KEVIN JIMINEZ VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3928-19
    KEVIN L. JIMENEZ a/k/a
    KEVIN JIMINEZ,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
    OF CORRECTIONS,
    Respondent.
    Submitted May 12, 2021 – Decided June 1, 2021
    Before Judges Rose and Firko.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Corrections.
    James S. Friedman, attorney for appellant.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Kevin L. Jimenez, an inmate at Southern State Correctional Facility
    (SSCF), appeals from a May 7, 2020 final agency decision of the New Jersey
    Department of Corrections (DOC), which upheld an adjudication and sanctions
    for committing prohibited act *.252, encouraging others to riot, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-
    4.1(a). We affirm.
    The charges stemmed from an incident that occurred on SSCF's Housing
    Unit 2-Right (Unit 2R) on April 9, 2020. The incident was captured on the
    prison's video system cameras and recorded without sound. Jimenez and sixty-
    two other inmates were housed on Unit 2R, which was designated as a
    quarantine unit to temporarily house inmates who were exposed to COVID-19.
    Around 9:20 p.m., custody staff moved twelve additional inmates to Unit
    2R. As those inmates entered, they were threatened by the sixty-three inmates,
    who yelled and cursed at them. The twelve inmates were temporarily moved to
    a secure location.
    At 9:30 p.m., prison officials instituted a "lock-up" order, requiring all
    inmates to exit the "day-space," return to their wings, and remain in their bunks
    until a head count was completed. Repeated orders were ignored. Instead, the
    inmates remained in the day-space, where they continued to watch television
    A-3928-19
    2
    and use the kiosks and telephones. Ten minutes later, several inmates pushed a
    large table against the tier entrance gate to block access to the unit.
    According to the report issued by Major Floyd Cossaboon, all inmates
    housed on Unit 2R were advised "if they were not participating in the refusing
    [-]to[-]count and unit-wide disturbance[,] they were to go down [to] their wings
    and remain on their assigned bunks." Notably, "[a]t no time was any inmate
    observed to have counted up as ordered and remain on their assigned bunk."
    Around 10:00 p.m., Cossaboon observed, via the prison's real-time
    monitoring system, "inmates from every wing milling about the unit. There
    were no wings that were not participating in their refusal to leave the day-space
    and 'count up.'" Because several inmates were wearing surgical masks or face
    coverings pursuant to the pandemic protocol, they could not be positively
    identified.
    On April 11, 2020, Jimenez was served with the charge at issue. Jimenez
    pled not guilty and requested a polygraph examination. Asserting neither the
    video evidence nor the reporting officers positively identified any inmates who
    took part in the incident, Jimenez argued that insufficient evidence entitled him
    to a polygraph examination.       A DOC administrator disagreed and denied
    Jimenez's request, concluding: "There [we]re no issues or any other concerns
    A-3928-19
    3
    noted that c[ould] not be addressed by the [h]earing [o]fficer at [Jimenez's]
    hearing."
    Through his counsel substitute, Jimenez submitted a written statement
    denying the charge. Similar to half the inmates involved, Jimenez claimed he
    was in his bunk during the incident. Maintaining there was insufficient evidence
    to establish his identity, Jimenez claimed the DOC had "a preconceived notion
    to everyone's guilt."
    Although Jimenez was afforded the opportunity to present witnesses on
    his behalf at the hearing, he declined to do so. The hearing officer also granted
    Jimenez's request to present confrontation questions to two officers and a
    lieutenant – all of whom answered the twenty written questions submitted by
    counsel substitute. In view of the hazards attendant to the ongoing pandemic,
    the hearing officer denied in-person confrontation.     Because all sixty-three
    inmates were charged following the incident, the hearing officer denied
    individual requests for witnesses and evidence. Noting "the state of emergency"
    resulting from the pandemic caused "prisons to functionally operate with only
    essential personnel[,]" the hearing officer reasoned that permitting individual
    requests would cause "mass disruption."
    A-3928-19
    4
    On April 30, 2020, the hearing officer issued a written decision,
    concluding Jimenez "encouraged inmates to riot," thereby committing the
    prohibited act charged. In reaching her decision, the hearing officer found the
    evidence adduced at the hearing established: (1) Jimenez "was part of a group
    that received orders"; (2) the orders were comprehensible; (3) "[t]he orders were
    loud enough that the entire group could have heard the orders"; (4) the inmates
    had sufficient time to follow the orders; (5) none of the inmates who received
    the orders complied; and (6) the escort reports demonstrate that Jimenez was
    part of the group.
    The hearing officer imposed the following sanctions:              210-day
    administrative segregation as a Category A offense pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:4-
    5.1(e); ninety-day loss of commutation time; and ten-day loss of recreation
    privileges. In doing so, the hearing officer recognized:
    In prison culture, said behaviors must be taken
    extremely seriously and cannot be tolerated. Inmates
    [sic] behaviors could have led to violence and injuries
    for staff and inmates. Orders are mandatory and must
    be followed immediately. Inmates [sic] actions caused
    S[pecial] O[perations] G[roup], central transportation,
    [and] the K[-]9 . . . unit to be dispatched and mass
    overtime as the entire second shift was mandatory due
    to this incident. Said behaviors cannot be tolerated and
    any future behavior of this type must be deterred for
    safety and security purposes. Prison[]s function on
    order. No mental health evaluation noted. Inmates
    A-3928-19
    5
    [sic] charge history noted.      Leniency provided;
    max[imum] sanction not given for [C]ategory A charge.
    Jimenez's administrative appeal was denied. The DOC, acting through
    assistant superintendent Heather Griffith, upheld the hearing officer's decision.
    The administrator elaborated:
    All procedural safeguards were adhered to by the
    [h]earing [o]fficer and found to be in accordance with
    [the applicable regulations]. The video supports that all
    inmates were actively engaged in the incident whether
    acting out [or] refusing to disp[e]rse. There is no video
    evidence that any inmate took precaution to recuse
    himself during the incident to his bunk or uncover his
    face to ensure identity for non-participation.
    Additionally, the custody interviews were consistent in
    their responses. There is no support or compelling
    argument to not support the sanction as written.
    This appeal followed.
    On appeal Jimenez raises the following points for our consideration:
    [POINT I]. The Decision Below Must Be Reversed
    Because the DHO's Findings and Conclusions Were
    Not Based On Substantial Evidence In The Record.
    [POINT II]. The Decision Below Must Be Reversed
    Because Jimenez Was Denied His Right To
    Confrontation.
    [POINT III]. The Decision Below Must Be Reversed
    Because Jimenez Was Denied The Opportunity To
    Submit To A Polygraph Examination.
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    6
    Our scope of review of an agency decision is limited. In re Stallworth,
    
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011); Malacow v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    457 N.J. Super. 87
    ,
    93 (App. Div. 2018).         Reviewing courts presume the validity of the
    "administrative agency's exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities."
    Lavezzi v. State, 
    219 N.J. 163
    , 171 (2014). "We defer to an agency decision
    and do not reverse unless it is arbitrary, capricious[,] or unreasonable or not
    supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't
    of Corr., 
    412 N.J. Super. 243
    , 259 (App. Div. 2010). "'Substantial evidence'
    means 'such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
    a conclusion.'" Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    414 N.J. Super. 186
    , 192 (App.
    Div. 2010) (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 
    35 N.J. 358
    , 376 (1961)).
    As we have long recognized, "[p]risons are dangerous places, and the
    courts must afford appropriate deference and flexibility to administrators trying
    to manage this volatile environment." Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    324 N.J. Super. 576
    , 584 (App. Div. 1999). A reviewing court "may not substitute its
    own judgment for the agency's, even though the court might have reached a
    different result." Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting In re Carter, 
    191 N.J. 474
    ,
    483 (2007)). "This is particularly true when the issue under review is directed
    A-3928-19
    7
    to the agency's special 'expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field.'"
    Id. at 195 (quoting In re Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 28 (2007)).
    However, our review is not "perfunctory," nor is "our function . . . merely
    [to] rubberstamp an agency's decision[.]" Figueroa, 
    414 N.J. Super. at 191
    (citation omitted).   "[R]ather, our function is 'to engage in a careful and
    principled consideration of the agency record and findings.'" 
    Ibid.
     (quoting
    Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 
    330 N.J. Super. 197
    , 204 (App. Div. 2000)). It is
    well settled that an agency's "interpretation of the law and the legal
    consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special
    deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995).
    Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a):
    An inmate who commits one or more of the
    following numbered prohibited acts shall be subject to
    disciplinary action and a sanction that is imposed by a
    Disciplinary Hearing Officer . . . . Prohibited acts
    preceded by an asterisk (*) are considered the most
    serious and result in the most severe sanctions . . . .
    Prohibited acts are further subclassified into five
    categories of severity (Category A through E) with
    Category A being the most severe and Category E the
    least severe.
    A Category A offense, including prohibited act *.252 encouraging others
    to riot, "shall result in a sanction of no less than 181 days and no more than 365
    A-3928-19
    8
    days of administrative segregation per incident." A hearing officer's finding that
    an inmate committed a prohibited act must be supported by "substantial
    evidence." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a).
    Applying these standards to the present matter, we discern no basis to
    disturb the DOC's decision. There was substantial credible evidence in the
    record to support the finding of guilt. Although the inmates wore masks, the
    video evidence and reporting officers' statements exposed the inmates' non-
    compliance with the lock-up order. Recognizing Jimenez's precise role in the
    incident could not be established, the hearing officer nonetheless was
    unpersuaded by Jimenez's unsupported assertion that he had returned to his
    bunk. Rather, the credible evidence in the record established Jimenez, and the
    multitude of inmates housed on Unit 2R, defied repeated orders and refused to
    "count up." That conduct interfered with the administrators' attempt "to manage
    th[e unit's] volatile environment." Russo, 
    324 N.J. Super. at 584
    .
    In addition, the sanctions, as lessened by the hearing officer, were
    commensurate with the severity of the infraction and authorized under N.J.A.C.
    10A:4-5.1(e) for an asterisk offense. Asterisk offenses "are considered the most
    serious and result in the most severe sanctions[.]" N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a).
    A-3928-19
    9
    We have also considered and reject Jimenez's assertion that he was denied
    due process.    Although inmates are not entitled to the same due process
    protections as criminal defendants, they are guaranteed certain limited
    protections. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 
    139 N.J. 188
    , 194 (1995); Avant v.
    Clifford, 
    67 N.J. 496
    , 523 (1975).
    Here, Jimenez was given written notice of the charge at least twenty-four
    hours before the hearing was originally scheduled;1 provided with counsel
    substitute; offered an opportunity to call and confront witnesses; and received a
    written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the discipline.
    Further, in view of the sheer volume of inmates charged in the same incident
    and the ongoing pandemic impact on personnel, we reject Jimenez's argument
    that he was improperly denied the right to submit individual confrontation
    questions. We find nothing in the record to suggest that this determination was
    arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
    Finally, we are unpersuaded by Jimenez's argument that he was
    improperly denied the opportunity to take a polygraph examination. We have
    long recognized an inmate does not have the right to a polygraph test to contest
    1
    The hearing was held on April 30, 2020 following multiple postponements,
    including Jimenez's request for confrontation of officers, polygraph request, and
    to permit the hearing officer to review the record.
    A-3928-19
    10
    a disciplinary charge. Johnson v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    298 N.J. Super. 79
    , 83
    (App. Div. 1997). "An inmate's request for a polygraph examination shall not
    be sufficient cause for granting the request." N.J.A.C. 10A:3-7.1(c). Indeed,
    N.J.A.C. 10A:3-7.1(c) "is designed to prevent the routine administration of
    polygraphs, and a polygraph is clearly not required on every occasio n that an
    inmate denies a disciplinary charge against him." Ramirez v. Dep't of Corr., 
    382 N.J. Super. 18
    , 23-24 (App. Div. 2005). A "prison administrator's determination
    not to give a prisoner a polygraph examination is discretionary and may be
    reversed only when that determination is 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.'"
    Id. at 24. "[A]n inmate's right to a polygraph is conditional and the request
    should be granted when there is a serious question of credibility and the denial
    of the examination would compromise the fundamental fairness of the
    disciplinary process." Id. at 20.
    In the present matter, the administrator determined all issues raised by
    Jimenez could be decided by the hearing officer. Notably, the administrator did
    not reference any issues of credibility raised in Jimenez's request. That is
    because Jimenez sought a polygraph examination to challenge the reporting
    officers' "conclusory statements" and lack of specific identification. However,
    Jimenez presented no evidence to support his bald assertion that he was in his
    A-3928-19
    11
    bunk during the incident or otherwise contradict the video evidence that none of
    the inmates had "counted up" or remained in their assigned bunks. Nor has
    Jimenez identified any extrinsic evidence in the record that would involve
    credibility.   We are therefore satisfied the administrator did not abuse her
    discretion by denying the request for a polygraph examination.
    To the extent we have not specifically addressed Jimenez's remaining
    contentions, we find they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in our
    written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
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