STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. STEPHON L. WILSON (17-12-3438, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4132-18
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    STEPHON L. WILSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________
    Submitted January 24, 2022 – Decided February 2, 2022
    Before Judges Fasciale and Firko.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 17-12-3438.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Brian Plunkett, Designated Counsel, on the
    briefs).
    Grace MacAulay, Acting Camden County Prosecutor,
    attorney for respondent (Kevin J. Hein, Special Deputy
    Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of
    counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant appeals from his convictions for second-degree burglary,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2); third-
    degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2); two counts
    of third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
    4(d); two counts of fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A.
    2C:39-5(d); third-degree criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1); fourth-
    degree stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b); and fourth-degree certain persons not to
    have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a). He received an aggregate prison sentence
    of seventeen and one-half years with thirteen years and seven months of parole
    ineligibility.
    The State produced evidence that defendant had violent encounters with
    the victim and the victim's family on May 14, May 22, and May 28, 2017.
    Particularly that defendant stalked the victim and committed the charged
    offenses. The evidence included testimony from the victim, testimony from
    witnesses, testimony from law enforcement, surveillance video, and DNA from
    a knife. Prior to trial, the judge denied defendant's motion to sever the counts
    in the indictment pertaining to the May 14 and May 28 encounters. 1 The judge
    1
    On appeal, defendant does not explicitly challenge the judge's discretionary
    denial of the severance motion.
    A-4132-18
    2
    charged the jury without objection and the jury found defendant guilty on all
    charges.
    On appeal, defendant argues:
    POINT [I]
    DEFENDANT'S CONVICTONS SHOULD BE
    REVERSED AND A NEW TRIAL ORDERED
    BECAUSE THE STATE MISUSED THE STALKING
    STATUTE BOTH SUBSTANTIVELY AND AS A
    DEVISE TO OBTAIN A TACTICAL ADVANTAGE.
    A. The State Misused N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b).
    B. The State May Not Charge [A] Certain
    Offense Solely [T]o Obtain [A] Tactical
    Advantage.
    POINT [II]
    THE FAILURE TO CHARGE DIMINISHED
    CAPACITY WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR BECAUSE
    THE   RECORD     CONTAINED        SUFFICIENT
    EVIDENCE OF A MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT
    THAT COULD HAVE NEGATED THE STATE OF
    MIND   REQUIRED    FOR     THE       OFFENSES
    CHARGED. U.S. CONST. ART. I, [§] 10.
    POINT [III]
    BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRODUCE
    SUFFICIENT FACTS AT TRIAL[,] DEFENDANT'S
    CONVICTION FOR ARMED ROBBERY SHOULD
    BE VACATED AND A JUDGMENT OF
    ACQUITTAL ENTERED.
    A-4132-18
    3
    POINT [IV]
    DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR ARMED
    ROBBERY SHOULD BE VACATED BECAUSE THE
    TRIAL [JUDGE] FAILED TO FULLY EXPLAIN
    LEGAL ISSUES CRITICAL TO THE JURY'S
    DETERMINATION, DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF
    HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.
    A. The Trial [Judge's] Instruction Failed [T]o
    Inform The Jury That [T]o [B]e Guilty [O]f
    Robbery Defendant Must Have Formed [T]he
    Intent [T]o Commit Theft Before [A]ny
    Intimidation [O]f W.K. Occurred.
    B. The Trial [Judge] Erred When [He] Failed
    [T]o Instruct [T]he Jury That [I]t Must Find That
    Defendant's Purpose [F]or Putting W.K. [I]n Fear
    [O]f Immediate Bodily Injury [W]as [T]o Coerce
    Him [I]nto Relinquishing His Phone.
    POINT [V]
    THE [JUDGE] VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT
    TO A UNANIMOUS VERDICT ON COUNT ONE
    ARMED BURGLARY WHEN THE JURORS WERE
    INSTRUCTED    THAT   EITHER  STALKING,
    CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, AND/OR THEFT COULD
    BE FOUND AS THE UNLAWFUL PURPOSE FOR
    DEFENDANT'S ENTRY BUT WERE NOT
    INSTUCTED THAT THEY MUST UNANIMOUSLY
    AGREE ON WHICH PURPOSE(S).
    POINT [VI]
    DEFENDANT SHOULD BE RESENTENCED TO A
    LOWER AGGREGATE TERM WITH MITIGATING
    FACTOR FOUR CONSIDERED.
    A-4132-18
    4
    We disagree with defendant's contentions and affirm.
    I.
    In Point I, defendant challenges the State's decision to try defendant for
    stalking. He argues the State misused the stalking statute to gain an unfair
    advantage by rebranding "existing crimes [to] recase its allegations of weapons
    possession, criminal mischief, and armed robbery into a stalking case." He
    contends the State's sole purpose in prosecuting him for stalking was to gain a
    "tactical advantage" to present "all of its accusations as one 'continuing course
    of conduct' in a single trial."
    The text of the anti-stalking statute is clear and unambiguous. Defendant
    has not argued otherwise. Instead, defendant suggests that under the facts of
    this case, the State misused the statute to obtain a tactical advantage. Defendant
    argues for the first time, without statutory authority, that the scope of the sta tute
    is limited to harassing or threatening conduct that occurs before crossing the line
    to actual violence. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b)
    [a] person is guilty of stalking, a crime of the fourth
    degree, if he purposefully or knowingly engages in a
    course of conduct directed at a specific person that
    would cause a reasonable person to fear for his safety
    or the safety of a third person or suffer other emotional
    distress.
    A-4132-18
    5
    Under subsection (a), the statute defines its terms:
    (1) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining
    a visual or physical proximity to a person; directly,
    indirectly, or through third parties, by any action,
    method, device, or means, following, monitoring,
    observing, surveilling, threatening, or communicating
    to or about, a person, or interfering with a person's
    property; repeatedly committing harassment against a
    person; or repeatedly conveying, or causing to be
    conveyed, verbal or written threats or threats conveyed
    by any other means of communication or threats
    implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at
    or toward a person.
    (2) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.
    (3) "Emotional distress" means significant mental
    suffering or distress.
    (4) "Cause a reasonable person to fear" means to cause
    fear which a reasonable victim, similarly situated,
    would have under the circumstances.
    Thus, contrary to defendant's assertion that the statute's scope is limited to
    situations where there was no actual attack, there is no such limitation expressed
    in the statute. To conclude otherwise would mean that no one could be charged
    with stalking once the conduct results in an attack. And if that is the case,
    stalkers would not be held accountable for stalking when their behavior
    escalates. Like here, the State properly prosecuted defendant for stalking and
    the other crimes.
    A-4132-18
    6
    The State introduced evidence that defendant stalked the victim on three
    separate days in May. On May 14, 2017, witnesses observed defendant destroy
    the windows of the victim's car, which was parked at her mother's house, and
    then tell the witnesses that "all I want is her" while pointing at the victim. Eight
    days later, on May 22, defendant returned to the victim's mother's house, broke
    more windows, and left three red roses behind. On May 28, defendant charged
    the victim in the morning while she was driving and then broke into her home
    through a bathroom window. Hearing noise from outside his room, the victim's
    fourteen-year-old son W.K. called the victim to ask if she was home, and she
    instructed him to call 911.
    Defendant broke into the son's bedroom with a knife and wanted to know
    when the victim would be home. The victim's mother observed the victim on
    the phone with the son and watched her leave in a distressed state. The victim's
    mother called her grandson's phone, and defendant answered. Defendant told
    the victim's mother, "I'm waiting for your daughter here so I can kill her. And
    the next one is going to be you." The victim testified that she experienced
    emotional distress and could not sleep at night. Suffice to say, he repeatedly
    targeted the victim.
    A-4132-18
    7
    In denying defendant's pre-trial motion to sever the first and third
    incidents, the trial judge concluded that each encounter would have been
    admissible in separate trials under N.J.R.E. 404(b). The crimes were relevant to
    defendant's motive and plan to stalk and harass the victim. They were similar
    in that he smashed windows and threatened the same victim. The State offered
    overwhelming evidence from witness observations, surveillance footage
    capturing defendant's behavior, DNA evidence linking defendant to the knife,
    and in-court and out-of-court identifications. And the probative value was not
    outweighed by any apparent prejudice, especially because defendant was not
    deprived of any available defense. Thus, even if joinder was appropriate—
    which is not the case—the evidence of each encounter between defendant and
    the victim would have been admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b).
    II.
    The trial judge did not err by denying defendant's late request, near the
    close of trial, that the judge charge diminished capacity. The record presented
    no competent evidence of diminished capacity evidencing a mental disease or
    defect that somehow negated defendant's state of mind to commit the offenses
    or impact his ability to form the requisite culpability. Contrary to his argument,
    A-4132-18
    8
    any evidence of defendant's mental health was insufficient to warrant a jury
    instruction of diminished capacity.
    A defendant asserting a diminished capacity defense carries the initial
    burden of "present[ing] evidence of a mental disease or defect that interferes
    with cognitive ability sufficient to prevent or interfere with the formation of the
    requisite intent or mens rea[,]" and "evidence that the claimed deficiency did
    affect the defendant's cognitive capacity to form the mental state necessary for
    the commission of the crime." State v. Baum, 
    224 N.J. 147
    , 160-61 (2016)
    (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Galloway, 
    133 N.J. 631
    , 647
    (1993)). Although a defendant must initially "introduce evidence of a mental
    disease or defect tending to show that he or she was incapable of forming the
    requisite intent, N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, 'the statute does not shift the burden of proof
    to the defendant to disprove an essential element of the case.'"        Id. at 161
    (quoting State v. Moore, 
    122 N.J. 420
    , 431 (1991)). Hence, "the burden of proof
    remains on the State to establish the mens rea of the offense." 
    Ibid.
     Indeed,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2 provides:
    [e]vidence that the defendant suffered from a mental
    disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant
    to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind
    which is an element of the offense. In the absence of
    such evidence, it may be presumed that the defendant
    A-4132-18
    9
    had no mental disease or defect which would negate a
    state of mind which is an element of the offense.
    Without introducing the requisite showing of diminished capacity—through
    expert testimony or otherwise—defense trial counsel requested the charge at the
    end of the case, pointing to "behavioral things" like "smiling" and "licking his
    lips," which were not "typical reactions to a police interview." But defendant
    produced no competent evidence of mental disease or defect. Rather, the State
    introduced evidence that defendant knew what he was doing as he pursued the
    victim at multiple locations. Although defendant behaved strangely, the judge
    did not abuse his discretion by denying the request.
    III.
    In Points III and IV, defendant maintains the State failed to prove that he
    intended to steal the son's phone when defendant entered the son's bedroom. He
    argues the judge therefore erred by denying defendant's motion for acquittal
    after the State rested. And he adds, for the first time, 2 that the judge failed to
    instruct the jury that defendant must have formed the intent to commit a theft
    2
    We consider this argument for plain error. R. 2:10-2.
    A-4132-18
    10
    before any "intimidating conduct occurred." The judge correctly denied the
    Reyes3 motion and properly charged the jury on robbery.
    N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 sets forth the elements of robbery and the gradation of
    the offense. A "person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a
    theft," that individual:
    (1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another; or
    (2) Threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear
    of immediate bodily injury; or
    (3) Commits or threatens immediately to commit any
    crime of the first or second degree.
    An act shall be deemed to be included in the phrase "in
    the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an
    attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the
    attempt or commission.
    [N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a).]
    Robbery is a crime of the first degree if "in the course of committing the
    theft, . . . the actor is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a
    deadly weapon." N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b). Relevant to this case, "the intention to
    steal must precede or be coterminous with the use of force." State v. Lopez,
    
    187 N.J. 91
    , 101 (2006).
    3
    State v. Reyes, 
    50 N.J. 454
     (1967) (setting forth the test for adjudicating a
    motion for judgment of acquittal).
    A-4132-18
    11
    The State introduced evidence that defendant's intent to steal the phone
    was coterminous with defendant putting the son in fear of immediate bodily
    injury. The son heard defendant going to the bedroom door, and although the
    son tried to barricade it, defendant broke the door down. The son then observed
    defendant holding two items: a twelve-inch knife with the blade pointing up,
    and a bottle of wine. Defendant demanded the son's phone and told the victim's
    mother, "[O]nce I go after [the victim], I'm going for you next." Defendant fled
    with the phone and ran from the police.
    Our review of a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 3:18-2 is
    de novo. State v. Lodzinski, ___ N.J. ___ (2021) (slip op. at 40). Defendant's
    motive for entering the house may have been to target the victim. But, looking
    at the evidence as we must in the State's favor, defendant formed the intent to
    steal the son's phone once he barged through the barricaded door and demanded
    the phone with a knife in hand. And he threatened bodily injury while holding
    the knife and instilling fear by saying on the phone, "I'm going for you next."
    We see no plain error as to the robbery charge. Indeed, when asked
    whether there where any concerns about the robbery charge, defense counsel
    said, "No." Defendant now argues the charge was flawed because the judge did
    not instruct the jury that defendant "must have formed the intent to commit a
    A-4132-18
    12
    theft before any intimidating conduct occurred" and the purpose of putting the
    son in fear of immediate bodily injury "was to coerce [the son] into relinquishing
    the phone." Looking at the charge as a whole, and considering the timing of the
    use of force by holding a raised knife while demanding the phone, we conclude
    the charge as given was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
    As part of the robbery charge, the jury asked for the meaning of "with
    purpose." In responding to the question, the judge and counsel agreed that the
    judge would re-read the definition of "purposely" in the robbery charge. The
    judge stated that the State must prove defendant, "while in the course of
    committing the theft," threatened the son, or it was his conscious object to put
    the son in fear of immediate bodily injury. This part of the model jury charge
    was given a second time.        The threatening conduct and the theft were
    coterminous. There was no error.
    IV.
    Defendant challenges for the first time the final charge on burglary. He
    contends that the judge failed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously decide
    which specific unlawful act defendant intended to commit when he broke into
    the mother's house. But unanimity is not required as to the specific offense
    A-4132-18
    13
    defendant intended to commit; only that he intended to commit an unlawful
    offense.
    Here, there was no ambiguity surrounding defendant's purpose for
    entering the structure. The evidence did not suggest both criminal and non -
    criminal purposes for entry. Along those lines, the judge instructed the jury that
    the "[p]urpose to commit an offense inside means that . . . defendant intended to
    commit an unlawful act inside the structure."      The State alleged defendant
    intended to commit stalking, criminal mischief, and/or theft inside the structure.
    The parties never introduced evidence that defendant entered the structure for
    any other purpose. The record demonstrates that defendant had no non-criminal
    purpose for entering.
    As to the obligation to charge unanimity on the purpose for entering the
    structure, we explained:
    where the circumstances surrounding the unlawful
    entry do not give rise to any ambiguity or uncertainty
    as to a defendant's purpose in entering a structure
    without privilege to do so [and] lead inevitably and
    reasonably to the conclusion that some unlawful act is
    intended to be committed inside the structure, then
    specific instructions delineating the precise unlawful
    acts intended are unnecessary.
    [State v. Robinson, 
    289 N.J. Super. 447
    , 458 (App. Div.
    1996).]
    A-4132-18
    14
    "[I]f the facts presented in evidence were such that [the] defendant's purpose in
    entering was unclear and therefore reasonably capable of two interpretations,
    one criminal and one non-criminal," then the judge must identify the specific
    offense. See 
    id. at 457
    . Thus, under the facts here, the judge had no obligation
    to consider charging the jury that it must agree on which unlawful act defendant
    intended to commit inside the structure. Consequently, we see no error, let alone
    plain error, that is clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
    V.
    Finally, defendant requests that we remand for re-sentencing, arguing that
    he should receive a lower sentence with mitigating factor four considered. But
    the record shows that the judge properly weighed the applicable factors and
    imposed a lower sentence than requested by the State. The judge considered
    defense counsel's reliance on defendant's emotional, social, and educational
    challenges. The judge's findings included consideration of defendant's "young
    life."
    The scope of our review of sentencing determinations is narrow and those
    decisions are examined under a highly deferential standard. See State v. Roth,
    
    95 N.J. 334
    , 364-65 (1984) (holding that an appellate court may not overturn a
    sentence unless "the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes
    A-4132-18
    15
    the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience"). Our
    review is limited to considering:
    (1) whether guidelines for sentencing established by the
    Legislature or by the courts were violated; (2) whether
    the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the
    sentencing [judge] were based on competent credible
    evidence in the record; and (3) whether the sentence
    was nevertheless "clearly unreasonable so as to shock
    the judicial conscience."
    [State v. Liepe, 
    239 N.J. 359
    , 371 (2019) (quoting State
    v. McGuire, 
    419 N.J. Super. 88
    , 158 (App. Div.
    2011)).]
    "[A]ppellate courts are cautioned not to substitute their judgment for those of
    our sentencing [judges]." State v. Case, 
    220 N.J. 49
    , 65 (2014). A trial judge's
    exercise of discretion in accordance with sentencing principles "should be
    immune from second-guessing." State v. Bieniek, 
    200 N.J. 601
    , 612 (2010).
    Sentencing decisions are based on a qualitative rather than quantitative
    analytical process. State v. L.V., 
    410 N.J. Super. 90
    , 108 (App. Div. 2009)
    (citing State v. Kruse, 
    105 N.J. 354
    , 363 (1987)); see also State v. Denmon,
    
    347 N.J. Super. 457
    , 467-68 (App. Div. 2002) (stating "[o]ur sentencing statute
    contemplates[, like here,] a thoughtful weighing of the aggravating and
    mitigating factors, not a mere counting of one against the other”). We will not
    second guess the judge's findings, which reflect a qualitative analysis.
    A-4132-18
    16
    Affirmed.
    A-4132-18
    17