ERICA FLOWERS VS. CROSSED KEY INN (L-0446-17, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0066-19
    ERICA FLOWERS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    CROSSED KEY INN, CROSSED
    KEY ESTATE, JOHN
    RODRIGUEZ, and JUSTIN
    MEZZINO,
    Defendants/Third-Party
    Plaintiffs-Respondents,
    v.
    SARAH BEAGLE,
    Third-Party Defendant.
    ______________________________
    Argued October 1, 2020 – Decided August 31, 2021
    Before Judges Fuentes, Whipple, and Firko.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Sussex County, Docket No. L-0446-17.
    David L. Wikstrom argued the cause for appellant
    (Javerbaum Wurgaft Hicks Kahn Wikstrom & Sinins,
    PC, attorneys; David L. Wikstrom, of counsel and on
    the briefs).
    Robert F. Ball argued the cause for respondents (Weber
    Gallagher Simpson Stapleton Fires & Newby,
    attorneys; Robert F. Ball, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    This civil action originated from an automobile accident. Plaintiff Erica
    Flowers was seriously injured on July 31, 2016, when a car driven by third-party
    defendant Sarah Beagle collided with a car that was lawfully stopped on the side
    of the road to assist a disabled motorist. The police officers who responded to
    the scene of the accident noticed that Beagle appeared to be under the influence
    of alcohol. The police officers obtained a sample of Beagle's blood for analysis
    by medical professionals.     The analysis revealed Beagle had an alcohol
    concentration (BAC) level of .16% or .17% at the time of the accident. Pursuant
    to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a), a person who drives a motor vehicle with a BAC level
    of .08% or higher is deemed to be under the influence of an intoxicating liquor
    as a matter of law.
    On September 13, 2017, plaintiff filed this civil action seeking
    compensatory damages and named as defendants the Crossed Key Inn, Crossed
    Key Estate, John Rodriguez and Justin Mezzino, and other fictitiously named
    A-0066-19
    2
    persons and entities. Plaintiff's theory of liability against defendants is based
    on negligent hiring and/or supervision of Beagle, who was employed by
    defendants as a bartender at the time of the accident. According to plaintiff,
    defendants are liable because Beagle drank alcohol to the point of intoxication
    at defendants' premises after her workday was over and in the presence of
    management.
    Defendants Crossed Key, Rodriguez and Mezzino filed their answer
    which included a third-party complaint against Beagle.      After joinder of issue,
    the parties conducted discovery until the end of the discovery period on Ap ril
    30, 2019.    Defendants moved for summary judgment on June 28, 2019,
    supported by a "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" as required by Rule
    4:46-2(a). Plaintiff responded with her own Statement of Undisputed Material
    Facts and a brief.
    Judge David J. Weaver heard oral argument on the motion on August 2,
    2019. The parties agree that the pertinent facts related to this cause of action
    are not disputed and the issue of liability is thus ripe for disposition as a matter
    of law. R. 4:46-2(c). We review a purely legal issue de novo. Manalapan
    Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995). As framed
    by the parties, this court must determine whether defendants can be held liable
    A-0066-19
    3
    to plaintiff based on the common law tort of negligent hiring and/or supervision.
    Stated differently, is plaintiff's cause of action precluded under the New Jersey
    Licensed Alcoholic Beverage Server Fair Liability Act, (Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-
    1 to -7.
    Judge Weaver reviewed the case law that has addressed this issue in a
    variety of factual settings and concluded that plaintiff's common law cause of
    action is explicitly precluded by the Legislature under the Act, based on the
    following unequivocal language:
    This act shall be the exclusive civil remedy for personal
    injury or property damage resulting from the negligent
    service of alcoholic beverages by a licensed alcoholic
    beverage server. Nothing contained herein shall be
    deemed to limit the criminal, quasi-criminal, or
    regulatory penalties which may be imposed upon a
    licensed alcoholic beverage server by any other statute,
    rule or regulation.
    [N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-4.]
    The Supreme Court has made clear that the Legislature "did not want our
    courts adding civil remedies, through either the common law or creative
    statutory construction, not found in the Act itself." Mazzacano v. Estate of
    Kinnerman, 
    197 N.J. 307
    , 322 (2009).        Thus, the exclusivity provision in
    N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-4 bars plaintiff's cause of action which arises out of the
    A-0066-19
    4
    common law tort of negligent hiring and/or supervision. Verni ex rel. Burstein
    v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 
    387 N.J. Super. 160
    , 187 (App. Div. 2007).
    We discern no legal basis to disagree with any part of Judge Weaver's
    comprehensive, well-reasoned legal analysis as expressed in his memorandum
    of opinion attached to his August 21, 2019 order granting defendants' motion
    for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's cause of action as a matter of
    law.
    Affirmed.
    A-0066-19
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-0066-19

Filed Date: 8/31/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/31/2021