sexually violent offense” as defined in N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26:
    P.D.’s 2009 conviction for second-degree sexual assault by force or coercion
    with no serious injury, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1), in which the victim
    was the fifteen-year-old daughter of P.D.’s girlfriend. The State also relied on
    P.D.’s 2005 conviction for third-degree endangering the welfare of a child,
    contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, in which the victim was P.D.’s fourteen-year-old
    daughter; a 1993 charge of aggravated sexual assault with a weapon, contrary
    to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(4), that was dismissed as part of a plea agreement; and
    two non-sexual offenses.
    3
    Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28(c), the State submitted two clinical
    certificates, each prepared by a psychiatrist who had evaluated P.D. Both
    psychiatrists opined that P.D. suffered from a mental abnormality or
    personality disorder that made him “likely to engage in acts of sexual violence
    if not confined to a secure facility for control, care and treatment.”
    On August 28, 2017, the trial court entered an order temporarily civilly
    committing P.D. to the Special Treatment Unit (STU). The court appointed
    the Office of the Public Defender to represent P.D. and ordered that
    the Public Defender shall have the right to inspect and
    copy all records relating to [P.D.’s] criminal history,
    psychiatric history, care and treatment, and mental
    abnormality including the full clinical record from the
    agency with jurisdiction, the short-term care facility,
    special psychiatric hospital, psychiatric facility, or
    institution where the individual was confined and the
    State of New Jersey Special Treatment Unit, on notice
    to the Office of the Attorney General and the facility
    from which the records are sought . . . .
    The court scheduled a final hearing on “the issue of the continuing need
    for [P.D.’s] involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator” for
    September 18, 2017.
    2.
    Following his temporary civil commitment, P.D. “knowingly and
    voluntarily” waived his right under the SVPA to a court hearing within twenty
    4
    days of the court’s temporary commitment order and consented to a hearing
    date beyond the twenty-day period. According to P.D.’s counsel’s
    certification, P.D. and his counsel decided to submit interrogatories to prepare
    for depositions “as to [the State’s experts’] reasons for concluding that P.D.
    required commitment under the SVPA.”
    Relying on Rule 4:10-1, which enumerates the discovery devices
    available in civil cases, and Rules 4:17 and 4:18, the general civil court rules
    governing interrogatories and requests for discovery and inspection of
    documents, P.D.’s counsel propounded interrogatories to the State. The
    interrogatories sought (1) identification of the State’s fact and expert
    witnesses; (2) a summary of the facts to which any fact witness for the State
    would testify; (3) information about the State’s expert witnesses, including a
    detailed description of each expert’s qualifications, a list and copies of all the
    expert’s publications, a summary of “the substance and conclusions as to
    which” each expert was expected to testify and “the bases for each such
    conclusion and opinion,” identification of all documents relied on by each
    expert in forming the opinion, and copies of any reports or documents prepared
    by or on behalf of each such expert “for this suit”; (4) copies of “all materials
    given to employees and consultants for the State for the purpose of conducting
    forensic evaluations,” including but not limited to manuals, policies and
    5
    procedures and training materials for conducting evaluations; (5) disclosure of
    “any process of review either formal or informal that occurs after the evaluator
    has completed his or her report but before the report is released,” including
    five enumerated categories of information on such a review process; (6)
    information about each expert’s risk assessment methods, including the source
    of the method, any testing of the method, copies of all studies in which the
    method was tested, the peer-review status of any such study, the known rate of
    error for the method and how the error rate was derived, and, if the method
    involves discretion by the expert, any standards that guide or control the
    exercise of that discretion; (7) identification by initials of “all residents . . .
    who have been released from the [STU] since its inception in 1999 to the
    community,” with each resident’s date of temporary commitment, civil
    commitment and discharge, details about the discharge of each resident,
    information about each resident’s treatment at the STU, and information as to
    whether the State consented to a court order ordering discharge planning for
    that resident; (8) for each resident released from the STU since 1999,
    identification of the State’s experts who produced reports for the court
    hearings at which the individual was discharged and two preceding hearings,
    and a statement of each expert’s conclusion on risk and the individual’s phase
    of treatment at the time of each expert’s report; and (9) identification by
    6
    initials of any resident released from the STU since 1999 who was returned to
    the STU, with detailed information as to the reasons for any such resident’s
    return.
    The State advised P.D. that it did not intend to answer his
    interrogatories.
    B.
    1.
    P.D. filed a motion to compel discovery, arguing that Rule 4:10-1
    applies in civil commitment proceedings under the SVPA, and that he was
    entitled to propound interrogatories and seek other forms of discovery pursuant
    to that rule. The State opposed the motion, arguing that -- consistent with the
    expedited schedule for SVPA commitment hearings -- it has provided specific
    categories of documents, not general responses to discovery, during the twenty
    years in which the SVPA has been in effect.
    The trial court denied P.D.’s motion to compel discovery. It observed
    that when the Legislature enumerated the rights of persons subject to
    involuntary commitment under the SVPA, see N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.31, it did not
    include a right to pre-hearing discovery. The trial court noted that counsel for
    individuals subject to SVPA commitment routinely conduct effective cross-
    examination of the State’s experts without the benefit of broad discovery.
    7
    The trial court stated that Rule 4:74-7(d) strictly limits the right to
    discovery in civil commitment proceedings pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.1
    to -27.11, and that those proceedings, like civil commitment under the SVPA,
    must be conducted on an expedited basis. It found no support for P.D.’s
    contention that a person facing an SVPA commitment hearing may seek
    discovery under the general civil discovery rule, Rule 4:10-1, or other rules
    governing civil cases. Finally, the trial court addressed the particularly
    onerous burden that would be imposed if the State were compelled to respond
    to P.D.’s inquiries about SVPA commitment proceedings other than his own.
    2.
    P.D. moved for leave to appeal the trial court’s decision. The Appellate
    Division denied his motion.
    3.
    P.D. filed a motion for leave to appeal before this Court. We granted
    leave to appeal, 
    238 N.J. 503
    (2019), and granted the application of the
    American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) to participate as
    amicus curiae.
    8
    II.
    A.
    P.D. contends that persons subject to SVPA commitment proceedings
    have the same right as other civil litigants to invoke the general civil discovery
    rules. He asserts that Rule 4:74-7 applies only to general civil commitment
    hearings under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.12, not to SVPA commitment hearings, and
    that Rules 4:10-1 and -2 thus govern SVPA commitment hearings. P.D. argues
    that he is entitled to explore the bases for the State’s experts’ opinions by
    serving interrogatories and requesting documents. P.D. contends that he has a
    particularly pressing need for the discovery because he faces his initial civil
    commitment hearing, not an annual review hearing, and he must understand
    why the State seeks commitment in order to have a realistic chance of
    defeating the State’s application.
    B.
    The State counters that no right to take discovery in accordance with the
    civil discovery rules has been recognized in the thousands of initial and annual
    review commitment hearings conducted pursuant to the SVPA over more than
    two decades. At oral argument, counsel for the State explained that as soon as
    a petition for civil commitment under the SVPA is filed, the State immediately
    provides the subject of that petition and counsel all documents relating to the
    9
    person’s criminal history, the person’s incarceration, any treatment provided to
    the person, and the basis for the State’s application for the person’s civil
    commitment. The State also represents that promptly after an expert for the
    State completes the expert report, the State discloses to the person and counsel
    that report and the expert’s curriculum vitae (CV). The State argues that it
    thus expeditiously affords all persons facing civil commitment hearings the
    materials relevant to the issues to be determined in those hearings.
    C.
    Amicus curiae ACLU argues that the State’s interest in protecting the
    public from sexually violent predators does not outweigh the due process
    interests of a person facing civil commitment and contends that P.D. has a
    constitutional right to full discovery under Rule 4:10-1. It notes that although
    the Legislature did not prescribe a right to discovery when it enacted the
    SVPA, it did not prohibit discovery. The ACLU reasons that because the
    SVPA affords to persons subject to commitment the right to present evidence,
    it must afford them the right to collect evidence through discovery.
    III.
    A.
    The trial court’s decision denying the discovery sought by P.D. was
    premised on its interpretation of the SVPA. We review that legal
    10
    determination de novo. In re Civil Commitment of D.Y., 
    218 N.J. 359
    , 373
    (2014); Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    ,
    378 (1995).
    B.
    When it enacted the SVPA in 1998, the Legislature recognized that the
    existing statutory scheme for civil commitment was inadequate to address the
    commitment of sexually violent predators. 
    D.Y., 218 N.J. at 380
    (citing
    N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25(b)). It found that “[t]he nature of the mental condition
    from which a sexually violent predator may suffer may not always lend itself
    to characterization under the existing statutory standard, although civil
    commitment may nonetheless be warranted due to the danger the person may
    pose to others as a result of the mental condition.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25(b).
    The Legislature found it “necessary to modify the involuntary civil
    commitment process in recognition of the need for commitment of those
    sexually violent predators who pose a danger to others should they be returned
    to society.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25(c).
    The Legislature prescribed a streamlined process for SVPA civil
    commitment. Under the SVPA provision that the State invoked in this case,
    the Attorney General may seek the civil commitment of an inmate “scheduled
    for release upon expiration of a maximum term of incarceration by submission
    11
    to the court of two clinical certificates for a sexually violent predator, at least
    one of which is prepared by a psychiatrist.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28(c). “[T]he
    court shall immediately review” the documents submitted “in order to
    determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the person is a
    sexually violent predator.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28(f). If, as in this matter, the
    court finds “probable cause to believe that the person is a sexually violent
    predator in need of involuntary commitment,” it must set a date for a final
    hearing and temporarily commit the person at issue to a “secure facility
    designated for the custody, care and treatment of sexually violent predators
    pending the final hearing.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28(g).
    When a court enters an order of temporary commitment under N.J.S.A.
    30:4-27.28, it schedules “a court hearing with respect to the issue of
    continuing need for involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator
    within 20 days from the date of the temporary commitment order.” N.J.S.A.
    30:4-27.29(a). The SVPA requires the State to provide notice of that hearing
    to the person subject to civil commitment, “the person’s guardian if any, the
    person’s next-of-kin, the person’s attorney, the agency with jurisdiction having
    custody of the person and any other individual specified by the court.”
    N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(a). The witnesses at the hearing must include “[a]
    psychiatrist on the person’s treatment team who has conducted a personal
    12
    examination of the person” no more than five days before the hearing; that
    psychiatrist “shall testify at the hearing to the clinical basis for the need for
    involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-
    27.30(b). “Other members of the person’s treatment team and any other
    witness with relevant information . . . shall also be permitted to testify at the
    hearing.”
    Ibid. A person committed
    under the SVPA “shall be afforded an annual court
    review hearing of the need for involuntary commitment as a sexually violent
    predator.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35. The annual review hearing, like the initial
    hearing, is conducted in accordance with N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30.
    Ibid. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.31 confers
    on a person subject to involuntary
    commitment as a sexually violent predator the following rights at the court
    hearing:
    a. The right to be represented by counsel or, if
    indigent, by appointed counsel;
    b. The right to be present at the court hearing unless
    the court determines that because of the person’s
    conduct at the court hearing the proceeding cannot
    reasonably continue while the person is present;
    c. The right to present evidence;
    d. The right to cross-examine witnesses; and
    e. The right to a hearing in camera.
    [N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.31(a) to (e).]
    13
    At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person at issue is a
    “sexually violent predator” for purposes of the SVPA. The Legislature defined
    the term “sexually violent predator” to denote
    a person who has been convicted, adjudicated
    delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity for
    commission of a sexually violent offense, or has been
    charged with a sexually violent offense but found to be
    incompetent to stand trial, and suffers from a mental
    abnormality or personality disorder that makes the
    person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not
    confined in a secure facility for control, care and
    treatment.
    [N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26.]
    The Legislature defined the phrase “[l]ikely to engage in acts of sexual
    violence” to mean that “the propensity of a person to commit acts of sexual
    violence is of such a degree as to pose a threat to the health and safety of
    others.”
    Ibid. Addressing a due
    process challenge to the SVPA, we held that a person
    subject to an SVPA civil commitment proceeding may be considered to “pose
    a threat to the health and safety of others,” as that phrase appears in the SVPA,
    “if he or she were found, by clear and convincing evidence, to have serious
    difficulty in controlling his or her harmful behavior such that it is highly likely
    that the individual will not control his or her sexually violent behavior and will
    14
    reoffend.” In re Commitment of W.Z., 
    173 N.J. 109
    , 130 (2002) (emphasis
    added).
    Thus construed, the SVPA imposes on the State the burden to prove
    three elements by clear and convincing evidence:
    (1) that the individual has been convicted of a sexually
    violent offense; (2) that he suffers from a mental
    abnormality or personality disorder; and (3) that as a
    result of his psychiatric abnormality or disorder, “it is
    highly likely that the individual will not control his or
    her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend.”
    [In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 
    217 N.J. 152
    , 173
    (2014) (citations omitted) (quoting 
    W.Z., 173 N.J. at 130
    ).]
    To meet its burden under the SVPA, the State typically presents the
    testimony of experts who opine on the likelihood that the person subject to
    civil commitment will reoffend. Those experts routinely rely on actuarial
    assessment instruments, “developed to assess a sex offender’s risk of reoffense
    by comparing him or her to the risk characteristics of groups of other sex
    offenders monitored for recidivism.” 
    W.Z., 173 N.J. at 133
    . Those assessment
    instruments “mainly measure static factors,” which “are historical facts about
    the offender which do not change.” In re Commitment of R.S., 
    339 N.J. Super. 507
    , 517 (App. Div. 2001), aff’d 
    173 N.J. 134
    , 137 (2002). In contrast,
    dynamic factors are “elements which can be modified over time.” In re
    15
    Commitment of J.P., 
    339 N.J. Super. 443
    , 451 (App. Div. 2001). As the
    Appellate Division commented in a decision regarding the Attorney General’s
    sex-offender classification guidelines for tiering under Megan’s Law, N.J.S.A.
    2C:7-1 to -23, the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale (RRAS), “[u]nlike the
    immutable static factors, nature and seriousness of the offense, the dynamic
    categories relate to the characteristics of the offender and community support
    and are evidenced by current conditions as found at the time the registrant’s
    risk to re-offend is assessed.” In re H.M., 
    343 N.J. Super. 219
    , 223 (App. Div.
    2001).
    Applying the reliability standard of Frye v. United States, 
    293 F. 1013
    ,
    1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), we found certain actuarial risk assessment instruments
    “admissible in evidence in a civil commitment proceeding under the SVPA
    when such tools are used in the formation of the basis for a testifying expert’s
    opinion concerning the future dangerousness of a sex offender.” In re
    Commitment of R.S., 
    173 N.J. 134
    , 137 (2002); see also 
    W.Z., 173 N.J. at 133
    (observing that the Court’s holding in R.S. “requires that we reject W.Z.’s
    contentions concerning the unreliability of those actuarial instruments”); In re
    Civil Commitment of A.Y., 
    458 N.J. Super. 147
    , 172 (App. Div. 2019) (noting
    the admissibility of actuarial risk assessment instruments under the Court’s
    decisions in R.S. and W.Z); see also In re Registrant J.M., 
    167 N.J. 490
    , 499-
    16
    507 (2001) (rejecting challenge to weighting of static factors more heavily
    than dynamic factors in RRAS under Megan’s Law).
    The State’s expert testimony and the risk assessment instruments on
    which the experts rely comprise the core of the State’s proofs in a typical
    SVPA civil commitment hearing. See, e.g., In re Civil Commitment of J.M.B.,
    
    395 N.J. Super. 69
    , 94 (App. Div. 2007) (describing State’s SVPA proofs to
    include expert witnesses who “both testified that the documents they relied on
    were commonly used by experts in the field of sex offender risk assessment”),
    aff’d, 
    197 N.J. 563
    (2009); In re Civil Commitment of D.L., 
    351 N.J. Super. 77
    , 90 (App. Div. 2002) (noting that the State’s SVPA case “generally
    consist[s] of extensive psychological or psychiatric testimony, as well as
    evidence of actuarial risk assessments”); 
    J.P., 339 N.J. Super. at 451-55
    (discussing the State’s use of expert testimony and risk assessment tools at
    SVPA commitment hearing); In re Commitment of W.Z., 
    339 N.J. Super. 549
    ,
    559-60 (App. Div. 2001) (summarizing the State’s SVPA commitment case to
    include the “results of several actuarial risk assessment instruments” “to get as
    much information as possible” on the individual), aff’d 
    173 N.J. 109
    (2002).
    Thus, the testimony of experts and the risk assessment instruments on which
    they rely are often the pivotal proofs on the question whether the individual is
    highly likely to offend again.
    17
    C.
    Against that backdrop, we consider whether the discovery available
    under Rule 4:10-1, Rule 4:17-1, and Rule 4:18-1 is consonant with the
    procedural framework that the Legislature prescribed in N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29
    and -27.30.
    As N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29 and -27.30 make clear, the Legislature intended
    that our courts conduct SVPA civil commitment hearings expeditiously.
    Although the person facing commitment may waive N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(a)’s
    twenty-day deadline for a hearing date as P.D. did in this matter, the
    Legislature clearly did not envision that the parties in SVPA civil commitment
    cases would take months to prepare for the court hearing. Indeed, such a
    protracted schedule would interfere with the annual review procedure set forth
    in N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35.
    The civil discovery that P.D. seeks pursuant to Rule 4:10-1, Rule 4:17-1,
    and Rule 4:18-1 would extend the pre-hearing period far beyond its intended
    parameters. Absent a court order limiting discovery, Rule 4:10-1 authorizes a
    civil litigant to
    obtain discovery by one or more of the following
    methods: Depositions upon oral examination or written
    questions; written interrogatories; production of
    documents or things; permission to enter upon land or
    other property, for inspection and other purposes;
    18
    physical and mental examinations; and requests for
    admissions. Unless the court orders otherwise under R.
    4:10-3, the frequency of use of these methods is not
    limited.
    Neither of the specific discovery devices that P.D. seeks to invoke can
    be utilized within the time frame that the Legislature prescribed. Rule 4:17-4
    allows a party sixty days to answer interrogatories; the exception to that rule,
    uniform interrogatories in certain cases under Rule 4:17-1(b)(2), also allows
    for response periods far in excess of the SVPA’s twenty-day pre-hearing
    period. Requests for production of documents served pursuant to Rule 4:18-1
    must be responded to within thirty-five days of service. In civil cases,
    deadlines to respond to discovery are often extended, and a party’s inquiry
    under one form of discovery may lead to months or years of additional
    discovery. The parties to an SVPA commitment hearing cannot proceed under
    Rule 4:10-1, Rule 4:17-1, and Rule 4:18-1, let alone use the other forms of
    discovery allowed under the civil rules, without delaying the hearing for
    months or even years.
    In short, the civil rules that P.D. seeks to use, unmentioned in the SVPA,
    are incompatible with the Legislature’s intent that SVPA civil commitment
    hearings take place on an expedited schedule. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29 to -
    27.30. Accordingly, P.D. is not entitled to discovery pursuant to Rule 4:10-1,
    19
    Rule 4:17-1, Rule 4:18-1, or the other discovery devices available under the
    civil discovery rules.
    D.
    We concur with P.D. that Rule 4:74-7 does not govern civil commitment
    proceedings under the SVPA. As the Appellate Division observed, “[Rule
    4:74-7] predates the SVPA and by its terms it applies to civil commitments
    generally, incorporating the definitions in N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2.” In re
    Commitment of G.D., 
    358 N.J. Super. 310
    , 316 (App. Div. 2003). The limited
    discovery available under Rule 4:74-7 is focused on the terms of the general
    civil commitment statute, not that of the SVPA, and the Rule was not amended
    after the SVPA was enacted to apply to that statute.
    IV.
    A.
    1.
    Although a person facing an SVPA civil commitment hearing may not
    obtain discovery pursuant to the civil discovery rules, the SVPA does not
    relieve the State of any obligation to provide discovery in advance of the
    hearing. To the contrary, we consider limited and expeditious sharing of
    information by the State to be essential to the person’s meaningful exercise of
    the “right to present evidence” and “right to cross-examine witnesses” in
    20
    defense of the State’s application for civil commitment, as guaranteed by
    N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.31(c) and (d). 1
    We thus view the State’s pre-hearing discovery obligation to consist of
    the exchange of two categories of information: (1) the production of
    documents in its possession, custody or control relating to the history and
    treatment of the person whose civil commitment is at issue; and (2) the service
    of expert reports that fully disclose the basis for the expert’s opinion regarding
    the person’s mental abnormality or personality disorder and the likelihood that
    the person will reoffend. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26. We address each in turn.
    2.
    The State represented at oral argument that shortly after it initiates a
    proceeding for civil commitment pursuant to the SVPA, it immediately
    produces (1) all documents in its possession relating to the person’s criminal
    history; (2) all documents in its possession relating to the person’s
    incarceration; (3) all documents in its possession relating to the person’s
    treatment, if any; and (4) all documents in its possession regarding the basis
    1
    We base our holding on our construction of the SVPA, and do not reach the
    due process claims raised by P.D. See 
    D.Y., 218 N.J. at 379
    (“[W]e strive to
    avoid reaching constitutional questions unless required to do so.” (quoting
    Comm. to Recall Menendez v. Wells, 
    204 N.J. 79
    , 95 (2010))); Randolph
    Town Ctr., L.P. v. County of Morris, 
    186 N.J. 78
    , 80 (2006) (“Courts should
    not reach a constitutional question unless its resolution is imperative to the
    disposition of litigation.”).
    21
    for civil commitment. The State indicated that it does not withhold documents
    within those categories on relevance grounds.
    In combination with disclosures concerning the State’s experts, those
    enumerated categories of documents enable a person facing an SVPA
    commitment hearing to present evidence and counter the State’s proofs. Those
    documents go to the heart of the State’s burden of proof by clear and
    convincing evidence; they address the State’s assertion that the person has
    been convicted of a sexually violent offense, the question of a mental
    abnormality or personality disorder, and the prospect that the person will
    recidivate. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26; 
    R.F., 217 N.J. at 173
    .
    3.
    The State’s experts’ reports should fully disclose the substance and
    foundation of the expert’s opinion in advance of the hearing. The report, in
    combination with the expert’s CV, should set forth the expert’s qualifications
    to render the opinion. The report should contain a complete statement of the
    expert’s opinion regarding the need for civil commitment of the person in
    question, and the basis for that opinion. The expert should state any diagnosis
    relevant to the opinion and explain the basis for each diagnosis. The expert
    should identify any risk assessment instrument used in the evaluation of the
    person involved. If the expert has utilized a risk assessment instrument that
    22
    has been deemed reliable and admissible in a decision by this Court or the
    Appellate Division, the report need not generally establish the reliability of
    that risk assessment instrument. However, the expert must identify any risk
    assessment instrument used in the particular case, address any relevant static
    and dynamic factors, and summarize any findings with respect to the
    likelihood that the person will reoffend. See generally 
    R.S., 173 N.J. at 137
    (noting that an expert may rely on “actuarial as well as clinical information
    when formulating an opinion concerning future dangerousness”).
    An individual subject to civil commitment who contends that the State’s
    expert report is deficient may challenge that report under the net opinion rule
    or other relevant grounds. The net opinion rule “mandates that experts ‘be
    able to identify the factual bases for their conclusions, explain their
    methodology, and demonstrate that both the factual bases and the methodology
    are reliable.’” Townsend v. Pierre, 
    221 N.J. 36
    , 55 (2015) (quoting Landrigan
    v. Celotex Corp., 
    127 N.J. 404
    , 417 (1992)).
    4.
    In a given case, the person subject to civil commitment may seek
    discovery other than the discovery described above in order to exercise the
    right under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.31 to present evidence and cross-examine
    witnesses. Such additional discovery must be sought in a motion filed with the
    23
    trial court on notice to the State, on a showing of exceptional circumstances.
    The court, in its discretion, may enter an order granting or denying the
    person’s application to take such additional discovery.
    B.
    As noted, no current court rule addresses the discovery that the State
    should provide to a person facing civil commitment under the SVPA. We
    exercise our rulemaking authority to promulgate a rule limited to pre-hearing
    discovery by the individual subject to civil commitment under the SVPA.
    The following rule shall be effective for SVPA proceedings thirty days
    after the date of this decision:
    Discovery by a Person Subject to Involuntary
    Commitment Pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator
    Act
    (a)   Any rule, regulation or policy of
    confidentiality notwithstanding, a person
    subject to involuntary commitment pursuant
    to the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator
    Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38, and the
    person’s counsel, shall have the right to
    inspect and copy the following documents, no
    later than ten days before the court hearing
    with respect to the issue of continuing need for
    involuntary commitment as a sexually violent
    predator:
    1. all documents in the possession,
    custody or control of the State relating
    to the person’s criminal history;
    24
    2. all documents in the possession,
    custody or control of the State relating
    to the person’s incarceration;
    3. all documents in the possession,
    custody or control of the State relating
    to the person’s treatment, if any;
    4. all documents in the possession,
    custody or control of the State relating
    to the basis for the State’s application
    for the person’s civil commitment
    pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29
    to -27.32;
    5. if the person is subject to an annual
    review hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-
    27.35, all documents in the possession,
    custody or control of the State relating to
    the person’s treatment and conduct while
    committed to a facility designated for the
    custody, care and treatment of sexually
    violent predators;
    6. names and addresses of each person
    whom the State expects to call at the
    civil commitment court hearing as an
    expert      witness,    the      expert’s
    qualifications, and a copy of the
    expert’s report. In the expert’s report,
    the expert shall state the opinion,
    explain the basis for that opinion,
    identify any diagnosis relevant to the
    opinion and the basis for that diagnosis,
    identify any risk assessment instrument
    that the expert has used in the
    evaluation of the person, explain the
    25
    manner in which the risk assessment
    instrument was used in the particular
    case, address any relevant static and
    dynamic factors, and summarize any
    findings with respect to the likelihood
    that the person will engage in acts of
    sexual violence if not confined to a
    secure facility for control, care and
    treatment.
    (b)   If the person whom the State seeks to civilly
    commit pursuant to the SVPA seeks discovery
    in addition to the discovery set forth above,
    the person must proceed by motion on notice
    to the State, which shall be granted only on a
    showing of exceptional circumstances
    V.
    The trial court’s decision denying P.D.’s application for discovery
    pursuant to Rule 4:10-1 is affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the trial
    court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN,
    FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE
    PATTERSON’s opinion.
    26