J.O. v. Township of Bedminster , 433 N.J. Super. 199 ( 2013 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NOS. A-1838-11T3
A-3182-11T3
J.O.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v.
October 31, 2013
TOWNSHIP OF BEDMINSTER, APPELLATE DIVISION
NANCI ARRAIAL, COUNTY OF
SOMERSET, BOROUGH OF
WESTWOOD, and ROBERT SAUL,
Defendants-Respondents.
______________________________
J.O.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF BEDMINSTER
and NANCI ARRAIAL,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
COUNTY OF SOMERSET, BOROUGH
OF WESTWOOD, and ROBERT SAUL,
Defendants.
________________________________________________________________
Argued April 8, 2013 – Decided October 31, 2013
Before Judges Ashrafi, Espinosa and
Guadagno.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, General Equity Part,
Bergen County, Docket No. C-35-10.
J.O. Jr., argued the cause for
appellant in A-1838-11 and respondent in A-
3182-11.
Richard J. Guss argued the cause for
Township of Bedminster and Nancy Arraial,
respondents in A-1838-11 and appellants in
A-3182-11 (DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley,
Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum,
P.C., attorneys; Mr. Guss, on the briefs).
Scott D. Rodgers, Deputy County Counsel,
argued the cause for respondent County of
Somerset in A-1838-11 (William T. Cooper,
III, Somerset County Counsel, attorney; Mr.
Rodgers, on the brief).
Mary C. McDonnell argued the cause for
respondents Robert Saul & Borough of
Westwood in A-1838-11 (Pfund McDonnell,
P.C., attorneys; Ms. McDonnell and David T.
Pfund, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ESPINOSA, J.A.D.
Although it was enacted in 1979, there are no published
opinions that interpret or apply the Subpoena First Act,
N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.9 to -21.13 (the Act),1 which has been
described as "narrowly circumscrib[ing] the situations in which
the State can properly search and seize materials acquired in
the course of newsgathering." In re Woodhaven Lumber and Mill
1
L. 1979, c. 488, § 1 (effective Feb. 28, 1980).
2 A-1838-11T3
Work, 123 N.J. 481, 491 (1991) (analyzing the Shield Law,
N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21 to -21.8); see also In re Subpoena Issued to
Schuman, 114 N.J. 14, 24 (1989) (same). In this case, we
consider the application of the Act to a suspect in a criminal
investigation who asserted a claim to its protection based upon
his status as an "internet publisher" after a search warrant was
executed and his suppression motion was denied. We affirm the
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against all defendants. As
for his claims under the Act, we hold that plaintiff waived any
claim to protection; that the officers here were not required to
conduct an investigation to determine whether plaintiff was
protected by the Act prior to seeking a warrant; and that, even
if plaintiff had timely asserted his claim, he was not entitled
to the Act's protection because the materials sought were not
obtained in the course of newsgathering activities.
Defendants Township of Bedminster and Nanci Arraial (the
Bedminster defendants) appeal from the denial of their motion
for counsel fees pursuant to Rule 1:4-8. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm that denial as well.
I.
It is generally acknowledged that the Act, like its federal
counterpart, the Privacy Protection Act (PPA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§
2000aa-aa12, was a legislative response to the United States
3 A-1838-11T3
Supreme Court's decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547, 567-68, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1982-83, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525, 543 (1978).
See Sennett v. United States, 667 F.3d 531, 535 (4th Cir. 2012);
Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 340 (6th Cir. 2001); Byrnes,
Current New Jersey Arrest, Search & Seizure 573-74 (2012-13);
Debra L. Stone, The Criminal Justice System and the News Media:
Recent Developments, 7 Crim. Just. Q. 178, 196 (1980).
Zurcher had its roots in an April 1971 demonstration at
Stanford University Hospital that devolved into a violent clash
in which a group of demonstrators, armed with sticks and clubs,
attacked and injured nine police officers. Zurcher, supra, 436
U.S. at 550, 98 S. Ct. at 1973-74, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 532.
Articles and photographs published in the Stanford Daily, a
student newspaper, suggested that a Daily staff member might
have photographed the assault on the officers. Although there
was no allegation that any members of the Daily staff had
engaged in unlawful activity, the Santa Clara County District
Attorney's Office obtained a warrant to search the Daily's
office for negatives and photographs that would assist in the
identification of the persons who assaulted the officers. Id.
at 551, 98 S. Ct. at 1974, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 532. When the
warrant was executed, the only photographs found were those that
had already been published. No materials were removed from the
4 A-1838-11T3
Daily's office. Id. at 551-52, 98 S. Ct. at 1974, 56 L. Ed. 2d
at 533.
The student newspaper and various staff members brought a
civil action, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983, against the law enforcement officials involved
and the judge who issued the warrant. Judgment was entered in
favor of the newspaper and its staff members and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. However, the Supreme Court reversed, stating,
[W]e decline to reinterpret the [Fourth]
Amendment to impose a general constitutional
barrier against warrants to search newspaper
premises, to require resort to subpoenas as
a general rule, or to demand prior notice
and hearing in connection with the issuance
of search warrants.
[Id. at 567, 98 S. Ct. at 1982, 56 L. Ed. 2d
at 543.]
The Court added, "Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not
prevent or advise against legislative or executive efforts to
establish nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses
of the search warrant procedure[.]" Ibid. Congress and a
number of state legislatures,2 including New Jersey, accepted the
invitation to establish such protections.
2
Or. Rev. Stat. § 44.520(2) (2011); Wash. Rev. Code §
10.79.015(3) (2013); Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(d) (2013); Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 54-33j(a) (2013); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
18.01(e) (West 2001); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/108-3(b) (2013).
5 A-1838-11T3
The protection provided by the federal statute does not
turn on whether the person who possesses the materials sought is
a member of the news media. Rather, the prohibition applies
when the person in possession has "a purpose to disseminate to
the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form
of public communication." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000aa(a), (b). The
PPA has certain limited exceptions, which include a "suspect"
exception:
[T]his provision shall not impair or affect
the ability of any government officer or
employee, pursuant to otherwise applicable
law, to search for or seize such materials,
if--
(1) there is probable cause to believe
that the person possessing such materials
has committed or is committing the criminal
offense to which the materials relate
. . . .
[Ibid.]
The prohibition in New Jersey's Act provides in pertinent
part:
Any person . . . engaged on, engaged
in, connected with, or otherwise employed in
gathering, procuring, transmitting,
compiling, editing, publishing, or
disseminating news for the public . . .
shall be free from searches and seizures, by
. . . law enforcement officers with respect
to any documentary materials obtained in the
course of pursuing the aforesaid activities
whether or not such material has been or
will be disseminated or published.
6 A-1838-11T3
[N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.9.]
Like the PPA, the Act has exceptions to the general
prohibition, which include a "suspect" exception virtually
identical to that in the federal statute:
This section shall not restrict or impair
the ability of any law enforcement officer,
pursuant to otherwise applicable law, to
search for or seize such materials, if there
is probable cause to believe that:
a. The person, corporation, partnership,
proprietorship or other entity possessing
the materials has committed or is committing
the criminal offense for which the materials
are sought . . . .
[Ibid.]
That the statute was a legislative response to Zurcher is
reflected in the distinction between the Act's application to
materials possessed by persons who are not suspects in a
criminal investigation and its explicit exception for situations
where the person in possession is suspected of "committing the
criminal offense for which the materials are sought." The
salient facts in Zurcher that caught the public's attention were
related to the unequivocal status of the persons in possession
as journalists doing their job. No Daily staff member was
suspected of criminal activity, and the items sought – the
photographs and negatives – were unquestionably obtained in the
course of newsgathering activity. As the Assembly Judiciary,
7 A-1838-11T3
Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee Statement on this
legislation explained:
The purpose of this bill is to preserve
the first amendment's freedom of the press
by insuring that the files of the news media
shall not be the subject of searches and
seizures by law enforcement officials,
except . . . in specifically enumerated
special cases. The exceptions [include]
where there is probable cause to believe
that: the news media is involved in a crime
. . . .
[Assembly Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and
Defense Committee, Statement to A.1535 (June
28, 1979) (emphasis added).]
This distinction is further evident in the nature of the
remedy provided. If a search or seizure is conducted in
violation of the Act, the aggrieved party may bring a civil
action. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.11. However, the Act does not
provide for the suppression of evidence seized in violation of
the statute.
II.
We now turn to the facts of this case, which are derived
from the record and the trial court's decision.
Detective Nanci Arraial of the Bedminster Township Police
Department initiated an investigation in 2007 after Amy Wollock,
an associate dean at Rutgers University, contacted her
concerning a website, amywollock.com. Wollock told Arraial she
advised plaintiff, a master's degree student, that he needed
8 A-1838-11T3
some additional humanities classes before she would approve his
certification to become a teacher in New Jersey. Plaintiff
threatened to sue Rutgers if he was not approved for a teacher
certification. Wollock told Arraial she was afraid of
plaintiff.
Amywollock.com was a self-described "web gripe site." The
text on the website began,
I have a gripe with Amy Wollock (former
Director of Teacher Education) of the
Rutgers University Graduate School of
Education (GSE), New Brunswick, NJ.
Unfortunately, I was systematically
threatened and excluded from opportunities
to file a formal grievance against Amy
Wollock while I was a student at Rutgers, so
this web site had become my only recourse.
The website had a photograph of Wollock, with a countdown
feature immediately below that stated, "Only 208 days until the
fun begins." The number of days was reduced on a daily basis.
The website did not explain what was meant by "the fun."
Plaintiff invited readers to return to the site to "tell your
own horror story" and promised not to publish names or contact
information unless requested to do so.
Through the use of grand jury subpoenas, Arraial learned
that amywollock.com was created using an email account,
amywollock@gmail.com, and that the registrant for that account
was listed as Amy Wollock. Arraial confirmed that Wollock had
9 A-1838-11T3
not created the email account and, investigating further, was
able to ascertain, through the IP address, that the creator of
the website was J.O.
Arraial filed a complaint against plaintiff alleging that
amywollock.com constituted harassment in violation of N.J.S.A.
2C:33-4(a). Plaintiff was found guilty in Bedminster Municipal
Court and sentenced to probation in February 2009, with the
conditions that plaintiff have no contact with Wollock and was
prohibited from "using [his] computer to make inquiries of any
kind about" her. Plaintiff appealed and was found not guilty by
the Superior Court on July 23, 2009.
However, on June 10, 2009, before plaintiff's conviction
was reversed, Wollock contacted Arraial regarding
amywollock.wordpress.com, a website she believed violated the
municipal court's order. The wording on the website mirrored
the nature and content of amywollock.com. In addition, the
website included hyperlinks to: a mapping system that showed
Wollock's home address with an aerial map of her home; Wollock's
email address, phone number, and a background check on her; and
other links to websites that offered personal information such
as the names of several of Wollock's relatives, her previous
addresses, date of birth, average income, and average home
value.
10 A-1838-11T3
Through the use of grand jury subpoenas, Arraial obtained
subscriber information for the website and learned that
amywollock.wordpress.com was registered on June 30, 2007.
Arraial also learned the subscriber's username (amywollock),
user email (amywollock@gmail.com), and IP address. None of
these were created by Wollock. Through the IP address, Arraial
determined that the website and email account were created and
used on plaintiff's computer.
In November 2009, the Somerset County Prosecutor's Office
applied for a search warrant/communications data warrant for
plaintiff's residence in Westwood. The stated purpose of the
warrant application was to obtain evidence of
impersonation/theft of identity, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17(a)(1);
trafficking in personal identifying information pertaining to
another person, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17.3(a); forgery, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-
1(a)(2); and uttering, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-1(a)(3).
The warrant was issued by a Superior Court judge and, on
November 9, 2009, executed by Arraial, another Bedminster
detective, and two Somerset County Prosecutor's Office
detectives. Robert Saul, a police detective from the Borough of
Westwood who had been involved in prior, unrelated
11 A-1838-11T3
investigations concerning plaintiff,3 was present as local law
enforcement. He did not participate in the search and seizure
of plaintiff's property. Approximately eighteen items,
including plaintiff's computers and related equipment, cell
phone, and digital camera, were seized.
According to plaintiff, when the officers arrived at his
home at 9:00 a.m. on November 9, 2009, they announced they were
executing a search warrant/communications data warrant. He
asked what this was about. One of the officers replied that it
was "about a website." Plaintiff replied that he had "a lot of
websites" and asked which one they were talking about.
Plaintiff stated the officers did not respond but threatened him
with arrest for obstruction. He testified he told the officers,
"I need to call my attorney. I need to see the search warrant."
The officers passed the search warrant through the door, and
plaintiff then called his attorney.
3
In March 2005, Saul conducted an investigation after a
complainant informed him that his deceased father's name had
been used as the registrant of westwoodcops.com. Saul's
investigation revealed that plaintiff was the operator of the
site, but no charges were filed because the victim suffered no
monetary loss.
12 A-1838-11T3
At no time before, during, or after the execution of the
warrant did plaintiff advise the officers that he was entitled
to the protection afforded by the Act.4 He testified,
I told them that I had websites. So they
were on notice that I was an internet
publisher. I don't have to be a journalist
under the statute. I could be a publisher
of news and information. Via an electronic
medium.
Plaintiff filed a motion to suppress the seized evidence.
The motion judge found that the application for the search
warrant was supported by sufficient evidence to establish the
requisite probable cause and denied the motion on January 19,
2010. Plaintiff did not appeal the denial of his suppression
motion or his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff
was never charged with any of the offenses listed in the
warrant.
In January 2010, more than two months after the search
warrant was executed and approximately one week after his
challenge to the search warrant failed, plaintiff filed a
verified complaint against the Bedminster defendants, Somerset
County, and the Borough of Westwood and Saul (the Westwood
defendants), seeking injunctive relief and damages. It was in
4
Given the relative obscurity of the Act, it could be that
plaintiff was unaware of its existence at the time the warrant
was executed. However, neither he nor Arraial claimed a lack of
knowledge of the Act as an explanation for their conduct.
13 A-1838-11T3
this complaint that plaintiff asserted for the first time that
the execution of the search warrant was a violation of the Act
because he "is a person engaged in gathering, procuring,
transmitting, compiling, editing, publishing, or disseminating
news for the public, via the internet."
In June 2010, the Bedminster defendants filed a demand for
withdrawal of frivolous pleadings pursuant to Rule 1:4-8. All
parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Somerset County and the
Westwood defendants, dismissing the claims against them. The
court denied the summary judgment motions of plaintiff and the
Bedminster defendants.
The court conducted a hearing to determine whether
plaintiff qualified as a news media person within the meaning of
N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.9. Following the Supreme Court's decision in
Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209 (2011), the court
heard re-argument and issued a written decision finding that
plaintiff did not qualify as a newsperson under the Act.
The Bedminster defendants filed a motion for attorney's
fees and costs pursuant to Rule 1:4-8, which was denied by the
trial court. They appeal from that order.
Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his
claims against all defendants. He argues that the trial court
14 A-1838-11T3
erred in dismissing his claims that defendants Township of
Bedminster, County of Somerset, and Borough of Westwood violated
the Act because he is a person protected by the Act and
therefore enjoys absolute freedom from searches and seizures
(Points I and VI). He challenges the trial court's findings
that the defendants had a good faith defense under the Act
(Point II); that Arraial neither knew nor had a duty to know
that he is a newsperson (Point III); and that Somerset County
was not a proper party (Point IV). Plaintiff also argues that
defendants violated the Act because they failed to obtain the
approval of the Attorney General or the Bergen County Prosecutor
prior to obtaining the warrant (Point V). Finally, plaintiff
argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his allegations
that Arraial and Saul violated the New Jersey Civil Rights Act,
N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) (Point VII).
We hold that plaintiff's claims resting upon the Act were
properly dismissed. Because defendant did not appeal from the
order denying his motion to suppress evidence, the argument that
the warrant was not supported by probable cause advanced in
Point VI is not properly before us. We also conclude that
plaintiff's claims based upon alleged violations of the Civil
Rights Act were properly dismissed. Plaintiff's remaining
15 A-1838-11T3
arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
The facts concerning plaintiff's activities and the
issuance and execution of the search warrant are essentially
undisputed. The issue here is the legal significance of those
facts. Therefore, our review is de novo. Manalapan Realty,
L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
III.
The Act declares that persons engaged in enumerated
activities are "free from searches and seizures" of documentary
materials obtained during the course of those activities, with
certain exceptions. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.9. Significantly, the
Act is designed to reach searches and seizures that would be
sanctioned if only subject to a Fourth Amendment analysis.
Plaintiff's arguments require us to address "who" and "what" the
Legislature intended to protect and the obligations of claimant
and law enforcement when a suspect in a criminal investigation
who claims the Act's protection lacks a connection to
traditional news media.
"In reading and interpreting a statute, primary regard must
be given to the fundamental purpose for which the legislation
was enacted." N.J. Builders, Owners & Managers Ass'n v. Blair,
60 N.J. 330, 338 (1972). "To discern the Legislature's intent,
16 A-1838-11T3
courts first turn to the plain language of the statute in
question." In re Young, 202 N.J. 50, 63 (2010); DiProspero v.
Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005); Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387,
392 (2001). "If the plain language leads to a clear and
unambiguous result, then [the] interpretive process is over."
Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192
N.J. 189, 195 (2007). "However, where a literal interpretation
would create a manifestly absurd result, contrary to public
policy, the spirit of the law should control." Turner v. First
Union Nat'l Bank, 162 N.J. 75, 84 (1999). "Thus, when a literal
interpretation of individual statutory terms or provisions would
lead to results inconsistent with the overall purpose of the
statute, that interpretation should be rejected." Hubbard,
supra, 168 N.J. at 392-93 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
The "who" element of the Act establishes a category of
persons who may seek its protection, identifying them by their
engagement in enumerated activities, i.e., "gathering,
procuring, transmitting, compiling, editing, publishing, or
disseminating news for the public." N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.9 (news-
persons). There is also a "what" component that limits its
application to documentary materials obtained in the course of
pursuing news activities. "Documentary materials" are defined
17 A-1838-11T3
as "materials upon which information is recorded and includes,
but is not limited to, written or printed materials,
photographs, tapes, videotapes, negatives, films, outtakes and
interview files." N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.12(a). The Act does not
require that the material in question "has been or will be
disseminated or published." N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.9.
Plaintiff has never been employed as a journalist by any
conventional news outlet. He argues that he is protected by the
Act because he considers himself "a legitimate gatherer and
publisher of news and information for the public." It is clear,
however, that a person does not become "free from searches and
seizures" under the Act solely by virtue of a claimed newsperson
status. Cf. Too Much Media, supra, 206 N.J. at 240-42. As the
Court recognized in addressing the application of the Shield
Law, it requires little analysis to determine whether a person
associated with traditional media may claim the privilege under
that law. Id. at 241-42. However, when, as here, a "self-
appointed" journalist or publisher claims statutory protection,
more scrutiny is required. Id. at 242.
Analyses of the Shield Law provide limited guidance. A
person who claims the privilege afforded by the Shield Law must
show a connection to "news media" as defined in the statute,
i.e., "newspapers, magazines, press associations, news agencies,
18 A-1838-11T3
wire services, radio, television or other similar printed,
photographic, mechanical or electronic means of disseminating
news to the general public." N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21a(a).5
Accordingly, the Court's "focus" in Too Much Media was on the
meaning of "news media." 206 N.J. at 231.
A similar nexus to "news media" was included when the Act
was first proposed. The Assembly Judiciary, Law, Public Safety
and Defense Committee Statement (June 28, 1979) declares the
bill, A.1535, was intended "to preserve the first amendment's
freedom of the press by insuring that the files of the news
media shall not be the subject of searches and seizures by law
enforcement officials." (Emphasis added). However, the terms
"news" and "news media" were not defined and "news media" was
not even mentioned in the final version of the Act.6
5
N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.3(a) requires claimants to make a prima
facie showing that (1) they have the requisite connection with
news media, (2) they have the necessary purpose to gather or
disseminate news, and (3) the materials subpoenaed were obtained
in the ordinary course of pursuing professional newsgathering
activities.
6
"News media" is mentioned in the headnote for the Act.
However, because headnotes are not the product of legislative
action, N.J.S.A. 1:3-1; State v. Darby, 246 N.J. Super. 432,
440-41 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 342 (1991), they
are not deemed part of the legislation itself and do not assist
in statutory interpretation. N.J.S.A. 1:1-6; State v. Malik,
365 N.J. Super. 267, 279 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 180
N.J. 354 (2004).
19 A-1838-11T3
As introduced, the "who" component of the Act tracked the
language of the Shield Law to identify the category of persons
covered. But amendments to the bill arguably expanded the
category of persons who might claim its protection. For
example, the amendments deleted language requiring that a
protected person be employed "by news media for the purpose of"
news gathering and disseminating activities.7 The word
"professional" was deleted from the description of activities.
Publishing was added to the enumerated activities that could
provide a basis for protection under the Act.
7
For clarification, we provide the amendments to the relevant
paragraph, with deletions struck through and additions
underlined:
Any person, corporation, partnership,
proprietorship or other entity engaged on,
engaged in, connected with, or otherwise
employed by news media for the purpose of in
gathering, procuring, transmitting,
compiling, editing, publishing, or
disseminating news for the general public,
or on whose behalf news is so gathered,
procured, transmitted, compiled, edited,
published or disseminated has a privilege to
shall be free from searches and seizures, by
State, county and local law enforcement
officers, for with respect to any
documentary materials obtained in the course
of pursuing his professional the aforesaid
activities whether or not such material has
been or will be disseminated or published.
20 A-1838-11T3
At the time the Act became law, the enumerated activities
were performed by readily identifiable, traditional newspersons.8
Today, the performance of those activities, made far more
accessible through the widespread use of electronic media, is a
commonplace. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853, 117 S. Ct.
2329, 2335, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874, 886 (1997) ("Any person or
organization with a computer connected to the Internet can
'publish' information."); Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 413 N.J.
Super. 135, 154 (App. Div. 2010), aff'd in part and modified,
206 N.J. 209 (2011); Developments in the Law -- The Law of
Media, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 990, 993 (2007). Today, a cellphone
can be used by a pedestrian to take a video of an incident of
police brutality that will be played on the evening news
broadcast. The same phone can be used to record a kitten who
refuses to leave a warm bath, producing a video seen by close to
four million people on YouTube. In each case, it could be
argued that the person who took the video engaged in an activity
described in the Act. Nonetheless, we are confident that the
Legislature did not intend to provide protection above and
8
Indeed, the statement issued by the Governor's Office after
the bill became law states the Act "imposes a strict prohibition
against searches and seizures of a newsman's 'work product'
materials, except in specific situations." (Feb. 28, 1980)
(emphasis added).
21 A-1838-11T3
beyond that provided by the Fourth Amendment to someone based
upon the posting of a video of a wet kitten on the Internet.
The absence of a definition of "news" and the deletion of
language requiring a nexus to "news media" and "professional"
activities invite an evaluation of the newsworthiness of the
material published that is bound to be subjective in nature. In
light of the stated purpose to preserve freedom of the press,
such a result is undesirable. Cf. Too Much Media, supra, 206
N.J. at 242 ("Hearings [to determine whether the Shield Law
privilege applies] should not devolve into extensive questioning
about an author's editorial, writing, or thought processes.").
As a self-described "internet publisher," plaintiff's claim
to protection under the Act merited more scrutiny than a claim
made by a member of traditional news media. See ibid. From the
officers' perspective, they went to plaintiff's residence to
execute a lawfully issued warrant to search for evidence of
offenses committed by plaintiff relating to his two "web gripe
sites" regarding Amy Wollock. Asked if she could make an
evaluation as to whether plaintiff was "a legitimate gatherer
and publisher of news and information for the public" based upon
the content of his websites, Arraial testified:
If there were any indication based on the
facts that I had at any point that Mr.
O was a news-reporting individual, I
could look at a website and decide that.
22 A-1838-11T3
But there was absolutely no indication
whatsoever that Mr. O was reporting
news during my investigation of
amywollock.wordpress.com or any other
investigation that I've done on behalf of
Ms. Wollock with regard to Mr. O as
a suspect.
Arraial's opinion that the websites failed to establish
plaintiff's status as "a news-reporting individual" was not
unreasonable. Plaintiff used a subterfuge to distance himself
from the Amy Wollock websites, creating an email account in her
name and using that to create the websites. Consistent with
that conduct, the stated purpose of the warrant application was
to obtain evidence that plaintiff used his computer to engage in
identity theft and related offenses.
Moreover, plaintiff's own conduct when the warrant was
executed failed to alert the officers to any claim of protected
status. When the officers announced their purpose, plaintiff
demanded to see the search warrant. He did not tell the
officers that the warrant was invalid because he was free from
searches and seizures under the Act. In fact, he did not assert
this claim until more than two months later, after a court had
determined that the search and seizure did not violate his
constitutional rights.
Plaintiff argues, however, that he had no obligation to
identify himself as a newsperson. He contends that the officers
23 A-1838-11T3
were on "inquiry notice" as to his status because he "told them
[he] had websites," and Arraial knew he had other websites based
upon Saul's prior investigation.9 As a result, he argues that
the officers had an obligation to conduct an investigation to
determine if he was protected by the Act before seeking a
warrant. We disagree.
As support for his position that the officers had a duty to
investigate his status, plaintiff cites Steve Jackson Games,
Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993),
aff'd on other grounds, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). His
reliance is misplaced.
In Steve Jackson Games, the Secret Service agents had
probable cause to believe that an employee of Steve Jackson
Games (the company) had hacked into Bell South's 911 program and
stored the information on his computers at home and at work.
They obtained a warrant for the company's offices, believing
9
Plaintiff identified four other websites, which he relies upon
to establish his bona fides as a newsperson. The website
mrwestwood.com identifies itself as "Westwood, NJ – Pascack
Valley Blog" and contains news and information about that
municipality. Plaintiff also created and maintained uhaul-
sucks.com and uhaulsucks.wordpress.com "after a horrible moving
experience" and described the websites as containing news and
information about unsafe equipment rented by the company. On
jo.com, plaintiff identifies himself as a biology,
chemistry, science, and tech teacher; SAT and ACT tutor; and
publisher, and blogs about related topics. This last website is
the only website on which plaintiff used his real name.
24 A-1838-11T3
that its business was to "put out games." 816 F. Supp. at 436.
But, unlike here, there was never any suspicion that the owner
of the company or any other plaintiff had engaged in any
criminal activities. Id. at 435. It was for this reason that
the District Court faulted the agents for failing to conduct any
investigation regarding the nature of the company's business.
Id. at 436, n.4.
Indeed, Steve Jackson Games provides support for the
concept that the claimant's timely assertion of the statutory
protection should be considered by the court in determining
whether the protection applies. Unlike here, an employee told
the agent that the company was in the publishing business at the
time the warrant was executed. Id. at 437. It was because the
Secret Service agents were advised of facts during the search
that put them on notice of probable violations of the PPA that
the Court found the continued seizure of the items thereafter
was a basis for liability under the PPA. Id. at 440-41.
Plaintiff also argues that he was not required to divulge
his claimed status to law enforcement, relying upon language in
Too Much Media, supra, 206 N.J. at 239. Again, his reliance is
misplaced.
First of all, the Court did not state that a newsperson
need not assert his status in order to invoke the privilege
25 A-1838-11T3
under the Shield Law. To the contrary, the Court observed that
N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.3 "outlines a procedure for invoking the
newsperson's privilege." Too Much Media, supra, 206 N.J. at
240. Before a newsperson is permitted to withhold information
otherwise subject to compulsory disclosure, the claim of
privilege must be invoked and the requisite prima facie showing
must be made. See ibid.Although the Act does not address this issue, the case for
timely disclosure is even stronger when the protection afforded
is to be "free from searches and seizures." By their nature,
there is a measure of urgency in securing items sought in search
warrants. See Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210-11, 53
S. Ct. 138, 140, 77 L. Ed. 260, 263 (1932) ("[I]t is manifest
that the proof [of probable cause] must be of facts so closely
related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a
finding of probable cause at that time.") (emphasis added);
State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 124 (1987).
Freedom of the press is not compromised by requiring
persons who claim protection under the Act to assert that claim
as early as practicable. In this case, that would have been at
the time the officers arrived at plaintiff's residence and
announced they had a warrant. However, not only did plaintiff
fail to assert his claim, he demanded to see the warrant as a
26 A-1838-11T3
condition of admission, an act that ratified the officers'
belief they were acting in full compliance with applicable laws.
Moreover, plaintiff's failure to timely advise the officers
of his claimed status deprived them of the opportunity to comply
with the requirement of N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.10 that applications
to the court for warrants sought under the Act be approved in
advance by the Attorney General "or the prosecutor of the county
in which execution of the warrant will take place." The Act
carved out an exception to the statutory prohibition for lawful
searches and seizures where there is probable cause to believe a
person who possesses the materials to be seized "has committed
or is committing the criminal offense for which the materials
are sought." N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.9(a). The search and seizure
here unequivocally falls within the four corners of this
"suspect" exception as the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a finding of probable cause is established. However,
the warrant was approved by the prosecutor of Somerset County,
not the prosecutor of Bergen County, where it was executed. The
presence of Saul at the execution of the search warrant suggests
an awareness and tacit approval of the search by Bergen County
law enforcement authorities. It is reasonable to conclude that,
if plaintiff had made his position known to the officers before
the warrant was executed, the approval of the Bergen County
27 A-1838-11T3
Prosecutor would have been secured or the search would have been
abandoned. No purpose identified by the Legislature is served
by permitting a suspect in a criminal investigation to evade the
application of the suspect exception by concealing his claim to
protected status under the Act.
In sum, the legislative intent to preserve the First
Amendment's freedom of the press is not compromised by requiring
persons who claim protection under the Act to alert law
enforcement officers to that fact in a timely manner. And, in
our view, it would place a wholly unnecessary burden upon law
enforcement officers to require them to conduct Internet
searches of postings by the targets of criminal investigations
to determine whether those persons might be protected under the
Act prior to obtaining validly issued search warrants under
circumstances such as those here.
We therefore hold that the detectives here were not
required to conduct an investigation to determine whether
plaintiff was protected by the Act under the facts known to them
when they sought and executed the warrant. We further hold
that, by failing to assert his claim to such protection when the
warrant was executed, plaintiff waived any right to pursue a
civil action under the Act.
28 A-1838-11T3
IV.
Even if plaintiff had alerted law enforcement to his
claimed status in a timely manner, he was not entitled to
protection under the Act. Rather than provide a blanket freedom
from otherwise lawful searches and seizures, the Act limits the
prohibited searches and seizures to those for "documentary
materials obtained in the course of pursuing" the enumerated
activities, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.9, or what might be described as
work product materials.
The materials sought by warrant here were not obtained by
plaintiff in any newsgathering activity, and he has not
identified any seized item as such. Plaintiff created
amywollock.com to publish his personal "gripe" with Amy Wollock
and invited others to "tell your own horror story." The website
acknowledged its limited purpose, stating, "Web gripe sites are
a protected form of free speech, well-established by case law.
If you encounter the RU Screw or any other injustice, keep notes
and wait until the time is right for your story to be safely
told." The second website, amywollock.wordpress.com, described
a similar purpose: "We hope that this website will be a place
where kindred spirits can come together to heal and to learn how
to enjoy life after escaping from Amy Wollock."
29 A-1838-11T3
Implicitly acknowledging that these websites were not
employed in newsgathering, plaintiff contends that the removal
of amywollock.com from the Internet in 2007 and the condition
attached to his probationary sentence prevented him from
developing the websites as he had developed other Internet
websites. However, his unrealized aspirations for the websites
will not validate his claim to protection under the Act. Cf.
Too Much Media, supra, 206 N.J. at 218-21, 238. We therefore
conclude that plaintiff was not "free from searches and
seizures" of the materials sought in the warrant because they
were not documentary materials obtained in the pursuit of
activities enumerated in the Act.
V.
In Point VII, plaintiff argues that Arraial and Saul
violated N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) by "act[ing] in bad faith, and
without probable cause that plaintiff had committed any crimes,
to deprive plaintiff of his rights . . . and to confiscate" his
property. He argues their involvement in the search and seizure
of his property was "retaliatory in nature," based upon
"harbored ill will toward plaintiff" as a result of his
publishing activity and his successful appeal of the harassment
conviction. He states their actions violated N.J. Const., art.
30 A-1838-11T3
I, ¶¶ 6, 7, and that they are not entitled to qualified
immunity. These arguments lack merit.
Plaintiff's challenge to the search on constitutional
grounds was rejected in the denial of his suppression motion and
again in the denial of his motion for reconsideration. He did
not appeal either of those decisions and cannot relitigate the
sufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant now. See Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J.
498, 505 (1991). Because plaintiff has not been "deprived of
any . . . substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured
by the Constitution or laws of this State," his claim under
N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) fails.
VI.
We next turn to the Bedminster defendants' argument that
the trial court erred in denying their motion for counsel fees
pursuant to Rule 1:4-8. This court's review of an order denying
a motion for attorneys' fees is guided by the abuse of
discretion standard. See Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier,
167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001); Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 46
(App. Div. 2011).
Rule 1:4-8 provides litigants with "a monetary sanction
remedy including an attorney's fee allowance" to punish
"frivolous pleadings." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
31 A-1838-11T3
Rules, comment 1 on R. 1:4-8 (2014); see R. 1:4-8(d)(2). Our
courts have strictly construed the nature of conduct warranting
sanction under R. 1:4-8, LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 116-
17 (2009), mindful that "honest and creative advocacy should not
be discouraged." Wyche v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund
of State, 383 N.J. Super. 554, 561 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting
Iannone v. McHale, 245 N.J. Super. 17, 28 (App. Div. 1990)).
Therefore, an award of attorney's fees under Rule 1:4-8 will not
be appropriate where there is an objectively reasonable belief
in the merits of an argument, see First Atl. Fed. Credit Union
v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super. 419, 433 (App. Div. 2007); K.D. v.
Bozarth, 313 N.J. Super. 561, 574-75 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 156 N.J. 425 (1998); or where the plaintiff is engaged
in a legitimate effort to extend the law on a previously
undecided issue. See Wyche, supra, 383 N.J. Super. at 560-61;
see also N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b).
As we have noted, there have been no published opinions
that interpreted or applied the Act in more than three decades.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to award counsel fees to the Bedminster
defendants pursuant to Rule 1:4-8.
Affirmed.
32 A-1838-11T3