New Jersey Transit Corporation v. Sandra Sanchez and Chad Smith (082292) (Bergen County & Statewide) ( 2020 )


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  •                                        SYLLABUS
    This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
    Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
    Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.
    New Jersey Transit Corporation v. Sandra Sanchez (A-68-18) (082292)
    Argued September 24, 2019 -- Decided May 12, 2020
    PER CURIAM
    New Jersey Transit Corporation (New Jersey Transit) sought to recover workers’
    compensation benefits paid to an employee, David Mercogliano, who sustained injuries
    in a work-related motor vehicle accident. It sued the individuals allegedly at fault in the
    accident, defendants Sandra Sanchez and Chad Smith, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, a
    provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act that authorizes employers and workers’
    compensation carriers that have paid workers’ compensation benefits to injured
    employees to assert subrogation claims. The Court considers whether that subrogation
    action was barred by the Auto Insurance Cost Recovery Act (AICRA).
    Mercogliano was acting in the course of his employment when the New Jersey
    Transit vehicle he was driving was struck from the rear by a vehicle driven by defendant
    Sanchez and owned by defendant Smith. At the time of his accident, Mercogliano was
    insured under a standard automobile policy, under which he was entitled to personal
    injury protection (PIP) and other benefits. New Jersey Transit’s workers’ compensation
    carrier paid Mercogliano workers’ compensation benefits. Mercogliano neither sought
    nor received PIP benefits under his automobile insurance policy in connection with his
    accident.
    New Jersey Transit filed a complaint seeking to “recoup workers’ compensation
    benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f).” Defendants pled as an affirmative defense
    that New Jersey’s no-fault insurance statutory scheme barred New Jersey Transit’s
    subrogation claim and moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendants’
    motion, ruling that New Jersey Transit could not assert a claim based on economic loss.
    It noted that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k) defines economic loss for purposes of AICRA to mean
    “uncompensated loss of income or property, or other uncompensated expenses, including,
    but not limited to, medical expenses.” In the trial court’s view, because New Jersey
    Transit’s workers’ compensation carrier paid benefits for all of Mercogliano’s medical
    expenses and lost income, he had no “uncompensated loss of income or property,” and
    thus sustained no economic loss for purposes of AICRA. The trial court relied on
    Continental Insurance Co. v. McClelland, 
    288 N.J. Super. 185
    (App. Div. 1996), and
    policy considerations in reaching its decision.
    1
    The Appellate Division reversed that judgment. 
    457 N.J. Super. 98
    , 113 (App.
    Div. 2018). The Appellate Division agreed with New Jersey Transit that its subrogation
    action arose entirely from “economic loss comprised of medical expenses and wage loss,
    not noneconomic loss.”
    Id. at 112.
    However, it rejected the trial court’s view that an
    employer’s or workers’ compensation carrier’s subrogation claim based on benefits paid
    for economic loss contravenes AICRA’s legislative intent.
    Id. at 107-12.
    The Appellate
    Division noted that in the Workers’ Compensation Act, the Legislature imposed on an
    employer the obligation to pay workers’ compensation benefits for an accident arising
    from an injured workers’ employment, and that N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 “gives the workers’
    compensation carrier an absolute right to seek reimbursement from the tortfeasor for the
    benefits it has paid to the injured employee.”
    Id. at 107.
    The Appellate Division acknowledged that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6’s collateral source
    rule places the primary burden on the employer’s workers’ compensation carrier to
    compensate an employee injured in the course of employment, in the event that only
    workers’ compensation benefits and PIP benefits are available sources of reimbursement.
    Id. at 110-11.
    It noted, however, that “where both workers’ compensation benefits and
    the proceeds of a tort action have been recovered, the tort recovery is primary” under
    N.J.S.A. 34:15-40.
    Id. at 111
    . 
    The Appellate Division therefore concluded that the
    collateral source rule posed no obstacle to New Jersey Transit’s claim.
    Id. at 111
    , 
    113.
    The Appellate Division viewed Continental to have been rejected by subsequent
    Appellate Division jurisprudence, and declined to follow it.
    Id. at 109-10.
    The court
    instead invoked Lambert v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America, 
    447 N.J. Super. 61
    , 67,
    75 (App. Div. 2016), which identified the Workers’ Compensation Act -- not AICRA --
    as the governing law for subrogation claims based on workers’ compensation benefits
    paid to workers injured in motor vehicle accidents in the course of their employment.
    Id. at 111
    -12. 
    The Appellate Division therefore reversed and remanded the matter for the
    entry of partial summary judgment in favor of New Jersey Transit.
    Id. at 113.
    The Court granted defendants’ petition for certification. 
    237 N.J. 317
    (2019).
    HELD: The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
    JUSTICE PATTERSON, CONCURRING, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER
    and JUSTICES FERNANDEZ-VINA, notes that the Workers’ Compensation Act
    provides employers or carriers with a mechanism through which to recover benefits paid
    when the injuries that necessitated those benefits were caused by a third party, N.J.S.A.
    34:15-40, which limits the employer’s or carrier’s right of recovery to the same “action
    that the injured employee . . . would have had against the third person,” in accordance
    with traditional principles of subrogation. Justice Patterson next traces the history of
    AICRA and observes that, under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, when an employee injured in a work-
    related accident is entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, that statute
    2
    -- not AICRA -- provides his or her primary source of recovery for medical expenses and
    lost wages. Justice Patterson stresses that, when it enacted AICRA, the Legislature did
    not amend the Workers’ Compensation Act to eliminate or circumscribe the statutory
    right of subrogation in cases involving injuries to employees in motor vehicle accidents.
    Justice Patterson reviews relevant case law and notes that Continental was not followed
    in later Appellate Division decisions. Noting that the trial court will have the discretion
    upon remand to expand the record and resolve any factual dispute about whether all
    payments were economic loss, Justice Patterson confines analysis to workers’
    compensation subrogation based on payments made for economic loss. Justice Patterson
    explains that, to the trial court, the act that gave rise to New Jersey Transit’s subrogation
    claim -- its payment of benefits to Mercogliano under N.J.S.A. 34:15-15 and N.J.S.A.
    34:15-12(a), (c) -- simultaneously defeated that claim, because it left Mercogliano with
    no “uncompensated” loss. Justice Patterson discerns no evidence that the Legislature
    intended to bar a workers’ compensation subrogation claim by virtue of the very benefits
    that created that claim in the first place and instead concludes, like the Appellate
    Division, that Mercogliano suffered an economic loss in the form of medical expenses
    and lost wages, and that New Jersey Transit paid him benefits for that economic loss.
    Finally, Justice Patterson explains why Lambert and two other Appellate Division cases
    are more persuasive than Continental as applied to this case.
    JUSTICE ALBIN, DISSENTING, joined by JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and
    SOLOMON, expresses the view that, when a driver is involved in a work-related
    automobile accident and his economic costs are recoverable under either his private
    automobile insurance carrier’s personal injury protection (PIP) policy or under his
    employer’s workers’ compensation scheme, New Jersey’s no-fault automobile insurance
    system makes the workers’ compensation carrier primarily responsible for reimbursing
    those costs. When an injured driver’s economic losses are “collectible” under his PIP
    policy but paid by his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier, Justice Albin explains,
    the no-fault system prohibits a workers’ compensation subrogation action against the
    tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurance carrier. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6,
    -12. In Justice Albin’s view, allowing the workers’ compensation carrier here to sue the
    tortfeasors or their automobile insurance carrier in a subrogation action permits the very
    outcome the Legislature intended to foreclose through adoption of no-fault insurance --
    more litigation and greater financial burdens on the automobile insurance system.
    The members of the Court being equally divided, the judgment of the Appellate
    Division is AFFIRMED.
    JUSTICE PATTERSON filed a concurrence, in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and
    JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA join. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which
    JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and SOLOMON join. JUSTICE TIMPONE did not
    participate.
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    A-68 September Term 2018
    082292
    New Jersey Transit Corporation,
    a/s/o David Mercogliano,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    Sandra Sanchez and Chad Smith,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    On certification to the Superior Court,
    Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
    
    457 N.J. Super. 98
    (App. Div. 2018).
    Argued                       Decided
    September 24, 2019              May 12, 2020
    John V. Mallon argued the cause for appellants (Chasan
    Lamparello Mallon & Cappuzzo, attorneys; John V.
    Mallon, of counsel and on the briefs, and Ryan J.
    Gaffney, on the briefs).
    Shawn C. Huber argued the cause for respondent (Brown
    & Connery, attorneys; Shawn C. Huber, on the brief).
    Richard J. Albuquerque argued the cause for amicus
    curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (D’Arcy
    Johnson Day, attorneys; Richard J. Albuquerque and
    Dominic R. DePamphilis, on the brief).
    1
    PER CURIAM
    The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed by an equally
    divided Court.
    JUSTICE PATTERSON, concurring.
    This appeal arises from an action brought by plaintiff New Jersey
    Transit Corporation (New Jersey Transit) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, a
    provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act that authorizes employers and
    workers’ compensation carriers that have paid workers’ compensation benefits
    to injured employees to assert subrogation claims. New Jersey Transit sought
    to recover workers’ compensation benefits paid to an employee, David
    Mercogliano, who sustained injuries in a work-related motor vehicle accident.
    It sued the individuals allegedly at fault in the accident, defendants Sandra
    Sanchez and Chad Smith.
    Defendants argued that New Jersey Transit’s subrogation action was
    barred by the Auto Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-
    1.1 to -35. Defendants asserted that because Mercogliano had elected the
    limitation-on-lawsuit option permitted by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), and sustained
    no permanent injury, AICRA barred New Jersey Transit’s claim.
    2
    The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and
    denied New Jersey Transit’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment. It
    barred New Jersey Transit’s subrogation action on the grounds that
    Mercogliano sustained no economic loss as defined in AICRA and that New
    Jersey Transit’s subrogation claim would subvert AICRA’s goals.
    The Appellate Division agreed with New Jersey Transit that the workers’
    compensation benefits paid to Mercogliano related only to economic loss. N.J.
    Transit Corp. v. Sanchez, 
    457 N.J. Super. 98
    , 112 (App. Div. 2018). It
    concluded that New Jersey Transit’s subrogation action did not implicate the
    limitation-on-lawsuit threshold imposed by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a).
    Ibid. The Appellate Division
    held that because Mercogliano’s economic loss was
    covered by his workers’ compensation benefits -- not by personal injury
    protection (PIP) benefits under his automobile insurance policy -- New Jersey
    Transit’s subrogation action did not run afoul of AICRA.
    Id. at 113.
    It
    reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
    Ibid. We concur with
    the Appellate Division’s determination. We view New
    Jersey Transit’s subrogation action to comport with the objectives and terms of
    the Workers’ Compensation Act. We find no evidence that when the
    Legislature enacted AICRA, it intended to bar employers and insurers that
    3
    have paid workers’ compensation benefits for economic loss from seeking
    reimbursement from third-party tortfeasors in cases such as this, in which the
    employee’s losses were covered by workers’ compensation benefits and he
    neither sought nor received PIP benefits. We do not view New Jersey
    Transit’s subrogation action -- limited to workers’ compensation benefits paid
    for economic losses -- to contravene AICRA’s provisions or to undermine its
    goals.
    I.
    A.
    The accident that gave rise to this action occurred on December 2, 2014
    in Cliffside Park. Mercogliano, acting in the course of his employment, was
    driving a vehicle owned by New Jersey Transit when his car was struck from
    the rear by a vehicle driven by defendant Sanchez and owned by defendant
    Smith. Mercogliano sustained injury to his “right upper extremity.” His
    treating physician later diagnosed him with “cervical strain and strain of the
    right trapezius.” Mercogliano was treated for his injuries and was medically
    cleared to return to work without restriction approximately two months after
    the accident.
    At the time of his accident, Mercogliano was insured under a standard
    automobile policy issued by New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company.
    4
    Under that policy, Mercogliano was entitled to up to $250,000 in PIP benefits
    and $400 weekly income continuation benefits. Because he had elected the
    limitation-on-lawsuit option under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), Mercogliano was
    subject to that provision’s threshold. It is undisputed that Mercogliano
    sustained no injury that would vault the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold.
    New Jersey Transit’s workers’ compensation carrier paid Mercogliano
    $33,625.70 in workers’ compensation benefits, consisting of $6694.04 in
    medical benefits, $3982.40 in temporary indemnity benefits, and $22,949.26 in
    “permanent indemnity benefits” characterized by New Jersey Transit as
    relating to “lost wages.” The record does not identify the specific losses for
    which those benefits were paid.
    With his losses covered by workers’ compensation benefits, Mercogliano
    neither sought nor received PIP benefits under his personal automobile
    insurance policy in connection with his accident.
    B.
    1.
    In its capacity as Mercogliano’s employer and subrogee, New Jersey
    Transit filed a complaint seeking to “recoup workers’ compensation benefits
    pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f).” New Jersey Transit alleged that
    Mercogliano’s injuries resulted from the negligence of Sanchez in the
    5
    accident. It also asserted a vicarious liability claim against Smith as Sanchez’s
    employer and the owner of the vehicle Sanchez was driving when the accident
    occurred. Defendants pled as an affirmative defense that New Jersey’s no-
    fault insurance statutory scheme barred New Jersey Transit’s subrogation
    claim.
    Pursuant to Rule 4:46-2, defendants moved for summary judgment
    dismissing New Jersey Transit’s complaint. They claimed that New Jersey
    Transit could not assert a subrogation claim because AICRA prevented
    Mercogliano from pursuing a third-party action against defendants, given his
    election of the limitation-on-lawsuit option in his personal insurance policy.
    New Jersey Transit cross-moved for partial summary judgment. It
    sought a declaration that defendants’ affirmative defense based on the
    limitation-on-lawsuit threshold would not bar the subrogation claim. New
    Jersey Transit conceded that it could bring no subrogation claim based on
    noneconomic losses in light of Mercogliano’s inability to vault N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-8(a)’s limitation-on-lawsuit threshold. It argued, however, that because
    its subrogation claim was based entirely on workers’ compensation benefits
    paid for economic losses, and Mercogliano received no PIP benefits, the
    Workers’ Compensation Act -- not AICRA -- governed the action.
    6
    The trial court ruled that New Jersey Transit could not assert a claim
    based on economic loss. It noted that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k) defines economic
    loss for purposes of AICRA to mean “uncompensated loss of income or
    property, or other uncompensated expenses, including, but not limited to,
    medical expenses.” In the trial court’s view, Mercogliano could not have sued
    defendants for economic loss. The court concluded that because New Jersey
    Transit’s workers’ compensation carrier paid benefits for all of Mercogliano’s
    medical expenses and lost income, he had no “uncompensated loss of income
    or property,” and thus sustained no economic loss for purposes of AICRA.
    Relying on Continental Insurance Co. v. McClelland, 
    288 N.J. Super. 185
    (App. Div. 1996), the trial court ruled that New Jersey Transit was barred from
    asserting a claim against defendants for the benefits that it had paid.
    The trial court expressed concern about a scenario distinct from the case
    before it, in which an automobile insurer pays PIP benefits to an injured
    worker, the employer or workers’ compensation carrier reimburses the
    automobile insurer, and the employer or workers’ compensation carrier then
    pursues a subrogation claim under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40. In the trial court’s view,
    such a result would undermine the legislative policies expressed in AICRA.
    The trial court also cautioned that if New Jersey Transit prevailed, employers
    and workers’ compensation carriers might seek to recover in subrogation
    7
    actions against defendants shielded from direct claims by statutes such as the
    Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:8-1 to 12-3, or the Charitable Immunity Act,
    N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11.
    Accordingly, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary
    judgment and denied New Jersey Transit’s cross-motion for partial summary
    judgment.
    2.
    New Jersey Transit appealed the trial court’s judgment. In a thoughtful
    opinion by Judge Geiger, the Appellate Division reversed that judgment.
    
    Sanchez, 457 N.J. Super. at 113
    .
    The Appellate Division agreed with New Jersey Transit that its
    subrogation action arose entirely from “economic loss comprised of medical
    expenses and wage loss, not noneconomic loss.”
    Id. at 112.
    However, it
    rejected the trial court’s view that an employer or workers’ compensation
    carrier’s subrogation claim based on benefits paid for economic loss
    contravenes AICRA’s legislative intent.
    Id. at 107-12.
    The Appellate
    Division noted that in the Workers’ Compensation Act, the Legislature
    imposed on an employer the obligation to pay workers’ compensation benefits
    for an accident arising from an injured workers’ employment, and that
    N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 “gives the workers’ compensation carrier an absolute right
    8
    to seek reimbursement from the tortfeasor for the benefits it has paid to the
    injured employee.”
    Id. at 107.
    The Appellate Division acknowledged that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6’s collateral
    source rule places the primary burden on the employer’s workers’
    compensation carrier to compensate an employee injured in the course of
    employment, in the event that only workers’ compensation benefits and PIP
    benefits are available sources of reimbursement.
    Id. at 110-11.
    It noted,
    however, that “where both workers’ compensation benefits and the proceeds of
    a tort action have been recovered, the tort recovery is primary” under N.J.S.A.
    34:15-40.
    Id. at 111
    (quoting Lefkin v. Venturini, 
    229 N.J. Super. 1
    , 8-9 (App.
    Div. 1988)). The Appellate Division therefore concluded that the collateral
    source rule posed no obstacle to New Jersey Transit’s claim.
    Id. at 111
    , 
    113.
    The Appellate Division viewed the decision in Continental, on which the
    trial court relied, to have been rejected by subsequent Appellate Division
    jurisprudence, and declined to follow it.
    Id. at 109-10.
    The court instead
    invoked Lambert v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America, in which the
    Appellate Division had identified the Workers’ Compensation Act -- not
    AICRA -- as the governing law for subrogation claims based on workers’
    compensation benefits paid to workers injured in motor vehicle accidents in
    9
    the course of their employment.
    Id. at 111
    -12 (citing Lambert, 
    447 N.J. Super. 61
    , 67, 75 (App. Div. 2016)).
    The Appellate Division therefore reversed and remanded the matter for
    the entry of partial summary judgment in favor of New Jersey Transit.
    Id. at 113.
    3.
    We granted defendants’ petition for certification. 
    237 N.J. 317
    (2019).
    We also granted the motion of the New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ)
    to appear as amicus curiae.
    II.
    A.
    Defendants assert that as a procedural matter, the Appellate Division
    should not have considered New Jersey Transit’s cross-motion for partial
    summary judgment, which was not the focus of the parties’ briefing before the
    court. Defendants also suggest that one of the three categories of workers’
    compensation benefits awarded to Mercogliano -- the partial permanent
    disability benefits that he received -- included compensation for pain and
    suffering and thus, at least in part, constituted benefits paid for noneconomic
    loss. As to economic loss, defendants argue that the Legislature intended the
    limitation-on-lawsuit threshold imposed by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) to provide a
    10
    third-party tortfeasor with a defense against a workers’ compensation carrier’s
    subrogation action. Defendants contend that the Appellate Division’s decision
    raises the specter of an increase in the volume of claims and undermines the
    Legislature’s cost-saving goals.
    B.
    New Jersey Transit represents that its subrogation claim is entirely
    premised on economic loss because the benefits paid to Mercogliano
    compensated him for medical expenses and lost wages. New Jersey Transit
    contends that the Appellate Division’s decision furthers the Legislature’s
    intent, in the Workers’ Compensation Act, to promote subrogation. It states
    that its subrogation claim does not interfere with the cost-saving legislative
    goals of AICRA, given that its action and any comparable cases will involve
    uncomplicated claims for liquidated damages that can be resolved quickly and
    efficiently.
    C.
    Amicus curiae NJAJ states that the subrogation claim asserted by an
    employer or its workers’ compensation carrier against a third-party tortfeasor
    is a rare category of claim. It primarily addresses a question that was not
    raised by any party and is not relevant to this appeal: whether an individual
    plaintiff should be allowed to pursue a direct claim for medical expenses and
    11
    lost wages against a tortfeasor, despite that plaintiff’s inability to meet the
    limitation-on-lawsuit threshold under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). NJAJ urges the
    Court to authorize individual plaintiffs to bring such claims.
    III.
    A.
    We review de novo the trial court’s summary judgment determinations
    and apply the same standard that court used in deciding the motions. Woytas
    v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 
    237 N.J. 501
    , 511 (2019).
    Familiar principles of statutory interpretation guide our review. We
    strive to “divine and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” Perez v. Zagami,
    LLC, 
    218 N.J. 202
    , 209 (2014) (quoting State v. Buckley, 
    216 N.J. 249
    , 263
    (2013)); accord DiProspero v. Penn, 
    183 N.J. 477
    , 492 (2005). To that end, we
    look to the statute’s plain language as “the best indicator” of the Legislature’s
    intent, giving its words “their ordinary meaning and significance.” In re
    Registrant H.D., ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op. at 7) (first quoting State v.
    Frye, 
    217 N.J. 566
    , 575 (2014); then quoting State v. Fuqua, 
    234 N.J. 583
    , 591
    (2018)). When statutory construction involves the interplay of multiple
    statutes, we seek to harmonize them to further the Legislature’s intent. Jones
    v. Morey’s Pier, Inc., 
    230 N.J. 142
    , 164 (2017). We also assume that the
    12
    Legislature is “aware of judicial construction of its enactments.” Maeker v.
    Ross, 
    219 N.J. 565
    , 575 (2014) (quoting 
    DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 494
    ).
    To apply those principles to the issue at hand, we review key provisions ,
    first of the Workers’ Compensation Act, upon which New Jersey Transit’s
    subrogation claim is premised, and, second, of AICRA, which defendants
    contend provides a defense to that claim. We then consider case law in which
    those two statutory schemes have been harmonized.
    B.
    “For more than a century, the Workers’ Compensation Act has provided
    employees injured in the workplace ‘medical treatment and limited
    compensation “without regard to the negligence of the employer.”’” Vitale v.
    Schering-Plough Corp., 
    231 N.J. 234
    , 250 (2017) (quoting Estate of Kotsovska
    ex rel. Kotsovska v. Liebman, 
    221 N.J. 568
    , 584 (2015)). The Act “reflects ‘a
    historic trade-off whereby employees relinquish[] their right to pursue
    common-law remedies in exchange for automatic entitlement to certain, but
    reduced, benefits whenever they suffer[] injuries by accident arising out of and
    in the course of employment.’” Caraballo v. City of Jersey City Police Dep’t,
    
    237 N.J. 255
    , 264 (2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Stancil v. ACE
    USA, 
    211 N.J. 276
    , 285 (2012)).
    13
    “The remedial objective of the Workers’ Compensation Act is ‘to make
    benefits readily and broadly available to injured workers through a non -
    complicated process.’” 
    Vitale, 231 N.J. at 250
    (quoting Tlumac v. High
    Bridge Stone, 
    187 N.J. 567
    , 573 (2006)). The Act is liberally construed “in
    order that its beneficent purposes may be accomplished.” 
    Kotsovska, 221 N.J. at 584
    (quoting Cruz v. Cent. Jersey Landscaping, Inc., 
    195 N.J. 33
    , 42
    (2008)).
    The Workers’ Compensation Act identifies distinct categories of benefits
    available to qualified employees injured in the course of their employment;
    benefits in three such categories were paid to Mercogliano and are therefore
    relevant to this appeal.
    First, subject to limitations set forth in the statute, an employer or
    workers’ compensation carrier may “furnish to the injured worker such
    medical, surgical and other treatment, and hospital service as shall be
    necessary to cure and relieve the worker of the effects of the injury and to
    restore the functions of the injured member or organ where such restoration is
    possible.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-15.
    Second, an employer or workers’ compensation carrier may pay
    temporary disability payments, calculated as a percentage of the employee’s
    14
    weekly wage and “paid during the period of [the employee’s] disability, not
    however, beyond 400 weeks.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(a).
    Third, an employer or workers’ compensation carrier may pay partial
    permanent benefits, “[f]or disability partial in character and permanent in
    quality,” based on a percentage of the employee’s weekly wage, with the
    period of payment determined by the nature of the disability. N.J.S.A. 34:15-
    12(c).1 Partial permanent disability is defined as a “permanent impairment . . .
    based upon demonstrable objective medical evidence, which restricts the
    function of the body or of its members or organs.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-36. Minor
    injuries and diseases, such as sprains, scars, lacerations, and contusions “which
    do not constitute significant permanent disfigurement” do not qualify as partial
    permanent disability.
    Ibid. The Workers’ Compensation
    Act thus details categories of claims for
    which employees may seek recovery from their employers or their employers’
    workers’ compensation carriers; it simultaneously provides those employers or
    carriers with a mechanism through which to recover benefits paid when the
    injuries that necessitated those benefits were caused by a third party.
    1
    No benefits in a fourth category, benefits “[f]or disability total in character
    and permanent in quality” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(b), were paid to
    Mercogliano, and that provision is irrelevant here.
    15
    When it enacted N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, the Legislature “sought . . . to
    regulate ‘the rights and responsibilities of the several parties concerned in
    compensation payments where, in the course of his employment, injury or
    death comes to a workman as the result of the fault of a third party.’” 
    Vitale, 231 N.J. at 251
    (quoting U.S. Cas. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 
    4 N.J. 157
    ,
    165 (1950)). A core component of the Legislature’s statutory scheme
    balancing the parties’ competing interests is the right of subrogation,
    recognized as “a device of equity to compel the ultimate discharge of an
    obligation by the one who in good conscience ought to pay it.” Standard
    Accident Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 
    15 N.J. 162
    , 171 (1954). “The underpinning
    of subrogation is its derivative nature. The insurer obtains only the right of the
    insured against the tortfeasor subject to defenses of the wrongdoer against the
    insured.” Aetna Ins. Co. v. Gilchrist Bros., Inc., 
    85 N.J. 550
    , 560-61 (1981).
    The employer’s subrogation right is set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:15-40,
    which authorizes employers and workers’ compensation carriers to seek
    reimbursement from third-party tortfeasors or their insurance carriers in one of
    two ways. First, if the employee recovers directly against the tortfeasor or the
    tortfeasor’s carrier, the employer or its workers’ compensation carrier may
    assert a lien against the employee’s recovery, N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(b); “for every
    dollar of the employee’s recovery from the third party, the carrier’s lien under
    16
    [N.J.S.A. 34:15-40] entitles it to reimbursement of one dollar (less legal cost)
    of workers’ compensation benefits.” Frazier v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 
    142 N.J. 590
    , 597-98 (1995).
    Second, the employer or its carrier may seek to recover directly from the
    third party tortfeasor or that party’s insurance carrier. If, as in this case, the
    employee does not settle with the third-party tortfeasor and declines to pursue
    a claim against that tortfeasor “within 1 year of the accident,” the employer or
    workers’ compensation carrier, after serving “a written demand on the injured
    employee or his dependents,” may pursue a claim against the third party: The
    employer or its worker’s compensation carrier
    can either effect a settlement with the third person or
    his insurance carrier or institute proceedings against the
    third person for the recovery of damages for the injuries
    and loss sustained by such injured employee or his
    dependents and any settlement made with the third
    person or his insurance carrier or proceedings had and
    taken by such employer or his insurance carrier against
    such third person, and such right of action shall be only
    for such right of action that the injured employee or his
    dependents would have had against the third person,
    and shall constitute a bar to any further claim or action
    by the injured employee or his dependents against the
    third person.
    [N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f).]
    17
    The statute thus limits the employer’s or carrier’s right of recovery to the
    same “action that the injured employee . . . would have had against the third
    person,” in accordance with traditional principles of subrogation.
    Ibid. It simultaneously provides
    that if, by settlement or judgment, the employer or
    workers’ compensation carrier recovers from the third-party tortfeasor or his or
    her insurance carrier an amount “in excess of the employer’s obligation to the
    employee or his dependents and the expense of suit, such excess shall be paid
    to the employee or his dependents.”
    Ibid. N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 operates
    “[t]o
    overcome the inequity of double recovery,” which could occur if an injured
    employee were permitted to keep both workers’ compensation benefits and
    damages from a third-party tortfeasor. 
    Frazier, 142 N.J. at 596-97
    . By
    authorizing actions against third-party tortfeasors, N.J.S.A. 34:15-40
    “promot[es] the equitable balancing of competing interests that the statutory
    scheme is designed to achieve.” 
    Vitale, 231 N.J. at 252
    . Because it provides
    the employer or workers’ compensation carrier a right to reimbursement,
    N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f) serves the legislative goal “to make benefits readily and
    broadly available to injured workers through a non-complicated process.”
    
    Tlumac, 187 N.J. at 573
    .
    18
    C.
    We next consider the Legislature’s intent when it created New Jersey’s
    no-fault insurance scheme in AICRA’s predecessor statute, the No-Fault Law,
    and when it reformed that scheme by enacting AICRA.
    The No-Fault Law was enacted in 1972. L. 1972, c. 70. It “required
    insurance companies to provide insureds unlimited medical expense benefits
    without regard to fault” while “limit[ing] the right to sue for pain and suffering
    [and] requiring parties to have over $200 in medical expenses before they
    would have standing for a negligence suit.” Haines v. Taft, 
    237 N.J. 271
    , 284
    (2019) (citing N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 (1973); N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8 (1973)), superseded
    by statute, L. 2019, cc. 244, 245.
    The statute’s mandated PIP benefits and related provisions were
    intended to ensure “‘prompt compensation for all [of a driver’s] economic
    losses’ and to ‘ease the burden placed upon [New Jersey] courts by the present
    system.’”
    Id. at 284
    (alterations in original) (quoting Governor’s Signing
    Statement to A. 667 (June 20, 1972)). As described by leading commentators
    on New Jersey automobile insurance law, “the PIP law mandates speedy first -
    party payment of a range of benefits, including medical expenses, lost wages,
    essential services, survivor benefits and funeral expenses to certain classes of
    19
    persons injured in automobile accidents without any consideration of fault at
    all.” Craig & Pomeroy, N.J. Auto Ins. Law § 4:1 (2020).
    From its inception, the No-Fault Law made clear that the burden to
    provide benefits to employees injured in work-related automobile accidents
    remained on the workers’ compensation system. L. 1972, c. 70, § 6. The
    original No-Fault Law’s collateral source rule stated that PIP benefits under
    “section 4” of the statute would be “payable as loss accrues upon written
    notice of such loss and without regard to collateral sources.”
    Ibid. However, that provision
    identified workers’ compensation benefits for employees injured
    in accidents in the course of their employment as an exception to that rule,
    providing that “benefits, collectible under workmen’s compensation insurance
    . . . shall be deducted from” the employee’s PIP benefits.
    Ibid. The Legislature’s intent
    to allocate the burden for such benefits to
    employers and their workers’ compensation carriers was underscored by a
    1983 amendment to the statute’s collateral source provision. L. 1983, c. 362,
    § 9. That provision authorized a PIP insurer to assert a claim for
    reimbursement of PIP benefits paid to an injured employee who was entitled to
    seek workers’ compensation benefits but failed to do so.
    Ibid. In 1998, the
    Legislature enacted AICRA, L. 1998, c. 21, § 1, describing
    it as “comprehensive legislation designed to preserve the no-fault system,
    20
    while at the same time reducing unnecessary costs which drive [automobile
    insurance] premiums higher,” N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1(b). AICRA “adhered to the
    recognized ‘philosophical basis of the no-fault system . . . a trade-off of . . .
    providing medical benefits in return for a limitation on the right to sue for non -
    serious injuries.’” 
    Haines, 237 N.J. at 287
    (ellipses in original) (quoting
    N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1(b) (1998)).
    New Jersey’s automobile liability insurance laws require that owners of
    motor vehicles registered or principally garaged in New Jersey maintain
    “minimum amounts of standard, basic, or special liability insurance coverage
    for bodily injury, death, and property damage caused by their vehicles.”
    Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 
    178 N.J. 460
    , 466 (2004) (citing N.J.S.A.
    39:6B-1). Every policy must “contain [PIP] benefits for the payment of
    benefits without regard to negligence, liability or fault of any kind” for the
    named insured and members of his or her family residing in his or her
    household who sustain bodily injury in an accident. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.
    If a named insured elects the limitation-on-lawsuit option, certain third-
    party tortfeasors are exempted “from tort liability for noneconomic loss”
    unless the insured “sustained a bodily injury which results in death;
    dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced
    fractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of
    21
    medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.” N.J.S.A. 39:6A -
    8(a). To recover for noneconomic loss, an insured must therefore “vault” the
    limitation-on-lawsuit threshold by “establish[ing] that ‘as a result of bodily
    injury, arising out of the . . . operation . . . or use of’ an automobile, she has
    ‘sustained a bodily injury which results in’ one of the enumerated categories of
    serious injury, including ‘a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of
    medical probability.’” Davidson v. Slater, 
    189 N.J. 166
    , 186 (2007) (quoting
    N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)); 
    DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 488
    ; 
    Caviglia, 178 N.J. at 470
    n.4.
    As used in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), the term “noneconomic loss” is defined
    as “pain, suffering and inconvenience.” N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(i). Economic loss,
    in contrast, is defined as “uncompensated loss of income or property, or other
    uncompensated expenses, including, but not limited to, medical expenses .”
    N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k).
    In AICRA, the Legislature retained the No-Fault Act’s provision
    precluding the admission of evidence of PIP benefits “collectible or paid”
    under an insured’s automobile insurance policy:
    Except as may be required in an action brought
    pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1], evidence of the
    amounts collectible or paid under a standard
    automobile insurance policy pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-4 and -10], amounts collectible or paid for
    22
    medical expense benefits under a basic automobile
    insurance policy pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1], and
    amounts collectible or paid for benefits under a special
    automobile insurance policy pursuant to [N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-3.3] to an injured person, including the amounts
    of any deductibles, copayments or exclusions,
    including exclusions pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.3],
    otherwise compensated is inadmissible in a civil action
    for recovery of damages for bodily injury by such
    injured person.
    [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12.]
    That section was intended to ensure that an “injured person who was the
    beneficiary of the PIP payments could not and should not recover from the
    tortfeasor the medical, hospital and other losses for which he had already been
    reimbursed.” Cirelli v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 
    72 N.J. 380
    , 387 (1977). The
    Legislature intended the provision to further ancillary goals of “easing court
    congestion and lowering automobile insurance costs.” Bardis v. First Trenton
    Ins. Co., 
    199 N.J. 265
    , 279 (2009).
    AICRA’s collateral source rule retains, among other exceptions, the No-
    Fault Act’s exception for workers’ compensation benefits. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6
    provides in part:
    The benefits provided in [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and -10],
    the medical expense benefits provided in [N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-3.1] and the benefits provided in [N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-3.3] shall be payable as loss accrues, upon
    written notice of such loss and without regard to
    23
    collateral sources, except that benefits, collectible
    under workers’ compensation insurance, . . . shall be
    deducted from the benefits collectible under [N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-4 and -10], the medical expense benefits
    provided in [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1] and the benefits
    provided in [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.3].
    The collateral source rule imposes the primary obligation to pay both
    benefits covered by workers’ compensation and PIP benefits “on the employer
    rather than the PIP insurer and reflects a legislative policy determination that
    losses resulting from work-related automobile accidents should be borne by
    the ‘ultimate consumers of the goods and services in whose production they
    are incurred’ as opposed to ‘the automobile-owning public’ in general.”
    Portnoff v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 
    392 N.J. Super. 377
    , 383 (App. Div. 2007)
    (quoting 
    Lefkin, 229 N.J. Super. at 12
    ).
    Thus, the Legislature made clear that when an employee injured in a
    work-related accident is entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation
    Act, that statute -- not AICRA -- provides his or her primary source of
    recovery for medical expenses and lost wages. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6. It
    envisioned that the employer or its workers’ compensation carrier will pay
    medical and disability benefits to the injured employee, and that the employee
    will neither seek nor receive PIP benefits under his automobile policy, thus
    24
    obviating the need for his or her automobile insurer to pay those benefits.
    Ibid. Significantly, when it
    enacted AICRA, the Legislature did not amend the
    Workers’ Compensation Act to eliminate or circumscribe the statutory right of
    subrogation in cases involving injuries to employees in motor vehicle
    accidents. N.J.S.A. 34:15-40. It left that provision intact.
    D.
    In a series of decisions over three decades, the Appellate Division has
    addressed challenges based on provisions of AICRA or the No-Fault Law to an
    employer’s or workers’ compensation carrier’s right of subrogation under
    N.J.S.A. 34:15-40.
    The first such decision was Lefkin, decided prior to AICRA’s enactment.
    There, an employee injured in a work-related automobile accident received
    workers’ compensation benefits, and his employer asserted a lien on any third-
    party recovery that he received. 
    Lefkin, 229 N.J. Super. at 6-7
    . The employee
    sued his automobile insurer, seeking PIP benefits, as well as the drivers
    allegedly at fault in his accident, who settled with him.
    Id. at 5.
    After the accident, the employee “instituted a workers’ compensation
    action against his alleged employer.”
    Id. at 5-6.
    The employee argued that his
    settlement with the third-party tortfeasor should not be construed to include
    25
    payment for the medical expenses covered by workers’ compensation, because
    N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 would bar evidence of “amounts collectible or paid” under
    PIP coverage in a third-party action.
    Id. at 8-9.
    He argued that “the PIP
    carrier, not he, should pay the medical expense portion of the compensation
    lien.”
    Id. at 8.
    The Appellate Division rejected that argument.
    Id. at 9.
    It held that
    when workers’ compensation benefits are collected by an employee, PIP
    benefits “are neither collectible nor paid,” and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12’s bar on
    evidence of “amounts collectible or paid” under PIP coverage does not apply.
    Ibid. The court accordingly
    ruled that an injured employee who receives
    workers’ compensation benefits for medical expenses and then settles with the
    tortfeasor subject to a workers’ compensation lien is not entitled to be
    reimbursed by his PIP insurer for the amount subject to that lien.
    Ibid. Noting the Legislature’s
    intent to ensure that an injured employee is
    reimbursed -- but reimbursed only once -- for his medical expenses, the court
    held:
    In the circumstances here, three potential sources of
    reimbursement of his medical expenses were available
    to plaintiff: workers’ compensation benefits, PIP
    benefits, and recovery from the tortfeasor. It is,
    moreover, clear that the overall legislative intention is
    ultimately to assure a plaintiff-insured-worker such
    reimbursement, but only by way of a single recovery.
    26
    Where only two potential payment sources are
    implicated, the controlling statute plainly dictates
    which of the two is primary. Thus, where both workers’
    compensation benefits and proceeds of a tort action
    have been recovered, the tort recovery is primary. This
    accords with the purpose of N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, which
    is to implement the employer’s right to subrogation
    against the tortfeasor responsible for its payment
    obligation to its employee. Where only workers’
    compensation benefits and PIP benefits are available,
    the primary burden is placed on workers’ compensation
    as a matter of legislative policy by way of the collateral
    source rule of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6. And when only PIP
    benefits and tortfeasor liability are involved, the
    primary burden is placed as a matter of policy on the
    PIP carrier by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12.
    [Id. at 8-9 (citations omitted).]
    The Appellate Division thus underscored in Lefkin that absent a third-
    party recovery, the primary source of reimbursement for medical benefits for
    an employee injured in a motor vehicle accident in the course of the
    employment is workers’ compensation.
    Ibid. It held, however,
    that if a third-
    party recovery is available, the provider of the workers’ compensation benefits
    has the right to assert its lien on the third-party recovery under N.J.S.A. 34:15-
    40 without contravening the No-Fault Act.
    Ibid. Two years before
    the Legislature enacted AICRA, the Appellate
    Division decided Continental, the decision on which the trial court most
    heavily relied in this case. 
    288 N.J. Super. 185
    . In Continental, an employee
    27
    who had elected the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold in his personal automobile
    policy was injured in a work-related automobile accident and was paid
    workers’ compensation benefits for medical expenses.
    Id. at 187-88.
    His
    employer’s workers’ compensation carrier sued the alleged tortfeasor pursuant
    to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, seeking reimbursement of the workers’ compensation
    benefits paid, and the tortfeasor raised the No-Fault Act’s limitation-on-
    lawsuit threshold as a defense to the third-party action.
    Id. at 188-89.
    The
    trial court granted the workers’ compensation carrier’s motion for partial
    summary judgment striking the tortfeasor’s defense based on the limitation-on-
    lawsuit threshold that was in effect under the No-Fault Law prior to AICRA.
    Id. at 188.
    Reversing the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment, the
    Appellate Division acknowledged that the No-Fault Act “does not limit ‘the
    right of recovery, against the tortfeasor, of uncompensated economic loss
    sustained by the injured party.’”
    Id. at 190
    (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12). It
    noted, however, that had the employee been injured in an accident unrelated to
    work, his sole source of benefits for medical and income continuation would
    have been the PIP provisions of his automobile insurance policy, and that
    under those circumstances, the employee would be precluded from pursuing a
    third-party claim for those losses.
    Ibid. The Appellate Division
    reasoned that
    28
    the “[d]efendant’s liability is not affected by the fortuitous circumstance that
    [the] plaintiff was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.”
    Ibid. The Appellate Division
    held in Continental that the injured employee
    was “clearly entitled to receive PIP benefits for his economic loss” and that
    “[w]hether he received them is immaterial” to the analysis.
    Ibid. Observing that the
    workers’ compensation carrier’s rights “rise no higher than the
    employee’s rights to which it is subrogated,” the court barred the subrogation
    claim for medical expenses.
    Ibid. It remanded the
    matter to the trial court to
    determine whether the employee had an uncompensated income loss, which
    might give rise to a subrogation claim.
    Id. at 191;
    see also Patterson v.
    Adventure Trails, 
    364 N.J. Super. 444
    , 447-49 (Law Div. 2003) (applying
    Continental and AICRA to bar a workers’ compensation carrier’s subrogation
    claim against a third-party tortfeasor for medical benefits paid to an injured
    worker).
    Two post-AICRA Appellate Division decisions addressed that statute’s
    interplay with workers’ compensation subrogation under N.J.S.A. 34:15 -40.
    In Talmadge v. Burn, an employee injured in a work-related accident
    received medical, wage, and indemnity benefits from her employer’s workers’
    compensation carrier. 
    446 N.J. Super. 413
    , 416 (App. Div. 2016). After the
    employee settled her claim with the third-party tortfeasor, the workers’
    29
    compensation insurer asserted a lien against her recovery.
    Ibid. Noting that as
    a no-fault insured she was barred from recovering medical benefits from
    another no-fault insured, the employee argued that the rights of the workers’
    compensation carrier were limited to the rights that she could have asserted,
    and that accordingly the carrier could not seek reimbursement of the benefits
    that it had paid to her.
    Id. at 417.
    The Appellate Division rejected that “syllogism” as an “inaccurate
    statement of the law.”
    Ibid. The court considered
    AICRA’s collateral source
    rule, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, to express the Legislature’s intent that workers’
    compensation -- not PIP benefits -- assume “the primary burden” when “only
    workers’ compensation and PIP benefits are available” to the injured
    employee.
    Id. at 418
    (citing 
    Lefkin, 229 N.J. Super. at 7
    ). The court reasoned
    that when workers’ compensation benefits are paid, N.J.S.A. 34:15-40’s right
    of subrogation is essential to avoid a double recovery by the employee.
    Ibid. (citing Frazier, 142
    N.J. at 597-98). It therefore enforced the workers’
    compensation lien.
    Id. at 419.
    In Lambert, the Appellate Division considered workers’ compensation
    carriers’ appeals of trial court orders partially extinguishing liens for medical
    benefits that had been imposed on injured employees’ recovery against
    
    tortfeasors. 447 N.J. Super. at 66-70
    . The Appellate Division reversed those
    30
    orders, holding that when it enacted AICRA, the Legislature “did not displace
    the workers’ compensation system.”
    Id. at 74.
    Instead, the court noted,
    N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6’s collateral source rule requires that benefits collectible
    under workers’ compensation insurance “‘shall be deducted’” from PIP
    benefits collectible under enumerated provisions of AICRA, thus “shift[ing]
    the burden of providing insurance from the automobile insurance system to the
    workers’ compensation system.”
    Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6).
    Accordingly, the Appellate Division enforced the workers’ compensation liens.
    Id. at 77.
    The Appellate Division’s decision in Continental was not cited in either
    Talmadge or Lambert. The Appellate Division panels in both cases, however,
    declined to follow the Continental panel’s reasoning that because an individual
    injured in an accident unrelated to work could have recovered medical
    expenses under his automobile insurance policy, and would be barred by the
    No-Fault Act from pursuing the tortfeasor for damages based on those two
    categories of loss, the workers’ compensation carrier could not assert a
    subrogation claim based on those benefits. See 
    Lambert, 447 N.J. Super. at 74-77
    (enforcing workers’ compensation lien for medical benefits); 
    Talmadge, 446 N.J. Super. at 417-19
    (same). Both courts relied instead on the principle
    stated in Lefkin: when workers’ compensation benefits are paid to an injured
    31
    employee for economic loss, as the collateral source rule set forth in N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-6 envisions, and the PIP carrier is relieved from the obligation to pay
    those benefits, AICRA poses no obstacle to a subrogation claim under N.J.S.A.
    34:15-40.
    Ibid. IV. Against that
    backdrop, we review the Appellate Division’s decision
    reversing the trial court’s grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgment
    and its denial of New Jersey Transit’s motion for partial summary judgment.
    
    Sanchez, 457 N.J. Super. at 113
    .
    A.
    We briefly comment on two procedural issues. First, we reject
    defendants’ argument that the Appellate Division improperly considered the
    trial court’s denial of New Jersey Transit’s motion for partial summary
    judgment as well as the trial court’s grant of defendants’ summary judgment
    motions. New Jersey Transit clearly appealed the trial court’s rulings on both
    cross-motions for summary judgment to the Appellate Division. Moreover,
    New Jersey Transit asserted before the Appellate Division the argument that it
    had made before the trial court in its motion for partial summary judgment:
    that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)’s limitation-on-lawsuit threshold should not bar its
    subrogation claim. The Appellate Division did not err when it reviewed the
    32
    trial court’s denial of New Jersey Transit’s motion for partial summary
    judgment.
    Second, we acknowledge defendants’ contention that there is an
    unresolved dispute as to the nature of the partial permanent disability benefits
    paid to Mercogliano pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(c). Notwithstanding New
    Jersey Transit’s representation that it paid workers’ compensation benefits to
    Mercogliano only for economic loss consisting of medical expenses and lost
    wages, defendants claim that some or all of the partial permanent disability
    benefits paid to Mercogliano actually compensated him for pain and suffering
    due to his accident, thus implicating N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)’s limitation-on-
    lawsuit threshold.
    The trial court viewed the workers’ compensation benefits at issue to
    compensate Mercogliano only for his economic loss in the form of medical
    expenses and lost wages. The Appellate Division agreed; it expressly assumed
    that this appeal implicates only benefits for economic loss. Sanchez, 457 N.J.
    Super. at 112 (noting that New Jersey Transit “seeks to recover benefits to
    Mercogliano for economic loss comprised of medical expenses and wage loss ,
    not noneconomic loss”). The record on appeal reveals no details about the
    partial permanent disability benefits that would contravene the trial court’s and
    33
    Appellate Division’s conclusion that those benefits exclusively related to
    economic loss.
    Should the trial court deem it appropriate, it has the discretion to expand
    the record on remand and resolve any factual dispute about the partial
    permanent disability payments made in this case. As did the Appellate
    Division, we confine our analysis to workers’ compensation subrogation based
    on payments made for economic loss.
    B.
    We concur with the Appellate Division that the Workers’ Compensation
    Act reflects the Legislature’s clear intent to allow employers and carriers that
    have paid workers’ compensation benefits to assert subrogation rights against
    third-party tortfeasors. 
    Sanchez, 457 N.J. Super. at 107
    ; see also N.J.S.A.
    34:15-40(b), (c), (f); 
    Vitale, 231 N.J. at 252
    -55 (discussing legislative policies
    reflected in Workers’ Compensation Act); 
    Frazier, 142 N.J. at 596-98
    (same);
    Danesi v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 
    189 N.J. Super. 160
    , 165 (App. Div. 1983)
    (same). The Legislature’s objective is clear: protected by their statutory
    subrogation rights, employers and workers’ compensation carriers will
    promptly pay benefits for medical expenses and other economic loss to
    employees injured in the course of their employment. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-
    40(b), (c), (f); 
    Vitale, 231 N.J. at 252
    -55 (discussing legislative policies
    34
    reflected in Workers’ Compensation Act); 
    Frazier, 142 N.J. at 596-98
    (same).
    The subrogation claim ensures that the employee will not be awarded a double
    recovery in workers’ compensation and then in a third-party claim. 
    Frazier, 142 N.J. at 597
    ; Marano v. Schob, 
    455 N.J. Super. 283
    , 290 (App. Div. 2018).
    Consistent with those objectives, the Legislature limits the subrogation right
    only by the principle that the employer’s or carrier’s right to reimbursement
    “shall be only for such right of action that the injured employee or his
    dependents would have had against the third person.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f).
    With a few words of statutory text, the Legislature could have excluded
    from the Workers’ Compensation Act subrogation claims based on the
    payment of benefits to an employee injured in a work-related motor vehicle
    accident, and treated such an accident, for purposes of AICRA, as it treats any
    other. It could have expressed its intent that AICRA alone governs benefits to
    individuals injured in motor vehicle accidents, even accidents that arise in the
    course of employment.
    The Legislature has declined to take such a step. It created no
    exceptions to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40’s subrogation right, either before the
    enactment of AICRA or in that statute’s wake, for employees eligible for PIP
    benefits who are injured in work-related automobile accidents such as the
    accident at issue here. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-40. As the Appellate Division
    35
    observed in Lambert, “had the Legislature intended to effectuate such a major
    change, it would have used express language in the statute and discussed that
    incorporation in AICRA’s legislative 
    history.” 447 N.J. Super. at 75
    .
    In the absence of direct evidence of legislative intent, the trial court
    relied on the description of economic loss in AICRA’s definitional provision,
    N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k). The court reasoned that once New Jersey Transit had
    paid Mercogliano’s medical expenses and awarded him disability benefits,
    there was no longer an “economic loss” at issue, and thus no basis for a
    subrogation claim. To the trial court, the act that gave rise to New Jersey
    Transit’s subrogation claim -- its payment of benefits to Mercogliano under
    N.J.S.A. 34:15-15 and N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(a), (c) -- simultaneously defeated
    that claim, because it left Mercogliano with no “uncompensated” loss.
    We respectfully disagree with the trial court. We discern no evidence
    that the Legislature intended to bar a workers’ compensation subrogation claim
    by virtue of the very benefits that created that claim in the first place. As did
    the Appellate Division, we conclude that Mercogliano suffered an economic
    loss in the form of medical expenses and lost wages, and that New Jersey
    Transit paid him benefits for that economic loss. 
    Sanchez, 457 N.J. Super. at 112
    .
    36
    As they did before the trial court and Appellate Division, defendants rely
    primarily on the Appellate Division’s decision in Continental. They argue that
    because Mercogliano would have been eligible to receive PIP benefits had he
    not qualified for workers’ compensation benefits, AICRA bars New Jersey
    Transit’s claim for reimbursement of the benefits it paid for that loss. We
    disagree.
    The Appellate Division’s decision does not contravene N.J.S.A. 39:6A-
    12. In most settings, that statute bars the admission in a third-party action of
    losses “collectible or paid” by PIP benefits under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3.1, -3.3, -4,
    -4.3, or -10. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. Reimbursed for his medical expenses and
    lost wages by virtue of his workers’ compensation benefits, Mercogliano was
    not entitled to -- and did not receive -- PIP benefits. 
    Sanchez, 457 N.J. Super. at 113
    . As the Appellate Division noted in Lefkin, when workers’
    compensation benefits are available to an injured employee, “PIP benefits in
    that situation are neither collectible nor paid,” and accordingly N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-12 has no bearing on the 
    analysis. 229 N.J. Super. at 9
    . We are
    unpersuaded by the reasoning set forth in the Continental decision as applied
    to the circumstances here, and agree that the Continental decision is “contrary
    to the purposes underlying the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Craig &
    Pomeroy, § 12:3.
    37
    Moreover, N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 does not contravene AICRA’s collateral
    source rule. In AICRA, the Legislature made clear its goal to provide prompt
    benefits to employees injured in work-related automobile accidents, with the
    ultimate responsibility to pay medical expenses imposed on the employer or its
    workers’ compensation carrier. The statute’s collateral source rule provides
    that workers’ compensation benefits “shall be deducted from the [PIP] benefits
    collectible” under one of four enumerated provisions of AICRA. N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-6. As the Appellate Division noted in Lambert, “[w]hen a worker
    suffers a work-related injury in a motor vehicle accident, workers’
    compensation coverage is the primary source of insurance under the collateral
    source 
    rule.” 447 N.J. Super. at 73
    (citing N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6). The employer’s
    or workers’ compensation carrier’s payment of workers’ compensation
    benefits “relieves the PIP carrier from the obligation of making payments for
    expenses incurred by the insured which are covered by workers’ compensation
    benefits.” 
    Lefkin, 229 N.J. Super. at 7
    .
    The result intended by the Legislature is precisely what occurred here.
    Mercogliano was paid workers’ compensation benefits for his medical
    expenses, temporary disability payments, and partial permanent disability
    payments. He never sought or received PIP benefits from his automobile
    insurer, and his accident imposed no burden on that insurer. The Legislature’s
    38
    objective in enacting the Workers’ Compensation Act -- and N.J.S.A. 39:6A-
    6’s collateral source rule -- was achieved in the setting of this appeal. New
    Jersey Transit’s subrogation claim is entirely consonant with AICRA’s
    collateral source rule.
    In short, we concur with the Appellate Division in this appeal that the
    Lefkin, Talmadge, and Lambert decisions properly reconciled the two statutory
    schemes at issue here. See 
    Sanchez, 457 N.J. Super. at 109-13
    . Like those
    courts, we find in AICRA no evidence that the Legislature intended to bar
    subrogation claims in settings such as this.2
    C.
    Our dissenting colleagues devote much of their argument to an
    exploration of the Legislature’s objective to reduce automobile insurance
    premiums when it enacted AICRA. Post at ___ (slip op. at 1-2; 5-7; 10-11).
    We agree with the dissent that the Legislature’s cost-saving goal in AICRA is
    laudable and clear. That goal, however, does not resolve the question of
    2
    We do not address the argument of amicus curiae NJAJ regarding potential
    claims by individual plaintiffs, as distinct from subrogation claims asserted by
    employers and workers’ compensation carriers that are governed by the
    Workers’ Compensation Act. That argument was not raised by any party. See
    Dugan v. TGI Friday’s, Inc., 
    231 N.J. 24
    , 70 n.15 (2017) (declining to reach an
    issue raised by amici but not by any party); Bethlehem Twp. Bd. of Educ. v.
    Bethlehem Twp. Educ. Ass’n., 
    91 N.J. 38
    , 48-49 (1982) (“[A]n amicus curiae
    must accept the case before the court as presented by the parties and cannot
    raise issues not raised by the parties.”).
    39
    statutory interpretation raised by this appeal: whether one or more provisions
    of AICRA should be construed to bar New Jersey Transit’s subrogation claim.
    Our dissenting colleagues adopt the trial court’s view that because New
    Jersey Transit paid Mercogliano’s medical expenses and lost wages in the form
    of workers’ compensation payments, there is no “economic loss” within the
    meaning of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k), and therefore no subrogation claim for such
    an economic loss. Post at ___ (slip. op. at 3-4). If our dissenting colleagues
    were correct that by virtue of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k), there was no economic loss
    in this case, then the dissent’s contentions regarding the impact of N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-6 and -12 on a subrogation action based on an injured employee’s
    economic loss, post at ___ (slip op. at 1-2, 6, 8, 10-11), would be irrelevant.
    In any event, for the reasons explained, see supra pp. 34-36, we view the
    trial court’s and dissent’s application of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k)’s definitional
    language to be incorrect. We view Mercogliano’s medical payments and lost
    wages to constitute economic loss and consider New Jersey Transit’s payment
    of workers’ compensation benefits for medical expenses and lost wages to
    derive from that loss.
    Our dissenting colleagues embrace the holding of Continental, 288 N.J.
    Super. at 190. Post at ___ (slip op. at 3-4). Our colleagues evidently share
    the Continental panel’s view that economic losses paid entirely through
    40
    workers’ compensation benefits nonetheless constitute “amounts collectible or
    paid” by PIP benefits inadmissible in a third-party action under N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-12. We disagree. Here, Mercogliano was never “paid” PIP benefits.
    Moreover, in the wake of New Jersey Transit’s award of workers’
    compensation benefits for Mercogliano’s loss, his economic losses were not
    “collectible” through his PIP carrier. See 
    Lefkin, 229 N.J. Super. at 9
    (“PIP
    benefits are not available to an insured if workers’ compensation benefits are
    also available to him.”). As noted, see supra pp. 36-38, we do not view
    Continental to be persuasive as applied to this case, and instead consider
    Lambert, 
    447 N.J. Super. 61
    , Talmadge, 
    446 N.J. Super. 413
    , and Lefkin, 
    229 N.J. Super. 1
    -- unaddressed by the dissent -- to provide the more compelling
    analysis.
    Finally, our dissenting colleagues enumerate three hypothetical
    scenarios; in each, Mercogliano would receive PIP benefits instead of the
    workers’ compensation benefits that he was actually awarded. Post at ___
    (slip op. at 9). Our dissenting colleagues argue that in each of their alternative
    fact patterns, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6 or N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 would bar a workers’
    compensation subrogation claim, and that those statutes should also bar the
    claim at issue here.
    Id. at 9-10.
    41
    We respectfully note that our task is not to address alternative fact
    patterns distinct from the one that is before us. According to the undisputed
    record, Mercogliano did not seek PIP benefits. He did not receive PIP
    benefits. New Jersey Transit did not seek reimbursement from Mercogliano’s
    PIP carrier, let alone prevail in such an effort. Instead, it paid the benefits as
    N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(a), (c) and -15 require, and sought reimbursement only from
    the third-party tortfeasor. See 
    Lefkin, 229 N.J. Super. at 9
    (noting that “where
    both workers’ compensation and proceeds of a tort action have been recovered,
    the tort recovery is primary.”). In the actual setting of this case, PIP benefits
    were never implicated. Alternative scenarios distinct from this case should be
    left for another day.
    D.
    We acknowledge defendants’ contention that workers’ compensation
    subrogation claims arising from work-related motor vehicle accidents may
    increase the volume of claims, thus exacerbating the burden on the no-fault
    automobile insurance system as a whole. We also note New Jersey Transit’s
    response that any such claims would be simple and easily resolved. The
    Legislature has the authority to address any such concerns by amending the
    Workers’ Compensation Act, AICRA, or both statutory schemes.
    42
    JUSTICE PATTERSON filed a concurrence, in which CHIEF JUSTICE
    RABNER and JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA join. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a
    dissent, in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and SOLOMON join. JUSTICE
    TIMPONE did not participate.
    43
    New Jersey Transit Corporation, a/s/o David Mercogliano,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    Sandra Sanchez and Chad Smith,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting.
    The conclusion reached by my concurring colleagues will ultimately
    lead to increased automobile insurance premiums and increased litigation over
    economic damages incurred in work-related automobile accidents -- an
    outcome in conflict with a series of legislative enactments aimed at making
    automobile insurance more affordable in this State. The simple question in
    this case is whether the economic costs of the injuries suffered by a driver in a
    work-related automobile accident are to be borne by the workers’
    compensation insurance system or the automobile insurance system. The
    Legislature has answered that question.
    When a driver is involved in a work-related automobile accident and his
    economic costs are recoverable under either his private automobile insurance
    carrier’s personal injury protection (PIP) policy or under his employer’s
    workers’ compensation scheme, New Jersey’s no-fault automobile insurance
    1
    system makes the workers’ compensation carrier primarily responsible for
    reimbursing those costs. When an injured driver’s economic losses are
    “collectible” under his PIP policy but paid by his employer’s workers’
    compensation carrier, the no-fault system prohibits a workers’ compensation
    subrogation action against the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s automobile liability
    insurance carrier. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, -12. Despite the clear language and
    intent of the no-fault system, the concurring opinion allows the workers’
    compensation carrier here to sue the tortfeasors or their automobile insurance
    carrier in a subrogation action, thus permitting the very outcome the
    Legislature intended to foreclose -- more litigation and greater financial
    burdens on our automobile insurance system.
    The misreading of the applicable statutory schemes compels me to
    dissent from my concurring colleagues.
    I.
    New Jersey Transit Corporation (New Jersey Transit) employee David
    Mercogliano was driving one of his employer’s vehicles when he was rear-
    ended by a vehicle driven by defendant Sandra Sanchez, owned by defendant
    Chad Smith, and insured by Allstate Insurance Corporation (Allstate). As a
    result of his injuries, Mercogliano incurred economic damages of
    approximately $7000 in medical expenses and $27,000 in lost wages -- costs
    2
    recoverable both under his PIP policy and under his employer’s workers’
    compensation policy.1 Under its workers’ compensation policy, New Jersey
    Transit paid Mercogliano’s economic damages and then, in a subrogation
    action, sued defendants. Because Allstate insured defendant Smith’s vehicle,
    Allstate was responsible for the defense and indemnification of any liability
    lawsuit as set forth in the insurance policy.
    Judge Polifroni dismissed New Jersey Transit’s subrogation action on
    summary judgment on the ground that New Jersey Transit had no greater rights
    than those held by Mercogliano. Mercogliano could not sue the tortfeasors (or
    their automobile insurance carrier) because he did not suffer an
    uncompensated loss under the no-fault system. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(k), -12.
    Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -146, New Jersey
    Transit could not undertake a cause of action that Mercogliano had no right to
    pursue against the tortfeasors. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f). Judge Polifroni
    understood that to rule otherwise would allow workers’ compensation carriers
    not only to introduce claims into the court system that the Legislature meant to
    1
    The policy limits of Mercogliano’s PIP coverage were $250,000 in medical
    expenses and $41,600 in lost wages. Mercogliano had selected the limitation-
    on-lawsuit threshold in his policy that barred him from suing for pain-and-
    suffering (noneconomic) damages in the absence of a permanent injury.
    Mercogliano did not allege that he vaulted that threshold. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-
    8.
    3
    exclude, but also to shift costs allocated to the workers’ compensation system
    to the automobile insurance system, in contravention of the no-fault scheme.
    Judge Polifroni followed the well-reasoned decision in Continental
    Insurance Co. v. McClelland, 
    288 N.J. Super. 185
    (App. Div. 1996). There,
    the Appellate Division, addressing an issue similar to the one before us,
    pointed out that “[t]he compensation carrier’s rights rise no higher than the
    employee’s rights to which it is subrogated. [The employee] was clearly
    entitled to receive PIP benefits for his economic loss. Whether he received
    them is immaterial.”
    Id. at 190
    . Thus, in Continental, the workers’
    compensation carrier could not sue the tortfeasor (or the automobile insurance
    liability carrier) because of “the fortuitous circumstance that [the injured
    employee] was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.”
    Ibid. The Appellate Division
    panel that reversed Judge Polifroni permits a
    new class of claims against automobile insurers, previously barred by
    Continental, that will inevitably lead to increased insurance premiums -- an
    outcome clearly not intended by the Legislature. See DiProspero v. Penn, 
    183 N.J. 477
    , 485 (2005) (“This State’s more than thirty-year history with no fault
    insurance has been marked by legislative efforts to control the rising cost of
    automobile insurance . . . .”); see also Haines v. Taft, 
    237 N.J. 271
    , 284-87
    (2019), superseded by statute, L. 2019, cc. 244, 245; Caviglia v. Royal Tours
    4
    of Am., 
    178 N.J. 460
    , 467 (2004). Because of the three-three split on this
    Court -- three members to affirm and three members to reverse -- that mistaken
    Appellate Division decision will stand. See Gallena v. Scott, 
    1 N.J. 430
    , 432
    (1949).
    A brief review of the history of New Jersey’s no-fault system lays bare
    the misguided path the concurrence has taken.
    II.
    Beginning in 1972, with the enactment of the New Jersey Automobile
    Reparation Reform Act (No Fault Act), L. 1972, c. 70, the Legislature passed a
    series of laws, all aimed at controlling the ever-rising cost of automobile
    insurance. See 
    DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 485
    . A major feature of the No Fault
    Act was PIP -- a form of first-party self-insurance that automatically covers an
    injured driver’s economic losses, such as medical expenses and lost wages,
    regardless of fault. See ibid.; L. 1972, c. 70, § 4. In exchange for the swift
    payment of economic losses paid by the PIP carrier, the No Fault Act
    prohibited the injured driver from bringing a claim for economic losses
    “collectible or paid” under PIP, thus eliminating costly litigation. 2 See L.
    1972, c. 70, § 12; 
    Caviglia, 178 N.J. at 467
    .
    2
    The No Fault Act also required all drivers to carry liability insurance. L.
    1972, c. 70, § 3.
    5
    Since its inception, and in its present iteration, our no-fault law makes
    the workers’ compensation system the primary source of reimbursement for
    economic damages suffered by a driver injured in a work-related automobile
    accident. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6; L. 1972, c. 70, § 6. When the economic losses
    incurred by a driver injured in the course of his employment are covered by
    both his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier and his PIP policy, the
    workers’ compensation carrier is responsible for the costs. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6.
    Consistent with the overall goal of the no-fault insurance system, this rule
    -- known as the collateral source rule -- was intended to lower automobile
    insurance premiums by making the workers’ compensation system responsible
    for the economic losses of the injured employee.
    Over decades, the Legislature made a number of alterations to the no-
    fault system to further its original purpose of keeping insurance premiums
    affordable. See 
    Haines, 237 N.J. at 284-87
    ; 
    DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 485
    -86;
    
    Caviglia, 178 N.J. at 467
    . Important to our analysis is the 1984 New Jersey
    Automobile Insurance Freedom of Choice and Cost Containment Act (Cost
    Containment Act), L. 1983, c. 362.
    With the Cost Containment Act, the Legislature again sought to achieve
    “reductions in premiums for New Jersey motorists.” Statement of Governor
    Thomas H. Kean to A. 3981 (Oct. 4, 1983). The Cost Containment Act
    6
    expanded the collateral source rule by providing that when a driver’s PIP
    policy pays for his economic losses that are also covered under the workers’
    compensation system, the automobile carrier may seek reimbursement from
    the workers’ compensation carrier. L. 1983, c. 362, § 9. By that expansion of
    the collateral source rule, the Legislature made clear again its intent to shift
    losses from automobile insurers to workers’ compensation carriers with the
    goal of reducing automobile insurance premiums.
    The 1998 Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-1.1 to -35, was the Legislature’s most recent concerted effort to address
    “[t]he high cost of automobile insurance in New Jersey” that forced many
    lower income residents “to drop or lapse their coverage in violation of the
    State’s mandatory motor vehicle insurance laws.” See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1.
    Although the details of AICRA are not relevant to our discussion, our present
    no-fault system still requires all drivers to carry liability insurance and PIP.
    See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3, -4.3 Significantly, an injured driver whose economic
    losses are “collectible or paid” under his PIP policy cannot sue the tortfeasor
    (or his automobile liability carrier) for those losses; instead, the injured driver
    can seek only “uncompensated” economic losses. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12.
    3
    In very limited circumstances, some individuals on government assistance
    may opt for special insurance that does not require liability coverage. N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-3.3.
    7
    The Workers’ Compensation Act, passed in 1911 -- over sixty years
    before the No Fault Act -- requires employers to cover their employees’
    medical expenses and lost wages for work-related accidents. See N.J.S.A.
    34:15-7, -12, -15; L. 1911, c. 95. The Workers’ Compensation Act allows
    employers to sue third-party tortfeasors who injure their employees on the job
    as subrogees of their employees, but “only for such right of action that the
    injured employee or his dependents would have had against the third person.”
    N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f).
    Harmonizing the no-fault automobile insurance system with the
    Workers’ Compensation Act, the economic losses suffered by a driver injured
    in a work-related accident are still “collectible” under PIP, even if covered by
    workers’ compensation. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. The injured driver,
    moreover, cannot sue unless he has an “uncompensated” economic loss. See
    ibid. An injured driver
    who has been made whole by a workers’ compensation
    carrier that covers his economic damages does not have an “uncompensated”
    loss. See
    ibid. Because the injured
    driver would not have a cause of action
    against the tortfeasor under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12, the workers’ compensation
    carrier does not have a right of subrogation against the tortfeasor or his
    automobile insurance carrier. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f). A workers’
    compensation subrogation action that shifts the cost to the automobile
    8
    insurance system undermines the very goal of decades of no-fault automobile
    insurance law.
    All three of the following outcomes are compelled by a common-sense
    reading of the legislation undergirding the no-fault system, which is aimed at
    eliminating economic damage lawsuits recoverable under PIP:
    (1)   had Mercogliano recovered his medical
    expenses and lost wages through PIP, his
    insurance company could not have sued
    defendants (or their automobile insurance
    carrier) in a subrogation action, see N.J.S.A.
    39:6A-12;
    (2)   had Mercogliano not sought reimbursement of
    his economic damages through his PIP policy or
    through the workers’ compensation system, he
    could not have sued defendants because those
    damages were “collectible” under his PIP
    policy, see N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12; and
    (3)   had Mercogliano received payment of his
    economic damages through his PIP policy, his
    PIP carrier would have been entitled to
    reimbursement from New Jersey Transit because
    Mercogliano’s injuries were work-related, see
    N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6.
    If those outcomes are compelled -- if Mercogliano and his PIP carrier
    cannot sue defendants’ automobile liability insurance carrier for compensated
    economic losses, and if Mercogliano and his PIP carrier can both seek the
    payment of economic losses from the workers’ compensation carrier -- it
    makes no sense that the legislative scheme would allow the workers’
    9
    compensation carrier to seek reimbursement from defendants’ automobile
    insurance carrier.
    The legislative policy underlying the no-fault system is to reduce the
    burdens placed on our automobile insurance system that have made insurance
    premiums unaffordable to many New Jersey residents. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-
    1.1. The subrogation action that my concurring colleagues allow defeats “a
    legislative policy determination that losses resulting from work -related
    automobile accidents should be borne by the ‘ultimate consumers of the goods
    and services in whose production they are incurred’ as opposed to ‘the
    automobile-owning public’ in general.” See Portnoff v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.,
    
    392 N.J. Super. 377
    , 383 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Lefkin v. Venturini, 
    229 N.J. Super. 1
    , 12 (App. Div. 1988)).
    Indeed, the reason that the workers’ compensation system is given
    primary responsibility for covering economic damages for work-related
    vehicular accidents is to relieve the financial pressure on the automobile
    insurance system.
    III.
    The relentless logic of the No Fault Act and successor enactments
    forbids a workers’ compensation carrier from seeking reimbursement in a
    subrogation action, therefore reducing costly litigation and lowering
    10
    automobile insurance premiums. Because Mercogliano was injured in the
    course of his employment, New Jersey Transit covered his economic losses.
    That result fulfilled the purpose of the no-fault system’s collateral source rule,
    shifting the losses from the automobile insurance industry to workers’
    compensation. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6. Permitting New Jersey Transit to sue
    defendants and their automobile insurance carrier for the economic losses, as
    the concurrence does, shifts the costs right back to the automobile insurance
    system. I therefore respectfully dissent.
    Our task is to give life to the Legislature’s policy choices. If the
    concurrence has misconstrued the interplay between the no-fault system and
    the Workers’ Compensation Act, as I believe it has, the Legislature has the
    power to correct the misinterpretation of its enactments.
    11