STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. KENDELL GRIMSLEY (11-02-0115, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5186-16T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KENDELL GRIMSLEY, a/k/a
KENDALL GRIMSLEY, SHAWN
HELTON, KEITH GRIMSLEY,
and KENDAL GRIMSLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted September 13, 2018 – Decided October 9, 2018
Before Judges Alvarez and Mawla.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Indictment No. 11-02-0115.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Andrew R. Burroughs, Designated Counsel,
on the brief).
Michael A. Monahan, Acting Union County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Izabella M.
Wozniak, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Kendell Grimsley appeals from the May 31, 2017 Law Division
order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.
A jury found defendant guilty of second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A.
2C:15-1. He thereafter entered a guilty plea to third-degree burglary, N.J.S.A.
2C:18-2, also charged in the same indictment, however, the burglary conviction
is not being appealed. Defendant was sentenced as a persistent offender,
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), to a ten-year term of incarceration on the robbery
conviction subject to eighty-five percent parole ineligibility pursuant to the No
Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. In accord with the plea
agreement, he was sentenced on the burglary charge to five years imprisonment,
subject to one and one-half years of parole ineligibility, to be served on a
concurrent basis. On appeal, we affirmed the judgment of conviction. State v.
Grimsley, No. A-4863-13 (App. Div. Sept. 28, 2015). The Supreme Court
denied certification. State v. Grimsley, 224 N.J. 123 (2016).
The incident which resulted in the conviction occurred on September 19,
2010. As we described in our prior decision:
. . . at approximately 10:00 p.m., S.M. was unloading
groceries in a well-lit parking area in front of her
apartment building when a vehicle pulled in next to her.
A man briefly stepped out of the car and she exchanged
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a few words with him. He said "she's not here" and got
back in the vehicle. S.M. resumed emptying her trunk
when she felt a "tremendous pull" on her purse, like
"someone ripped my arm off[.]" She turned and saw
the man she had spoken to, whom she later identified as
defendant, "tugging and tugging[.]" S.M. was dragged
to the ground while defendant continued to tug at her
purse; he was eventually able to pull it away and
jumped back into the vehicle. As a result of the
encounter, S.M.'s arm was badly bruised, she scraped
her left elbow, and ripped her pants. The car drove off
slowly enough that S.M. was able to note the make and
license plate number and provide the relevant
information to the Hillside Police Department. The
robbery was witnessed from a distance of five to ten
feet by an acquaintance of S.M., J.M., and by J.M.'s
husband.
[Grimsley, slip op. at 3.]
On September 21, 2010, defendant and his co-defendants were arrested in
the vehicle described by the robbery victim. The car had the same license plate
the robbery victim described, and police found a flash drive she kept in her purse
in the car. Id. at 4.
When presented with a photographic array, the victim selected defendant's
photo, as did J.M. Ibid. J.M.'s husband could not identify anyone. At trial,
although counsel told the judge that J.M.'s husband's description of the robber
significantly differed from defendant's appearance, no supporting affidavit or
other documentation has been presented to support the point. Essentially,
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nothing in the record indicates the substance of the husband's proposed
testimony.
On appeal, defendant alleged that one of his co-defendants had given an
exculpatory statement. Id. at 8. After the trial, Mateen Abdul-Malik gave a
statement to defendant's investigators. In it, he claimed he had told prosecutors
that when the occupants of the vehicle described by the robbery victim were
arrested, defendant had just gotten into the car, and was being driven to a
supermarket. Id. at 7. Abdul-Malik also alleged that the prosecutor's
investigators became angry and left when they heard this narrative. Ibid.
Defendant asserted that Abdul-Malik described this in a letter, although it has
never been produced. Id. at 6-7.
A Union County Prosecutor's Office detective, however, stated in a
follow-up interview summary that Abdul-Malik, when he spoke to the
authorities, denied being in the vehicle on the night of the robbery, and did not
mention defendant at all. Id. at 7. We concluded on appeal that the State did
not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), since Abdul-Malik had no
relevant, exculpatory information until after defendant was convicted. Id. at 9-
10. Defendant was not prejudiced by the State's failure to disclose the pretrial
interview with the co-defendant, since at that point the co-defendant provided
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absolutely no relevant information whatsoever. Thus, the State could not "be
charged with withholding information it never possessed." Id. at 10. The
argument lacked sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion and
nothing further was stated with regard to Abdul-Malik's alleged exoneration.
Ibid.
Following the affirmance of his conviction, defendant filed a timely PCR
petition pro se, arguing that counsel should have interviewed his mother and
called her as his alibi witness. His petition, asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel, was not supplemented once counsel was assigned. However, we note
in defendant's PCR brief filed in the Law Division, without any supporting
certification or affidavit, counsel argued that trial counsel was ineffective
because he did not realize co-defendants Dandel Grimsley and Abdul-Malik
could have exonerated defendant. Grimsley is not mentioned again. Defendant
attached to the brief statements allegedly taken from Abdul-Malik as exhibits.
The statements are not included in our appendix, and in any event, were never
signed by Abdul-Malik because they were the same statements taken by
defendant's investigators after the trial ended. No mention is made anywhere in
either the petition or the brief, regarding the eyewitness's husband's allegedly
different description of the victim's assailant.
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Although the judge granted an evidentiary hearing, he concluded after
hearing testimony from trial counsel, defendant's mother, and defendant that
counsel was not ineffective because he made a strategic decision not to call
defendant's mother as a witness. He concluded that the mother's testimony even
at the hearing was inconsistent as to times, and that when interviewed by trial
counsel, she was confused about timeframes. Therefore, trial counsel's decision
not to call her as a witness was an unimpeachable strategic decision.
On this appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
PETITIONER RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
(1) Trial counsel erred when he failed to call Sarah
Grimsley as an alibi witness at trial.
(2) Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call
co-defendant Mateen Abdul-Malik as a witness.
(3) Trial counsel's cumulative errors deprived
[d]efendant of his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel.
POINT II
AS THE PCR COURT FAILED TO ADJUDICATE
ALL OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS, THIS MATTER
MUST BE REMANDED FOR A NEW PCR
HEARING.
A-5186-16T1
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POINT III
THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A
NEW PCR HEARING AS PCR COUNSEL FAILED
TO RAISE A MATERIAL CLAIM OF ERROR BY
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY.
We find no merit to these arguments. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
In order to obtain relief based on ineffective assistance grounds, defendant
is obliged to show not only the particular manner in which counsel's
performance was deficient, but also that the deficiency prejudiced his right to a
fair trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The alleged
deficiencies here do not meet either the performance or prejudice prongs of the
Strickland test.
First, as to defendant's mother, trial counsel testified explicitly that when
he interviewed her before trial, she could not pinpoint the time she saw
defendant at their home on the night in question. Counsel's decision not to call
a witness who could potentially do the case more harm than good was strategic
and is inviolate. "[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law
and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable[.]"
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. "Decisions as to trial strategy or tactics are virtually
unassailable on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds." State v. Cooper, 410
N.J. Super. 43, 57 (App. Div. 2009).
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The issue regarding calling Abdul-Malik was not raised by PCR counsel
during the evidential hearing. It was not mentioned in the trial judge's decision
granting it. But Rule 3:22-10(c) requires factual assertions to be set forth in an
affidavit or certification, and to be based upon personal knowledge only.
Unsigned investigator's reports summarizing statements made by a third party
do not fall within the requirements of the rule.
Additionally, Rule 3:22-5 bars consideration of issues previously
addressed. Clearly, Abdul-Malik's allegedly exculpatory statements regarding
defendant's involvement have been previously addressed and disposed of. His
claims here are nothing more than a reiteration of a bald assertion which lacked
merit. See discussions in State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013); State v.
Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).
No mention whatsoever was made either in the PCR moving papers, the
PCR petition submissions, or by counsel, regarding any claim that the
eyewitness's husband's description of the assailant differed from defendant's
appearance. Nothing in the record other than defense counsel's uncorroborated
claim at trial even gives rise to speculation regarding this point. It is nothing
more than an unsupported bald assertion. See Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at
170.
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Affirmed.
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