SAMUEL MOORE VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4192-16T2
SAMUEL MOORE,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE
PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent.
_____________________
Submitted November 8, 2018 – Decided September 3, 2019
Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
Samuel Moore, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Gregory R. Bueno,
Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Samuel Moore appeals from the April 19, 2017 final agency decision of
the New Jersey State Parole Board (Board) denying his parole and establishing
a one hundred twenty-month future eligibility term (FET). We affirm.
On January 14, 1992, Moore pled guilty to two counts of purposeful or
knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(1) or (2), and two weapons offenses. 1 He
admitted using a hammer to bludgeon to death his twenty-three-year-old wife,
who was six months pregnant, and his twenty-month-old son. On January 27,
1992, after merging the weapons offenses, the trial court sentenced Moore to
serve two concurrent terms of life imprisonment, thirty years of which were to
be served without parole.
Moore became eligible for parole in June 2016. A two-member panel of
the Board denied Moore parole. Because the panel determined the presumptive
FET may be inappropriate, the panel referred Moore's case to a three-member
panel for review. On August 3, 2016, the three-member panel established a one
hundred twenty month FET.
1
In June 1987, a jury convicted defendant of all charges and sentenced him to
death on the two murder counts. On January 23, 1991, the Supreme Court
reversed the guilty verdict and death penalty sentence. State v. Moore, 122 N.J.
420, 427 (1991). In January 1992, defendant pled guilty to the counts for which
he is presently incarcerated.
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In a comprehensive written decision, the three-member panel noted Moore
had been committed for multiple offenses, including two murders. Specifically,
the panel noted Moore had struck his wife in the head with a hammer no less
than twenty times. When his son entered the room, Moore struck him in the
head several times.
During his incarceration, Moore committed four infractions, two of
which were serious. Significantly, the panel also found Moore lacked insight
into his anti-social behavior and had not sufficiently addressed a substance abuse
problem.
During the parole hearing, the three-member panel questioned Moore
about what he thought had motivated him to react with such rage and violence
to a domestic dispute. The panel also questioned him about his drug use during
his incarceration, and the panel attempted to determine whether Moore had any
insight into his behavior "so it could be determined if there is a substantial
likelihood that [he] would commit another crime if released." During the three-
member panel's questioning of Moore at the parole hearing, the members
pointed out that he had not explained what had enraged him to such a violent
degree. They noted he had a wife and a girlfriend when he committed the
crimes. The panel observed Moore smiling and laughing. When asked why he
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was laughing, Moore denied doing so. Moore admitted that he had never
attempted to speak to anybody about the crimes or the degree of rage he
demonstrated while committing them.
It was apparent to the panel Moore had no insight into his anger or the
behavioral traits that caused him to become so violent during a domestic dispute.
The panel determined Moore had "not fully explored the root causes to [his]
maladaptive conduct." In fact, he had "begun [no] introspection addressing the
internal characteristic that impelled [him] to commit the crimes." To the
contrary, he had spoken to no one about the crimes or his violent actions.
Consequently, the panel concluded that Moore's "lack of introspection would
place public safety in grave jeopardy if [he] were to be released on parole at this
time."
Although the three-member panel considered mitigating factors, it denied
Moore parole. In addition, the panel determined the presumptive FET was
clearly inappropriate due to Moore's lack of satisfactory progress in reducing
the likelihood of future criminal behavior. After considering the factors set forth
in the New Jersey Administrative Code relevant to its determination, the panel
imposed a one hundred twenty-month FET.
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Moore filed an appeal with the full Board. On April 19, 2017, the Board
upheld the panel recommendations to deny parole and impose a one hundred
twenty-month FET.
Moore submits the following arguments for our consideration:
POINT ONE
THE NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD'S
DENIAL OF PAROLE WAS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS, WHERE THE REASONS STATED
FOR DENIAL WERE INADEQUATE AND THE
DENIAL WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN THE RECORD.
POINT TWO
THE BOARD PANEL DENIED APPELLANT HIS
RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS DUE TO
THE BOARD PANEL'S VIOLATION OF WRITTEN
BOARD POLICY (Not Raised Below).
POINT THREE
THE BOARD PANEL UTILIZED ERRONEOUS
MATERIAL FACTS TO DENY PAROLE TO
APPELLANT.
POINT FOUR
THE USAGE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS
SUCH AS LACK OF INSIGHT, REMORSE AND/OR
EMPATHY AS A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR
DENYING PAROLE CREATES ISSUES OF EQUAL
AND UNIFORM STANDARDS OF REVIEW DUE
TO THE VAGUENESS OF THESE CONCEPTS
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BEING UNDEFINED AND HIGHLY SUBJECTIVE;
THUS ALLOWING AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
We have carefully considered Moore's arguments in light of the record
and controlling legal principles. We affirm, substantially for the reasons
expressed in the Board's comprehensive written decision, which is supported by
sufficient credible evidence on the record as a whole. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). We
add only the following comments.
"Drawing on the diverse backgrounds of its members, the Parole Board
makes 'highly predictive and individualized discretionary appraisals.'" Acoli v.
N.J. Parole Bd., 224 N.J. 213, 222 (2016) (quoting Beckworth v. N.J. State
Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 359 (1973)). Such "appraisals must realistically be
recognized to be inherently imprecise, as they are based on 'discretionary
assessment[s] of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man
is and what he may become rather than simply what he has done.'" Ibid.
(alteration in original) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)).
Our review of a Parole Board's decision is limited. Hare v. N.J. State
Parole Bd., 368 N.J. Super. 175, 179 (App. Div. 2004). We "must determine
whether the factual finding could reasonably have been reached on sufficient
credible evidence in the whole record." Id. at 179 (citing Trantino v. N.J. State
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Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 172 (2001), modified, 167 N.J. 619 (2001)). The
appellant has "[t]he burden of showing that an action was arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious[.]" McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J.
Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002).
Here, the Board's determination that "there is a substantial likelihood that
the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of the State of New Jersey if
released on parole," as well as the Board's reasons for departing from the
presumptive FET, are amply supported by the record. Moore's arguments to the
contrary are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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