U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOICATION, ETC. VS. ARTHUR ROSENBERG (F-042671-13, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4936-16T3
    U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
    as Trustee, Successor in Interest
    to Wachovia Bank, National
    Association, as Trustee for Wells
    Fargo Asset Securities Corporation,
    Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
    Series 2005-AR14,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    ARTHUR ROSENBERG and ILENE
    ROSENBERG,
    Defendants-Appellants,
    and
    WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL
    ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for Certificate
    Holders of Saco I Inc., Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2005-2,
    Defendant.
    ————————————————————
    Submitted September 26, 2018 – Decided October 3, 2018
    Before Judges Alvarez and Mawla.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket No. F-
    042671-13.
    Arthur M. Rosenberg, appellant pro se.
    Reed Smith, LLP, attorneys for respondent (Henry F.
    Reichner and Laura K. Conroy, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendants Arthur and Ilene Rosenberg appeal from an order granting
    plaintiff summary judgment and striking defendants' pleadings. Defendants also
    appeal from a final judgment of foreclosure. We affirm.
    The following facts are taken from the record.       In 2005, defendants
    obtained a $580,000 loan from Wells Fargo Bank, NA and executed a note
    secured by their home in Livingston. The mortgage was thereafter recorded, the
    note was then delivered and formally assigned to plaintiff. Defendants ceased
    paying the mortgage in April 2011. Plaintiff filed a foreclosure complaint in
    November 2013, but the complaint was dismissed without prejudice in May
    2014, because plaintiff had not complied with discovery. Plaintiff's counsel had
    filed for bankruptcy, forcing plaintiff to seek new counsel who filed a motion to
    reinstate the complaint in May 2016. Plaintiff's motion was granted.
    A-4936-16T3
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    Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to include a new junior lien holder
    for a subordinate mortgage. The junior lien holder was served with the amended
    complaint.
    Plaintiff then filed a motion for summary judgment and defendants cross -
    moved to compel discovery.        Plaintiff's motion was granted, defendants'
    pleadings were stricken, and default was entered on January 26, 2017. The final
    judgment of foreclosure was subsequently entered on June 8, 2017.
    On appeal, defendants assert plaintiff lacked standing because it failed to
    prove possession of the note. Defendants argue plaintiff did not prove it served
    a junior lien holder. Defendants argue the court also erred when it reinstated
    plaintiff's foreclosure complaint and improperly denied defendants' motion to
    compel discovery.
    Our review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Graziano
    v. Grant, 
    326 N.J. Super. 328
    , 338 (App. Div. 1999). "[W]e review the trial
    court's grant of summary judgment . . . under the same standard as the trial
    court." Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,
    
    224 N.J. 189
    , 199 (2016). The court considers all of the evidence submitted "in
    the light most favorable to the non-moving party," and determines if the moving
    party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Brill v. Guardian Life
    A-4936-16T3
    3
    Ins. Co. of Am., 
    142 N.J. 520
    , 540 (1995). The court may not weigh the
    evidence and determine the truth of the matter. 
    Ibid.
     If the evidence presented
    "show[s] that there is no real material issue, then summary judgment should be
    granted." Walker v. Atl. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 
    216 N.J. Super. 255
    , 258
    (App. Div. 1987) (citing Judson v. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co. of Westfield, 
    17 N.J. 67
    , 75 (1954)). "[C]onclusory and self-serving assertions by one of the parties
    are insufficient to overcome [summary judgment]." Puder v. Buechel, 
    183 N.J. 428
    , 440-41 (2005).
    The right to foreclose arises upon proof of execution, recording of a
    mortgage and note, and default on payment of the note. Thorpe v. Floremoore
    Corp., 
    20 N.J. Super. 34
    , 37 (App. Div. 1952). Standing to foreclose derives
    from N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301, which states:
    "Person entitled to enforce" an instrument means the
    holder of the instrument, a nonholder in possession of
    the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or a
    person not in possession of the instrument who is
    entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to 12A:3-
    309 or subsection d. of 12A:3-418. A person may be a
    person entitled to enforce the instrument even though
    the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in
    wrongful possession of the instrument.
    We have stated, standing may be established through "either possession of the
    note or an assignment of the mortgage that predated the original complaint."
    A-4936-16T3
    4
    Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Angeles, 
    428 N.J. Super. 315
    , 318 (App. Div.
    2012).
    The record here demonstrates plaintiff had standing to foreclose. Plaintiff
    offered the certification of Caroline K. Courtney, Vice President of Loan
    Documentation of plaintiff's servicing agent, which proved the mortgage was
    assigned to plaintiff before the complaint for foreclosure was filed. Courtney's
    certification proved plaintiff held the note before the filing date of the complaint.
    Her certification also established the mortgage was recorded before plaintiff
    filed its complaint. For these reasons, we reject defendant's argument plaintiff
    lacked standing.
    Additionally, defendants' claim plaintiff had not served the junior lien
    holder lacks merit. The record bears an affidavit of service upon the junior lien
    holder's agent dated February 13, 2017.
    We also reject defendants' argument the trial court erred when it reinstated
    plaintiff's complaint. Motions to reinstate are viewed "with great liberality."
    Ghandi v. Cespedes, 
    390 N.J. Super. 193
    , 197 (App. Div. 2007). We review
    such determinations for an abuse of discretion. 
    Id. at 196
    .
    Rule 4:64-8 states:
    [W]hen a foreclosure matter has been pending for
    twelve months without any required action having been
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    5
    taken therein, the Clerk of the Superior Court shall
    issue written notice to the parties advising that the
    matter as to any or all defendants will be dismissed
    without prejudice 30 days following the date of the
    notice unless . . . an affidavit or certification has been
    filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court asserting that
    the failure of filing or taking the next required action is
    due to exceptional circumstances. If the plaintiff fails
    to respond as herein prescribed, the court shall enter an
    order of dismissal without prejudice as to any named
    party defendant who has not been served or has not
    answered and shall furnish the plaintiff with a copy
    thereof. Reinstatement of the matter after dismissal
    may be permitted only on motion for good cause shown.
    Here, there was good cause to reinstate plaintiff's complaint. Indeed, the
    delay in prosecuting the foreclosure was occasioned by the bankruptcy of
    plaintiff's counsel, which required new counsel to be retained and learn the case
    before seeking re-instatement. Plaintiff was not the cause for the dismissal of
    its complaint. The trial court did not abuse its discretion to reinstate plaintiff' s
    complaint.
    Finally, we reject defendants' argument they were deprived of discovery.
    As a general proposition, "summary judgment is inappropriate prior to the
    completion of discovery." Wellington v. Estate of Wellington, 
    359 N.J. Super. 484
    , 496 (App. Div. 2003). However,
    [a] party challenging a motion for summary judgment
    on grounds that discovery is as yet incomplete must
    show that "there is a likelihood that further discovery
    A-4936-16T3
    6
    would supply . . . necessary information" to establish a
    missing element in the case. The party must show, with
    some specificity, the nature of the discovery sought and
    its materiality to the issues at hand.
    [Mohamed v. Iglesia Evangelica Oasis De Salvacion,
    
    424 N.J. Super. 489
    , 498 (App. Div. 2012) (alteration
    in original) (citations omitted).]
    See also Auster v. Kinoian, 
    153 N.J. Super. 52
    , 56 (App. Div. 1977) (explaining
    a party raising an incomplete discovery defense has "an obligation to
    demonstrate with some degree of particularity the likelihood that further
    discovery will supply the missing elements of the cause of action").
    Here, defendants pled a defense grounded in the alleged lack of service
    on the junior lien holder. However, the discovery defendants sought was broad
    and unrelated to their pleadings. Specifically, they sought discovery relating to
    plaintiff's standing, assignment and possession of the note, the loan origination
    file, the identity of the parties who collected defendants' mortgage payments,
    title insurance documents, and the mortgage interest rate calculation.       Our
    review of the record demonstrates this information was either already contained
    in plaintiff's proofs, or immaterial to whether plaintiff was entitled to a
    foreclosure judgment. The trial court's decision to deny defendants' motion to
    compel discovery was not an abuse of discretion.
    Affirmed.
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