Johnson & Johnson v. Director, Division of Taxation (083612)(Statewide) ( 2020 )


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  •                                        SYLLABUS
    (This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
    Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
    Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.)
    Johnson & Johnson v. Director, Division of Taxation (A-51-19) (083612)
    (NOTE: The Court did not write a plenary opinion in this case. The Court affirms
    the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in
    Judge Haas’s opinion, published at 
    461 N.J. Super. 148
     (App. Div. 2019).)
    Argued October 27, 2020 -- Decided December 7, 2020
    PER CURIAM
    The Court considers the Appellate Division’s determination that, in light of the
    Legislature’s 2011 amendment to N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64, respondent Johnson & Johnson
    (J&J) was required to pay an insurance premium tax (IPT) based only upon its premium
    for risks localized in New Jersey rather than upon its total United States premium.
    J&J is insured through Middlesex Assurance, which it wholly owns and which
    provides insurance exclusively to J&J. Middlesex is not a licensed or authorized
    insurance dealer in New Jersey. As a result, J&J’s IPT requirements are governed by the
    statutes regulating New Jersey’s “nonadmitted” or “unauthorized” insurance market.
    The nonadmitted market is comprised of two main types of unauthorized
    insurance markets, which are separate and distinct from each other: the surplus lines
    market and the self-procured market. The principal difference is that surplus lines
    insurance is purchased through a surplus lines agent who bears responsibility for paying
    any insurance premium taxes, N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.59, while the insured is responsible for
    paying premium taxes on self-procured insurance, N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64.
    Prior to 2011, New Jersey collected IPT on both surplus lines and self-procured
    insurance that covered risks located in New Jersey. See N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.59 (2010)
    and -6.64 (2010). If the insurance covered risks located in other states as well, those
    other states could each assess IPTs based on the premium for the risk located there.
    In 2011, Congress enacted the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act
    (NRRA), 
    15 U.S.C. §§ 8201
     to 8206. Most relevant here, the NRRA provides that, in
    cases where nonadmitted insurance covers multistate risks, “[n]o State other than the
    home State of an insured may require any premium tax payment for nonadmitted
    insurance.” 
    15 U.S.C. § 8201
    (a).
    1
    That new Home State Rule prompted the New Jersey Legislature to amend certain
    state insurance laws. See L. 2011, c. 119. As relevant here, a sentence was added to both
    N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.59 and -6.64: “If a surplus lines policy covers risks or exposures in this
    State and other states, where this State is the home state, . . . the tax payable pursuant to
    this section shall be based on the total United States premium for the applicable policy.”
    Although that sentence was added to N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64, the rest of that statute
    was left unchanged, including the statute’s requirements that every holder of self-
    procured insurance report when it procures or continues coverage “upon a subject of
    insurance resident, located or to be performed within this State, other than insurance
    procured through a surplus lines agent pursuant to the surplus lines law of this State,” and
    pay a five-percent IPT for such coverage.
    Here, it is undisputed that J&J’s insurance is self-procured. Prior to the 2011
    Amendments, J&J accordingly paid IPT based on its New Jersey-located risks. The
    question here is whether, in light of the 2011 Amendments, J&J is now also required to
    pay IPT to its home state of New Jersey on its nationwide coverage. In other words, did
    the 2011 Amendments extend an obligation to pay IPT based on the total United States
    premium solely to holders of surplus lines policies, or did they also impose that
    obligation upon holders of self-procured policies, like J&J?
    In the wake of the 2011 Amendments, J&J increased its IPT payments to reflect
    the amount due on its nationwide insurance premiums “as a precautionary measure.” J&J
    continued to make those voluntary payments until November 2015, when it filed a claim
    with the Department of Banking and Insurance (DOBI) and the Director of the Division
    of Taxation (Division) seeking a refund of IPT in the amount of nearly $56 million, plus
    interest. The Division denied J&J’s refund claim in August 2016.
    J&J then filed a complaint in the Tax Court. See 
    30 N.J. Tax 479
    , 490-91 (Tax Ct.
    2018). The Tax Court found in favor of the Division and DOBI, concluding that the 2011
    “amendments apply the Home State Rule to all nonadmitted insurance including self-
    procured captive insurance.” Id. at 513. The court acknowledged that “the addition of a
    paragraph in the self-procurement statute relating to surplus lines policies is problematic,
    as is the failure to remove the original language allocating the IPT to the location of the
    risk.” Ibid. “Nonetheless,” the court reasoned, “the Legislature’s intent is clear and
    purposeful. By amending both N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.59 and -6.64, the Legislature kept
    consistent its equal treatment of nonadmitted insurers, and maximized its nonadmitted
    IPT revenue stream under the NRRA.” Ibid.
    The Appellate Division reversed, finding that “J&J’s IPT obligation should have
    continued to be based solely upon the risks it insured that were located within New
    Jersey” because N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64 provided -- both before and after the 2011
    Amendments -- “that IPT was to be calculated at the rate of ‘5% of the gross amount of
    such premium’ paid for insurance procured ‘upon a subject of insurance resident, located
    or to be performed within [New Jersey].’” 
    461 N.J. Super. 148
    , 151 (App. Div. 2019).
    2
    Stressing that the original plain language of N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64 “clearly limited
    J&J’s tax liability to the risks it insured in New Jersey [and] was not changed in any way,
    shape, or form in the 2011 amendment to” that section, the Appellate Division explained
    that it was “bound to follow and apply” that language. 
    Id. at 163
    . The appellate court
    was not persuaded that the sentence added to both N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.59 and -6.64
    extended the application of the Home State Rule to self-procured policies because that
    added sentence “is limited by its express terms to ‘surplus lines polic[ies] cover[ing] risks
    or exposures in this State and other states.’” 
    Id. at 164
     (quoting N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64).
    The court reasoned that, because “J&J does not procure surplus lines coverage from
    Middlesex Assurance,” that added sentence “is simply inapplicable to J&J.” 
    Ibid.
    The Appellate Division ultimately declared itself “unable to conclude that the
    Legislature, by specifically stating that the Home State Rule only applied to surplus
    insurance coverage obtained through surplus line agents, likewise intended to extend it to
    the types of insurance coverage procured by J&J from Middlesex Assurance.” 
    Ibid.
    The Court granted certification. 
    241 N.J. 94
     (2020).
    HELD: The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons
    expressed in Judge Haas’s thoughtful opinion, which rests heavily on the plain language
    of N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64. 461 N.J. Super. at 162-64. The Legislature, of course, may
    amend the statute if it chooses to do so.
    AFFIRMED.
    JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, dissenting, finds that the plain language argument
    advanced here asks the Court to put on blinders and ignore the effort the Legislature has
    made to achieve taxation of premiums on nationwide risks insured by entities for which
    New Jersey is the home state. Stressing the primacy of legislative intent in statutory
    construction, as well as the deference due the Division’s interpretation of tax statutes, the
    dissent explains that the only conceivable purpose for including the new clause in
    N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64 was to impose nationwide premium taxation on home-state insureds
    with self-procured coverage. That purpose is further evidenced by the new provisions
    allowing the State to engage in compacts with other states for the collection of taxation
    under N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64 as well as -6.59. Noting that the Legislature has at times
    referred to all nonadmitted insurance as surplus lines coverage, without distinguishing
    between surplus lines insurance and self-procured insurance, the dissent opines that
    reading the new clause in -6.64 to draw such a distinction renders the clause meaningless.
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA,
    SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in this opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA
    filed a dissent. JUSTICE PATTERSON did not participate.
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    A-51 September Term 2019
    083612
    Johnson & Johnson,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    Director, Division of Taxation, and Commissioner,
    Department of Banking and Insurance,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    On certification to the Superior Court,
    Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
    
    461 N.J. Super. 148
     (App. Div. 2019).
    Argued                       Decided
    October 27, 2020             December 7, 2020
    William B. Puskas, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, argued
    the cause for appellants (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
    General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel, and William B. Puskas, Jr., on the
    brief).
    Margaret C. Wilson argued the cause for respondent
    (Wilson Law Group, attorneys; Margaret C. Wilson, on
    the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    1
    The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the
    reasons expressed in Judge Haas’s thoughtful opinion, which rests heavily on
    the plain language of N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64. Johnson & Johnson v. Dir., Div. of
    Tax’n, 
    461 N.J. Super. 148
    , 162-64 (App. Div. 2019). The Legislature, of
    course, may amend the statute if it chooses to do so.
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA,
    SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in this opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA
    filed a dissent. JUSTICE PATTERSON did not participate.
    2
    Johnson & Johnson,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    Director, Division of Taxation, and Commissioner,
    Department of Banking and Insurance,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, dissenting.
    I cannot join in the majority’s affirmance of the Appellate Division’s
    judgment in this matter. For the reasons expressed herein, I agree with the
    judgment of the Tax Court, which upheld the tax imposed on the corporate
    taxpayer in this matter. I write separately to add my reasons for believing that
    the Tax Court reached the correct outcome.
    I.
    This appeal requires the Court to review the State’s tax treatment of
    certain premiums paid by Johnson & Johnson (J&J) for insurance policies
    following the Legislature’s 2011 amendments and additions to what is
    commonly known as the Surplus Lines Law. In those amendments, for reasons
    set forth herein, the Legislature made evident its intent to exercise its right to
    1
    impose insurance premium taxation on the nationwide risks of an insured that
    has New Jersey as its home state, such as J&J. At stake in this interpretative
    question is whether the State must reimburse J&J the approximately $56
    million in insurance premium taxes it has already paid on its self-procured
    insurance. In my view, J&J is not entitled to that reimbursement.
    A brief recitation of the factual and procedural setting of this matter
    provides sufficient context for my disagreement with the majority’s outcome
    in this appeal.
    J&J is an international corporation headquartered in New Brunswick,
    New Jersey. J&J maintains insurance purchased through Middlesex
    Assurance, a Bermuda corporation that was subsequently re-domiciled in
    Vermont. Middlesex Assurance is wholly owned and controlled by J&J,
    making Middlesex Assurance a single-parent captive insurance company.
    Middlesex Assurance is not a licensed or authorized insurance dealer in New
    Jersey.
    The insurance at issue is regulated under the Surplus Lines Law,
    N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.40 to -6.65. New Jersey assesses a tax of five percent on all
    insurance premiums (insurance premium tax or IPT) from unauthorized foreign
    or alien insurers, sometimes referred to as nonadmitted insurers. N.J.S.A.
    17:22-6:59 and -6.64. Our law divides the nonadmitted insurance market into
    2
    two categories: surplus lines insurance and self-procured insurance. The
    principal difference is that surplus lines insurance is purchased through a
    surplus lines agent who bears responsibility for paying any insurance premium
    taxes, while the insured is responsible for paying premium taxes on self-
    procured insurance, which is obtained without an agent. 
    Ibid.
    Before 2011, federal law permitted states to assess taxes on premiums
    paid to nonadmitted insurers only to the extent that those premiums covered
    risks in-state. The federal Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act (NRRA)
    modified that scheme to both limit and expand state powers to tax insurance.
    Now, under the NRRA, nonadmitted insurance premiums may be taxed only
    by the “home state” of the insured entity. 
    15 U.S.C. §§ 8201
    (a), 8206(6)(A).
    But that home state may tax the whole of that insured entity’s nonadmitted
    premiums -- even if some or all of the insured risks are situated out-of-state.
    
    15 U.S.C. § 8201
    (a). 1
    To make use of that newfound authority to tax, the New Jersey
    Legislature passed S. 2930 (2011) (the 2011 Amendments) for the express
    purpose of “bring[ing] the surplus lines law . . . into compliance with the
    1
    State taxes imposed pursuant to the NRRA are sometimes referred to as
    relying on the “Home State Rule”; however, for simplicity’s sake, this dissent
    shall refer to an IPT assessed upon the whole of an in-state entity’s insurance
    premiums as “nationwide premium taxation” or a “nationwide IPT.”
    3
    [NRRA].” Sponsors’ Statement to S. 2930 7 (L. 2011, c. 119). The 2011
    Amendments altered both N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.59, the section imposing taxation
    on surplus lines coverage, and N.J.S.A. 17:22-64, the section imposing a tax
    on all other nonadmitted insurance coverage. Both sections now include an
    identical clause regarding nationwide premium taxation:
    If a surplus lines policy covers risks or exposures in this
    State and other states, where this State is the home state,
    as defined in section 7 of L. 1960, c. 32 ([N.J.S.A.]
    17:22–6.41), the tax payable pursuant to this section
    shall be based on the total United States premium for
    the applicable policy.
    [N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.59 and -6.64.]
    J&J had historically paid the New Jersey Division of Taxation (the
    Division) within the Department of the Treasury IPT on the portion of its
    premiums allocable to risks in New Jersey. After the 2011 Amendments, J&J
    increased its IPT payments to reflect the amount due on its nationwide
    insurance premiums in what it describes “as a precautionary measure.”
    However, in 2015, J&J concluded that, notwithstanding the enactment of the
    2011 Amendments, it was required to pay IPT only on the portion of its
    insurance premiums attributable to New Jersey-based risks. It therefore filed a
    claim with the Division seeking the refund of its claimed IPT overpayment in
    the amount of $55,902,070.95 plus interest.
    4
    J&J principally argued that the NRRA and the new statutory language
    quoted above, which was inserted into N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.59 and -6.64 via the
    2011 Amendments, changed only the tax treatment of surplus lines coverage.
    Because J&J did not purchase its insurance through a surplus lines agent, J&J
    claimed that it held self-procured insurance, which it argued was unimpacted
    by the 2011 Amendments.
    The Department of Banking & Insurance, and specifically the
    Commissioner of that Department, is assigned supervisory and administrative
    responsibilities in the regulatory area that includes this taxing scheme. See
    generally N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.40 to -6.84.2 The Department issued a letter
    rejecting J&J’s asserted basis for claiming entitlement to a refund because, in
    its view, the 2011 Amendments extended to self-procured policies such as
    J&J’s. Thereafter, the Division denied the claim.
    2
    In particular, the Commissioner is empowered to set standards for financial
    integrity for nonadmitted surplus lines insurers eligible to have insurance
    placed through a licensed surplus lines agent and to publish lists of such
    eligible insurers, N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.45; to establish and operate “The Surplus
    Lines Examining Office,” 
    id.
     at -6.48; to revoke the license of a surplus lines
    agent, 
    id.
     at -6.61; to collect taxes levied upon premiums for other nonadmitted
    insurance, which tax is required to be paid by an insured and not through a
    surplus lines agent, 
    id.
     at -6.64; to order production of records relating to
    nonadmitted insurance policies, 
    id.
     at -6.65; to enter into interstate compacts
    allocating taxation authority over policies that cover multi-state risks, 
    id.
    at -6.69d; and to adopt rules and regulations governing nonadmitted insurance
    policies, 
    id.
     at -6.69g.
    5
    J&J then filed this action with the Tax Court. The matter proceeded on
    the basis of cross motions for summary judgment.
    In granting summary judgment for the Division and denying summary
    judgment to J&J, the Tax Court held that J&J was not entitled to the
    reimbursement requested. Johnson & Johnson v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 
    30 N.J. Tax 479
    , 513 (Tax 2018). Although the Tax Court did not rely on the
    Division’s argument that the term “surplus lines policy” in the newly added
    sentence inserted into N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.59 and -6.64 was definitionally meant
    to include both surplus lines coverage and self-procured coverage, the court
    nevertheless held that the 2011 Amendments evidenced an overall legislative
    intent to impose nationwide premium taxation on both surplus lines policies
    and self-procured coverage. Id. at 511. The Tax Court took into account the
    Legislature’s consistent pattern of treating the two types of policies equally.
    Id. at 511-12. That -- when combined with the perceived clear legislative
    intent to impose nationwide insurance premium taxation -- was determined to
    outweigh the reference to “surplus lines policies” in the newly inserted
    language in N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64, taking into consideration the identical
    language in both statutes. Id. at 512-13.
    J&J appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed and remanded the
    matter for a determination of the amount of refund due to J&J. Johnson &
    6
    Johnson v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 
    461 N.J. Super. 148
    , 165 (App. Div. 2019).
    The court held that the plain language of the new insertion into N.J.S.A. 17:22-
    6.64 is limited to surplus lines coverage, which does not include self-procured
    coverage. 
    Id. at 163-64
    . The panel further relied on the principle that, even if
    it found some ambiguity in the legislative amendment, that ambiguity would
    have to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, J&J. 
    Id. at 165
    .
    II.
    In this matter of statutory interpretation involving a pure question of
    law, our Court’s review is de novo. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
    
    142 N.J. 520
    , 539-40 (1995). The arguments take two starkly different views
    of legislative intent concerning the perplexing insertion of identical language
    into two provisions dealing with the taxation of insurance premiums paid by
    home-state insureds with respect to two categories of nonadmitted insurers in
    the wake of a change in federal law that prompted revision in the states’ taxing
    of such premiums.
    The Division’s arguments can be summarized as a straightforward
    proposition: the Legislature’s historically parallel treatment of surplus lines
    coverage and self-procured coverage, combined with the Legislature’s clear
    intention that the 2011 Amendments impose nationwide IPT, should be read to
    outweigh the technical language of the statutes. The Division points to further
    7
    evidence of legislative intent by noting the addition of a new section allowing
    the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to enter into compacts with other
    states -- for administrative ease and efficiency in the collection of receipts
    from entities that implicate multi-state risks -- with respect to taxes to be
    collected under either N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.59 or -6.64. In addition, the Division
    highlights legislative history discussing the State’s loss of revenue from
    NRRA and expressing an intent to “maximize the tax revenue rightfully due
    and owing the State.” Sponsors’ Statement to S. 2930 8 (L. 2011, c. 119). In
    sum, the Division maintains that the new authority granted to the
    Commissioner plainly evidences the Legislature’s intention to allow collection
    through -6.64 of nationwide premium taxation on self-procured risks for home-
    state insureds.
    J&J, in turn, roots its argument in the asserted plain language of the
    statute. J&J cites language within the Surplus Lines Law indicating that the
    act does not apply to “insurance coverages which are independently procured
    as provided in [N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64].” N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.40 (emphasis added).
    The text of -6.64 begins by clarifying that it extends to insurance “other than
    insurance procured through a surplus lines agent pursuant to the surplus lines
    law.” According to J&J, while both sections were created through the same
    enactment, the Surplus Lines Law clearly distinguishes self-procured insurance
    8
    -- which is not obtained through a surplus lines agent -- from surplus lines
    coverage. J&J asserts that the new language addressing “the total United
    States premium,” quoted in full above, can therefore impact only surplus lines
    coverage (i.e., not self-procured insurance), even though that language was
    inserted into N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64, a provision that addresses only self-procured
    insurance.
    III.
    For me, the plain language argument asks the Court to put on blinders
    and ignore the effort the Legislature has made to achieve taxation of premiums
    on nationwide risks insured by entities for which New Jersey is the home state.
    I cannot accept the argument.
    The “overriding goal” of statutory construction “must be to determine
    the Legislature’s intent.” Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety v. Gonzalez, 
    142 N.J. 618
    , 627 (1995). We have heretofore always recognized that “when a ‘literal
    interpretation of individual statutory terms or provisions’ would lead to results
    ‘inconsistent with the overall purpose of the statute,’ that interpretation should
    be rejected.” Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 
    168 N.J. 387
    , 392-93 (2001)
    (quoting Cornblatt v. Barow, 
    153 N.J. 218
    , 242 (1998)). Indeed, the
    Legislature has acknowledged that very principle in the statute to which we
    adhere when following its direction on statutory construction: N.J.S.A. 1:1-1
    9
    provides that, when interpreting a law, courts should give words their plain
    meaning “unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature.”
    Through that language, the Legislature asks courts to opt for intended results ,
    not ones that are contrary to manifest intent.
    Furthermore, the Court owes deference to the Division’s interpretations
    of tax statutes. The Division’s interpretation of a tax statute “is entitled to
    prevail, so long as it is not plainly unreasonable.” Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir.,
    Div. of Tax’n, 
    97 N.J. 313
    , 327 (1984). Such deference is especially
    appropriate “when the case involves the construction of a new statute by its
    implementing agency.” Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 
    510 F.2d 692
    ,
    706 (D.C. Cir. 1974). That principle is plainly applicable here, for the
    Department of Banking and Insurance has weighed in, and strongly,
    concerning the intent of the adjustment to the taxing of premiums paid by
    home-state insureds to nonadmitted insurers in the wake of the change in
    federal law.
    The only conceivable purpose for including the new clause in N.J.S.A.
    17:22-6.64 was to impose nationwide premium taxation on home-state
    insureds with self-procured coverage. The NRRA was specifically passed with
    a future effective date to allow states to recalibrate their insurance taxation
    systems. Following the passage of the NRRA, at least forty-three states
    10
    undertook such reforms. Insurance Oversight: Policy Implications for U.S.
    Consumers, Businesses and Jobs: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Ins.,
    Housing, & Cmty. Opportunity, 112th Cong. 29 (2011) (statement of Letha
    Heaton on behalf of the National Association of Professional Surplus Lines
    Offices, Ltd.). Those reforms typically had the same, clear objective: to claim
    the newly available revenue (from nationwide taxation of nonadmitted
    insurance held by “at home” entities) to compensate for the revenue withdrawn
    (from taxation of nonadmitted insurance on in-state risks held by out-of-state
    entities). See, e.g., 78 Del. Laws c. 176 (2011) (“[P]rotecting the revenue of
    this State . . . may be accomplished by facilitating the payment and collection
    of premium tax on nonadmitted insurance . . . .”); Fiscal Note to S. 1096 (
    2011 Pa. Laws 194
    , No. 28) (June 26, 2011) (noting that imposing nationwide
    taxation on home-state insureds would compensate for revenue loss caused by
    the NRRA).
    In New Jersey’s instance, as noted above, the 2011 Amendments
    introduced the same clause into the sections dealing with surplus lines
    coverage and self-procured coverage:
    If a surplus lines policy covers risks or exposures in this
    State and other states, where this State is the home state,
    as defined in section 7 of L. 1960, c. 32 ([N.J.S.A.]
    17:22-6.41), the tax payable pursuant to this section
    shall be based on the total United States premium for
    the applicable policy.
    11
    [N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.59 and -6.64 (emphasis added).]
    Accepting J&J’s interpretation, that provision is not just effectively a
    nullity, it is a wholly meaningless addition to N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64 because
    N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.59 already adopts a rule of nationwide premium taxation for
    surplus lines policies. We have said repeatedly that courts “must avoid an
    interpretation that renders words in a statute surplusage.” Shelton v.
    Restaurant.com, Inc., 
    214 N.J. 419
    , 440 (2013). The Court should “assume
    that the Legislature purposely included every word, and[] strive to give every
    word its logical effect.” Id. at 441.
    The canon against surplusage weighs heavily in favor of reading
    N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64 in the sensible manner that the Legislature clearly
    intended, rather than rendering the Legislature’s enactment entirely
    ineffectual. And the legislative history of the Surplus Lines Law provides still
    more support for the Division’s position.
    The history of legislative actions relating to the surplus lines section,
    N.J.S.A. 17:22-6:59, and the self-procured section, N.J.S.A. 17:22-6:64,
    demonstrates that the Legislature has used the term “surplus lines” as
    interchangeable with “nonadmitted insurance,” i.e., to encompass both surplus
    lines insurance and self-procured insurance. When the Legislature raised the
    tax on nonadmitted insurers from three percent to five percent, the legislative
    12
    budget committee statement in the General Assembly explained that “[t]his
    bill, as amended, increases the premium receipts tax for surplus lines coverage
    from 3% to 5%.” Assem. Budget Comm. Statement to A. 1408 1 (June 22,
    2009). But the law increased the tax rates on both surplus lines policies and
    self-procured policies. L. 2009, c. 75, §§ 4, 5. Similarly, the Office of
    Legislative Services estimated the revenue increase from the elevated tax on
    “Surplus lines carriers” as if the adjustments to N.J.S.A. 17:22-6:59 and -6.64
    impacted a singular tax. Legis. Fiscal Estimate for A. 1408 1 (June 22, 2009).
    Nowhere in the legislative history of the 2009 law does there appear a
    reference to self-procured insurance as being separate from surplus lines
    insurance. Additionally, L. 1996, c. 69, which provided a series of technical
    fixes to the Surplus Lines Law, is entitled “An act concerning surplus lines
    insurers,” despite its application to both N.J.S.A. 17:22-6:59 and -6.64.
    This case is a far cry from one where it can be said that a statute’s
    language plainly directs its outcome, in my view. Further evidence of the lack
    of a plain meaning to be attributed to the “surplus lines coverage” verbiage
    used in the two clauses added in 2011 -- and specifically those words where
    inserted into N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64 -- can be gleaned from review of other
    relevant provisions of the Surplus Lines Law.
    13
    It is important to consider here that “surplus lines coverage” is not a
    defined term in the Surplus Lines Law. See N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.41. However,
    the law does offer a definition of “surplus lines insurer” that is quite broad:
    “an unauthorized insurer in which an insurance coverage is placed or may be
    placed under this surplus lines law.” N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.41(b). That broad
    reference reaches all nonadmitted insurance, including self-procured insurance,
    because self-procured insurance is covered by N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.64, which was
    enacted as a part of the Surplus Lines Law. L. 1960, c. 32, § 30.
    The interpretation advanced by the Division -- that the undefined phrase
    “surplus lines coverage” in -6.59 incorporates a reference to both self-procured
    polices and policies procured through a surplus lines agent -- does not make
    the 2011 Amendments redundant as to -6.64. The amendatory language
    needed to be separately included in -6.64 because the tax imposed through that
    section is collected from the insured rather than through a surplus lines agent,
    as in -6.59. Inclusion of the amendatory language solely in N.J.S.A. 17:22-
    6.59 would have been insufficient to impose an IPT on the premiums for self-
    procured insurance. There had to be a second inclusion in -6.64 because there
    is no agent (as there is in -6.59) on whom to impose the duty to collect the tax.
    Placing the reference in both statutes was necessary to effectuate the tax’s
    collection. Thus, the Division’s interpretation does not render N.J.S.A. 17:22-
    14
    6.64’s levy of the IPT upon self-procured coverage to be without meaning or
    legal effect.
    On the other hand, the canon against surplusage does not work in an
    opposite direction to support J&J’s position. To be sure, N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.40
    states that the Surplus Lines Law -- which includes -6.64 -- does not apply
    to -6.64, but that statement is not as paradoxical as it appears. As Division’s
    counsel argued, there are regulatory provisions governing surplus lines agents’
    procurement of surplus lines insurance that are not applicable to self-procured
    insurance from unaffiliated insurers. In -6.40, in contrast to -6.59, the term
    “surplus lines” is used not as a catch-all denoting all nonadmitted insurance,
    but rather to refer to a specific category of nonadmitted insurance. 3
    The NRRA defined its terms so as to clearly apply to “surplus lines or
    independently procured insurance coverage.” See 
    15 U.S.C. § 8206
    (12)
    (emphasis added). As the Division argues, the NRRA included the word “or,”
    emphasizing that “[i]f Congress wanted the NRRA to apply only to surplus
    lines transactions, it would have said so. It did not.” Sadly, this appeal would
    3
    This Court has contributed to a muddying of the two categories on occasion.
    See, e.g., R.R. Roofing & Bldg. Supply Co. v. Fin. Fire & Cas. Co., 
    85 N.J. 384
    , 389 (1981) (defining “[s]urplus lines insurance [as] involv[ing] New
    Jersey risks which insurance companies authorized or admitted to do business
    in this State have refused to cover by reason of the nature of the risk”).
    Technically, that definition describes nonadmitted insurance as a whole, which
    encompasses both surplus lines coverage and self-procured insurance.
    15
    have been much more straightforward had the amendatory language used by
    the Legislature in the wake of the NRRA’s enactment been similarly clear in
    expression. Rather, it appears that the Legislature has allowed itself on several
    occasions in the past, and again in the 2011 Amendments, to be lulled into
    referring to all nonadmitted insurance as surplus lines coverage, without
    acknowledging the Surplus Lines Law’s original distinction between surplus
    lines insurance and self-procured insurance. Nevertheless, the legislative
    amendments enacted in 2011 to render New Jersey taxation in this area
    consistent with the rules of the NRRA convey to me an unmistakable intent to
    impose nationwide premium taxation on both forms of nonadmitted insurance.
    Because the amendments’ structure, new compact provisions, and
    legislative history reveal the Legislature’s intent to capture this revenue, I find
    inapplicable the default rule provided in Fedders Financial Corp. v. Director,
    Division of Taxation, 
    96 N.J. 376
    , 385-86 (1984), which resolves ambiguity in
    a tax statute, after other efforts to discern legislative intent fail, in favor of the
    taxpayer. That rule applies when there is no evidence of legislative intent in
    the extrinsic aids available to instruct a court. I find evidence of the legislative
    intent unmistakable here for the reasons expressed. Therefore, I decline to
    ignore that intention and require the State to reimburse paid premiums that J&J
    16
    has made in IPT for its nationwide insured risks covered by insurance it self -
    procured through its wholly owned captive insurance company.
    For all those reasons, I respectfully dissent.
    17