Cordell Sanders v. Michael Melvin ( 2022 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 20-3276
    CORDELL SANDERS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    MICHAEL MELVIN, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Central District of Illinois.
    No. 16-cv-1366 — Jonathan E. Hawley, Magistrate Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED NOVEMBER 3, 2021 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 1, 2022
    ____________________
    Before KANNE, BRENNAN, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
    KANNE, Circuit Judge. Cordell Sanders has “three strikes”
    under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). That means
    he cannot bring a lawsuit in federal court without prepaying
    the filing fee unless he plausibly pleads that he is in imminent
    danger of serious physical injury. He did just that, indicating
    his belief that certain practices at the Pontiac Correctional
    Center, where he was housed in solitary confinement, would
    lead him to self-harm.
    2                                                   No. 20-3276
    The district court found that this allegation was a lie de-
    signed to allow Sanders to sneak around the three-strikes rule
    and dismissed his entire suit as a sanction for misconduct. It
    did so without explicitly considering whether lesser sanctions
    would be appropriate instead.
    Because we conclude that the district court’s finding of
    fraud was clearly erroneous, and its failure to consider lesser
    sanctions was an abuse of discretion, we reverse.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Factual Background
    Sanders, a severely mentally ill inmate, has been in the
    custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)
    since 2004. For eight of those years, he was held in solitary
    confinement. When he was sixteen years old, he was diag-
    nosed with intermittent explosive disorder, an impulse con-
    trol disorder, and depressive disorder. Since then, his diagno-
    ses have expanded to include, among others, schizoaffective
    disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. His mental
    health has deteriorated during his time in solitary confine-
    ment.
    Sanders has even attempted suicide, or otherwise engaged
    in self-harm, on multiple occasions. One time Sanders over-
    dosed on Motrin; another time he bit flesh out of his wrist. He
    alleges in his original and first amended complaints that the
    prison “require[s] … inmates to self mutilate, overdose on
    pills, hang themselves, [and] fals[e]ly declare to be suicidal in
    order to speak with them about non-suicidal issues.” More
    than once, Sanders alleges, he has been told that his concerns
    do not warrant attention unless he is in crisis.
    No. 20-3276                                                    3
    For example, Sanders claims that one time in October
    2015, after he expressed to a prison guard that he needed to
    speak with someone about his depression, “[t]he prison guard
    came back and told [him] that [Qualified Mental Health Pro-
    fessional Andrea] Moss stated that if [he] was n[o]t suicidal,
    no one wants to see him right now.” Soon after that discus-
    sion, Sanders overdosed on Motrin.
    Another time, he claims he saw Dr. Daidra Marano in the
    prison infirmary. He alleges that, in response to his assertion
    that he thought he had to declare he was suicidal in order to
    speak to a member of the mental health staff, Dr. Marano al-
    legedly said, “that[’]s what it seems like.”
    In July 2016, Sanders alleges he experienced a replay of the
    first event recounted above. He told a guard that he needed
    to speak to a social worker about an issue unrelated to suicide,
    and the guard left to consult Moss and returned saying that
    no one wanted to see him unless he was suicidal.
    At one point, he alleges that he took Moss up on her prop-
    osition. After “fals[e]ly” declaring that he was suicidal, he was
    taken to Moss, who allowed him to speak with a social worker
    about an issue unrelated to suicide.
    This pattern led Sanders to declare that “if the aforemen-
    tioned mental health people in this count[y] continue with the
    self mutilation policy as a pre-condition to speak with a men-
    tal health person, he will eventually succeed in commit[t]ing
    suicide.”
    In his original complaint, Sanders described his mental
    health needs in detail. Below are some relevant portions of the
    complaint:
    4                                                    No. 20-3276
    19. Defendants Andrea Moss, Dr. Marano, Kelly
    Haag, Todd Nelson, Linda Duckworth, Stephan
    Lanterman, have deliberately failed to devise the
    plaintiff a personalized treatment plan conducive to
    improving his mental illnesses in spite of his numer-
    ous requests on numerous occasions which has con-
    tributed to the Plaintiff’s attempted suicide on Octo-
    ber 27, 2015, [and] July 24th 2016 by swallowing
    dangerous amounts of motrin and other medica-
    tions, self mutilation by way of biting flesh out of his
    wrist on July 27, 2016 while on suicide watch status
    which was made possible due to the non-mental
    health prison guards failure to adequately monitor
    inmates on suicide watch.
    ….
    20. Since May 27, 2016, Plaintiff hasn[’]t been given
    psychotherapy that he needs on a fixed basis [which]
    has contributed to his suicide attempts.
    ….
    21. Plaintiff has informed defendants that the isolat-
    ing stressful conditions of disciplinary isolation has
    exacerbated his [mental illnesses] … and ha[s] re-
    peatedly requested his release from disciplinary iso-
    lation and to be house[d] in a mental health setting
    which the defendants have failed to do which con-
    tributes to Plaintiff’s suicide attempts.
    ….
    27. Plaintiff reasonably foresee[s] that if defendants
    don[’]t remove him from disciplinary isolation and
    into a mental health setting, and don[’]t construct
    Plaintiff a personal mental health treatment plan at
    improving his mental health diagnosis, and if
    No. 20-3276                                                    5
    defendants continue to … refuse to interview the
    Plaintiff on a weekly basis, that it will lead to more
    suicide attempts and or actual suicide, including de-
    fendants refusal to provide the Plaintiff with indi-
    vidual and or group psychotherapy, specialized
    psycho-educational groups, etc.
    B. Procedural History
    Sanders filed his original pro se complaint in September of
    2016. The defendants still in the suit are Michael Melvin, An-
    drea Moss, Dr. Daidra Marano, Kelly Haag, Todd Nelson, An-
    thony Wills, Linda Duckworth, Stephan Lanterman, Teri Ken-
    nedy, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and Rob Jeffreys (collec-
    tively, “the Defendants”). Melvin, Marano, Wills, Kennedy,
    and Jeffreys are referred to as the “IDOC Defendants,” while
    Moss, Lanterman, Haag, Nelson, Duckworth, and Wexford
    are referred to as the “Wexford Defendants.”
    On the same day he filed the complaint, Sanders applied
    to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which is a status that al-
    lows indigent prisoners to bring suits without prepaying the
    usual filing fee. There are some limits on who can proceed
    IFP. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g). A prisoner who has three
    strikes—actions or appeals dismissed for being “frivolous,
    malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim”—can only proceed
    without prepayment if he is “under imminent danger of seri-
    ous physical injury.” 
    Id.
     Sanders is one such litigant, and he
    indicated as much in his application, noting that he was seek-
    ing IFP status under the “imminent danger exception.”
    The district court initially granted his application to pro-
    ceed IFP, but after a merit review the court revoked its grant,
    finding that none of Sanders’s allegations demonstrated that
    he was in imminent danger.
    6                                                       No. 20-3276
    Sanders subsequently obtained representation and ap-
    pealed to this court, and we vacated the revocation, restoring
    his IFP status. We determined that only one of Sanders’s con-
    tentions sufficed to allege he is in imminent danger of serious
    physical harm:
    But Sanders advances a stronger contention: that his
    mental condition … disposes him to self-harm. He
    asserts that he has twice tried to commit suicide and
    at least once engaged in self-mutilation. According
    to his complaint, the mental-health staff at Pontiac
    ignores the problems of inmates in solitary confine-
    ment unless they engage in self-harm. … That Sand-
    ers has attempted self-harm multiple times lends
    support to his allegation that a future attempt is “im-
    minent” unless he is released from solitary or al-
    lowed mental-health care. Courts don’t accept alle-
    gations of danger uncritically. But Sanders’s history,
    coupled with the prison’s diagnosis of his condition,
    makes his allegations plausible. And plausibility is
    enough in a pleading.
    …
    When the prospect of self-harm is a consequence of
    the condition that prompted the suit, a court should
    treat the allegation (if true) as imminent physical
    injury. And this is the kind of allegation Sanders has
    advanced. He contends that solitary confinement
    not only is injurious by itself but also causes
    prisoners to lose the benefit of mental-health care,
    and that only self-mutilation (or a credible threat of
    self-mutilation) restores that care.
    Sanders v. Melvin, 
    873 F.3d 957
    , 960–61 (7th Cir. 2017) (citations
    omitted).
    No. 20-3276                                                               7
    Although we allowed Sanders to proceed IFP, we did so
    with a caveat: “If Sanders’s allegations of imminent physical
    harm are untrue, then he must pay the whole filing fee
    promptly. … And if it turns out that Sanders has lied in an
    effort to manipulate the judge, the case may be dismissed with
    prejudice as a sanction even if he comes up with the $400.” 
    Id. at 961
     (citations omitted) (citing Thomas v. Gen. Motors Ac-
    ceptance Corp., 
    288 F.3d 305
    , 306–07 (7th Cir. 2002); Ammons v.
    Gerlinger, 
    547 F.3d 724
    , 725–26 (7th Cir. 2008)). We then re-
    manded the suit.
    On remand, now represented by counsel, Sanders paid the
    filing fee, terminating his IFP status. He then filed an
    amended complaint, adding several claims. Over the next
    fourteen months, there was a flurry of action in the district
    court, but none of that action is relevant to this appeal.
    However, two motions filed after that period are relevant.
    First, the Wexford Defendants filed a motion for summary
    judgment in February of 2020. Sanders responded in opposi-
    tion, and those defendants replied. Second, and more im-
    portant, the IDOC Defendants filed a motion for sanctions. 1
    The motion for sanctions contended that Sanders’s entire
    suit should be dismissed with prejudice because he lied to ob-
    tain IFP status. The district court agreed, finding that “100
    pages of mental health progress notes … would appear to re-
    fute [his] claim that he only received mental health treatment
    when he harmed himself or credibly threatened self-harm.” It
    concluded that this discrepancy
    1 Really, they filed two motions for sanctions, but the first motion was
    withdrawn because it did not comply with the notice requirements of Rule
    11.
    8                                                    No. 20-3276
    represent[ed] far more than inaccuracy. Plaintiff, a
    prolific litigator, was aware that he could not pro-
    ceed IFP absent allegations of imminent danger of
    serious physical harm. It appears that Plaintiff made
    such unsupported allegations so as to circumvent
    the 3-strikes rule, and reiterated that claim in his
    amended complaint. In so doing, he lied in his
    pleadings.
    Based on the IDOC Defendants’ motion for sanctions, the dis-
    trict court dismissed Sanders’s suit with prejudice pursuant
    to its inherent authority to punish fraud on the court.
    Sanders now appeals the dismissal.
    II. ANALYSIS
    We review the district court’s finding of fraud for clear er-
    ror, and its dismissal with prejudice of Sanders’s claims for an
    abuse of discretion. Thomas, 
    288 F.3d at 308
    .
    Sanders argues that the district court lacked a sufficient
    factual or legal basis for finding fraud; that even if it did have
    such a basis, dismissal with prejudice was improper; and that
    the district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions
    without holding an evidentiary hearing. We begin with a re-
    view of the law surrounding the district court’s inherent au-
    thority to sanction a party for fraud on the court before turn-
    ing to the factual question at the heart of this appeal: did
    Sanders lie to circumvent the three-strikes rule?
    A. Inherent Authority to Sanction Fraud
    “It has long been understood that ‘[c]ertain implied pow-
    ers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the
    nature of their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot be dis-
    pensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the
    No. 20-3276                                                      9
    exercise of all others.’” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 
    501 U.S. 32
    ,
    43 (1991) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hud-
    son, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)).
    “For this reason, ‘Courts of justice are universally
    acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with
    power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their pres-
    ence, and submission to their lawful mandates.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)). But im-
    plied powers, “[b]ecause of their very potency, … must be ex-
    ercised with restraint and discretion.” 
    Id.
     at 44 (citing Roadway
    Express, Inc. v. Piper, 
    447 U.S. 752
    , 764 (1980)).
    Among these powers is the ability of “a federal court to
    vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud has been per-
    petrated upon the court.” 
    Id.
     (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
    Hartford-Empire Co., 
    322 U.S. 238
     (1944); Universal Oil Prods.
    Co. v. Root Refin. Co., 
    328 U.S. 575
    , 580 (1946)).
    And if fraud is discovered prior to judgment, a court “may
    impose appropriate sanctions to penalize and discourage mis-
    conduct.” Ramirez v. T & H Lemont, Inc., 
    845 F.3d 772
    , 776 (7th
    Cir. 2016). Dismissal may even “be appropriate when the
    plaintiff has abused the judicial process by seeking relief
    based on information that the plaintiff knows is false.” Se-
    crease v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 
    800 F.3d 397
    , 401 (7th Cir. 2015).
    More specifically, “we have held that a dismissal with
    prejudice is an appropriate sanction for lying to the court in
    order to receive a benefit from it, because no one needs to be
    warned not to lie to the judiciary.” Ayoubi v. Dart, 640 F. App’x
    524, 528–29 (7th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (citing Mathis v. N.Y.
    Life Ins. Co., 
    133 F.3d 546
    , 547 (7th Cir. 1998)).
    10                                                   No. 20-3276
    To put an even finer point on it, “[w]e have approved that
    sanction when a litigant has lied to receive the benefit of pro-
    ceeding [IFP], observing that fines would be an ineffective
    sanction against an indigent plaintiff.” 
    Id.
     at 529 (citing
    Hoskins v. Dart, 
    633 F.3d 541
    , 543–44 (7th Cir. 2011); Thomas,
    
    288 F.3d at 308
    ). But see Ebmeyer v. Brock, 
    11 F.4th 537
    , 547 (7th
    Cir. 2021) (“For a pro se prisoner proceeding [IFP], a verbal or
    written warning, or a modest monetary sanction may have a
    sufficient effect.” (citing Evans v. Griffin, 
    932 F.3d 1043
    , 1048
    (7th Cir. 2019))).
    Before we discuss the district court’s finding of fraud, we
    want to clear something up to focus the inquiry. We have al-
    ready established that dismissal with prejudice is an appro-
    priate sanction for lying to obtain IFP status. Here, that pur-
    ported lie occurred in Sanders’s original complaint, so we will
    look to that filing.
    Although Sanders subsequently amended his complaint
    and paid the filing fee, that does not cure any lie made to ob-
    tain IFP status, if one was made, because “courts generally
    have an interest in both punishing a party’s dishonesty and
    deterring others who might consider similar misconduct.” Se-
    crease, 800 F.3d at 402.
    If, after a court catches him in a critical lie, a party were
    permitted to continue with his case upon the payment of $400,
    then he would suffer almost no consequence for his attempt
    to subvert the court’s authority, and others would not be de-
    terred.
    But at the same time, the amended complaint cannot rea-
    sonably be said to contain the same “fraud on the court”
    found in the original because there was no benefit that the
    No. 20-3276                                                   11
    “lie” would further Sanders in obtaining. At that point, his IFP
    status had been vitiated by payment of the fee.
    In other words, the lie would not be material. Cf. Greyer v.
    Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 
    933 F.3d 871
    , 879–80 (7th Cir. 2019) (“None-
    theless, [district courts] should proceed carefully before im-
    posing severe sanctions on prison litigants who omit portions
    of their litigation histories, if those omissions do not add
    strikes and thus have no bearing on the prisoner’s ability to
    proceed under the PLRA.”). Therefore, our inquiry will exclu-
    sively look at allegations in the original complaint.
    B. The Fraud
    Critical to the fraud question is what Sanders pled in his
    original complaint. The district court found that he “plainly
    pled that he was not provided mental health care unless he
    harmed himself.” Sanders contends that he pled “that he did
    not receive mental health care adequate to his serious needs
    … and that he was told on at least two occasions that [he]
    would have to be suicidal in order to see a mental health pro-
    vider.” Appellant’s Br. at 29.
    This is important because the record clearly reflects that
    Sanders was seen many times by the mental health staff. If we
    accept the district court’s characterization, then the “100
    pages of mental health progress notes” documenting “that he
    was seen 44 times” between 2015 and 2016 make it “demon-
    strably clear that self-harm was not a prerequisite to [Sanders]
    receiving mental health treatment.” This conclusion would
    seem to justify dismissal with prejudice. See Ayoubi, 640 F.
    App’x at 526–27 (dismissal with prejudice proper where au-
    thenticated dated prison library logs refuted plaintiff’s claim
    12                                                    No. 20-3276
    that jail officials had “totally disregarded” the court’s request
    that he be given reasonable access).
    If we accept Sanders’s characterization, on the other hand,
    then it’s possible his allegation is true, or at the very least in-
    accurate but not made “with a degree of culpability that ex-
    ceeds simple inadvertence or mistake” and constitutes a
    “willfull[] abuse[] [of] the judicial process” or otherwise indi-
    cates bad faith. Ebmeyer, 11 F.4th at 546 (quoting Ramirez, 845
    F.3d at 776, 778). In the latter situation, he would simply be
    required to pay the filing fee—something he has already
    done—to avoid dismissal. Melvin, 873 F.3d at 961 (citing Tay-
    lor v. Watkins, 
    623 F.3d 483
    , 486 (7th Cir. 2010)).
    The complaint itself contains competing indications that
    each party is correct. Supporting the district court’s character-
    ization are at least two isolated statements:
    •   “Defendants … require the Plaintiff and other inmates
    to self mutilate, overdose on pills, hang themselves,
    [or] fals[e]ly declare to be suicidal in order to speak
    with them about non-suicidal issues.”
    •   “Plaintiff reasonably foresee[s] that if the aforemen-
    tioned mental health people in this count[y] continue
    with the self mutilation policy as a pre-condition to
    speak with a mental health person, he will eventually
    succeed in commit[t]ing suicide.”
    Other parts of the complaint suggest that Sanders’s allega-
    tions were more nuanced. He alleged specific inadequacies in
    his care that he feared would lead to him taking his own life:
    •   “Defendants … have deliberately failed to devise the
    plaintiff a personalized treatment plan conducive to
    improving his mental illnesses in spite of his numerous
    No. 20-3276                                                  13
    requests … which has contributed to the plaintiff’s at-
    tempted suicide … .”
    •   “Plaintiff hasn[’]t been given psychotherapy that he
    needs on a fixed basis [which] has contributed to his
    suicide attempts.”
    •   “Plaintiff has … repeatedly requested his release from
    disciplinary isolation and to be house[d] in a mental
    health setting which the defendants have failed to do
    which contributes to Plaintiff’s suicide attempts.”
    •   “Plaintiff reasonably foresee[s] that if defendants
    don[’]t remove him from disciplinary isolation and
    into a mental health setting, and don[’]t construct
    plaintiff a personal mental health treatment plan …
    and if defendants continue to … refuse to interview the
    Plaintiff on a weekly basis, that it will lead to more
    suicide attempts and or actual suicide, including
    defendants refusal to provide the Plaintiff with
    individual and or group psychotherapy, specialized
    psycho-educational groups, etc.”
    In an ordinary case, the deference accorded under clear er-
    ror review might be strong enough for us to affirm the district
    court’s factual determination of fraud. That is, we might say
    that because “there are two permissible views of the evidence,
    the trial court’s choice between them cannot be clearly erro-
    neous.” Goodvine v. Carr, 761 F. App’x 598, 601 (7th Cir. 2019)
    (unpublished) (quoting Gaffney v. Riverboat Servs. of Ind., Inc.,
    
    451 F.3d 424
    , 448 (7th Cir. 2006)). But this is not an ordinary
    case. It is a suit brought pro se by a prisoner, and we must be
    more lenient in our approach.
    14                                                    No. 20-3276
    The Supreme Court has noted that “[i]t is settled law that
    the allegations” in a pro se prisoner “complaint, ‘however in-
    artfully pleaded’ are held ‘to less stringent standards than for-
    mal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Hughes v. Rowe, 
    449 U.S. 5
    , 9 (1980) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520 (1972)).
    In the 12(b)(6) context, this means that “[s]uch a complaint
    should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
    appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
    facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to re-
    lief.” 
    Id.
    We have also acknowledged that “[i]t is the recognized
    duty of the trial court to insure that the claims of a pro se [liti-
    gant] are given a ‘fair and meaningful consideration,’” Schil-
    ling v. Walworth Cnty. Park & Plan. Comm’n, 
    805 F.2d 272
    , 277
    (7th Cir. 1986) (alteration in original) (quoting Childs v. Duck-
    worth, 
    705 F.2d 915
    , 922 (7th Cir. 1983)), because “[t]he acces-
    sibility of the courts to those who cannot afford counsel is too
    important a value to be sacrificed for the needless exaction of
    harsh penalties for isolated and minor mistakes,” 
    id.
    Moreover, “[a] litigant who appears pro se should not be
    treated more harshly for negligent errors than one repre-
    sented by an attorney. Otherwise, only those wealthy enough
    to be able to afford an attorney would be able to insulate
    themselves from the consequences of an occasional human er-
    ror … .” 
    Id.
     at 277 n.8 (citation omitted).
    In similar cases that have come before us, we have em-
    ployed this concern. In Greyer v. Illinois Department of Correc-
    tions, a pro se prisoner attempting to proceed IFP with his
    § 1983 suit against prison officials failed to list two prior suits
    under the litigation-history portion of his form complaint. 933
    F.3d at 875–76. We said that “[w]hen viewed in the liberal
    No. 20-3276                                                    15
    light in which we must take pro se pleadings, Greyer’s expla-
    nation for his failures is plain: his mental health issues and
    illiteracy created a situation in which he did not fully under-
    stand what was being asked of him, and thus the omissions
    were inadvertent.” Id. at 878 (citation omitted). With respect
    to one of the omitted suits, we added, “Understandably,
    someone with no legal training might not draw the conclusion
    that he must include his habeas corpus petition on a list of
    cases ‘relating to [his] imprisonment.’” Id. (alteration in origi-
    nal). We thus concluded that the district court’s factual find-
    ings about intent were unsupported. Id. at 879.
    In Ebmeyer v. Brock, another pro se prisoner brought a
    § 1983 suit alleging that a team of officers in his prison “sub-
    jected him to a humiliating, unconstitutional strip search and
    excessive force.” 11 F.4th at 540. The prisoner alleged that “an
    unidentified ‘John Doe’ member of that team placed him in
    extremely tight handcuffs that caused him injuries.” Id. Later,
    after the court expended a considerable amount of effort to
    help him identify the John Doe, it learned that Ebmeyer had
    known his first name since the beginning of the suit. Id. It dis-
    missed his suit with prejudice for failing to disclose this fact
    sooner and rejected his explanation. Id. at 540–41. We vacated
    the judgment in part, finding that, with respect to intent, “Eb-
    meyer’s conduct [was] plausibly the result of misunderstand-
    ing, inadvertence or mistake as opposed to an indication of
    bad faith or a willful abuse of the judicial process.” Id. at 547.
    Returning to the case before us, we believe that the district
    court’s finding of fraud was clearly erroneous. When we cast
    Sanders’s complaint into “the liberal light in which we must
    take pro se pleadings,” we are compelled to conclude that this
    mentally ill prisoner with no legal training, drafting his
    16                                                     No. 20-3276
    complaint while housed in solitary confinement, may have
    “inartfully pleaded” his claims, but there is no basis to say
    that he has committed a fraud on the court.
    His complaint tells a story of inadequate care. He details
    specific needs he has that are not being met. He relates inter-
    actions he has had with staff that seem to explicitly confirm
    that a certain degree of crisis is a prerequisite to obtaining nec-
    essary care. And the most unfortunate corroboration of all is
    his record of self-harm and attempted suicide.
    Construing his complaint in this way, as we must, we are
    “left with a ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
    been committed.’” See Brown v. Plata, 
    563 U.S. 493
    , 513 (2011)
    (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 
    470 U.S. 564
    , 573
    (1985)) (explaining clear error standard). The district court’s
    finding that the allegations were untrue was clearly errone-
    ous.
    This case is not like many of the other situations where we
    have found that a litigant has committed a fraud on the court
    in an effort to proceed IFP. A lot of those cases are clear-cut.
    Either there is documentary proof that “the allegation of pov-
    erty is untrue,” see, e.g., Childress v. Kerr, 803 F. App’x 949, 950–
    51 (7th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (receipts and IFP revocation
    in another court proved litigant had not updated court on
    changed financial status); Hughes v. Anderson, 829 F. App’x
    724, 724 (7th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (jail calls with brother
    demonstrated explicit scheme to avoid fees); Kennedy v. Hui-
    bregtse, 
    831 F.3d 441
    , 443 (7th Cir. 2016) (pretrial discovery un-
    covered undeclared trust fund with $1,400 balance); O’Connor
    v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 790 F. App’x 801, 802 (7th Cir. 2019) (un-
    published) (litigant admitted under oath to inaccuracies in fi-
    nancial affidavit); Shuhaiber v. Illinois, 747 F. App’x 428, 428
    No. 20-3276                                                   17
    (7th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (litigant admitted to forging sig-
    nature of jail’s trust fund officer), or that the litigant misrep-
    resented his litigation history, see Hoskins, 
    633 F.3d at 543
    (court records showed three pending cases omitted from IFP
    application). Not so here.
    Viewed in the proper light, the documentary evidence
    here—100 pages of mental health progress notes—does not
    refute the truth of Sanders’s allegations. They show that he
    received some care, but many of the visits were only five or ten
    minutes long, and he indisputably received flurries of addi-
    tional attention and care following self-harm. These facts cor-
    roborate the allegations as we have construed them above.
    But let’s suppose that the allegations were indisputably
    disproved by the progress notes, as the district court found. It
    was still clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude
    that that inaccuracy constituted a sanctionable lie. A court
    must find that a litigant acted intentionally, or “with a degree
    of culpability that exceeds simple inadvertence or mistake.”
    Ebmeyer, 11 F.4th at 546 (quoting Ramirez, 845 F.3d at 776, 778).
    The conduct must be “an indication of bad faith or a willful
    abuse of the judicial process.” Id. at 547. The record is devoid
    of anything showing this level of culpability.
    The district court’s finding on intent was consequently
    lacking. It held that Sanders’s assertion “represents far more
    than inaccuracy. Plaintiff, a prolific litigator, was aware that
    he could not proceed IFP absent allegations of imminent dan-
    ger of serious physical harm. It appears that Plaintiff made
    such unsupported allegations so as to circumvent the 3-strikes
    rule … . In so doing, he lied … .”
    18                                                    No. 20-3276
    First, despite its view that Sanders is a “prolific litigator,”
    the district court was nevertheless under an obligation to hold
    the allegations in his complaint “to less stringent standards
    than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes, 
    449 U.S. at 9
     (quoting Haines, 
    404 U.S. at 520
    ). It appears to have done
    the opposite, justifying its approach by labeling Sanders a
    “prolific litigator.”
    And to say that his knowledge of the three-strikes rule and
    its exception means that his attempt to fit his claim within that
    exception is indicative of fraud is to hold his pleading to a
    more stringent standard than the court would hold an attor-
    ney’s, for knowing the standard, the law, and the jurisdic-
    tional requirements, and ensuring a client’s case survives
    scrutiny under those dictates, is ordinary legal practice.
    There are a sufficient number of situations where an in-
    mate with three strikes might know the three-strikes rule and
    still have a meritorious claim that truthfully demonstrates he
    is in imminent danger. For these reasons, the finding of intent
    was clearly erroneous.
    C. Lesser Sanctions
    District judges drawing on their inherent power to sanc-
    tion fraud on the court are required to consider lesser sanc-
    tions before resorting to dismissal with prejudice. See, e.g., Ri-
    vera v. Drake, 
    767 F.3d 685
    , 687 (7th Cir. 2014). But the bar is
    extraordinarily low. See Hoskins, 
    633 F.3d at 544
     (“We view the
    court’s citation of Oliver as demonstrating that it considered
    lesser sanctions.”).
    The Defendants argue that Sanders forfeited his argument
    that the district court’s failure to consider lesser sanctions con-
    stitutes legal error by not raising it until after judgment, when
    No. 20-3276                                                    19
    Sanders filed a Rule 59(e) motion. Sanders responds, cor-
    rectly, that the court’s legal error—not considering lesser
    sanctions—did not arise until the time of judgment, so he
    could not have raised the argument before then. See Duran v.
    Town of Cicero, 
    653 F.3d 632
    , 643 (7th Cir. 2011). Therefore, the
    issue is properly before us on appeal.
    The district court never addressed lesser sanctions. And
    although the Defendants assert that “the appropriateness of
    lesser sanctions need not be explored if the circumstances jus-
    tify imposition of the ultimate penalty—dismissal with preju-
    dice,” Appellees’ Br. at 46 (citing Fuery v. City of Chicago, 
    900 F.3d 450
    , 464 (7th Cir. 2018)), that is not what the case law on
    IFP-related fraud-on-the-court dismissals says. What that
    case law says is that district judges must consider other sanc-
    tions before resorting to dismissal.
    Indeed, the “need for the district court to exercise discre-
    tion in deciding among alternative sanctions [is] especially
    great” when the plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Ebmeyer, 11
    F.4th at 547 (quoting Schilling, 
    805 F.2d at 277
    ). It was an abuse
    of discretion for the district court to forego this assessment al-
    together. See id. at 540. But this conclusion is beside the point
    because sanctions were unwarranted to begin with—there
    was no fraud on the court.
    Finally, because we primarily rest our decision on a find-
    ing that there was no fraud on the court, we have no need to
    reach a number of other arguments raised by the parties. We
    express no opinion on these unaddressed issues, saving their
    resolution for another day.
    20                                               No. 20-3276
    III. CONCLUSION
    Because we conclude that the district court’s finding of
    fraud was clearly erroneous, and that its failure to consider
    lesser sanctions was an abuse of discretion, we REVERSE.