NARSAN LINGALA VS. SAROJA ALKANTIÂ (FM-12-2371-11, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4343-14T1
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
FOR PERMIT TO CARRY A HANDGUN
OF JOHN L. REIDER.
___________________________________
Submitted October 31, 2016 – Decided April 3, 2017
Before Judges Nugent and Haas.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Union County.
Evan F. Nappen, attorney for appellant John
L. Reider (Louis P. Nappen, on the briefs).
Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent State of New Jersey
(Milton S. Leibowitz, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
A month after the Rahway Police Chief granted petitioner John
L. Reider's application to renew his permit to carry a handgun, a
Law Division judge denied the application. Petitioner appealed
from the judge's April 20, 2015 memorializing order. We affirm.
We derive the following procedural history and facts from the
record on appeal. In March 2015, petitioner filed his renewal
application for a permit to carry a handgun. On his application,
he listed his occupation as a "Security Guard/Private
Investigator" with Armor Security, Inc., in Elizabeth. Petitioner
attached three endorsements to his application attesting to his
good moral character and behavior, and his ability to exercise
self-control. He also attached his employer's letter stating, in
part:
Mr. Reider will be responsible for the safety
and welfare of employees and customers, he
acts as a deterrent, and protects property and
reduces losses. Armor Security[,] Inc. is
under contract to respond to burglary alarms,
and also Mr. Reider will also be involved in
surveillances, stakeouts, undercover
assignments, fugitive recovery, criminal
investigations, high value payroll
protection, high value truck escorts, alarm
responses and building searches which require
apprehending intruders and holding them for
local police arrests. In addition, Mr. Reider
will frequently be assigned to armed accounts
and to hold shifts for armed officers on
vacation or sick leave.
. . . .
The execution of the aforementioned duties
subjects Mr. Reider to a substantial threat
to serious bodily harm. It is imperative that
Mr. Reider be permitted to carry a handgun
since he will be thrust into situations where
the presence of a handgun will reduce the
threat of unjustifiable harm to both Mr.
Reider and those individuals on whose behalf
he is assigned to perform investigations or
protect.
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Petitioner's application included a second letter from the
Managing Member of GDNJ, LLC, who stated petitioner would also be
employed by that company as an armed security officer. The letter
continued:
His duties will include but not be limited to:
(Uniformed or client requirements) of: armed
cash courier, armed payroll escort, armed bank
guard, special protection services of
individuals, transportation of valuables,
etc. recovery services, investigations etc.
The employee will carry the firearm only while
on duty or on assignment for the company and
to and from his home.
An example of an assignment would be the
protection of individuals who repair ATM
machine[s] throughout the State. . . . The
technician will proceed to fix the machine;
this may require the technician to open the
safe to fix the ATM. This exposes currency
in the hundreds of thousands. . . . One
technician can have one to ten calls a night
in their designated county. A security guard
is needed to protect the technician from being
hurt and or robbed.
After evaluating the submissions, Judge Stuart Peim denied
petitioner's application. In a written statement of reasons
appended to the denial order, the judge first noted the application
listed only Armor Security, Inc., as petitioner's employer. For
that reason, the judge did not consider the GDNJ letter. After
reviewing petitioner's application and relevant case law, the
judge concluded:
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In the instant case, the applicant has not
shown specific threats against his person.
Employer's letter of need asserts that "It is
imperative that Mr. Reider be permitted to
carry a handgun since he will be thrust into
situations where the presence of a handgun
will reduce the threat of unjustifiable harm
to both Mr. Reider and those individuals on
whose behalf he is assigned to perform
investigations or protect." However, the
Employer's letter does not outline specific
occasions when this employee, its clients or
others have been subject to such danger.
These bare statements do not provide
information necessary to meet the required
criteria set forth in our case law. Applicant
has not shown any danger to the applicant or
to others associated with this employment or
locations with the required specificity.
Although applicant submitted a letter of need
from GDNJ Protective Services LLC, an armored
security agency involved with the protection
of ATM machine technicians, this employer is
not included in the application for renewal
of permit to carry a handgun . . .
Accordingly, the stringent requirements of our
law have not been satisfied and as such this
application is DENIED.
We affirm, substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge
Peim. New Jersey's handgun licensing provisions are contained in
N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4. The statute provides in pertinent part:
If the application has been approved by the
chief police officer or the superintendent,
as the case may be, the applicant shall
forthwith present it to the Superior Court of
the county in which the applicant resides, or
to the Superior Court in any county where he
intends to carry a handgun, in the case of a
nonresident or employee of an armored car
company. The court shall issue the permit to
the applicant if, but only if, it is satisfied
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that the applicant is a person of good
character who is not subject to any of the
disabilities set forth in [N.J.S.A.] 2C:58-
3c., that he is thoroughly familiar with the
safe handling and use of handguns, and that
he has a justifiable need to carry a handgun.
The court may at its discretion issue a
limited-type permit which would restrict the
applicant as to the types of handguns he may
carry and where and for what purposes such
handguns may be carried.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(d).]
"[E]mployees of a private-security agency have [no] preferred
right by virtue of their status to obtain a permit to carry a
gun." In re Preis, 118 N.J. 564, 566 (1990). The statute makes
an exception only for employees of armored-car companies. See
N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4.1. Thus, petitioner was required to comply with
N.J.A.C. 13:54-2.4, which provides:
(d) Each application form shall also be
accompanied by a written certification of
justifiable need to carry a handgun, which
shall be under oath and which:
. . . .
2. In the case of employees of private
detective agencies, armored car companies and
private security companies, that:
i. In the course of performing
statutorily authorized duties, the applicant
is subject to a substantial threat of serious
bodily harm; and
ii. That carrying a handgun by the
applicant is necessary to reduce the threat
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of unjustifiable serious bodily harm to any
person.
We agree with Judge Peim that conclusory assertions parroting
statutory language are insufficient to satisfy the statutory
requirements for obtaining a permit to carry a handgun.
Petitioner's contention that the statute as applied to him
violates the separation of powers doctrine is unavailing. As our
Supreme Court has explained:
So concerned is the Legislature about this
licensing process that it allows only a
Superior Court judge to issue a permit, after
applicants first obtain approval from their
local chief of police. In this (as perhaps
in the case of election laws) the Legislature
has reposed what is essentially an executive
function in the judicial branch. We have
acceded to that legislative delegation because
"[t]he New Jersey Legislature has long been
aware of the dangers inherent in the carrying
of handguns and the urgent necessity of their
regulation," although we "might well have
declined the designation" because the
"functions . . . were clearly non-judicial in
nature." Siccardi v. State, 59 N.J. 545, 553
(1971).
[Preis, supra, 118 N.J. at 569.]
Petitioner also asserts he was denied due process. He argues
he should have been afforded a hearing and that the judge should
have considered the Police Chief's reasons for granting the permit.
Petitioner does not discuss, however, under what circumstances
process is due. The licensing statute provides that "[i]f the
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superintendent or chief police officer approves an application and
the Superior Court denies the application and refuses to issue a
permit, the applicant may appeal such denial in accordance with
law and the rules governing the courts of this State." N.J.S.A.
2C:58-4(e). Petitioner has cited no authority to support his
argument that a hearing is required in matters involving
perfunctory licensing applications. Significantly, he was
afforded the opportunity to provide with his application the
information necessary to satisfy the statutory criteria.
We have considered petitioner's remaining arguments and found
them to be without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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