NINETEEN HUNDRED BOARDWALK CONDOMINIUM, ETC. v. MAUREEN A. DUGAN (DC-002508-20, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0971-20
NINETEEN HUNDRED
BOARDWALK CONDOMINIUM,
a New Jersey not for profit
corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MAUREEN A. DUGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted November 18, 2021 – Decided January 20, 2022
Before Judges Alvarez and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Gloucester County, Docket No. DC-002508-
20.
Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellant
(Michael Confusione, of counsel and on the briefs).
Eric S. Kershenblatt, attorney for respondent.
PER CURIAM
Maureen A. Dugan, a unit owner in a condominium association, appeals
the December 3, 2020 denial of her reconsideration motion. On September 24,
2020, after a bench trial, the trial judge entered judgment awarding $350 in
unpaid move-in renter's fees assessed by plaintiff 1900 Boardwalk
Condominium Association, and $3,000 in counsel fees. Dugan's notice of
appeal only lists the reconsideration order. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
After the trial, the judge found the Association master deed and bylaws
permitted the condominium board "to adopt and amend the rules and regulations
covering the details of the operation and use of property." This meant the board
was also authorized to impose sanctions against unit owners who failed to
comply with the Association's rules and regulations.
Accordingly, Dugan's loss of parking privileges and pool usage, imposed
because she failed to pay move-in renter's fees, was proper. The board assessed
$75 move-in renter's fees for the 2018 summer, and $70 in 2019—Dugan owed
five fees for 2018, and one for 2019—which the judge reduced to five fees at
$70 each. The Association documents also provided that the prevailing party in
litigation regarding disputes between the Association and a unit owner could
"recover the cost of the proceedings and reasonable attorneys' fees . . . ."
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The judge reduced the Association's requested counsel fees from $5,000
to $3,000 in light of the work performed. He also dismissed Dugan's
counterclaim, finding she had no cause of action for harassment in a contract
dispute, nor could she seek recovery of any alleged loss of rental income
generated by the imposition of penalties, since that would essentially permit her
to recover losses incurred as a result of her violation of Association rules.
Notice of the move-in fees had been served upon Dugan's predecessor in
interest in March 2018; Dugan purchased in May. The judge considered that the
notice sufficed to put Dugan on notice as well. The judge was unconvinced by
Dugan's argument that any statute or case limited the Association's counsel to
twenty percent of the amount in dispute. He agreed with the Association's
argument that Park Place E. Condo. Association v. Hovbilt, Inc., 279 N.J. Super.
319 (Ch. Div. 1994), imposed a counsel fee cap solely on prelitigation costs.
On the motion for reconsideration, during which Dugan was again self-
represented, she renewed her arguments and added new ones—such as that the
matter should have been submitted, as required by the court rules, to alternative
dispute resolution (ADR). Since she had objected to the submission to ADR
initially, the judge concluded that failure to participate in it did not defeat the
Association's cause of action.
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Dugan also requested the judge vacate the Association's lien against her
unit, which request he did not grant because he lacked the authority in this
Special Civil Part litigation. Neither did he grant her a stay pending appeal, nor
the Association's request for additional counsel fees for the reconsideration
motion. As to the latter, he denied relief without prejudice.
Now on appeal, Dugan merely contends in general terms that the judgment
should be vacated. We find no merit to those arguments, in light of the judge's
comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of the claims made by the parties and his
review of the condominium documents, within the context of the statutes
regulating condominium associations.
Motions for reconsideration are reviewed deferentially. They are
governed by Rule 4:49-2, "which provides that the decision to grant or deny a
motion for reconsideration rests within the sound discretion of the trial court."
Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382
(App. Div. 2015). Reconsideration "is not appropriate merely because a litigant
is dissatisfied with a decision of the court or wishes to reargue a motion."
Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010). That is
precisely what Dugan is attempting here.
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On appeal, Dugan is restating the arguments that she made during the trial,
and made again during the motion for reconsideration. The judge's denial of
reconsideration was not an abuse of discretion—neither palpably incorrect or
irrational, nor did he fail to consider, or appreciate the significance of probative,
competent evidence. See ibid. (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392,
401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).
Finally, Dugan sought to have the lien vacated, but a motion for
reconsideration was not the appropriate vehicle for a new legal issue. See
Medina v. Pitta, 442 N.J. Super. 1, 18 (App. Div. 2015). Furthermore, as the
judge observed, the Special Civil Part was not the proper forum for such a
request. Even if the motion been brought in a procedurally proper fashion, it
had no merit because Dugan's attack on the judge's decision lacks merit.
Affirmed.
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