William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. v. Zajaczkowski , 172 Conn. App. 405 ( 2017 )


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    WILLIAM RAVEIS REAL ESTATE, INC. v. PETER
    ZAJACZKOWSKI ET AL.
    (AC 37843)
    Lavine, Sheldon and Flynn, Js.
    Argued November 17, 2016—officially released April 25, 2017
    (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
    Fairfield, Kamp, J.)
    Enrico Vaccaro, with whom, on the brief, was Emily
    A. Gianquinto, for the appellants (defendants).
    Tracey Lane Russo, for the appellee (plaintiff).
    Opinion
    LAVINE, J. The defendants, Peter Zajaczkowski and
    Iwona Zajaczkowski, appeal from the judgment of the
    trial court, rendered after a trial to the court, in favor
    the plaintiff, William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. On appeal,
    the defendants claim that the court (1) erred in conclud-
    ing that they had breached the exclusive agreement
    they had with the plaintiff, (2) abused its discretion by
    awarding the plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs in the
    absence of an evidentiary hearing, and (3) violated Gen-
    eral Statutes § 42-150aa with respect to the award of
    attorney’s fees. We affirm the judgment of the trial
    court.
    In its memorandum of decision issued on February
    26, 2015, the trial court made the following findings of
    fact. The plaintiff, a Connecticut corporation with its
    principal office located in Shelton, is a real estate bro-
    kerage firm that represents buyers and sellers. The
    plaintiff commenced the present litigation to obtain
    payment of a real estate commission it alleged it was
    owed in connection with the defendants’ purchase of
    a home at 6 Blackhouse Road (Blackhouse property)
    in Trumbull.1 The plaintiff alleged that it was due a
    commission pursuant to an agreement between the par-
    ties known as an ‘‘Exclusive Right to Represent Buyer
    Authorization’’ (agreement). The defendants denied
    that an enforceable agreement existed between them
    and the plaintiff and that they owed the plaintiff a com-
    mission. The defendants alleged three special defenses
    as to the plaintiff’s cause of action2 and a two count
    counterclaim.3
    The defendants are husband and wife, who have two
    school aged children. Iwona Zajaczkowski, a native of
    Poland, had resided in Connecticut for approximately
    seventeen years by the time of trial. She had been
    employed by Connor Corporation, a marketing com-
    pany. Peter Zajaczkowski was employed as an execu-
    tive director of process engineering at Morgan Stanley
    Fund Services. He previously was employed by General
    Electric Corporation and Deloitte & Touche. He had
    earned a bachelor of science degree in business man-
    agement and a master’s degree in business administra-
    tion and finance from the University of Connecticut.
    Early in 2010, the defendants were living in an apart-
    ment and wanted to purchase a three or four bedroom
    house with a yard. Although they wanted to find a home
    in Trumbull to take advantage of its public schools,
    they were willing to look at homes in other Fairfield
    county towns. They had no time constraints, but ideally
    wished to purchase a home before the month of Septem-
    ber so that their son could enter school at the beginning
    of the school year.
    The court found that a friend of the defendants had
    referred them to Freda Takacs, a licensed real estate
    agent who had been affiliated with the plaintiff for
    approximately fifteen years. Peter Zajaczkowski made
    the initial contact with Takacs and described to her the
    type of home the defendants wished to purchase and its
    preferred location. Thereafter, Takacs identified houses
    to show the defendants. In addition, she gave the defen-
    dants access to the plaintiff’s listing book, a nonpropri-
    etary service that the plaintiff’s agents offer to
    customers so that customers can perform their own
    Internet searches of homes available for purchase.
    Peter Zajaczkowski actively searched for homes that
    met the defendants’ specifications by using the listing
    book and regularly contacting Takacs about properties
    that the defendants wished to view.
    Prior to showing the defendants a particular house
    on March 29, 2010, Takacs presented them with the
    agreement. The agreement is a preprinted, three page
    form with the plaintiff’s name appearing prominently
    at the top of each page. Before Takacs presented the
    agreement to the defendants, she entered certain infor-
    mation onto it, including the term of the agreement
    and the compensation to be paid to the plaintiff. The
    agreement was for a term of one year, from March 29,
    2010 to March 29, 2011. The agreement provided, in
    part, that Takacs, as the buyer’s agent, was to use dili-
    gent efforts to locate property that met the defendants’
    specifications and that she was to negotiate the terms
    and conditions of the purchase of any property the
    defendants wished to buy. The agreement also provided
    that if the defendants purchased a home during the term
    of the agreement, the plaintiff was to earn a commission
    equal to 3 percent of the sale or exchange price of the
    purchased property. In addition, the plaintiff was to
    earn an administrative fee of $195. The defendants
    signed and initialed each page of the agreement on
    March 29, 2010. They did not request that any of the
    terms of the agreement be changed. Takacs, as the
    plaintiff’s authorized agent, signed the agreement on
    behalf of the plaintiff.
    After the agreement was signed, Takacs showed the
    defendants a number of homes in Monroe, Trumbull,
    and Fairfield, including 77 Russ Road (Russ Road prop-
    erty) in Trumbull. The defendants submitted an offer
    to purchase the Russ Road property, but the transaction
    was not consummated because a bank appraisal failed
    to support the purchase price and mortgage financing
    contingencies. Although there was some evidence that
    the defendants’ offer was higher than the fair market
    value of the property, Peter Zajaczkowski testified that
    he was not pressured by Takacs to submit an offer. The
    defendants, however, criticized Takacs’ efforts to work
    with the bank’s appraiser to ensure that the appraisal
    satisfied the mortgage lending requirements. Despite
    this criticism, the court found that Takacs acted with
    appropriate diligence during the negotiations regarding
    the defendants’ attempt to purchase the Russ Road
    property.
    The court found that following their failed attempt
    to purchase the Russ Road property, the defendants’
    relationship with Takacs deteriorated. Peter Zajacz-
    kowski felt that he could no longer work with her and by
    October 15, 2010, he wished to terminate the agreement.
    Takacs did not agree to rescind the agreement and
    reminded Peter Zajaczkowski of the defendants’ obliga-
    tions under the agreement. On November 5, 2010,
    Takacs sent an e-mail message to Peter Zajaczkowski
    stating: ‘‘[t]o be told that you no longer want to work
    with me after I worked so hard stung and made me feel
    unappreciated and I told you so. This is not cancellation
    of a contract and it is still in force. My frustration at
    being rejected does not in any way negate your responsi-
    bility to work with my company if you choose to buy
    without me or my company, we will be pursuing you
    for commission.’’ The court found that Linda Myers,
    the plaintiff’s sales manager, was the only individual
    within the company with authority to terminate an
    agreement. Myers never agreed to terminate the par-
    ties’ agreement.
    The court also found that despite Peter Zajacz-
    kowski’s claim that he terminated the agreement, he
    continued to use the listing book provided by the plain-
    tiff to research available properties subsequent to Octo-
    ber, 2010. On December 21, 2010, he contacted Takacs
    to ask her opinion about a piece of property in Trumbull.
    Although Peter Zajaczkowski testified that he contacted
    Takacs to ask her input ‘‘as a friend,’’ Takacs testified
    that she reminded him of their mutual obligations under
    the agreement. Takacs wrote in an e-mail to Peter Zajac-
    zkowski on December 21, 2010: ‘‘[p]lease also do know
    that you need to go through William Raveis for any
    house you want to purchase. This is the same as when
    you have your house on the market. The agency gets
    paid if you sell during a listing contract and gets paid
    if you buy during it as well.’’
    On January 5, 2011, the defendants submitted a writ-
    ten offer to purchase the Blackhouse property through
    Chris Carey, a real estate agent not affiliated with the
    plaintiff. The defendants had a fully executed purchase
    and sale contract with the sellers of the Blackhouse
    property by January 21, 2011, and obtained title to the
    Blackhouse property on April 12, 2011. The defendants
    have not paid the plaintiff a commission with respect
    to their purchase of the Blackhouse property.
    In resolving the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim
    alleged in count one, the court found that the agreement
    is entitled, ‘‘Exclusive Right to Represent Buyer Autho-
    rization.’’ The term of the agreement was from March
    29, 2010 to March 29, 2011. The agreement identifies
    the buyers as the defendants and provides in relevant
    part: ‘‘You, Buyer(s) [the defendants] appoint Us [the
    plaintiff] as Your exclusive real estate Broker to repre-
    sent You and assist You in locating and purchasing
    or exchang[ing] real property acceptable to You and
    generally described as residential real estate located
    within the State of Connecticut . . . . During the term
    of this Authorization You will work exclusively through
    Us in locating and purchasing or exchanging the Prop-
    erty.’’ The agreement also states with respect to the
    defendant: ‘‘(A) You will tell Us about all past and cur-
    rent contacts with any real property or any other real
    estate agents and refer all leads or information about
    the Property to Us. (B) You will cooperate with Us and
    be reasonably available to examine real property.’’
    The court found that the agreement also imposed
    certain duties on the plaintiff, to wit: ‘‘(A) We will use
    diligent efforts to find property within Your specifica-
    tions. (B) We will negotiate on Your behalf for terms
    and conditions agreeable to You. (C) We will assist and
    act in Your interest regarding the location and purchase
    or exchange, as the case may be, of the Property.’’
    As to the compensation due the plaintiff, the court
    found that section VI of the agreement states in part:
    ‘‘You agree to pay Us a fee of . . . 3 % of the sales or
    exchange price of the real property You purchase. This
    fee will be waived if We collect from the Seller or Listing
    Agency.’’ Also, the agreement provides: ‘‘In addition to
    the above compensation and upon passing of title, You
    agree to pay [the plaintiff] an Administrative Fee of
    $195.00. This fee does not apply to purchases financed
    by government loans (VA, CHFA, FHA).’’
    On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the
    court found that on November 21, 2010, while the
    agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants was
    in full force and effect, the defendants entered into
    an exclusive right to represent buyer agreement with
    Carey, a real estate broker with Carey & Guarrera. On
    January 5, 2011, the defendants submitted a written
    offer to purchase the Blackhouse property through
    Carey, who was not affiliated with the plaintiff. A fully
    executed contract to purchase the Blackhouse property
    was in effect by January 21, 2011, and the closing took
    place on April 12, 2011. The court credited Carey’s testi-
    mony that at no time was he aware that the defendants
    previously had entered into ‘‘an exclusive right to repre-
    sent buyer authorization’’ with the plaintiff.
    The court also found that the defendants were not
    unsophisticated consumers. Peter Zaczkowski holds a
    bachelor of science degree in business management
    and a master’s degree in business administration and
    finance. He was employed by large corporations, includ-
    ing Morgan Stanley Fund Services and Deloitte & Tou-
    che. Peter Zaczkowski was very engaged in the process
    of researching and locating potential homes to pur-
    chase. The court found that the defendants’ claim that
    they were forced into signing the agreement and that
    they could not negotiate different terms was not
    credible.
    The court concluded, therefore, that the defendants’
    actions constituted a breach of the agreement that they
    had entered into with the plaintiff. As a consequence
    of the defendants’ breach of the agreement, the court
    awarded the plaintiff damages of $12,300 pursuant to
    the agreement, which provides that the defendants
    agree to pay the plaintiff ‘‘3 [percent] of the sales or
    exchange price of the real property [they] purchase[d]
    . . . upon passing of title . . . .’’4
    The court, however, found in favor of the defendants
    on the plaintiff’s counts of fraudulent misrepresentation
    and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
    ing.5 With respect to the defendants’ counterclaims,
    breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good
    faith and fair dealing, the court found that the defen-
    dants failed to meet their burden of proof.
    On March 5, 2015, the defendants filed a motion for
    reargument and reconsideration (motion to reargue) of
    the judgment for the plaintiff on its breach of contract
    claim. The defendants argued that the plaintiff was not
    entitled to be paid 3 percent of the purchase price of
    the Blackhouse property because the transfer of title
    occurred after the term of the agreement. Moreover,
    the defendants argued that the contract into which they
    entered for the Blackhouse property was unenforceable
    as it was illusory. The plaintiff objected to the motion
    to reargue on the ground that the motion to reargue
    had failed to identify a case or principle of law that the
    court had overlooked. The court denied the motion to
    reargue on the ground that the defendants had failed
    to identify any new issue or principle of law or appellate
    authority that was not previously raised and considered
    by the court in its memorandum of decision.
    The defendants appealed on April 6, 2015. On April
    15, 2015, the court awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees
    and costs in the amount of $12,293, and the defendants
    filed an amended appeal. Additional facts shall be set
    forth as necessary. We now turn to the defendants’
    claims on appeal.
    I
    The defendants first claim that the court erred in
    concluding that they breached their agreement with the
    plaintiff by entering into ‘‘[a] fully executed contract’’
    to purchase the Blackhouse property during the term
    of the agreement when the contract to purchase the
    Blackhouse property was illusory, unenforceable, and
    not a contract as a matter of law. We need not decide
    this claim because the court found that the defendants
    breached the agreement on other grounds.
    Our review of the defendants’ claim requires us to
    construe the contract. ‘‘The standard of review for the
    issue of contract interpretation is well established.
    When . . . there is definitive contract language, the
    determination of what the parties intended by their
    contractual commitments is a question of law. . . .
    Accordingly, our review is plenary. . . . [W]here the
    legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must
    determine whether they are legally and logically correct
    and whether they find support in the facts set out in
    the memorandum of decision; where the factual basis
    of the court’s decision is challenged we must determine
    whether the facts set out in the memorandum of deci-
    sion are supported by the evidence or whether, in light
    of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record,
    those facts are clearly erroneous.’’ (Citation omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) Giedrimiene v.
    Emmanuel, 
    135 Conn. App. 27
    , 34, 
    40 A.3d 815
    (2012).
    Following oral argument in this court, we sua sponte
    ordered the trial court to articulate its decision.6 The
    court issued its articulation on December 16, 2016. The
    court found that the parties entered into an exclusive
    buyer representation agreement. Section V (B) of the
    agreement states that the defendants ‘‘represent that
    [they] have not signed and will not sign any representa-
    tion authorization or agreements which are in effect
    during the term of this Authorization with any other
    broker or brokerage firm for the location, purchase or
    exchange of residential real estate located in the Towns
    identified . . . .’’
    The court also stated that on November 21, 2010,
    while the agreement was in full force and effect, ‘‘the
    defendants entered into another exclusive buyer repre-
    sentation agreement with another real estate broker,’’
    Carey. The defendants never advised Carey that they
    had entered into the agreement with the plaintiff. If
    Carey had been made aware of the agreement, he would
    not have entered into an agreement with the defendants.
    The court found that, by entering into an agreement
    with Carey, the defendants breached the provisions of
    section V (B) of the agreement.
    The court further found that section I (A) of the
    agreement provided that the defendants had appointed
    the plaintiff to be their ‘‘exclusive real estate Broker
    to represent [them] and assist [them] in locating and
    purchasing or exchang[ing] real property acceptable to
    [them] . . . .’’ The defendants also agreed that, during
    the term of the agreement, they would ‘‘work exclu-
    sively through [the plaintiff] in locating and purchasing
    or exchanging the Property.’’ Section IV (A) of the
    agreement provided that the defendants ‘‘will tell [the
    plaintiff] about all past and current contacts with any
    real property or any other real estate agents and refer all
    leads or information about the Property’’ to the plaintiff.
    The court found that the defendants breached the provi-
    sions of sections I (A) and IV (A) of the agreement
    when they knowingly entered into the agreement with
    Carey while the agreement with the plaintiff was in
    effect.
    Pursuant to Carey’s testimony, the court found that
    the defendants utilized his agency to view properties
    that they had determined would meet their needs. On
    January 5, 2011, with Carey acting as their agent, the
    defendants submitted an offer to purchase the Black-
    house property. On January 21, 2011, the defendants
    executed a contract to purchase the Blackhouse prop-
    erty with Carey acting as their exclusive agent. At no
    time did the defendants contact the plaintiff to express
    their interest in the Blackhouse property, and at no time
    did they use the plaintiff as their broker to purchase
    that property. Takacs had sent e-mail messages to the
    defendants on more than one occasion to remind them
    that the agreement had not been cancelled and that, if
    the defendants wished to purchase a house, they had
    to use the plaintiff as their agent. The defendants pro-
    ceeded to work with Carey despite those reminders.
    The court found that, when the defendants failed to
    use the plaintiff as their exclusive real estate broker,
    and, when during the term of the agreement, the defen-
    dants did not work exclusively through the plaintiff in
    locating and purchasing the Blackhouse property, the
    defendants breached the provisions of section I (A) of
    the agreement. The court found that when the defen-
    dants did not ‘‘refer all leads or information’’ about the
    Blackhouse property to the plaintiff, they breached the
    provisions of section IV (A) of the agreement.
    The court also articulated on ‘‘which of the defen-
    dants’ actions found to constitute breach of the
    agreement’’ it awarded damages to the plaintiff. The
    court found that the defendants entered into an
    agreement with Carey while the agreement with the
    plaintiff was in effect, did not inform Carey of the exis-
    tence of the agreement the defendants had with the
    plaintiff, and did not inform the plaintiff of their
    agreement with Carey. The defendants did not use the
    plaintiff as their exclusive real estate broker to repre-
    sent them in locating and purchasing the Blackhouse
    property, nor did they work exclusively through the
    plaintiff to locate and purchase that property. The
    defendants did not refer leads or information about the
    Blackhouse property to the plaintiff.
    The court articulated that it awarded damages to the
    plaintiff pursuant to section VI of the agreement. The
    agreement required the defendants to pay the plaintiff
    a fee of 3 percent of the sales price of the real property
    that they purchased. The court awarded damages to
    the plaintiff as a result of the defendants’ entering into
    an agreement with Carey during the term of their
    agreement with the plaintiff. The court also awarded
    damages as a result of the defendants’ negotiating and
    entering into a binding contract to purchase and ulti-
    mately buy the Blackhouse property for $410,000. The
    closing on the Blackhouse property did not take place
    until April 12, 2011, which was beyond the termination
    date of agreement. Nonetheless, the defendants negoti-
    ated and entered into an enforceable contract to pur-
    chase that property during the time their agreement
    with the plaintiff was in effect. The defendants actively
    participated in the process of identifying prospective
    properties. They frequently used their access to the
    plaintiff’s resources to identify new properties that
    came to market that may have met their housing needs.
    The court specifically rejected the defendants’ argu-
    ment that they were not aware of or did not understand
    their obligations—including their obligation to pur-
    chase a home using the plaintiff as their exclusive real
    estate agent—under the agreement.
    Although the court found that the defendants
    breached the agreement with plaintiff by entering into
    an enforceable contract to purchase the Blackhouse
    property during the time their agreement with the plain-
    tiff was in effect, that was not the only basis for its
    finding that the defendants breached their agreement
    with the plaintiff. The court found other ways in which
    the defendants violated the agreement that led proxi-
    mately to their finding and eventually purchasing the
    Blackhouse property. To wit: the court found that the
    defendants breached the agreement by entering into an
    exclusive agreement with Carey while the agreement
    with the plaintiff was still in effect; they did not inform
    Carey of the existence of their agreement with the plain-
    tiff; they did not use the plaintiff as their exclusive
    real estate broker to represent them and assist them in
    locating and purchasing the Blackhouse property; they
    did not work exclusively through the plaintiff to locate
    and purchase the Blackhouse property; and they did
    not refer information about the Blackhouse property
    to the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendants do not claim
    that any of the court’s findings, other than the enforce-
    ability of the contract to purchase the Blackhouse prop-
    erty, are clearly erroneous or that the court’s
    conclusions are not legally correct.
    On the basis of our review of the record and the
    court’s articulation, we conclude that the court did not
    award damages to the plaintiff merely because the
    defendants entered into a fully executed contract to
    purchase the Blackhouse property in January, 2011,
    which was within the term of their agreement with the
    plaintiff.7 The court found that the defendants breached
    numerous provisions of the contract during the term
    of the contract, but two are particularly significant,
    namely, they entered into an agreement with Carey and
    they executed a contract to purchase the Blackhouse
    property. Consequently, the defendants damaged the
    plaintiff in that their breach of the agreement led
    directly and proximately to the plaintiff’s loss of a com-
    mission. The court properly measured the damages by
    3 percent of the purchase price of the Blackhouse prop-
    erty, a commission the plaintiff would have earned if
    the defendants had continued to work with Takacs,
    or another of the plaintiff’s agents, as the agreement
    required them to do. We, therefore, conclude that the
    court’s award of damages was legally correct. The
    defendants’ first claim, therefore, fails.
    II
    The defendants’ second claim is that the court
    improperly awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees without
    holding an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.
    The following facts are relevant to our resolution of
    the defendants’ claim. In its memorandum of decision,
    the court stated that the agreement ‘‘permits the plain-
    tiff to recover costs and attorney’s fees. The plaintiff
    shall submit an affidavit setting forth its claim for these
    expenses.’’ On March 9, 2015, the plaintiff’s counsel
    filed an affidavit seeking $11,984 for attorney’s fees and
    $2602.80 for costs. On March 16, 2015, the court ordered
    the plaintiff to submit a more detailed accounting of
    both time spent and costs incurred on or before March
    30, 2015. The plaintiff complied with the order by sub-
    mitting approximately six pages of detailed billing and
    cost records. On April 6, 2015, the defendants filed an
    appeal to this court.8 On March 9, 2015, the plaintiff
    filed a bill of costs, which the clerk of the court rejected
    because the present case was on appeal to this court.
    On April 15, 2015, the court issued a memorandum
    of decision regarding attorney’s fees. In its memoran-
    dum of decision, the court summarized the nature of
    the case and its judgment in favor of the plaintiff. It
    stated: ‘‘A trial before the court commenced on July
    15, 2014, and ended on October 17, 2014. Although there
    were five days of evidence, only two days were full trial
    days.’’ The court found that the plaintiff submitted an
    affidavit of fees and expenses and, thereafter, on March
    30, 2015, submitted time and billing records detailing
    the requested attorney’s fees and expenses. The plaintiff
    was seeking attorney’s fees in the amount of $11,984
    and costs of $2602.80. The court cited the legal basis
    for the award of attorney’s fees in a case such as the
    present one. ‘‘[A] contract clause providing for reim-
    bursement of ‘incurred’ fees permits recovery upon the
    presentation of an attorney’s bill, so long as that bill is
    not unreasonable upon its face and has not been shown
    to be unreasonable by countervailing evidence or by
    the exercise of the trier’s own expert judgment.’’ Storm
    Associates, Inc. v. Baumgold, 
    186 Conn. 237
    , 246, 
    440 A.2d 306
    (1982).
    The court found that the invoice submitted by the
    plaintiff was not unreasonable on its face. Plaintiff’s
    trial counsel billed at the rate of $125 per hour for out-
    of-court time and $200 per hour for in-court time. The
    court found the rate to be reasonable and that the num-
    ber of hours billed reflected the fact that the trial
    occurred over five separate trial days or parts thereof.
    Significantly, the court found that the defendants did
    not file any objection with respect to the plaintiff’s
    filings as to attorney’s fees and costs. The court found
    the request for attorney’s fees to be reasonable and
    awarded the plaintiff the sum of $11,984.
    As to costs, the court found that the plaintiff had
    submitted an invoice in the amount of $2602.80, but that
    the majority of the expenses were for the acquisition of
    transcripts of the court proceedings. The court did not
    request a transcript be submitted posttrial. The court,
    therefore, awarded costs of $309 relating to marshal
    service fees. The total fees and costs awarded by the
    court was $12,293.
    On April 24, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to
    reargue and for reconsideration of the court’s award
    of attorney’s fees. The defendants claimed that the con-
    tract on which the court relied to award attorney’s fees
    is illusory and failed to comply with General Statutes
    § 20-325a (b); in the alternative, if the contract on which
    the court relied to award attorney’s fees is a legally
    enforceable agreement, the defendants claimed that the
    court erred in awarding attorney’s fees without first
    conducting an evidentiary hearing, and the contract
    is a consumer contract, the present action was not
    commenced by an attorney who is not a salaried
    employee of the plaintiff and the amount awarded is
    in excess of the 15 percent permitted by § 42-150aa (b).
    The defendants asked the court to vacate its award of
    attorney’s fees. The court did not rule on the defendants’
    motion to reargue, and the defendants have taken no
    action to secure a ruling on the motion. On December
    23, 2015, the defendants amended their appeal to chal-
    lenge the court’s award of attorney’s fees.9
    We now turn to the standard of review and law perti-
    nent to the awarding of attorney’s fees by the trial court.
    ‘‘A trial court’s decision to award attorney’s fees is
    reviewable for abuse of discretion. . . . [When
    determining] reasonableness of requested attorney’s
    fees . . . more than [a] trial court’s mere general
    knowledge is required for an award of attorney’s fees.
    . . . The burden of showing reasonableness rests on
    the party requesting the fees, and there is an undisputed
    requirement that the reasonableness of attorney’s fees
    and costs must be proven by an appropriate evidentiary
    showing. . . . [T]here must be a clearly stated and
    described factual predicate for the fees sought, apart
    from the trial court’s general knowledge of what consti-
    tutes a reasonable fee. . . . That factual predicate
    must include a statement of the fees requested and a
    description of services rendered.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 
    118 Conn. App. 367
    ,
    371–72, 
    984 A.2d 1084
    (2009); see also Commission on
    Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan, 
    285 Conn. 208
    , 237–38, 
    939 A.2d 541
    (2008).
    The defendants’ claim on appeal is that the court’s
    award of attorney’s fees must be reversed because the
    court did not hold an evidentiary hearing and provide an
    opportunity for them to challenge the reasonableness of
    the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees. Our resolution
    of the defendants’ claim turns on the timeliness of their
    objection to the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees
    and costs. See Smith v. Snyder, 
    267 Conn. 456
    , 480–81,
    
    839 A.2d 589
    (2004). The court found that the defendants
    never filed an objection to either of the plaintiff’s
    requests for attorney’s fees, that is either the plaintiff’s
    initial affidavit filed on March 9, 2015, or its more
    detailed request filed on March 30, 2015. The court,
    therefore, was under no obligation to hold a hearing at
    which the defendants could litigate fully the reasonable-
    ness of the attorney’s fees sought. See 
    id., 479–80 n.14.
       It is an ‘‘undisputed requirement that the reasonable-
    ness of attorney’s fees and costs must be proved by an
    appropriate evidentiary showing.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. House,
    
    202 Conn. 106
    , 121, 
    520 A.2d 162
    (1987). Our Supreme
    Court has noted that ‘‘courts have a general knowledge
    of what would be reasonable compensation for services
    which are fairly stated and described . . . and that
    [c]ourts may rely on their general knowledge of what
    has occurred at the proceedings before them to supply
    evidence in support of an award of attorney’s fees.’’
    (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) Smith v. 
    Snyder, supra
    , 
    267 Conn. 471
    . ‘‘Even though a court may employ its own general
    knowledge in assessing the reasonableness of a claim
    for attorney’s fees, we also have emphasized that no
    award for an attorney’s fee may be made when the
    evidence is insufficient.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) 
    Id., 472. A
    party need not, however, present
    expert testimony regarding attorney’s fees. 
    Id., 473. A
    trial court properly may rely on a financial affidavit as
    well as its own general knowledge and involvement
    with the trial to ascertain a reasonable attorney’s fee.
    
    Id., 474. In
    Shapero v. Mercede, 
    262 Conn. 1
    , 10, 
    808 A.2d 666
    (2002), our Supreme Court concluded that the court’s
    ‘‘general knowledge [of what constitutes a reasonable
    attorney’s fee] and the referee’s unchallenged findings
    relevant to the value of the plaintiff’s services provided
    sufficient support for the challenged finding that $275
    per hour was an appropriate measure of the value of
    those services.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation
    marks omitted.)
    ‘‘[O]ur case law demonstrates, to support an award
    of attorney’s fees, there must be a clearly stated and
    described factual predicate for the fees sought, apart
    from the trial court’s general knowledge of what consti-
    tutes a reasonable fee.’’ Smith v. 
    Snyder, supra
    , 
    267 Conn. 477
    . ‘‘[A] threshold evidentiary showing is a pre-
    requisite to an award of attorney’s fees.’’ 
    Id. ‘‘[W]hen a
    court is presented with a claim for attorney’s fees, the
    proponent must present to the court at the time of trial
    or, in the case of a default judgment, at the hearing
    in damages, a statement of the fees requested and a
    description of the services rendered. Such a rule leaves
    no doubt about the burden on the party claiming attor-
    ney’s fees and affords the opposing party an opportunity
    to challenge the amount requested at the appropriate
    time.’’ (Footnote omitted.) 
    Id., 479. Our
    review of the plaintiff’s March 30, 2015 filing
    of time records and description of services rendered
    indicates that the plaintiff met its burden of providing
    a factual predicate upon which the court could deter-
    mine an award of attorney’s fees. The defendants did
    not object to the plaintiff’s initial affidavit for attorney’s
    fees or its subsequent filing in response to the court’s
    order for more information, thereby triggering a hearing
    to litigate the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees
    requested. This situation is similar to that in Smith v.
    
    Snyder, supra
    , 
    267 Conn. 480
    . In Smith, our Supreme
    Court affirmed the trial court’s award of $20,000 in
    attorney’s fees ‘‘because the defendants did not oppose
    or otherwise take any action in response to the plain-
    tiffs’ request for $25,000 in fees in their post-damages
    hearing brief. Although the proponent bears the burden
    of furnishing evidence of attorney’s fees at the appro-
    priate time, once the plaintiff in this case did make such
    a request, the defendants should have objected or at
    least responded to that request. Had the defendants
    demonstrated any interest in objecting to the plaintiffs’
    request for attorney’s fees, the trial court would have
    been obligated to grant the defendants an opportunity
    to be heard.’’ (Footnote omitted.) 
    Id., 480–81. Our
    Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney’s fees
    in Smith ‘‘in light of the defendants’ failure, prior to
    this appeal, to interpose any objection whatsoever to
    the plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees. In other words,
    the defendants, in failing to object to the plaintiff’s
    request for attorney’s fees, effectively acquiesced in
    that request, and, consequently, they now will not be
    heard to complain about that request.’’ (Emphasis in
    original.) 
    Id., 481. In
    the present case, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit
    requesting costs and attorney’s fees on March 9, 2015.
    In response to the affidavit, the court ordered the plain-
    tiff to submit a more detailed affidavit by March 30,
    2015. The plaintiff filled a more detailed affidavit as
    ordered by the court. On April 6, 2015, the defendants
    filed an appeal. Thereafter, the court issued a memoran-
    dum of decision on April 15, 2015. The defendants never
    objected to the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees
    until they filed a motion to reargue and for reconsidera-
    tion after the court had ruled on the plaintiff’s detailed
    time records. Despite the fact that the defendants filed
    an appeal on April 6, 2015, they did not amend their
    appeal to challenge the attorney’s fees awarded until
    December 23, 2015. Because the defendants failed to
    timely object to the award of attorney’s fees that would
    have triggered their right to litigate the reasonableness
    of the fees requested, we conclude that the court did
    not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attor-
    ney’s fees without holding an evidentiary hearing.10
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The plaintiff’s complaint sounds in three counts: breach of contract,
    fraud and misrepresentation, and breach of the implied covenant of good
    faith and fair dealing. The defendants also alleged two counterclaims: breach
    of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
    2
    The defendants asserted the following special defenses: anticipatory
    breach of the agreement, mutual rescission of the agreement and that the
    agreement fails to comply with General Statutes § 20-325a.
    3
    In count one of their counterclaim, the defendants alleged that the plain-
    tiff was responsible for their inability to get a mortgage for 77 Russ Road
    in Trumbull, which caused them to suffer money damages. In count two of
    their counterclaim, the defendants alleged that the plaintiff’s conduct was
    wilfull, wanton, and malicious and, therefore, breached the covenant of
    good faith and fair dealing of the agreement.
    4
    The court did not award an administrative fee, which was a contingent
    fee. No evidence was presented as to how the defendants financed the
    purchase of the Blackhouse property.
    5
    The court also addressed the defendants’ special defenses. In their first
    special defense, the defendants alleged that the agreement was not enforce-
    able pursuant to General Statutes § 20-325a (b), which by its express lan-
    guage prohibits the bringing of an action to recover a real estate commission
    unless services were performed pursuant to a written contract. See Thornton
    Real Estate, Inc. v. Lobdell, 
    184 Conn. 228
    , 230, 
    439 A.2d 946
    (1981) (statute
    has been strictly construed). At trial, the defendants claimed that the
    agreement is void because it fails to ‘‘show the date [on which such] contract
    was entered into or such authorization given’’ as provided by § 20-325a (b)
    (3). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court found it undisputed,
    pursuant to the testimony of Iowna Zajaczkowski and the type written text
    of the agreement, that the defendants and Takacs signed the agreement on
    March 29, 2011.
    In their second special defense, the defendants alleged that the plaintiff
    anticipatorily breached the agreement. ‘‘Anticipatory breach of contract
    occurs when a party communicates a definite and unequivocal manifestation
    of intent not to render the promised performance at the contractually agreed
    upon time.’’ Koski v. Eyles, 
    37 Conn. Supp. 861
    , 862, 
    440 A.2d 317
    (1981).
    The court found that there was a breakdown in the relationship between
    Takacs and the defendants, but that Takacs made clear that there were
    other agents of the plaintiff who were willing to work with the defendants
    to locate a suitable property. The evidence established that the plaintiff did
    not engage in conduct constituting an anticipatory breach of the agreement.
    The court further found that the evidence did not support the defendants’
    third special defense of mutual rescission. ‘‘A definite election to rescind a
    contract is final and operates as a waiver of any claim for damages for
    breach of the contract. A rescission is effective when, in addition to a
    restoration of status quo, an intention on the part of both parties that the
    contract be rescinded exists.’’ Gordon v. Indusco Management Corp., 
    164 Conn. 262
    , 266, 
    320 A.2d 811
    (1973). Myers was clear and unequivocal that
    the plaintiff never agreed to rescind the contract. Moreover, Takacs explicitly
    informed Peter Zajaczkowski that the plaintiff did not consent to a rescission.
    The defendants raised a fourth defense for the first time in their posttrial
    brief, in which they claimed that the agreement was unenforceable because
    it is a contract of adhesion and contains terms that are unreasonable and
    unconscionable. The court found, as a matter of law, that the fourth special
    defense was not properly before the court as it had not been specially
    alleged. See Practice Book § 10-50. If the defendants had intended to rely
    on this theory, they were required to plead it initially or seek to amend their
    existing special defenses.
    6
    We sua sponte ordered the trial court, pursuant to Practice Book § 60-
    5, ‘‘to articulate which of the defendants’ actions constituted a breach of
    the agreement they entered into with the plaintiff. Also, the court is ordered
    to articulate upon which of the defendants’ actions found to constitute
    breach of the agreement between the [plaintiff] and the defendants did the
    court award damages to the plaintiff. The trial court shall file a written
    articulation of its decision with the Appellate Court Clerk [within thirty
    days of issuance of notice of this order].’’
    7
    Because we conclude that there were factual and legal bases on which
    the court properly found that the defendants breached the agreement and
    awarded the plaintiff damages, we need not decide whether the contract
    to purchase the Blackhouse property was illusory, unenforceable, and not
    a contract as a matter of law, as the defendants claim.
    8
    See Hylton v. Gunter, 
    313 Conn. 472
    , 479, 
    97 A.3d 970
    (2014) (judgment
    is final for purposes of appeal when trial court has awarded, but not yet
    determined amount of, attorney’s fees); Paranteau v. DeVita, 
    208 Conn. 515
    , 523, 
    544 A.2d 634
    (1988) (judgment for purposes of appeal final even
    though amount of attorney’s fees to be determined).
    9
    Practice Book § 61-9 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Should the trial court,
    subsequent to the filing of a pending appeal, make a decision that the
    appellant desires to have reviewed, the appellant shall file an amended
    appeal within twenty days from the issuance of notice of the decision as
    provided for in Section 63-1.’’ The plaintiff did not object to the untimely
    filing of the defendants’ amended appeal.
    10
    The defendants also claim that the amount of the court’s award of
    attorney’s fees was improper pursuant to § 42-150aa. The defendants also
    failed to timely raise this claim in the trial court, and we decline to review
    it on appeal.