Com. v. Williams, K. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S36025-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    KENNETH WILLIAMS,
    Appellant                 No. 2652 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order of August 11, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005462-2013
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                              FILED JUNE 14, 2017
    Appellant, Kenneth Williams, appeals pro se from the order entered on
    August 11, 2016, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
    Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    The PCRA court ably summarized the underlying facts and procedural
    posture of this appeal:
    On June 6, 2012, [Appellant] was arrested and charged with
    murder and related offenses. On July 14, 2014, [Appellant]
    pled guilty before [the trial] court in exchange for a
    negotiated sentence of [20] to [40 years’] imprisonment for
    third-degree murder, a consecutive sentence of two-and-a-
    half to five years[’ imprisonment] for possession of a
    firearm [by a] prohibited [person], and a concurrent
    sentence of one to two years[’ imprisonment] for firearms
    not to be carried without a license, for [an aggregate]
    sentence of [22 ½ to 45 years in prison].
    ...
    J-S36025-17
    At the negotiated plea hearing on July 14, 2014, [Appellant]
    agreed to the following facts:
    On Saturday, April 14, 2012, just before noon,
    [Appellant] and an unidentified male were following the
    victim in this case, Vondell Reavis, around to the
    victim’s block.
    [Appellant] then approached the victim, and an
    argument ensued. During that argument, [Appellant]
    took out a gun[] and the victim tried to struggle with
    [Appellant] to get the gun away from him.
    During the incident, [Appellant] fired a total of three
    times, striking the victim three times, two of which were
    close-range shots to the victim’s torso area and one of
    which was a fatal shot where it is alleged that
    [Appellant] pushed the victim away from him and then
    made that fatal shot through his armpit which went
    through the victim’s lungs and heart.
    [Appellant] then fled along with a male that was with
    him, and the victim fell to the ground. The victim was
    pronounced dead at the hospital.
    The motive for this case was drug-related, and the
    evidence would also show that [Appellant] had a prior
    conviction for possession with intent to deliver which
    precluded him from carrying a firearm.
    [N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 7/14/14,] at 14-16.
    PCRA Court Opinion, 8/11/16, at 1-2 (some internal capitalization and
    corrections omitted).
    Appellant did not file a notice of appeal from his judgment of sentence.
    On July 9, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se, timely, first PCRA petition.
    Within the petition, Appellant claimed that plea counsel was ineffective for:
    1) failing to investigate Appellant’s self-defense claim; 2) failing to raise
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    Appellant’s self-defense claim; and 3) coercing Appellant “into pleading
    guilty knowing [Appellant] had the viable [self-defense claim].” Appellant’s
    Pro Se PCRA Petition, 7/9/15, at 1-3E (some internal capitalization omitted).
    Appellant also claimed that he received an illegal mandatory minimum
    sentence for third degree murder and that the clerk of courts had interfered
    with his right to appeal his judgment of sentence by failing to provide him
    with the transcript from his preliminary hearing.      Id. at 3E-4.   Appellant
    later filed a supplemental PCRA petition, wherein he claimed that plea
    counsel was ineffective for “fail[ing] to investigate [that Appellant] was
    coerced into pleading guilty where if guilty plea counsel did properly
    investigate the mitigating evidence[, Appellant] would have rather opted to
    go to trial instead of pleading guilty.”      Appellant’s Supplemental PCRA
    Petition, 11/24/15, at 4 (internal capitalization omitted).
    The PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant during the
    proceedings. However, on June 30, 2016, appointed counsel filed a no-merit
    letter and a request to withdraw as counsel, pursuant to Commonwealth v.
    Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). After reviewing counsel’s no-merit letter,
    the PCRA court issued Appellant notice, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 907, of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition in 20
    days, without holding a hearing. PCRA Court Order, 10/21/15, at 1-3.
    Appellant filed a response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice, wherein
    he repeated the claims he raised in his PCRA petition and also claimed that
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    trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the lack of a presentence
    report.    Appellant’s Response, 7/21/16, at 1-3.    On August 11, 2016, the
    PCRA court issued an opinion and order, which dismissed Appellant’s petition
    and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. PCRA Court Opinion and Order,
    8/11/16, at 1-8. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal
    Appellant raises two claims on appeal:
    [1.] Is [] 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c) unconstitutional under the
    void for vagueness doctrine in that it promotes the arbitrary
    and discriminatory enforcement due to its over broad
    definition of criminal conduct?
    [2.] Is Appellant’s guilty plea void due to being unknowingly
    and unintelligently induced due to the ineffective assistance
    of counsel?
    Appellant’s Brief at 5.1
    As we have stated:
    [t]his Court’s standard of review regarding an order
    dismissing a petition under the PCRA is whether the
    determination of the PCRA court is supported by evidence of
    record and is free of legal error. In evaluating a PCRA
    court’s decision, our scope of review is limited to the
    findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record,
    viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at
    the trial level. We may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on
    any grounds if it is supported by the record.
    Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
    10 A.3d 1276
    , 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
    citations omitted).
    ____________________________________________
    1
    For ease of discussion, we have re-ordered Appellant’s claims on appeal.
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    To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and
    prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence
    resulted from “one or more” of the seven, specifically enumerated
    circumstances listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). One of these statutorily
    enumerated circumstances is the “[i]neffectiveness of counsel which, in the
    circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
    process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
    place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).
    Counsel is, however, presumed to be effective and “the burden of
    demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [A]ppellant.”      Commonwealth v.
    Rivera, 
    10 A.3d 1276
    , 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010).         To satisfy this burden,
    Appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
    (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the
    particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not
    have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his
    interests; and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is
    a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged
    proceedings would have been different.
    Commonwealth v. Fulton, 
    830 A.2d 567
    , 572 (Pa. 2003).             “A failure to
    satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the
    claim.” 
    Id.
    We also note that “[a] criminal defendant has the right to effective
    counsel during a plea process as well as during trial.” Commonwealth v.
    Hickman, 
    799 A.2d 136
    , 141 (Pa. Super. 2002).                 Yet, where the
    ineffectiveness of counsel is claimed in connection with the entry of a guilty
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    plea, a petitioner may only obtain relief where “counsel’s deficient
    stewardship resulted in a manifest injustice, for example, by facilitating [the]
    entry of an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent plea.” Commonwealth
    v. Moser, 
    921 A.2d 526
    , 530 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc) (internal
    citations and quotations omitted). As we have explained:
    once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is
    presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the
    burden of proving involuntariness is upon him. Therefore,
    where the record clearly demonstrates that a guilty plea
    colloquy was conducted, during which it became evident
    that the defendant understood the nature of the charges
    against him, the voluntariness of the plea is established.
    Commonwealth v. Stork, 
    737 A.2d 789
    , 791 (Pa. Super. 1999) (internal
    quotations, citations, and corrections omitted), quoting Commonwealth v.
    Myers, 
    642 A.2d 1103
    , 1105 (Pa. Super. 1994).         To prove prejudice, the
    “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
    counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
    on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 59 (1985).
    Appellant first claims that the third-degree murder statute is void for
    vagueness. Appellant’s Brief at 12-17. This claim is waived, as Appellant
    did not raise the claim in his PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Santiago,
    
    855 A.2d 682
    , 691 (Pa. 2004) (“a claim not raised in a PCRA petition cannot
    be raised for the first time on appeal”); Commonwealth v. Washington,
    
    927 A.2d 586
    , 601 (Pa. 2007) (“[a]ny claim not raised in the PCRA petition
    is waived and not cognizable on appeal”).
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    Second, Appellant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to investigate three witnesses:        Gary Lathan, Lillie Reavis, and
    Vaughn Christopher. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-11. These claims fail.
    With respect to Gary Lathan, Appellant claims that his plea counsel
    was ineffective for failing to impeach Mr. Lathan at the preliminary hearing,
    with possible crimen falsi convictions and possible suspicious motives. See
    Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. Appellant’s claim fails, given that:       Mr. Lathan
    was testifying at a preliminary hearing, the purpose of which “is to avoid the
    incarceration or trial of a defendant unless there is sufficient evidence to
    establish a crime was committed and the probability the defendant could be
    connected with the crime,” Commonwealth v. Tyler, 
    587 A.2d 326
    , 328
    (Pa. Super. 1991); Appellant later pleaded guilty to murder; and, even if
    Appellant’s   suppositions   regarding   Mr.   Lathan’s   possible    crimen   falsi
    convictions and possible suspicious motives are true, Appellant never
    claimed that, had counsel impeached Mr. Lathan at the preliminary hearing,
    Appellant “would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
    to trial.” Hill, 
    474 U.S. at 59
    . The claim thus fails.
    Next, Appellant claims that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to
    investigate Lillie Reavis, who informed the police that she saw a male
    running from an area near the crime scene and that she was “pretty sure”
    Appellant was not the man she saw.          Appellant’s Brief at 9.    Appellant’s
    claim of ineffectiveness fails because Appellant does not deny shooting the
    victim; Appellant merely claims that he did so in self-defense.                See
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    Appellant’s Affidavit Attached to Pro Se PCRA Petition, 7/9/15, at 1.
    Therefore,       Ms.   Reavis’   potential   testimony   could   not   have   changed
    Appellant’s decision to plead guilty.
    Finally, Appellant claims that his plea counsel was ineffective for failing
    to investigate an individual named Vaughn Christopher, who told the police
    that, prior to the shooting, the victim “jumped up and grabbed [Appellant’s]
    hands.”    Appellant’s Brief at 9.      Again, however, such potential testimony
    could not have altered Appellant’s decision to plead guilty, as the testimony
    would not have entitled Appellant to a jury instruction on self-defense or
    justification.     See Commonwealth v. Hansley, 
    24 A.3d 410
    , 421 (Pa.
    Super. 2011) (“[e]ven if the court accepted as true [a]ppellant's assertion
    that [the victim] failed to identify himself as a Target employee before he
    ‘grabbed’ [a]ppellant, [a]ppellant's decision to respond to [the victim’s]
    efforts to restrain [a]ppellant by withdrawing a knife and pointing it at [the
    victim’s] stomach does not constitute proper justification under Section 505,
    and does not meet the three (3) elements required to establish self-defense.
    The court properly determined as a matter of law that [a]ppellant was not
    entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense or justification under the facts of
    this case”).
    Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/14/2017
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