Martin v. City of League City ( 2000 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 99-40867
    Summary Calendar
    BETH L MARTIN, Individually and as Next Friend
    of Matthew Jordan Martin, a Minor, and as Personal
    Representative for the Estate of James F Martin,
    Deceased; MATTHEW JORDAN MARTIN, A Minor; JAMES
    F MARTIN, Deceased
    Plaintiffs-Appellants
    v.
    CITY OF LEAGUE CITY; WILLIAM SCHULTZ; CHRIS REED;
    JAIME CASTRO; JAMES MAYNARD, III; ELISABETH HERNANDEZ;
    DONNA HACKER; ALBERT DUNAWAY, III; UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES,
    OFFICERS AND/OR AGENTS OF CITY OF LEAGUE CITY; RICHARD JAMES
    HERNANDEZ, also known as Rick Hernandez
    Defendants-Appellees
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas, Galveston
    USDC No. G-98-CV-266
    --------------------
    June 14, 2000
    Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and BENAVIDES, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiffs-appellants appeal the dismissal with prejudice of
    their federal claims for “failure to state a claim upon which
    relief can be granted.”   FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).   For the
    following reasons, we affirm.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    According to the Second Amended Complaint filed in this
    case, James Martin had a history of mental difficulties.      On
    August 22, 1996, James’s wife, Beth Martin, contacted the
    Emergency Medical Service (“EMS”) seeking help for her husband,
    who was acting irrationally.    Before EMS arrived, Defendants-
    Appellees William Schultz and Chris Reed, two City of League City
    police officers, arrived at the Martin home.    They found James
    outside in the rain; he appeared disoriented, violent, and
    incoherent.   EMS technicians arrived shortly thereafter and
    evaluated James.    In addition to determining that he was mentally
    ill, they found signs of intoxication.    Schultz and Reed
    contacted the on-call representative of the Department of Mental
    Health and Mental Retardation (“MHMR”) and spoke to Defendant-
    Appellee Jaime Castro,1 who advised them either to file charges
    against James or take him into protective custody.       Schultz and
    Reed did not follow Castro’s suggestion, but instead directed
    Beth and her minor son, Matthew Martin, to leave their home.
    Beth and Matthew complied with the officers’ direction and left.
    Unbeknownst to Beth, the officers and EMS technicians left some
    time later, leaving James alone in the Martin home.      When Beth
    returned home the next day, she discovered that James had
    committed suicide.
    1
    Castro asserts that he was not on call for MHMR but was a
    Deputy Sheriff for the County of Galveston.
    2
    Beth filed suit on her own behalf, on behalf of Matthew, and
    as the personal representative of James’s estate (“Appellants”)
    against the city of League City, officers Schultz and Reed,
    Castro, the EMS technicians, and others, raising federal claims
    under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     and various state law claims.       The
    complaint was amended twice, and in the process the suit was
    whittled down, leaving the city, the officers, and Castro as
    defendants.    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6), the district court dismissed all federal claims with
    prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
    granted and, additionally, dismissed all state claims without
    prejudice.    Appellants timely appeal.
    II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim,
    applying the same standard used by the district court:       a claim
    may not be dismissed unless it appears certain that no set of
    facts can be proved by the plaintiff in support of her claim that
    would entitle her to relief.        Norman v. Apache Corp., 
    19 F.3d 1017
    , 1021 (5th Cir. 1994); Carney v. RTC, 
    19 F.3d 950
    , 954 (5th
    Cir. 1994). “The complaint must be liberally construed in favor
    of the plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the complaint must be
    taken as true.”    Shipp v. McMahon, 
    199 F.3d 256
    , 260 (5th Cir.
    2000).
    III.   DISCUSSION
    3
    We note first that Appellants fail to raise an argument
    concerning a cause of action against Defendant-Appellee City of
    League City.     Any claims against the city are therefore deemed
    abandoned on appeal.     See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25
    (5th Cir. 1993).
    Plaintiffs’ federal claims are based upon 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983.2
    “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a
    violation of rights secured by the Constitution . . . and (2)
    demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
    person acting under color of state law.”     Leffall v. Dallas
    Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    28 F.3d 521
    , 525 (5th Cir. 1994).     Appellants
    here allege violations of James’s rights under the Fourteenth
    Amendment and the Fourth Amendment of the United States
    Constitution.3
    First, Appellants argue that they pleaded a Fourteenth
    Amendment claim based on the theory of state-created danger.
    According to Appellants, the individual defendants created a
    2
    Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
    Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
    regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
    the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
    subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
    within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
    rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
    Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
    in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
    proceeding for redress . . . .
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     (Supp. III 1997).
    3
    Below, Appellants advanced an additional substantive due
    process argument premised on a special relationship. They have
    abandoned that argument on appeal.
    4
    danger by directing Beth and her son to leave their home and then
    leaving James alone while he was in a mentally unbalanced state.
    We have never recognized liability for a violation of substantive
    due process rights premised on the theory of state-created
    danger.   See Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    113 F.3d 1412
    ,
    1415 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc).   Assuming without deciding,
    however, that the theory is constitutionally sound, the district
    court did not err in determining that the allegations in the
    complaint failed to state such a claim.    In Doe, we explained
    that, in order for a plaintiff to succeed under the state-created
    danger theory, “‘[t]he environment created by the state actors
    must be dangerous;   they must know it is dangerous;   and, to be
    liable, they must have used their authority to create an
    opportunity that would not otherwise have existed for the third
    party's crime to occur.’” 
    Id. at 1415
     (quoting Johnson v. Dallas
    Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    38 F.3d 198
    , 201 (5th Cir. 1994)).    There is
    no indication in the Second Amended Complaint that the officers
    knew that leaving James alone in the house created a danger that
    he would commit suicide.   Merely alleging that he was violent,
    incoherent or disoriented is not enough.   “The key to the
    state-created danger cases . . . lies in the state actors’
    culpable knowledge and conduct in affirmatively placing an
    individual in a position of danger, effectively stripping a
    person of [his] ability to defend [him]self, or cutting off
    potential sources of private aid.”    Johnson, 
    38 F.3d at 201
    (internal quotation marks omitted).   Thus, the officers must have
    5
    known that James was suicidal before they can be viewed as having
    placed him in a position of danger.
    Appellants also argue that their complaint stated a Fourth
    Amendment claim premised on the officers’ purported unreasonable
    release of James.   They cite no authority, nor have we found one,
    for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects an
    individual from an unreasonable release by a government agent.
    Because Appellants have failed sufficiently to allege a violation
    of rights secured by the Constitution, they have failed to state
    a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted.
    IV.   CONCLUSION
    Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the district court
    dismissing Appellants’ federal claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
    is AFFIRMED.
    6