State of Iowa v. Veil Jacoby Jackson-Douglass ( 2022 )


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  •                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 20–1530
    Submitted November 17, 2021—Filed February 4, 2022
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Appellee,
    vs.
    VEIL JACOBY JACKSON-DOUGLASS,
    Appellant.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bradley J.
    Harris, Judge.
    The defendant challenges his conviction and sentence for sexual abuse in
    the third degree. AFFIRMED.
    McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen,
    C.J., and Appel, Waterman, Mansfield, and Oxley, JJ., joined. Appel, J., filed a
    concurring opinion. McDermott, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
    Richard Hollis, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    2
    McDONALD, Justice.
    Veil Jacoby Jackson-Douglass, age thirty five, sexually abused a fourteen-
    or fifteen-year-old child on multiple occasions and impregnated her. He entered
    a written guilty plea to the crime of sexual abuse in the third degree, a class “C”
    felony. After the district court imposed a prison sentence, Jackson-Douglass filed
    a pro se motion in which he explained he did not want to enter a guilty plea but
    instead wanted to enter an Alford plea. “An Alford plea allows a defendant to
    plead guilty to a crime without admitting to the underlying facts that establish
    the crime.” State v. Rodriguez, 
    804 N.W.2d 844
    , 847 n.1 (Iowa 2011) (citing North
    Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
     (1970)). The district court denied the pro se
    motion, and Jackson-Douglass filed a pro se notice of appeal. In this appeal,
    Jackson-Douglass contends the district court misinterpreted his pro se
    postjudgment motion, his counsel was ineffective in failing to ensure he entered
    an Alford plea and in failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment, and his
    sentencing hearing was defective because the district court failed to ask him if
    he knew of legal cause why judgment of sentence should not be pronounced.
    I.
    Before turning to the merits of the defendant’s appeal, we must first
    address two jurisdictional issues. The first jurisdictional issue is whether the
    defendant timely perfected his appeal. To exercise an appeal as a matter of right,
    Jackson-Douglass was required to timely initiate his appeal. An appeal from a
    final judgment of sentence is initiated by “filing a notice of appeal with the clerk
    of the district court where the order or judgment was entered.” Iowa R. App. P.
    3
    6.102(2). The “notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the filing of the
    final order or judgment.” 
    Id.
     r. 6.101(1)(b). This rule is “mandatory and
    jurisdictional.” Concerned Citizens of Se. Polk Sch. Dist. v. City Dev. Bd., 
    872 N.W.2d 399
    , 402 (Iowa 2015) (quoting Root v. Toney, 
    841 N.W.2d 83
    , 87 (Iowa
    2013)). If a party does not timely file a notice of appeal, the court has no
    jurisdiction over the appeal and the matter must be dismissed. See 
    id.
    Here, Jackson-Douglass timely filed his pro se notice of appeal. However,
    Iowa Code section 814.6A(1) (2019) provides that “[a] defendant who is currently
    represented by counsel shall not file any pro se document . . . in any Iowa court”
    and further provides that a court “shall not consider, and opposing counsel shall
    not respond to, such pro se filings.” When Jackson-Douglass filed his pro se
    notice of appeal, he was still represented by appointed counsel. Plea counsel
    never timely filed a notice of appeal on the defendant’s behalf.
    In light of section 814.6A and plea counsel’s failure to timely file a notice
    of appeal, we had concerns regarding this court’s jurisdiction over Jackson-
    Douglass’s appeal. See, e.g., Colwell v. Iowa Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 
    923 N.W.2d 225
    , 238 (Iowa 2019) (“It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that a
    court has the inherent power to decide if it has subject matter jurisdiction over
    a matter.”); State v. Stark, No. 20–1503, 
    2021 WL 4592246
    , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.
    Oct. 6, 2021) (stating pro se notice of appeal was a nullity but granting delayed
    appeal); cf. Boring v. State, No. 20–0129, 
    2021 WL 2453045
    , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.
    June 16, 2021) (“However, the notice of appeal was again filed pro se while Boring
    was still represented by counsel. Accordingly, it was a document that could not
    4
    be considered. It was a nullity, as the State claims. For that reason, the appeal
    is dismissed.”). We requested that the parties provide supplemental briefing on
    the issue.
    In their supplemental briefing, both parties recognized our caselaw allows
    a defendant a delayed appeal where the defendant expressed a good faith intent
    to appeal before the appeal deadline but failed to timely perfect the appeal due
    to state action or circumstances beyond the defendant’s control. See Swanson v.
    State, 
    406 N.W.2d 792
    , 793 (Iowa 1987); State v. Anderson, 
    308 N.W.2d 42
    , 46
    (Iowa 1981); Horstman v. State, 
    210 N.W.2d 427
    , 429 (Iowa 1973); State v.
    Wetzel, 
    192 N.W.2d 762
    , 764 (Iowa 1971); see also Earley v. Bd. of Adjustment
    of Cerro Gordo Cnty., 
    955 N.W.2d 812
    , 819 (Iowa 2021) (describing the
    importance of stare decisis). In its supplement brief, the State contended section
    814.6A renders the notice of appeal a nullity but acknowledged that allowing
    delayed appeal would be appropriate in this case. In his supplemental brief, the
    defendant contended section 814.6A is inapplicable here because he was not
    represented by counsel, “practically speaking,” at the time he filed his notice of
    appeal. In the alternative, the defendant requested this court allow him to pursue
    a delayed appeal in this case.
    We agree with the parties that delayed appeal is appropriate under the
    circumstances presented. In State v. Davis, ___ N.W.2d ____, ___ (Iowa 2022), we
    held that even if section 814.6A prohibited a represented defendant from filing a
    pro se notice of appeal, the defendant should nonetheless be allowed to pursue
    a delayed appeal where the defendant timely expressed an intent to appeal before
    5
    the appeal deadline but failed to timely initiate the appeal due to state action or
    circumstances beyond the defendant’s control. See 
    id.
     As in Davis, Jackson-
    Douglass timely expressed an intent to appeal by filing his notice of appeal. As
    in Davis, Jackson-Douglass’s plea counsel failed to act on Jackson-Douglass’s
    expressed intent. As we explained in Davis, plea counsel’s failure to file a notice
    of appeal after the defendant unequivocally expressed an intent to do so is a
    circumstance outside the defendant’s control and serves as grounds for allowing
    delayed appeal.
    Having concluded delayed appeal is appropriate here, we return to
    Jackson-Douglass’s argument that he was without counsel, “practically
    speaking,” at the time he filed his notice of appeal. We disagree with this
    contention. The district court entered judgment of sentence on October 15, 2020.
    On October 29, Jackson-Douglass’s trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw from
    the case. Jackson-Douglass filed his notice of appeal on Monday, November 16.
    The district court did not grant counsel’s motion to withdraw until November 18.
    Although it seems obvious Jackson-Douglass was, in fact, represented by
    counsel at the time he filed his notice of appeal, we think further discussion of
    the issue important because section 814.6A has rendered certain district court
    practices prejudicial, or potentially prejudicial, to defendants.
    In this case, plea counsel’s motion to withdraw requested that “both the
    undersigned and the Waterloo Adult Public Defender’s Office be deindexed from
    EDMS [(Electronic Document Management System)] as the pending matter listed
    above is now closed.” Counsel’s request to be deindexed from EDMS was a
    6
    request to stop receiving EDMS communications regarding the case. See Iowa
    Rs. Elec. P. 16.304(1)(h) (“A registered filer’s withdrawal from participation in
    EDMS is not a withdrawal from a case.”), 16.315(1)(b) (“When a document is
    electronically filed, EDMS serves the document on all parties who are registered
    filers.”), 16.315(1)(d) (“Notices of electronic filing or presentation will continue to
    be provided to a registered filer until the filer has filed a withdrawal from the
    case and, if applicable, obtained an order allowing the withdrawal.”). Although it
    is unclear whether the clerk of court immediately deindexed counsel from the
    case, this court has become aware that some attorneys have been “deindexed
    from EDMS” prior to the time expressed in Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure
    2.29(6) and 2.30(1). We disapprove of the practice.
    Jackson-Douglass’s plea counsel’s motion to withdraw did not relieve
    counsel of his ongoing duty of representation. To the contrary. Iowa Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 2.29(6) states “trial counsel shall continue as defendant’s
    appointed appellate counsel unless the trial court or supreme court orders
    otherwise.” Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.30(1) further provides that:
    [I]n the event of the entry of a judgment of conviction and sentence,
    an attorney may not withdraw without leave of court until filing of
    notice of appeal, an application for appointment of counsel, and an
    application for production of transcripts at public expense in
    accordance with rule 2.29(6), if applicable, or until the expiration of
    the time for appeal from the judgment of conviction if no notice of
    appeal is filed, whichever occurs first.
    Counsel’s request to be deindexed from EDMS and the clerk of court’s grant of
    any request to be deindexed from EDMS prior to the district court’s grant of
    counsel’s motion to withdraw is contrary to the rules of criminal procedure. Until
    7
    such time as the district court grants counsel’s motion to withdraw or the time
    for appeal has passed, whichever comes first, counsel continues to represent the
    defendant in the matter. Counsel has an ongoing duty to receive and monitor
    EDMS filings and notifications in the case without regard to whether the attorney
    considers the case “closed.” See Iowa R. Elec. P. 16.304(1)(g)(2) (“Registered filers
    must monitor their accounts regularly and ensure that notifications sent to the
    account are timely opened.”). An attorney who is deindexed from the case and
    fails to act appropriately in response to pro se filings violates the rules of criminal
    procedure and risks prejudicing his client as evidenced in Davis and in this case.
    The second jurisdictional issue is whether the defendant actually had an
    appeal as a matter of right. “Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) provides a
    defendant may appeal as a matter of right from a conviction entered upon a
    guilty plea only when the conviction is for a class ‘A’ felony or the defendant
    establishes good cause.” State v. Boldon, 
    954 N.W.2d 62
    , 68 (Iowa 2021). The
    defendant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of a class “C” felony and thus
    must establish good cause to appeal as a matter of right. Good cause requires
    the defendant to establish a “legally sufficient reason” to appeal. State v. Damme,
    
    944 N.W.2d 98
    , 104 (Iowa 2020). We have found a defendant generally has good
    cause to appeal as a matter of right when the defendant challenges his
    sentencing hearing or the sentence itself. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 
    959 N.W.2d 395
    , 399 (Iowa 2021) (finding good cause to determine whether a prosecutor
    breached a plea agreement to remain silent at sentencing when the defendant
    absconded after the plea hearing and failed to appear at the original sentencing
    8
    hearing); Boldon, 954 N.W.2d at 69 (finding good cause to determine whether
    prosecutor breached a plea agreement and whether the district court improperly
    used the defendant’s juvenile offense history during sentencing); Damme, 944
    N.W.2d at 105 (finding good cause to determine whether the district court
    improperly referred to the defendant’s family’s criminal history during
    sentencing). Jackson-Douglass challenges the legality of the sentencing hearing
    and subsequent sentence and thus has established good cause to appeal as a
    matter of right.
    II.
    We now address the merits of Jackson-Douglass’s appeal.
    A.
    Jackson-Douglass first argues that the district court misinterpreted his
    postjudgment motion. On November 9, after the entry of judgment of sentence
    on October 15, Jackson-Douglass filed a pro se motion. In the motion, Jackson-
    Douglass stated the following: “I would like to file a motion to reconsider my
    sentence on behalf of my plea. I told my lawyer to file an Alford plea on my behalf
    and he didn’t. He only entered a guilty plea. I want to plead under the Alford
    plea.” The district court denied this motion on November 18 because the
    “[r]eason stated for Reconsideration of Sentence was not ground[s] to
    reconsider.” On appeal, Jackson-Douglass contends the district court erred in
    treating the motion as a motion to reconsider sentence rather than a motion in
    arrest of judgment to undo the defendant’s guilty plea.
    9
    This claim does not entitle the defendant to any relief. Iowa Code section
    814.6A prohibits any Iowa court from considering pro se supplemental filings,
    and Jackson-Douglass does not contest the constitutionality of the law as
    applied to his pro se supplemental motion. Despite section 814.6A, the district
    court nonetheless ruled on the motion, but we cannot conclude the district court
    erred in treating Jackson-Douglass’s motion as a motion to reconsider his
    sentence when the defendant specifically asked the court to “reconsider my
    sentence.” In addition, the defendant suffered no prejudice. A motion in arrest
    of judgment “must be made not later than 45 days after plea of guilty, verdict of
    guilty, or special verdict upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered,
    but in any case not later than five days before the date set for pronouncing
    judgment.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(b). The defendant’s motion was filed sixty-
    seven days after the written guilty plea and twenty-five days after the district
    court pronounced judgment. To the extent the defendant intended the motion to
    serve as a motion in arrest of judgment, the filing was untimely and the district
    court would not have been able to provide the defendant with any relief even if
    section 814.6A were inapplicable.
    B.
    Jackson-Douglass contends his counsel provided ineffective assistance in
    failing to ensure that Jackson-Douglass entered an Alford plea rather than a
    traditional guilty plea and in failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment to undo
    the guilty plea. Neither claim can serve as a ground for relief on direct appeal.
    Iowa courts are “without the authority to decide ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
    10
    claims on direct appeal.” State v. Tucker, 
    959 N.W.2d 140
    , 154 (Iowa 2021). Iowa
    Code section 814.7 provides:
    An ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case
    shall be determined by filing an application for postconviction relief
    pursuant to chapter 822. The claim need not be raised on direct
    appeal from the criminal proceedings in order to preserve the claim
    for postconviction relief purposes, and the claim shall not be decided
    on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings.
    Pursuant to the statute, all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be
    presented in the first instance through a claim for postconviction relief rather
    than on direct appeal. This statute simply codifies more strongly our appellate
    practice   of   preserving   claims   of   ineffective   assistance   of   counsel   for
    postconviction-relief proceedings. See State v. Treptow, 
    960 N.W.2d 98
    , 103
    (Iowa 2021).
    The defendant asserts several constitutional challenges to section 814.7,
    but this court rejected identical constitutional challenges after the defendant
    submitted his briefing in this case. See 
    id.
     at 103–04 (holding section 814.7 does
    not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine); 
    id.
     at 104–07 (holding section
    814.7 does not violate the right to equal protection of the laws); 
    id.
     at 107–08
    (holding section 814.7 does not violate the right to due process or the right to
    the effective assistance of counsel); see also Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 151
    (“Regardless, section 814.7 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.”).
    Treptow and Tucker are dispositive of the defendant’s constitutional claims.
    11
    C.
    Jackson-Douglass challenges his sentencing hearing. Iowa Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(a) provides that “[w]hen the defendant appears for
    judgment, the defendant must be informed by the court or the clerk under its
    direction, of the nature of the indictment, the defendant’s plea, and the verdict,
    if any thereon, and be asked whether the defendant has any legal cause to show
    why judgment should not be pronounced against the defendant.” Here, the
    district court told Jackson-Douglass he had “a right to speak on [his] own behalf”
    and asked if there was “anything [he’d] like to tell the Court?” Jackson-Douglass
    then proceeded to discuss his situation and responsibility in committing the
    crime. Jackson-Douglass nonetheless argues the district court erred in not
    reciting verbatim rule 2.23(3)(a) and asking him whether he knew of “any legal
    cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced?”
    We disagree with the defendant’s hyperliteral reading of the rules of
    procedure. Our courts have repeatedly stated that the trial court need not use
    the exact language in the rules of criminal procedure at sentencing. See e.g. State
    v. Lumadue, 
    622 N.W.2d 302
    , 304 (Iowa 2001) (en banc); State v. Duckworth,
    
    597 N.W.2d 799
    , 800 (Iowa 1999) (per curiam); State v. Craig, 
    562 N.W.2d 633
    ,
    634–35 (Iowa 1997) (per curiam). Substantial compliance is sufficient.
    Duckworth, 
    597 N.W.2d at 800
    . “The important thing is whether the defendant
    is given an opportunity to volunteer any information helpful to the defendant’s
    cause.” Craig, 
    562 N.W.2d at 635
     (emphasis added). In State v. Christensen, 
    201 N.W.2d 457
    , 460 (Iowa 1972), this court held the defendant was not denied the
    12
    right of allocution where the district court asked, “Is there anything you would
    like to say to the court before I pronounce sentence?” The district court’s
    statements to Jackson-Douglass were almost identical to those approved in
    Christensen. Therefore, we conclude the district court substantially complied
    with rule 2.23(3)(a) and did not deny the defendant the right of allocution.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and
    sentence for sex abuse in the third degree.
    AFFIRMED.
    McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen,
    C.J., and Appel, Waterman, Mansfield, and Oxley, JJ., joined. Appel, J., files a
    concurring opinion. McDermott, J., files a dissenting opinion.
    13
    #20–1530, State v. Jackson-Douglass
    APPEL, Justice (concurring).
    I concur in the opinion in this case. I incorporate by reference herein my
    concurring opinion in State v. Davis, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2022) (Appel, J.,
    concurring).
    14
    #20–1530, State v. Jackson-Douglass
    McDERMOTT, Justice (dissenting).
    Iowa Code section 814.6A(1) (2019) commands that “[t]he court shall not
    consider” filings made by defendants in criminal cases if the defendant is
    represented by counsel. The pro se notice of appeal that Jackson-Douglass filed
    is thus ineffectual—we, as a court, cannot consider it—because he was
    represented by counsel when he made the filing. See State v. Thompson, 
    954 N.W.2d 402
    , 418–19 (Iowa 2021). By the time his lawyer filed a notice of appeal
    on Jackson-Douglass’s behalf, the appeal deadline had long since passed.
    “The right to appeal is strictly governed by statute.” In re Melodie L., 
    591 N.W.2d 4
    , 6 (Iowa 1999). Appeal deadlines are jurisdictional. Root v. Toney, 
    841 N.W.2d 83
    , 87 (Iowa 2013). This means that our court doesn’t have jurisdiction—
    the power to decide a case—when parties miss the prescribed appeal deadlines.
    If a party “is late in filing, by as little as one day, we are without jurisdiction to
    consider the appeal.” In re Marriage of Mantz, 
    266 N.W.2d 758
    , 759 (Iowa 1978).
    Since both legal and pragmatic reasons dictate that we not take up the merits of
    appeals filed beyond the mandatory deadlines, see In re A.B., 
    957 N.W.2d 280
    ,
    301–05 (Iowa 2021) (McDermott, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I
    would not consider the merits as the majority does under our ever-expanding
    “delayed appeal” jurisprudence.
    Jackson-Douglass claims that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of
    counsel in failing to timely file the notice of appeal on his behalf. That may be.
    But another statute prevents us from considering that issue on appeal too.
    15
    Under Iowa Code section 814.7, we lack the power to hear ineffective-assistance
    claims on direct appeal. Such a claim would need to be brought in a
    postconviction-relief action. See State v. Treptow, 
    960 N.W.2d 98
    , 107–08 (Iowa
    2021).
    I thus respectfully dissent and would dismiss the defendant’s appeal.