STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOAO C. TORRES (17-03-0371, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1005-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOAO C. TORRES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued May 18, 2020 – Remanded July 9, 2020
Reargued February 10, 2022 – Decided March 1, 2022
Before Judges Alvarez and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 17-03-
0371.
Margaret McLane, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Margaret McLane, of
counsel and on the briefs).
Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting
Attorney General, attorney; Steven A. Yomtov, of
counsel and on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
This matter returns after a remand to the motion judge for further findings
regarding a suppression motion filed by defendant Joao C. Torres challenging
the constitutionality of a warrantless seizure during a murder investigation.
State v. Torres, No. A-1005-18 (App. Div. July 9, 2020) (slip op. at 2).
Defendant argued the judge erred when he failed to suppress the seizure of
clothing defendant was wearing when he was taken into custody as an
unconstitutional strip search. We rejected that argument. However, we
remanded for further findings because the judge did not determine whether there
was probable cause to arrest defendant when his clothing was seized, and did
not analyze whether the warrantless seizure was valid under the search incident
to arrest or inevitable discovery exceptions. Id. at 8-10. On July 6, 2021, the
motion judge issued a final decision and written findings denying defendant's
motion. We now affirm.
Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office Detective Craig Marchak was the
sole witness at the suppression hearing. On January 4, 2017, at 12:30 p.m.,
Marchak was assigned to investigate a homicide at a Monroe Township
residence where officers responded to a 9-1-1 call and reported large amounts
of blood in a bedroom. Police located the body of defendant's stepfather
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Christopher Ernst, Sr., wrapped in a blanket and a garbage bag secured by duct
tape in the residence's garage. Detectives learned defendant and Ernst were
home the night before. Ernst's truck and defendant were missing.
Police located defendant and the truck in a nearby wooded area. He was
in a structure on the property, and when he exited, he ignored police commands
to stop and entered the woods. Defendant was later discovered in the rear
storage of a disabled mulch truck and placed under arrest on an outstanding
traffic warrant. Marchak testified at that point defendant was a suspect in the
murder. Defendant was transported to the police department, Mirandized,1 and
Marchak and Monroe Township Police Detective Joseph Silvestri began
interviewing him at 4:26 p.m. The video recording of the interview was played
at the suppression hearing.
Marchak informed defendant they were interviewing him about the blood
in the house and the discovery of Ernst's body. Marchak told defendant police
"talked to a lot of people already" and defendant responded: "I'm always the
[scapegoat] in the family so go ahead." Later during the interview, Silvestri
described more of the evidence police found and said: "We know what
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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happened." Defendant then invoked his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel. Marchak noted defendant never asked what happened to Ernst.
Marchak testified he decided to take defendant's clothing following his
statement because "[t]hroughout the interview" he noticed a substance on
defendant's hands. Marchak explained defendant "was picking at his hands,
looking at his hands. . . . I could see him . . . rubbing his fingers when his hands
are crossed. He then put his hands into his pockets. And you could see
movement within that. That's when [defendant asks] why I'm staring at him."
The prosecutor paused the video at the 4:51 p.m. time stamp to show the judge
an example of defendant's conduct.
Marchak testified he exited the interview room at approximately 5:08 p.m.
to discuss the matter with other officers. He stated:
Due to the enormous amount of blood [at the
crime scene] . . . whatever other evidence [that] would
be there should have been on someone's hands or . . .
clothing . . . and there should be something possibly left
over, whether [you wear] gloves or not. . . .
I was trying to look at his hands . . . [a]nd you
could see . . . they're a little dirty, like they've already
either been washed . . . or maybe it's just dirt, but at that
point we weren't sure. So, we took precautionary
measures.
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Marchak explained he wanted to get a warrant to take defendant's clothing and
swab his hands but decided against it out of concern defendant would destroy
the evidence on his hands by continuing to rub them or using the bathroom.
Without a warrant, officers swabbed defendant's hands, removed his clothing,
and gave him a Tyvek suit. 2
Following our remand, the motion judge found the warrantless search
lawful as a search incident to arrest. He concluded the "officers acted in an
objectively reasonable manner[,]" reasoning defendant was initially a person of
interest as a household member, but could not be found, and later "fled and hid,"
requiring a police search and was arrested on an outstanding warrant. The judge
found police "made a reasonable decision" to swab defendant's hands and seize
his clothing based on the concern defendant was destroying evidence. The judge
stated:
[U]nder the totality of the circumstances, especially
considering the information officers were already
privileged to regarding the victim's death,[] a real-time
decision had to be made, balancing the intrusion on
[defendant's] Fourth Amendment interests against the
legitimate governmental interests. There is no doubt
that the interest to collect the evidence as soon as
possible without a warrant is a legitimate governmental
interest.
2
The record shows this process began at 6:41 p.m. and concluded at 7:02 p.m.
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Citing our decision in State v. Lentz, 463 N.J. Super. 54, 68 (App. Div.
2020), the judge further noted the warrantless swabbing of a defendant's hands
and removal of his clothing was constitutional because it "'was non-invasive,
brief, and performed only to recover evidence . . . stemming from [defendant's]
suspected involvement' in the murder of his step-father."
On appeal, defendant argues:
POLICE WERE NOT PERMITTED TO SEIZE AND
SEARCH DEFENDANT'S CLOTHES WITHOUT A
WARRANT HOURS AFTER HIS ARREST.
"An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal
case must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision,
provided that those findings are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence in the
record.'" State v. Mandel, 455 N.J. Super. 109, 113-14 (App. Div. 2018)
(quoting State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 425-26 (2017)). "We owe no deference,
however, to conclusions of law made by trial courts in deciding suppression
motions, which we . . . review de novo." State v. Brown, 456 N.J. Super. 352,
358-59 (App. Div. 2018) (citing State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015)).
"Both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution
guarantee an individual's right to be secure against unreasonable searches or
seizures." State v. Minitee, 210 N.J. 307, 318 (2012) (citing U.S. Const. amend.
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IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7). "[S]earches and seizures conducted without warrants
issued upon probable cause are presumptively unreasonable and therefore
invalid." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 246 (2007).
"[T]he search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement was
limned for two specific purposes—the protection of the police and the
preservation of evidence . . . ." State v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523, 524 (2006).
Pursuant to the exception, "the arresting officer [can] search" both "the arrestee's
person and the area 'within his immediate control'" in order to prevent the
arrestee from obtaining a weapon or destroying evidence. Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The arrest need not be related to the offense for which
the search is being conducted. Lentz, 463 N.J. Super. at 60, 75. Indeed,
because a lawful "custodial arrest of a suspect based on
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the
Fourth Amendment[,] . . . a search incident to the arrest
requires no additional justification," and the mere "fact
of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to
search" justifies "a full search of the person."
[Id. at 70 (alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).]
"Whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 'depends
on [the totality] of the circumstances surrounding the search . . . and the nature
of the search . . . itself.'" State v. O'Hagen, 189 N.J. 140, 149 (2007) (quoting
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Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)). "In making that
determination, the [c]ourt balances the 'intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against [the] promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.'" Ibid. (second alteration in original) (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at
619).
We have held "a search incident to an arrest may be valid under some
circumstances even though it is not conducted contemporaneously with the
arrest." State v. Oyenusi, 387 N.J. Super. 146, 156 (App. Div. 2006). In
Oyenusi, we pointed to United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974),
where the Court "upheld the validity of the seizure and subsequent search of
clothing taken from an arrestee in jail approximately ten hours after his arrest."
387 N.J. Super. at 156. In Lentz, we also discussed Edwards, stating:
There, the defendant was lawfully arrested and in
custody in a jail cell "[w]hen it became apparent that
the articles of clothing [he was wearing] were evidence
of the crime for which [he] was being held." [Edwards,
415 U.S. at 608]. The Court found it was "reasonable
to take and examine [his clothing] as the police did,
particularly in view of the existence of probable cause
linking the clothes to the crime." Ibid.....
The Court explained "it is difficult to perceive
what is unreasonable about the police's examining and
holding as evidence those personal effects of the
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accused that they already have in their lawful custody
as the result of a lawful arrest." [Ibid.]
[Lentz, 463 N.J. Super. at 71-72 (alterations in
original).]
We noted our own Supreme Court held "if the arrest . . . is lawful the
search . . . [is] not invalidated solely because the officers had adequate time to
procure a search . . . warrant." Id. at 77 (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Doyle, 42 N.J. 334, 343 (1964)). Rather, "the proper inquiry for determining
the constitutionality of a search-and-seizure is whether the conduct of the law
enforcement officer who undertook the search was objectively reasonable."
Watts, 223 N.J. at 514 (quoting State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 219 (1983)).
"The test is not whether there were other reasonable or even better ways to
execute the search, for hindsight and considered reflection often permit more
inspired after-the-fact decision-making." Ibid. "For purposes of our Federal
and State Constitutions, it is enough that the police officers, in performing their
duties, acted in an objectively reasonable fashion." Id. at 515.
Defendant argues the search incident to arrest was unconstitutional
because: police lacked probable cause; there was an unreasonable delay
between his arrest and the seizure of his clothing; and the search was
unreasonably invasive. We are unpersuaded.
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Defendant was under lawful arrest on a traffic warrant at the time he was
taken to the police station to be interviewed. Based on the information police
gathered prior to the interview, he was clearly a suspect, and police told him so
during the interview. The record corroborates Marchak's testimony; defendant
appeared to be destroying the evidence on his hands as the interview progressed.
Given the totality of the circumstances—namely the blood discovered at the
crime scene and that the body was moved from one part of the residence to
another; defendant's attempt to flee police; and his comments and conduct at the
interview—it was not unreasonable for police to conclude his clothing also
contained evidence of the crime. The record shows there was probable cause.
There was also no unreasonable delay in the seizure of defendant's
clothing because it occurred less than two hours after the interview ended.
Finally, the search was not unduly intrusive because, as we previously ruled,
defendant was ordered to remove his clothing to retain the evidence on the
garments rather than to visually inspect his underwear or body. Torres, slip op.
at 14-15.
For these reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion by the motion judge.
The judge properly concluded the search incident to arrest was constitutional
and did not err in denying the suppression motion.
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Affirmed.
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