United States v. Boyce , 232 F. App'x 298 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4964
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ROGER BOYCE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr.,
District Judge. (2:06-cr-00066)
Submitted: June 8, 2007 Decided: July 9, 2007
Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jacqueline A. Hallinan, HALLINAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Charleston,
West Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States
Attorney, Monica L. Dillon, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Roger Boyce entered a conditional plea of guilty to one
count of manufacturing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2000). Boyce was sentenced by the district court to
ninety-seven months’ imprisonment. Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, Boyce argues the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress. We review the factual findings
underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and
its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d
187, 193 (4th Cir. 2005). The evidence is construed in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party below. United States v.
Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
Boyce initially contends that law enforcement officers
violated the Fifth Amendment by questioning him at the door of his
residence without first advising him of his Miranda* rights. Law
enforcement officers, however, are not required to administer
Miranda warnings to everyone they question or suspect. Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). Rather, Miranda
is only implicated when officers question an individual who is “in
custody.” Id. at 494-95. An individual “is ‘in custody’ for
purposes of receiving Miranda protection . . . [when] there is a
‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S.
*
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at
495). Thus, when reviewing whether a suspect was “in custody” at
the time of law enforcement questioning, two inquiries are
essential: “first, what were the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a
reasonable person have felt that he or she was not at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516
U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (footnote omitted).
We conclude Boyce was not in custody. He was not
handcuffed or otherwise restrained. Boyce was questioned by law
enforcement officers at the door of his residence, in the presence
of another adult—his wife. Nothing in the joint appendix suggests
that the officers ever drew their weapons, were antagonistic
towards Boyce, or informed him that he was not free to end the
interview. Though Boyce suggests that the officers improperly
sought to obtain consent to search and travelled to Boyce’s
residence expecting to make an arrest, the officers’ “unarticulated
plan,” if any, is irrelevant to the issue of whether Boyce was in
custody. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). Thus,
under these circumstances, we conclude a reasonable person in
Boyce’s position would not have considered the restraint on his
freedom of movement comparable to that associated with formal
arrest.
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Boyce also contends that law enforcement officers
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. He argues that
because he was represented by counsel in pending, unrelated
charges, law enforcement personnel could not question him without
counsel present. However, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
offense specific. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991);
see also, United States v. Kennedy, 372 F.3d 686, 692 (4th Cir.
2004). “It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for
it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced . . . .”
McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175. As law enforcement officers were
investigating an alleged offense wholly unrelated to the charges
for which Boyce was represented, Boyce’s right to counsel had not
yet attached and, consequently, there was no Sixth Amendment
violation. Thus, the district court’s denial of Boyce’s motion to
suppress was proper.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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